大般涅槃經疏 29.7

29.7

「迦葉白佛」下，是大段中第二明生善。文為三：初雙明中道生善、二單明中道、三單明生善。初有五番問答，亦可為三：初一番明生善時節、次一番明不斷佛性、三三番因性生善。初番，問如文。佛答中二：先明時節、次明生善。初文者，利人初入，鈍者後出。道理應有中根之人在中生善，在獄受苦無暇能生，是故不說。「善有三種」下，更對生善而論斷善。但斷現善，不斷過未，由有此善令善得生。又三：先唱三世、次釋、三結。釋中二：過去之善，善已隱伏，不可得斷。因雖滅盡果未熟者，未來未起，復不可斷。三「是故不名」下，雙結，又二：初明過未世不可斷、次明現善可斷。初文者，過未二世皆不可斷。過去即結過去不斷，又言果字即結未來不斷。次「斷三世」下，正明斷三世因者，正斷現在善因，現善因滅即無當善，當善不起義說為斷。既無現未，過去亦息，義說為斷，即是具斷三世之善。習因既盡，亦不能牽三世習果。第二番問答，明佛性不斷。問為二：初問佛性是三世不？次問佛性是可斷不。初先領旨、次定宗、後結難。於定宗中有四問，即是通別三世結難，但難別三世義。初難云：若過去者，佛性若常即非過去，云何乃言過去斷耶？若未來者，即有兩難：一難令非未來、二難令在未來。佛性既常，常非未來。若非未來者，未來皆當得三菩提，豈非未來？現在亦兩難：初難令非現在，以其常故。二難令是現在。何者？性既可見，寧非現在？「如來亦說」下，第二問可斷不可斷，又二：先舉六事、次方正問。初之六事為問緣起六義，二解：一云是了因；二謂正因。望下法性，即是九地佛性，故其數相應。「若斷善根」下，第二正問中三問：初問闡提若有佛性，不應斷善。此從六事中第四佛性是生善。「若無佛性」下，第二問，若斷佛性，云何說言一切悉有？此從六中第六可見生。既一切可見，云何斷耶？「若言佛性」下，第三問，懸取答意難。若謂往時等有，後自被斷者，則亦有亦斷，云何言常？此從六中第一常生。佛答為二：初唱四章門、次解釋。釋中先解三門，仍重釋分別；後方釋置。釋前三答即為三。文就重釋分別，答正用遣問，所以重釋，前答後問、後答前問。初答後問有四：一從「如來十力」下舉佛性七事、次舉後身六事。若七若六，皆是答之緣由。「如汝先問」下，三正牒問。其問有三，今牒初問。「亦有如來」下正答，初明雖有而無、後明雖無而有，即通答前三。「如來佛性非過去」下，第二追答前三世問。前問佛性是常則非三世，佛今答之，先分別如來九八五住等佛性不同。然斷善人悉皆有此七種六種等性，未來當得，故不得言非三世法；當相即非三世所攝，而未來得復云未來。文為五：一如來及後身佛性、二九住佛性、三八住至六住佛性、四五住至初住佛性、五結其所問。初又四：一如來性則非三世；二後身性則有三世，現在少見，未來全見；三重明如來因是三世、果有是非，若善五陰猶是三世，若菩提果則非三世；四重明後身皆是三世可見。「九住」下，第二九住六事，但言可見，與前為異。「八住」下，第三明八住至六住，但有五事不與常名。「五住」下，第四明五住至初住，但有五事言善不善，異前後身六事。言少見者，其位既高能得少見，隨分見性故言少見。九地至初地，其位既下未能見性，當應得見故言可見。五地至初地言善不善者，善有修不修義，修得是善、不修不善。並云亦應真不真，解云：真實是佛性體，不有而已有。即真實只為此真，所以有於善不善異。舊解：六地般若現前，有時失念，失念不善、不失是善。問：後身與九地同有六事，六事之中同有常之一事。八地至初地同有五事，何故無常一事？人解云：後身位高、九地位下、故長有常。仍未遣難、故更並五地至初地位下，同有無常一事，後身望佛亦應無常。有人答云：佛隨自意語，不可彊分別。難亦未去。問：後身有常淨，何意無我樂？答菩薩常具二慧，化物故言常，境智俱明故言淨。真是對偽，實是待虛。無惡名善。分見故少。無八自在，是故無我。有報身在，是故無樂。今謂此解非圓，後當別釋。「是五種六種」下，五結詶前問。「若有說言」下，釋置答，先正釋、後明問答。置答有二：置而不答，是置答。反質答之，亦是置答。私云：以置為答，名為置答。

From "Kāśyapa addressed the Buddha" onward is the second [section] within the main section, explaining the production of good. The text has three parts: first, both the middle way and the production of good are explained together; second, the middle way alone is explained; third, the production of good alone is explained. In the first part, there are five rounds of questions and answers, which may also be divided into three: the first round explains the timing of producing good; the next round explains that the buddhadhātu is not severed; the third three rounds explain producing good on the basis of nature. In the first round, the question is as in the text. In the Buddha's answer there are two parts: first he explains the timing; next he explains the production of good. As for the first text, those of sharp faculties enter first, and those of dull faculties emerge later. By principle there should be persons of medium capacity who produce good while in the midst [of it], but while undergoing suffering in hell there is no respite in which they can produce it; therefore, it is not mentioned. From "Good is of three kinds" onward, severing good is discussed further in contrast to producing good. One severs only present good and does not sever past or future good; because of the existence of this good, it allows good to be produced. This also has three parts: first, stating the three times; next, explaining them; third, concluding. In the explanation there are two parts: regarding past good, the good has already become latent and cannot be severed. When causes have been extinguished but their fruits have not yet matured, the future has not yet arisen, so again it cannot be severed. Third, from "Therefore it is not named" onward, both are concluded together, again having two parts: first, explaining that the past and future times cannot be severed; next, explaining that present good can be severed. In the first text, both the past and future times cannot be severed. "Past" concludes that the past is not severed, and saying the word "fruit" concludes that the future is not severed. Next, from "severing the causes of the three times" onward, directly explaining the severing of the causes of the three times refers to directly severing present good causes; when present good causes are extinguished, there will be no future good, and because future good does not arise, it is conceptually spoken of as severed. Since there are no present or future ones, the past is also ceased, and is conceptually spoken of as severed; that is to say, one completely severs the good of the three times. Once habituated causes are exhausted, they also cannot lead to habituated fruits of the three times. In the second round of question and answer, it explains that the buddhadhātu is not severed. The question has two parts: first, asking whether the buddhadhātu belongs to the three times or not; next, asking whether the buddhadhātu can be severed or not. The first part begins by grasping the meaning, next determines the thesis, and finally concludes with objections. In determining the thesis there are four questions, which are objections concluding on the general and specific three times, yet they only challenge the sense of the specific three times. The first objection says: If it were past, since the buddhadhātu is eternal it is not past; how then can one say it is severed in the past? If it were future, there are two objections: one challenges it not to be future, and the second challenges it to be in the future. Since the buddhadhātu is eternal, what is eternal is not future. If it is not future, yet in the future all will attain sambodhi, how could it not be future? Present also has two objections: the first objection challenges it not to be present, because it is eternal. The second challenges it to be present. Why? Since the nature can be seen, how could it not be present? From "The Tathāgata has also said" onward is the second question, asking whether it can be severed or not, which also has two parts: first raising six matters, and then directly asking the formal question. The initial six matters are the six senses of the arising of causes for the question. There are two explanations: one says they are the revealing cause (vyañjaka-hetu); the second considers them the direct cause (pradhāna-hetu). Looking forward to the dharmatā below, these are the buddhadhātu of the nine stages; hence their numbers correspond. From "If the root of goodness is severed" onward, there are three questions in the second, formal inquiry: First, asking that if an icchantika possesses the buddhadhātu, he should not sever the good. This arises from the fourth among the six matters: that the buddhadhātu produces good. From "If there were no buddhadhātu" onward is the second question: If the buddhadhātu were severed, how could it be said that all completely possess it? This arises from the sixth among the six: that it can be seen. Since all can see it, how could it be severed? From "If one says that the buddhadhātu" onward is the third question, anticipating the intended answer to formulate an objection. If one claims that in former times all equally had it, and later it was naturally severed, then it would both exist and be severed; how could it be called eternal? This arises from the first among the six: being eternal. The Buddha's answer has two parts: first stating the four chapter headings, and next explaining them. In the explanation, he first explains three headings, still re-explaining and distinguishing them; only afterwards does he explain the [point of] setting aside (sthāpanīya). Explaining the first three answers thus has three parts. The text proceeds to re-explain and distinguish them, the answers being properly used to dispel the questions. The reason he re-explains them is that the earlier answers address the later questions, and the later answers address the earlier questions. The first answering of the later questions has four parts: 1. From "The Tathāgata's ten powers" onward, raising the seven items of the buddhadhātu; next, raising the six items of the final body (caramabhavika). Whether seven or six, all are the reasons for the answer. 2. From "As you previously asked" onward, directly citing the question. The questions were three, and here he cites the first question. 3. From "There is also the Tathāgata" onward, directly answering; first explaining that although existing it is non-existent, and next explaining that although non-existent it is existent, thus broadly answering the preceding three. 4. From "The Tathāgata's buddhadhātu is not past" onward, retrospectively answering the earlier question on the three times. The previous question asked: If the buddhadhātu is eternal, then it is not of the three times. Now the Buddha answers it, first distinguishing the differences in the buddhadhātu of the Tathāgata, the ninth, eighth, fifth abiding stages, and so forth. However, those who sever good all possess these sevenfold and sixfold natures, and they will attain them in the future; therefore, one cannot say it is a dharma not of the three times. In its own aspect it is not subsumed under the three times, yet because it is attained in the future, it is again said to be future. The text has five parts: 1. The buddhadhātu of the Tathāgata and the final body; 2. The buddhadhātu of the ninth abiding stage; 3. The buddhadhātu from the eighth abiding stage to the sixth abiding stage; 4. The buddhadhātu from the fifth abiding stage to the first abiding stage; 5. Concluding what was asked. The first also has four parts: first, the Tathāgata's nature is not of the three times; second, the nature of the final body has the three times, being seen a little in the present and seen completely in the future; third, reiterating that the Tathāgata's cause belongs to the three times while the fruit has yes and no: if the wholesome five aggregates, they still belong to the three times, but if the fruit of bodhi, it is not of the three times; fourth, reiterating that the final body belongs entirely to the three times and can be seen. From "The ninth abiding stage" onward, the second part treats the six items of the ninth abiding stage; it only says "can be seen," which differs from the previous. From "The eighth abiding stage" onward, the third part explains that from the eighth abiding stage to the sixth abiding stage, there are only five items, not being given the designation "eternal." From "The fifth abiding stage" onward, the fourth part explains that from the fifth abiding stage to the first abiding stage, there are only five items, saying "wholesome and unwholesome," which differs from the six items of the preceding final body. As for saying "seen a little": since that stage is high, one can see a little; because one sees the nature according to one's measure, it is said to be "seen a little." From the ninth bhūmi to the first bhūmi, since those stages are lower, they are not yet able to see the nature, but in the future they will certainly come to see it; hence it says "can be seen." As for the fifth bhūmi to the first bhūmi saying "wholesome and unwholesome": wholesome has the sense of cultivated and uncultivated; what is attained through cultivation is wholesome, and what is uncultivated is unwholesome. It also says they should be true and untrue. The explanation says: The real is the essence of the buddhadhātu; it was not non-existent, but already exists. Being real is solely on account of this truth; therefore, there is the difference between wholesome and unwholesome. An older explanation says: On the sixth bhūmi prajñā is manifest before one, but at times there is lapse of mindfulness; when there is lapse of mindfulness it is unwholesome, and without lapse it is wholesome. Question: Both the final body and the ninth bhūmi equally have six items, and among the six items both equally have the item of "eternal." From the eighth bhūmi to the first bhūmi there are equally five items; why is there not the single item of "eternal"? Someone explains: The final body is high in stage, while the ninth bhūmi is lower in stage, so it specially has "eternal." This still does not resolve the objection; hence, comparing it further with the lower stages from the fifth bhūmi to the first bhūmi which equally have the single item of "impermanent," the final body when viewed against the Buddha should also be impermanent. Someone answers: The Buddha speaks according to his own intention (svābhiprāya); one cannot force distinctions. The objection still has not been removed. Question: The final body has eternal and pure; why does it lack self and bliss? Answer: A bodhisattva constantly possesses the two wisdoms; because he transforms beings it is called eternal, and because both realm and wisdom are radiant it is called pure. True contrasts with false; real depends on empty. Lacking evil is named good. Because it is partially seen, it is little. Lacking the eight sovereign masteries, therefore it lacks self. Because the retribution body remains, therefore it lacks bliss. Now I say this explanation is not perfect; it will be specially explained later. From "These five kinds and six kinds" onward is the fifth part, concluding the response to the previous question. From "If someone says" onward explains the sthāpanīya answer; first explaining it directly, and next clarifying the question and answer. Sthāpanīya answers are of two kinds: setting it aside without answering is a sthāpanīya answer. Answering by counter-questioning is also a sthāpanīya answer. I personally comment: Taking setting aside as the answer is named a sthāpanīya answer.