大般涅槃經疏 32.5

32.5

From the passage beginning "At that time the non-Buddhists" below, the second [part] is the refutation of heterodox views, which also has two [subsections]: first, the circumstances of origin, and next, the refutation proper. Within the circumstances of origin there are two: first, plotting and deliberating, and next, seeking to contend in debate with the Buddha. The deliberations take five rounds, which can be seen [in the text]. From the passage beginning "At that time there were many" below, next is the desire to seek a contest of power. From the passage beginning "At that time in the assembly, Jāti..." below, the second is the refutation proper of the ten ṛṣis, which constitutes ten sections. This is one of them. Jātiśoṇa took Kapila as his patriarch and held that the effect pre-exists in the cause and that cause and effect are simultaneous. Thus the *Śataśāstra* says, "The disciples of Kapila recite the twenty-five principles of the *Sāṃkhya-sūtra*." Since here they are set forth in full, one knows this is so. This section has two [parts]: first, the debate, and second, their submission. The debate has four [parts]: first, determining the thesis; second, accepting the determination; third, the objection proper; fourth, the resolution and explanation. First, as for determining the thesis: "I have heard that Gautama's nirvāṇa is permanent; is it definitely so or not?" Next, replying, "It is so, it is so," is accepting the determination. Yet when has nirvāṇa ever definitely been permanent, impermanent, both permanent and impermanent, or neither permanent nor impermanent? Desiring to refute him by means of permanence, he therefore says, "It is so, it is so." From the passage beginning "The brāhmaṇa said" below, the third is the objection proper, which also has three [parts]: first, negating the Buddha's doctrine; next, the objection proper; third, inferring the intent and concluding. The first is as in the text. Next, in the objection proper there are five objections, which do not go beyond two points: the first four objections jointly reduce [nirvāṇa] to impermanence; the latter one objection argues that not only is it impermanent, but it is also devoid of bliss, purity, and self. The first clarifies that by cultivating the thought of impermanence one attains permanent nirvāṇa, [objecting that] an impermanent cause should not yield a permanent effect. Ancient [commentators] encountered this objection. That [opponent] says that nirvāṇa is an effect, and that cultivating a causal practice yields in return a habitual effect. Since the effect that is nirvāṇa is permanent, what could be the permanent cause for this? The same applies to self and purity. If he were to reply that my nirvāṇa is inherently a permanent effect, he falls into the view of spontaneous existence, and so on. In the second objection, beginning from "Gautama also says that by liberating oneself from desire and greed" below, he clarifies that by liberating oneself from desire and greed one attains nirvāṇa. Since the desire and greed that are liberated from are impermanent, the nirvāṇa that is able to liberate must also be impermanent. This objection is the clumsiest. In the third objection, beginning from "Gautama also says that because of being born from causes one is born in heaven" below, he directly clarifies that because it is produced from causes, it is therefore impermanent. Nirvāṇa is an effect, so it is born from causes and cannot be permanent. In the fourth objection, beginning from "Gautama also says that form is produced from conditions" below, he opens it into two difficulties: if nirvāṇa is identical with the aggregates, since the aggregates are impermanent, nirvāṇa is also like that; if it is apart from the five aggregates and distinct from the five aggregates, like empty space, it is ungraspable—how could sentient beings attain nirvāṇa? In the fifth objection, beginning from "Gautama also says that it is produced from causes" below, he clarifies that since nirvāṇa is impermanent and cannot be permanent, how could it merely be impermanent?—it also lacks bliss, purity, and self. From the passage beginning "If Gautama says it is both permanent and impermanent" below, the third is inferring the intent and concluding. The intent of the objection is: seeing that the Buddha's thesis of permanence cannot be maintained against objections, he feared the Buddha might shift his position to 'both permanent and impermanent', which would constitute speaking double words; and if one speaks double words, one is not named a Buddha. From the passage beginning "The Buddha said" below, the fourth is the resolution and explanation, the text of which has two [parts]: first, answering the objections proper, and next, answering the concluding objection. The first text also has two [subsections]: first, answering the first objection, and next, answering the third objection. As for why he does not answer the remaining three objections: because their objections reduce nirvāṇa to impermanence, the rest follow by analogy. He does not answer the second on the severed desire and greed, because desire and greed are impermanent—how could they make the severance impermanent as well? He does not answer the fourth, because nirvāṇa is permanent—why discuss whether it is identical or separate? He does not answer the fifth, because nirvāṇa is permanent—how could it lack bliss and purity? Now he first answers the first objection. The Buddha first questions him to make him set forth his own doctrine. Previously, he had resisted and would not disclose his doctrine; taking occasion from the other objections, the Buddha then made him set forth his doctrine: "Our Nature (prakṛti) is permanent; why should the Mahat and other phenomena not be impermanent?" If so, then the generating cause is permanent while the generated effects are impermanent. The Buddha then drew a parallel resolution: "If in your doctrine the cause is permanent and the effect is impermanent, why in my Dharma should the cause not be impermanent and the effect permanent?" and so forth. These twenty-five principles have similarities and differences with the *Śataśāstra*, which can be summarized under three [headings]: First, the names differ but the substance is the same. The treatise says, "From the Unmanifest (tamas/avyakta) arises intellection (buddhi); from intellection arises the ego-sense (ahaṃkāra)." Here it says, "From Nature (prakṛti) arises the Great (mahat); from the Great arises conceit (māna)." This is where names differ but the substance is the same: the Unmanifest is obscure and unknowable beyond eighty thousand kalpas. Here, "Nature" refers to the nature of the myriad phenomena, hidden and dormant beyond eighty thousand kalpas and impossible to know. What the treatise calls "intellection" is knowing the affairs of eighty thousand kalpas. What is here called "the Great" simply means capable of being great; knowing and conceit/ego are easy to understand. Second, the names and substance are both the same: these are the five great elements, five sense objects, five sense capacities, five action capacities, and the equal mind-sense. Third, both names and substance differ: the treatise says, "The spiritual self (puruṣa) is the master, which is one faculty." Here it says, "The stained (rajas), the gross (tamas), and the dark are also one faculty." This is a great difference. How can the three—stained, gross, and dark—be one? It is explained: the three do not arise together; taking one or another among greed and the rest, whichever is earlier or later, it makes up the twenty-four. Question: Since this Jāti took the doctrine of Kapila as his tradition, why are they not the same? Answer: During the Buddha's time, one did not see the three masters, but only saw their disciples; their disciples altered the original texts, and therefore what they expounded differed, having variations such as 'stained' and so forth. For example, Master Zhuāngyán said: In the Buddha-fruit there are no continuous, dependent, or causally accomplished provisionalities. Later, Yǎn of Zhāotí was his student, and he altered it, saying that in the Buddha-fruit there is no causal accomplishment, though there may well be continuous and dependent [provisionality]. Kāishàn said: The two truths are of the same substance. Later, Lóngguāng was his student, and he altered it to say that the two truths each have their own substance, and so forth. Among the five action faculties it mentions the male and female faculties; the treatise takes defecation and urination as the two faculties, each having its textual basis. The treatise is based on a single body, while the sūtra is based on two persons, and so forth. However, regarding this principle of Nature (prakṛti), some consider it to be the spiritual self (puruṣa), while others consider it to be the Primal Darkness (pradhāna); both have their reasoning. Primal Darkness relies on its being the beginning of the twenty-five principles, hence the dark principle. But it is also said to be permanent, which would make it the spiritual self; it is not yet determined how they differ. In that [passage] where it says that from conceit arise sixteen phenomena: these do not immediately produce sixteen phenomena, for there are no instances of the stained, dark, and gross arising all at once; they are produced according to whichever of them arises, and because this is indefinite, it is not stated beforehand. The sixteen phenomena are the five great elements, the five cognitive faculties, the five action faculties, and the equal mind faculty. Listing the names of the five faculties, it then says that touch refers to the body being touch. Question: Regarding the equal faculty, what the treatise master explains is that when the mental consciousness arises dependent upon the five faculties, they are the five cognitive faculties; since the mind cognizes everywhere, it is named 'equal'. The text says that these twenty-five phenomena are all produced from Nature; in reality, Nature produces twenty-four phenomena, and counting both the producer and the produced together makes twenty-five. According to his doctrine, Nature is permanent and what it produces is impermanent; the Buddha used his doctrine to draw a parallel resolution: "Why should it hinder my doctrine that the cause is impermanent while the effect is permanent?" From the passage beginning "In your doctrine, are there two causes or not?" below, the second answers his third objection, also first scrutinizing his doctrine one by one. The text says: "Is that which is revealed by an elucidating cause identical with the elucidating [cause] or not?" This means: must the effect revealed by an elucidating cause necessarily be identical with the elucidating [cause] or not? For instance, a lamp is an elucidating cause that reveals the effect of a pot or a basin. Is this elucidating cause identical with the revealed effect such as the pot or basin, or not? He says they are not identical. Why is that? Just as a lamp is called an elucidating cause, when someone quenches it and the fire is extinguished, how could that cause the pot to be destroyed? Nirvāṇa is also like this: although it emerges from an elucidating [cause], the fruit of nirvāṇa is permanent; you cannot say that because it is produced from a cause, it is therefore impermanent. If I answer according to your doctrine that since there are two causes, the effect revealed by an elucidating cause is not identical with the elucidating cause, my [Dharma] is also like this: this nirvāṇa comes about from an elucidating cause; the elucidating cause is impermanent, but the fruit of nirvāṇa is permanent. From the passage beginning "Therefore, what the Tathāgata speaks has two [aspects]" below, the second refutes his concluding objection drawn from intent. It clarifies that the Buddha has no double words; expounding the Dharma according to faculties, at times he speaks of existence, and at times he speaks of non-existence, intending to lead them to understand the correct Dharma of the middle way—how could this be double words? The later text further takes the eye and form generating consciousness to explain the meaning of what is spoken: that the Buddha's two words serve to elucidate a single word means that although the eye and form are two, they together produce consciousness, and because consciousness is one, it is called a single word.