大般涅槃經疏 28.7

28.7

From "World-Honoured One, as for icchantikas" onwards is the second [section], the characteristics of severing goodness, which consists of three parts: first, directly explaining the severing of goodness; second, explaining that goodness is severed because the faculties and nature are indeterminate; and third, explaining that goodness is severed because the taught doctrine is indeterminate. The first has five rounds of questions and answers. In the first round, there is first a question; then, in the Buddha's reply, because they sever the roots of goodness, there is therefore no goodness. According to the explanation of the masters of the Abhidharma, an icchantika gives rise to evil and wrong [views] that unimpededly sever these roots of goodness, just as the uncontaminated path of unimpeded progress severs afflictions. If so, one should know that goodness would ultimately never arise again; how then could roots of goodness be restored and reborn? This interpretation is incorrect. Within the body of an icchantika there are grave, evil hindrances, and goodness cannot arise alongside them; this is termed the hindered goodness being unable to arise. Later, as evil gradually fades away, goodness can arise again; hence it is said that the roots of goodness are restored and reborn. Question: Does an icchantika have goodness to sever, or no goodness to sever? Answer: Both meanings are present. If one previously performed goodness and later encountered evil companions and severed and destroyed this goodness, this is termed having goodness to sever. As for having no goodness to sever, when performing evil earlier there was no goodness whatsoever, yet as evil karma was about to be extinguished and good karma should have arisen, an obstruction arose again so that goodness could not arise; this is termed having no goodness to sever. The text states that all sentient beings possess the five faculties of faith and so forth, whereas an icchantika completely severs them; traditional explanations say: sentient beings within the principle possess the five faculties of faith and so forth, whereas those outside the principle are inverted and false, hence lacking the five faculties of faith and so forth. This interpretation is incorrect; even those outside the principle possess faith and so forth. Since an icchantika is outside the principle, by giving rise to evil they sever these five faculties. However, since sentient beings who perform evil possess buddhadhātu, the five faculties ought to arise; yet in actual fact they do not yet exist, and it is said conceptually that they ought to exist; hence it says that all sentient beings possess them. The text states that killing an icchantika is without sin, while killing a mosquito or ant incurs sin; this is because the icchantika has grave evil in their person, so killing them is without sin, whereas mosquitoes and ants lack grave evil, so killing them incurs sin. The text states that giving to an animal brings a hundredfold reward, while giving to an icchantika brings a thousandfold reward; this is because an icchantika's human status was elicited by the five precepts in past lives, so giving to them yields heavy merit, whereas an animal's bodily form was elicited by evil karma in previous lives, so giving to them yields light merit. From "World-Honoured One, an icchantika" onwards is the second round of questions and answers. In the question, the thesis is established; the reply can be understood. From "World-Honoured One, all sentient beings" onwards is the third round of questions and answers. In the question, it is explained that since the icchantika does not sever the future, how can it be said that they sever goodness? The Buddha answers that severing is of two kinds: first, extinction in the present; second, obstruction of the future. If evil arises in the present, good dharmas do not arise, hence it is extinction in the present. Having performed evil in the present, it further prevents future goodness from arising, hence severing the future. It also completely severs all three time periods: performing evil in the past without repenting means there is no more goodness; in the future there is also the sense of goodness being reborn, but being weak of itself, it cannot save them. From "World-Honoured One, as for icchantikas" onwards is the fourth round of questions and answers, explaining that buddhadhātu is not severed. Buddhadhātu is good; that this goodness is not severed is termed not severing the nature. Furthermore, buddhadhātu is eternal and indeed cannot be severed. Regarding what is said of the selfhood and buddhadhātu of worldly sentient beings, there are three explanations: The first says that the self of the non-Buddhists is borrowed as an analogy; there is no false self at all, hence it is not subsumed under the three time periods; the true self is eternal and not subsumed under the three time periods. The second says this is not so: it is simply that the selfhood of worldly sentient beings is itself buddhadhātu, and because it is buddhadhātu it is not subsumed under the three time periods. The third says it is precisely the true self, the momentum of the wording implying that buddhadhātu is eternal. The later text says that buddhadhātu belongs to the future, whereas the earlier text says it is not subsumed under the three time periods; these two statements conflict, and now they must be harmonised. What was earlier stated as not being subsumed under the three time periods refers to the essence of buddhadhātu; what is later stated as belonging to the future is in terms of the cultivation of sentient beings. All sentient beings will in the future attain a pure body; hence it is said to belong to the future. From "Kāśyapa said: Buddhadhātu" onwards is the fifth round of questions and answers. First he asks about buddhadhātu; next he asks about the icchantika. The first question: Since buddhadhātu is not subsumed under the three time periods, why is it said to belong to the future? From "If the Tathāgata says" onwards, he next asks about the icchantika: If one says an icchantika completely lacks good dharmas, why do they have minds of love and pity? If they have such a mind, then they possess goodness. From "The Buddha said" onwards is the reply. First he answers the first question, which again has two parts: first answering the question, and next discussing the meaning. In the first answer there are two parts: first praising the question, and next directly answering. The nature does not belong to the three time periods; it is called future in terms of its future attainment, and therefore below an analogy is raised of speaking of the cause as the fruit, and speaking of the fruit as the cause. Buddhadhātu is also like this: saying it is future speaks of the fruit within the cause. Regarding "food and contact": food can be understood; the designations of contact differ: some take consciousness as contact, and some take the sense faculties as contact. Here both meanings are present; hence the treatise says, "Because contact is not fixed, there is no separate dharma." If the mental consciousness is focused on a condition, it is called contact; this contact lies in consciousness. If one speaks of visual consciousness and visual contact, this contact lies in ideation. Now, saying that seeing visible form is called contact means that the conscious mind takes this as contact. Visible form is an external datum capable of producing conscious contact; hence visible form is called contact, which is also speaking of the fruit within the cause.