大般涅槃經疏 29.7

29.7

From "Kāśyapa addressed the Buddha" onward is the second [section] within the main section, explaining the production of good. The text has three parts: first, both the middle way and the production of good are explained together; second, the middle way alone is explained; third, the production of good alone is explained. In the first part, there are five rounds of questions and answers, which may also be divided into three: the first round explains the timing of producing good; the next round explains that the buddhadhātu is not severed; the third three rounds explain producing good on the basis of nature. In the first round, the question is as in the text. In the Buddha's answer there are two parts: first he explains the timing; next he explains the production of good. As for the first text, those of sharp faculties enter first, and those of dull faculties emerge later. By principle there should be persons of medium capacity who produce good while in the midst [of it], but while undergoing suffering in hell there is no respite in which they can produce it; therefore, it is not mentioned. From "Good is of three kinds" onward, severing good is discussed further in contrast to producing good. One severs only present good and does not sever past or future good; because of the existence of this good, it allows good to be produced. This also has three parts: first, stating the three times; next, explaining them; third, concluding. In the explanation there are two parts: regarding past good, the good has already become latent and cannot be severed. When causes have been extinguished but their fruits have not yet matured, the future has not yet arisen, so again it cannot be severed. Third, from "Therefore it is not named" onward, both are concluded together, again having two parts: first, explaining that the past and future times cannot be severed; next, explaining that present good can be severed. In the first text, both the past and future times cannot be severed. "Past" concludes that the past is not severed, and saying the word "fruit" concludes that the future is not severed. Next, from "severing the causes of the three times" onward, directly explaining the severing of the causes of the three times refers to directly severing present good causes; when present good causes are extinguished, there will be no future good, and because future good does not arise, it is conceptually spoken of as severed. Since there are no present or future ones, the past is also ceased, and is conceptually spoken of as severed; that is to say, one completely severs the good of the three times. Once habituated causes are exhausted, they also cannot lead to habituated fruits of the three times. In the second round of question and answer, it explains that the buddhadhātu is not severed. The question has two parts: first, asking whether the buddhadhātu belongs to the three times or not; next, asking whether the buddhadhātu can be severed or not. The first part begins by grasping the meaning, next determines the thesis, and finally concludes with objections. In determining the thesis there are four questions, which are objections concluding on the general and specific three times, yet they only challenge the sense of the specific three times. The first objection says: If it were past, since the buddhadhātu is eternal it is not past; how then can one say it is severed in the past? If it were future, there are two objections: one challenges it not to be future, and the second challenges it to be in the future. Since the buddhadhātu is eternal, what is eternal is not future. If it is not future, yet in the future all will attain sambodhi, how could it not be future? Present also has two objections: the first objection challenges it not to be present, because it is eternal. The second challenges it to be present. Why? Since the nature can be seen, how could it not be present? From "The Tathāgata has also said" onward is the second question, asking whether it can be severed or not, which also has two parts: first raising six matters, and then directly asking the formal question. The initial six matters are the six senses of the arising of causes for the question. There are two explanations: one says they are the revealing cause (vyañjaka-hetu); the second considers them the direct cause (pradhāna-hetu). Looking forward to the dharmatā below, these are the buddhadhātu of the nine stages; hence their numbers correspond. From "If the root of goodness is severed" onward, there are three questions in the second, formal inquiry: First, asking that if an icchantika possesses the buddhadhātu, he should not sever the good. This arises from the fourth among the six matters: that the buddhadhātu produces good. From "If there were no buddhadhātu" onward is the second question: If the buddhadhātu were severed, how could it be said that all completely possess it? This arises from the sixth among the six: that it can be seen. Since all can see it, how could it be severed? From "If one says that the buddhadhātu" onward is the third question, anticipating the intended answer to formulate an objection. If one claims that in former times all equally had it, and later it was naturally severed, then it would both exist and be severed; how could it be called eternal? This arises from the first among the six: being eternal. The Buddha's answer has two parts: first stating the four chapter headings, and next explaining them. In the explanation, he first explains three headings, still re-explaining and distinguishing them; only afterwards does he explain the [point of] setting aside (sthāpanīya). Explaining the first three answers thus has three parts. The text proceeds to re-explain and distinguish them, the answers being properly used to dispel the questions. The reason he re-explains them is that the earlier answers address the later questions, and the later answers address the earlier questions. The first answering of the later questions has four parts: 1. From "The Tathāgata's ten powers" onward, raising the seven items of the buddhadhātu; next, raising the six items of the final body (caramabhavika). Whether seven or six, all are the reasons for the answer. 2. From "As you previously asked" onward, directly citing the question. The questions were three, and here he cites the first question. 3. From "There is also the Tathāgata" onward, directly answering; first explaining that although existing it is non-existent, and next explaining that although non-existent it is existent, thus broadly answering the preceding three. 4. From "The Tathāgata's buddhadhātu is not past" onward, retrospectively answering the earlier question on the three times. The previous question asked: If the buddhadhātu is eternal, then it is not of the three times. Now the Buddha answers it, first distinguishing the differences in the buddhadhātu of the Tathāgata, the ninth, eighth, fifth abiding stages, and so forth. However, those who sever good all possess these sevenfold and sixfold natures, and they will attain them in the future; therefore, one cannot say it is a dharma not of the three times. In its own aspect it is not subsumed under the three times, yet because it is attained in the future, it is again said to be future. The text has five parts: 1. The buddhadhātu of the Tathāgata and the final body; 2. The buddhadhātu of the ninth abiding stage; 3. The buddhadhātu from the eighth abiding stage to the sixth abiding stage; 4. The buddhadhātu from the fifth abiding stage to the first abiding stage; 5. Concluding what was asked. The first also has four parts: first, the Tathāgata's nature is not of the three times; second, the nature of the final body has the three times, being seen a little in the present and seen completely in the future; third, reiterating that the Tathāgata's cause belongs to the three times while the fruit has yes and no: if the wholesome five aggregates, they still belong to the three times, but if the fruit of bodhi, it is not of the three times; fourth, reiterating that the final body belongs entirely to the three times and can be seen. From "The ninth abiding stage" onward, the second part treats the six items of the ninth abiding stage; it only says "can be seen," which differs from the previous. From "The eighth abiding stage" onward, the third part explains that from the eighth abiding stage to the sixth abiding stage, there are only five items, not being given the designation "eternal." From "The fifth abiding stage" onward, the fourth part explains that from the fifth abiding stage to the first abiding stage, there are only five items, saying "wholesome and unwholesome," which differs from the six items of the preceding final body. As for saying "seen a little": since that stage is high, one can see a little; because one sees the nature according to one's measure, it is said to be "seen a little." From the ninth bhūmi to the first bhūmi, since those stages are lower, they are not yet able to see the nature, but in the future they will certainly come to see it; hence it says "can be seen." As for the fifth bhūmi to the first bhūmi saying "wholesome and unwholesome": wholesome has the sense of cultivated and uncultivated; what is attained through cultivation is wholesome, and what is uncultivated is unwholesome. It also says they should be true and untrue. The explanation says: The real is the essence of the buddhadhātu; it was not non-existent, but already exists. Being real is solely on account of this truth; therefore, there is the difference between wholesome and unwholesome. An older explanation says: On the sixth bhūmi prajñā is manifest before one, but at times there is lapse of mindfulness; when there is lapse of mindfulness it is unwholesome, and without lapse it is wholesome. Question: Both the final body and the ninth bhūmi equally have six items, and among the six items both equally have the item of "eternal." From the eighth bhūmi to the first bhūmi there are equally five items; why is there not the single item of "eternal"? Someone explains: The final body is high in stage, while the ninth bhūmi is lower in stage, so it specially has "eternal." This still does not resolve the objection; hence, comparing it further with the lower stages from the fifth bhūmi to the first bhūmi which equally have the single item of "impermanent," the final body when viewed against the Buddha should also be impermanent. Someone answers: The Buddha speaks according to his own intention (svābhiprāya); one cannot force distinctions. The objection still has not been removed. Question: The final body has eternal and pure; why does it lack self and bliss? Answer: A bodhisattva constantly possesses the two wisdoms; because he transforms beings it is called eternal, and because both realm and wisdom are radiant it is called pure. True contrasts with false; real depends on empty. Lacking evil is named good. Because it is partially seen, it is little. Lacking the eight sovereign masteries, therefore it lacks self. Because the retribution body remains, therefore it lacks bliss. Now I say this explanation is not perfect; it will be specially explained later. From "These five kinds and six kinds" onward is the fifth part, concluding the response to the previous question. From "If someone says" onward explains the sthāpanīya answer; first explaining it directly, and next clarifying the question and answer. Sthāpanīya answers are of two kinds: setting it aside without answering is a sthāpanīya answer. Answering by counter-questioning is also a sthāpanīya answer. I personally comment: Taking setting aside as the answer is named a sthāpanīya answer.