大般涅槃經疏 31.4

31.4

「迦葉白」下，第二明異虛空義，又兩番問答。此初番問者，正言佛性、涅槃、虛空等並非三世。虛空非三世而名為無，涅槃非三世而名為常。同無三世，何不同有？佛答為三：一章門、二解釋、三結酬。先唱章門，如文。「云何名」下，次釋三門皆有所以。涅槃等三，為利益故相待而說；空無利益故無相待，但得是無不名為常。私謂：言利益者，只為將護末代權機者不宜聞於生死是涅槃、二乘是如來、瓦礫是佛性，忽有機緣不可不說，但依下答，其言有歸。《法華》已說，豈可固違。故經云「世間相常住」，世間之言豈過五陰國土等耶？況陰界入色大小兩乘不唯正報。「一切世間」下，第三結酬。以虛空無待故，所以名無；涅槃有待，故名為常。問：涅槃對非涅槃、虛空亦對非虛空，何故非待？解云：欲互顯故。涅槃本絕而名為待，虛空本待而名為絕。涅槃相待故得是有，明是妙有；虛空絕待故得是無，明是妙無。此即不例，後番迦葉因佛上答即設並云：如來向云涅槃有對是故名有、虛空無對即是無者，四大無對亦應是無。四大無對而是有者，虛空無對亦應是有。此文不易，故一切世間無非四大對。猶名四大有者，一切世間凡所有物，皆是四大即皆是有，無非四大對於四大。雖復作並，佛竟不答，但牒虛空以對涅槃問。何故不答？亦有深意。迦葉本云：四大無對是故名有，虛空亦應無對是有。今明四大雖無外計，非四大來對於四大，而四大中自有相對，如地水等各自相對。而虛空中更無有物自相對者，所以是無。此並虛出，故佛不答。佛答有三：初牒問非之。「何以故」下，二釋，明涅槃有十五句所以有，虛空無十五句故所以無。「若有離於」下，第三正答，有五句，先明虛空若有，應同四大有三世攝。「如世人說」下，第二明虛空若有應同心數，自有三句。「虛空若同」下，第三明若有待者，是三世攝。「若三世攝」下，第四明應是四陰，但同四陰。除色一事，餘名四陰。四陰非見，虛空亦然。陰三世攝，空亦然耶？「是故離四陰」下，第五結非有。此意正明法若是有，可論相待。空既是無，無何所待？

From "Kāśyapa addressed [the Buddha]" onward is the second section, which clarifies the meaning of [nirvāṇa's] difference from space, comprising two rounds of questions and answers. In this first round of questioning, the main point is that buddhadhātu, nirvāṇa, and space alike are not subsumed under the three times. Space is not subsumed under the three times and is designated as non-existent, while nirvāṇa is not subsumed under the three times and is designated as permanent. Since both alike lack the three times, why are they not alike in being existent? The Buddha's answer has three parts: first, stating the topical headings; second, explaining them; third, concluding the reply. First, stating the topical headings, as in the text. From "Why is it called..." onward, next explaining that all three headings have their reasons. The three—nirvāṇa and the like—are spoken of correlatively for the sake of benefit, whereas space provides no benefit and thus has no correlative; it can only be non-existent and is not designated permanent. I privately note: as for the phrase "for the sake of benefit," it is merely to protect those with provisional capacities in the final age who should not hear that saṃsāra is nirvāṇa, that the two vehicles are the Tathāgata, and that rubble is the buddhadhātu. Yet if there happens to be an opportune capacity, it cannot remain unspoken; relying on the answer below, these words have their proper source. The Lotus Sūtra has already stated it; how could one obstinately contravene it? Thus the sūtra says: "The worldly characteristics are permanently abiding." Could the word "worldly" go beyond the five aggregates, realms, and so forth? Furthermore, the aggregates, realms, and entrances, whether matter or mind, in both the Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna, are not limited to sentient beings alone. From "All worldly..." onward is the third part, concluding the reply. Because space has no correlative, it is therefore designated as non-existent; because nirvāṇa has correlatives, it is therefore designated as permanent. Question: Nirvāṇa is correlated with non-nirvāṇa, and space is also correlated with non-space; why is it said to have no correlative? The explanation says: This is because they are meant to illuminate each other. Nirvāṇa is inherently absolute, yet is designated as correlative; space is inherently correlative, yet is designated as absolute. Because nirvāṇa is correlative, it can be [termed] existent, clarifying that it is marvelous existence; because space is free of correlation, it can be [termed] non-existent, clarifying that it is marvelous non-existence. Thus this does not serve as a parallel case. In the subsequent round, Kāśyapa, based on the Buddha's preceding answer, sets forth an equal challenge, saying: If the Tathāgata just said that nirvāṇa has a counterpart and is therefore named existent, while space lacks a counterpart and is thus non-existent, then the four great elements, lacking a counterpart, should also be non-existent. If the four great elements lack a counterpart yet are existent, then space, lacking a counterpart, should also be existent. This text is not easy. Therefore, in all the world there is nothing that is not a counterpart to the four great elements; if one still calls the four great elements existent, then all things whatever that exist in all the world are the four great elements and are thus all existent, with nothing that is not the four great elements standing as counterparts to the four great elements. Although he puts forward this equal challenge, the Buddha ultimately does not answer it directly, but merely takes up space in contrast to nirvāṇa to question him. Why did he not answer? There is also a profound meaning. Kāśyapa originally said: The four great elements lack counterparts and are therefore named existent, so space also ought to lack counterparts and be existent. Now it is clarified that although the four great elements have no external notions—in that non-four elements do not come to serve as counterparts to the four elements—yet within the four elements they naturally have mutual counterparts, as earth and water and so forth are each counterparts to one another. Within space, however, there is no other entity whatsoever that can serve as its mutual counterpart; therefore it is non-existent. Since this challenge was set forth in vain, the Buddha does not answer it. The Buddha's answer has three parts: first, taking up the question to refute it. From "For what reason?" onward is the second, an explanation clarifying that nirvāṇa has fifteen clauses and therefore is existent, while space lacks the fifteen clauses and therefore is non-existent. From "If there were something free from..." onward is the third, the direct answer, which contains five clauses. First, it clarifies that if space were existent, it should be like the four great elements, being subsumed under the three times. From "Just as worldly people say..." onward is the second, clarifying that if space were existent, it should be like mental factors, itself containing three clauses. From "If space were like..." onward is the third, clarifying that if it had correlatives, it would be subsumed under the three times. From "If it were subsumed under the three times..." onward is the fourth, clarifying that it would have to be the four aggregates, merely identical to the four aggregates. Setting aside the single factor of form, the remainder are called the four aggregates. The four aggregates are not visible, and space is also like this. If the aggregates are subsumed under the three times, is space also like this? From "Therefore, free from the four aggregates..." onward is the fifth, concluding that it is not existent. This meaning primarily clarifies that if a phenomenon is existent, correlation can be discussed. Since space is already non-existent, to what could non-existence correlate?