大般涅槃經疏 32.5

32.5

「爾時外道」下，第二破邪，又二：初緣起、次正破。就緣起中二：初謀議、次求佛角力。謀議有五番，可見。「爾時多有」下，次欲求角力。「爾時眾中闍提」下，第二正破十仙，即為十章。此是其一。闍提首那，宗迦毘羅，執因有果因果同時。故《百論》云「迦毘羅弟子，誦僧佉經二十五諦。」今此具出，故知是也。此章為二：一論義、二歸伏。論義為四：一定義宗、二受定、三正難、四通釋。初定宗者，我聞瞿曇涅槃常者，為定爾不？次答如是如是，即是受定。然涅槃何曾定是常、無常、亦常亦無常、非常非無常耶？欲以常破之，故言如是如是。「婆羅門言」下，第三正難，又三：先非佛義、次正難、三取意結。初如文。次正難中有五難，不出兩意：初四難同令無常，後一難非但無常亦無樂淨我。初明修無常想得常涅槃，不應無常因得於常果。舊當此難。彼云涅槃是果，修於習因還生習果。涅槃之果既其是常，復以何等為此常因？乃至我淨亦復如是。彼若答言我之涅槃自是常果，墮自然義（云云）。「瞿曇又說解脫欲貪」下，第二難，明解脫欲貪得於涅槃。所脫欲貪既無常者，能脫涅槃亦是無常。此難最拙。「瞿曇又說從因故生天」下，第三直明從因生故故是無常。涅槃是果，即從因生，不得是常。「瞿曇亦說色從緣生」下，第四開作兩難：若涅槃即陰，陰既無常，涅槃亦爾。若離五陰，與五陰異，猶如虛空，即不可得。云何眾生能得涅槃？「瞿曇亦說從因生」下，第五難，明涅槃既是無常不得是常者，何但無常亦無樂淨我。「若瞿曇說亦常無常」下，第三取意結。難意云：佛見難常既不可通，恐佛移宗向亦常亦無常，即成二語。若二語者，即不名佛。「佛言」下，第四通釋，文為二：初答正難、次答結難。初文又二：初答第一難、次答第三難。所以不答餘三難者，其難涅槃令是無常，故餘從例。不答第二所斷欲貪者，欲貪無常，云何能令斷亦無常？不答第四者，涅槃是常，何論即離？不答第五者，涅槃是常，寧無樂淨？今先答初難。佛先問之令出彼義，其向拒抗不出其義，佛因餘難遂出其義。我性是常，大等諸法何妨無常。若爾，即是能生之因是常，所生之果無常。佛便並通，如汝法中因常果無常者，何妨我法因是無常而果是常（云云）。此二十五諦與《百論》中有同有異，總為三：一者名異體同。論云「從冥生覺，從覺生我心。」此中云「從性生大，從大生慢。」即是名異體同者，冥是八萬劫外冥然不知。此中言性是萬法性，冥伏在於八萬劫外不可得知。論云覺者，即是覺知八萬劫事。此中言大，只是能大，覺知慢我，易見。二者名體俱同，即是五大五塵、五情五業，并心平等。三名體俱異者，論云「神我為主即是一根。」此云「染麁黑者亦是一根。」此即大異，染、麁、黑三，云何為一？解云：三不並起。貪等後前，隨取其一，足二十四。問：此闍提既其宗於迦毘羅義，何故不同？解云？當佛世時，不見三師但見其徒，其徒改本，故說不同，有染等異。如莊嚴云：佛果無有續、待、因成三假。後招提琰是彼學士，即改云佛果無因成，不妨有續待。開善云：二諦同體。後龍光是其學士，即改二諦各各有體（云云）。五業中云男女二根，論以大小便為二根，各有所據。論就一體，經就二人（云云）。但此性諦，或謂即是神我，或謂是冥初，皆有其義。冥初據二十五諦之初，以是冥諦。又言是常，乃是神我，未測何異。於中云從慢生十六法者，此未即生一十六法，無有染黑麁三一時而起，隨從其一生，此不定故，先不說言。十六法者，即是五大、五知根、五業根、心平等根。列五根名，乃云觸者謂身為觸。問：平等根者，論家所明意識以託五根起者為五知根，心既遍緣故名平等。文言是二十五法皆性生者，其實性生二十四法，能所合數故二十五。準彼義者，性即是常，所生無常，佛以彼義而並通，云何妨我義因是無常而果是常。從「汝等法中有二因不」下，第二答彼第三難，亦先一一覈出彼義。文言了因所了即同了不者，謂了因所了之果，必與了同不。如燈是了因，了出缾盆之果。此之了因與缾盆等了果同不？彼云不同。何故爾？如燈名了因，因人息之火滅，豈令缾滅？涅槃亦爾。雖從了出涅槃果常，汝不得云從因生果即是無常。若答汝義既有二因，了因所了之果不同能了之因，我亦如是，此之涅槃從了因有，了因無常涅槃果常。「是故如來所說有二」下，第二破其取意結難。明佛無二言，隨根說法，有時說有、有時說無，意欲令解中道正法，寧是二語？後文更取眼色生識釋所說意。佛之二語為了一語者，謂眼色雖二而同生識，識是一故，故言一語。

From the passage beginning "At that time the non-Buddhists" below, the second [part] is the refutation of heterodox views, which also has two [subsections]: first, the circumstances of origin, and next, the refutation proper. Within the circumstances of origin there are two: first, plotting and deliberating, and next, seeking to contend in debate with the Buddha. The deliberations take five rounds, which can be seen [in the text]. From the passage beginning "At that time there were many" below, next is the desire to seek a contest of power. From the passage beginning "At that time in the assembly, Jāti..." below, the second is the refutation proper of the ten ṛṣis, which constitutes ten sections. This is one of them. Jātiśoṇa took Kapila as his patriarch and held that the effect pre-exists in the cause and that cause and effect are simultaneous. Thus the *Śataśāstra* says, "The disciples of Kapila recite the twenty-five principles of the *Sāṃkhya-sūtra*." Since here they are set forth in full, one knows this is so. This section has two [parts]: first, the debate, and second, their submission. The debate has four [parts]: first, determining the thesis; second, accepting the determination; third, the objection proper; fourth, the resolution and explanation. First, as for determining the thesis: "I have heard that Gautama's nirvāṇa is permanent; is it definitely so or not?" Next, replying, "It is so, it is so," is accepting the determination. Yet when has nirvāṇa ever definitely been permanent, impermanent, both permanent and impermanent, or neither permanent nor impermanent? Desiring to refute him by means of permanence, he therefore says, "It is so, it is so." From the passage beginning "The brāhmaṇa said" below, the third is the objection proper, which also has three [parts]: first, negating the Buddha's doctrine; next, the objection proper; third, inferring the intent and concluding. The first is as in the text. Next, in the objection proper there are five objections, which do not go beyond two points: the first four objections jointly reduce [nirvāṇa] to impermanence; the latter one objection argues that not only is it impermanent, but it is also devoid of bliss, purity, and self. The first clarifies that by cultivating the thought of impermanence one attains permanent nirvāṇa, [objecting that] an impermanent cause should not yield a permanent effect. Ancient [commentators] encountered this objection. That [opponent] says that nirvāṇa is an effect, and that cultivating a causal practice yields in return a habitual effect. Since the effect that is nirvāṇa is permanent, what could be the permanent cause for this? The same applies to self and purity. If he were to reply that my nirvāṇa is inherently a permanent effect, he falls into the view of spontaneous existence, and so on. In the second objection, beginning from "Gautama also says that by liberating oneself from desire and greed" below, he clarifies that by liberating oneself from desire and greed one attains nirvāṇa. Since the desire and greed that are liberated from are impermanent, the nirvāṇa that is able to liberate must also be impermanent. This objection is the clumsiest. In the third objection, beginning from "Gautama also says that because of being born from causes one is born in heaven" below, he directly clarifies that because it is produced from causes, it is therefore impermanent. Nirvāṇa is an effect, so it is born from causes and cannot be permanent. In the fourth objection, beginning from "Gautama also says that form is produced from conditions" below, he opens it into two difficulties: if nirvāṇa is identical with the aggregates, since the aggregates are impermanent, nirvāṇa is also like that; if it is apart from the five aggregates and distinct from the five aggregates, like empty space, it is ungraspable—how could sentient beings attain nirvāṇa? In the fifth objection, beginning from "Gautama also says that it is produced from causes" below, he clarifies that since nirvāṇa is impermanent and cannot be permanent, how could it merely be impermanent?—it also lacks bliss, purity, and self. From the passage beginning "If Gautama says it is both permanent and impermanent" below, the third is inferring the intent and concluding. The intent of the objection is: seeing that the Buddha's thesis of permanence cannot be maintained against objections, he feared the Buddha might shift his position to 'both permanent and impermanent', which would constitute speaking double words; and if one speaks double words, one is not named a Buddha. From the passage beginning "The Buddha said" below, the fourth is the resolution and explanation, the text of which has two [parts]: first, answering the objections proper, and next, answering the concluding objection. The first text also has two [subsections]: first, answering the first objection, and next, answering the third objection. As for why he does not answer the remaining three objections: because their objections reduce nirvāṇa to impermanence, the rest follow by analogy. He does not answer the second on the severed desire and greed, because desire and greed are impermanent—how could they make the severance impermanent as well? He does not answer the fourth, because nirvāṇa is permanent—why discuss whether it is identical or separate? He does not answer the fifth, because nirvāṇa is permanent—how could it lack bliss and purity? Now he first answers the first objection. The Buddha first questions him to make him set forth his own doctrine. Previously, he had resisted and would not disclose his doctrine; taking occasion from the other objections, the Buddha then made him set forth his doctrine: "Our Nature (prakṛti) is permanent; why should the Mahat and other phenomena not be impermanent?" If so, then the generating cause is permanent while the generated effects are impermanent. The Buddha then drew a parallel resolution: "If in your doctrine the cause is permanent and the effect is impermanent, why in my Dharma should the cause not be impermanent and the effect permanent?" and so forth. These twenty-five principles have similarities and differences with the *Śataśāstra*, which can be summarized under three [headings]: First, the names differ but the substance is the same. The treatise says, "From the Unmanifest (tamas/avyakta) arises intellection (buddhi); from intellection arises the ego-sense (ahaṃkāra)." Here it says, "From Nature (prakṛti) arises the Great (mahat); from the Great arises conceit (māna)." This is where names differ but the substance is the same: the Unmanifest is obscure and unknowable beyond eighty thousand kalpas. Here, "Nature" refers to the nature of the myriad phenomena, hidden and dormant beyond eighty thousand kalpas and impossible to know. What the treatise calls "intellection" is knowing the affairs of eighty thousand kalpas. What is here called "the Great" simply means capable of being great; knowing and conceit/ego are easy to understand. Second, the names and substance are both the same: these are the five great elements, five sense objects, five sense capacities, five action capacities, and the equal mind-sense. Third, both names and substance differ: the treatise says, "The spiritual self (puruṣa) is the master, which is one faculty." Here it says, "The stained (rajas), the gross (tamas), and the dark are also one faculty." This is a great difference. How can the three—stained, gross, and dark—be one? It is explained: the three do not arise together; taking one or another among greed and the rest, whichever is earlier or later, it makes up the twenty-four. Question: Since this Jāti took the doctrine of Kapila as his tradition, why are they not the same? Answer: During the Buddha's time, one did not see the three masters, but only saw their disciples; their disciples altered the original texts, and therefore what they expounded differed, having variations such as 'stained' and so forth. For example, Master Zhuāngyán said: In the Buddha-fruit there are no continuous, dependent, or causally accomplished provisionalities. Later, Yǎn of Zhāotí was his student, and he altered it, saying that in the Buddha-fruit there is no causal accomplishment, though there may well be continuous and dependent [provisionality]. Kāishàn said: The two truths are of the same substance. Later, Lóngguāng was his student, and he altered it to say that the two truths each have their own substance, and so forth. Among the five action faculties it mentions the male and female faculties; the treatise takes defecation and urination as the two faculties, each having its textual basis. The treatise is based on a single body, while the sūtra is based on two persons, and so forth. However, regarding this principle of Nature (prakṛti), some consider it to be the spiritual self (puruṣa), while others consider it to be the Primal Darkness (pradhāna); both have their reasoning. Primal Darkness relies on its being the beginning of the twenty-five principles, hence the dark principle. But it is also said to be permanent, which would make it the spiritual self; it is not yet determined how they differ. In that [passage] where it says that from conceit arise sixteen phenomena: these do not immediately produce sixteen phenomena, for there are no instances of the stained, dark, and gross arising all at once; they are produced according to whichever of them arises, and because this is indefinite, it is not stated beforehand. The sixteen phenomena are the five great elements, the five cognitive faculties, the five action faculties, and the equal mind faculty. Listing the names of the five faculties, it then says that touch refers to the body being touch. Question: Regarding the equal faculty, what the treatise master explains is that when the mental consciousness arises dependent upon the five faculties, they are the five cognitive faculties; since the mind cognizes everywhere, it is named 'equal'. The text says that these twenty-five phenomena are all produced from Nature; in reality, Nature produces twenty-four phenomena, and counting both the producer and the produced together makes twenty-five. According to his doctrine, Nature is permanent and what it produces is impermanent; the Buddha used his doctrine to draw a parallel resolution: "Why should it hinder my doctrine that the cause is impermanent while the effect is permanent?" From the passage beginning "In your doctrine, are there two causes or not?" below, the second answers his third objection, also first scrutinizing his doctrine one by one. The text says: "Is that which is revealed by an elucidating cause identical with the elucidating [cause] or not?" This means: must the effect revealed by an elucidating cause necessarily be identical with the elucidating [cause] or not? For instance, a lamp is an elucidating cause that reveals the effect of a pot or a basin. Is this elucidating cause identical with the revealed effect such as the pot or basin, or not? He says they are not identical. Why is that? Just as a lamp is called an elucidating cause, when someone quenches it and the fire is extinguished, how could that cause the pot to be destroyed? Nirvāṇa is also like this: although it emerges from an elucidating [cause], the fruit of nirvāṇa is permanent; you cannot say that because it is produced from a cause, it is therefore impermanent. If I answer according to your doctrine that since there are two causes, the effect revealed by an elucidating cause is not identical with the elucidating cause, my [Dharma] is also like this: this nirvāṇa comes about from an elucidating cause; the elucidating cause is impermanent, but the fruit of nirvāṇa is permanent. From the passage beginning "Therefore, what the Tathāgata speaks has two [aspects]" below, the second refutes his concluding objection drawn from intent. It clarifies that the Buddha has no double words; expounding the Dharma according to faculties, at times he speaks of existence, and at times he speaks of non-existence, intending to lead them to understand the correct Dharma of the middle way—how could this be double words? The later text further takes the eye and form generating consciousness to explain the meaning of what is spoken: that the Buddha's two words serve to elucidate a single word means that although the eye and form are two, they together produce consciousness, and because consciousness is one, it is called a single word.