大般涅槃經疏 22

English (machine translation) 22

Language: English

22.1

Composed by Master Guàndǐng of Zhāng'ān under the Sui

22.2

Re-edited by the Tiāntái Śramaṇa Zhànrán under the Tang

From "Furthermore" below, the second part explains knowing past lives, which also has two parts: first, directly explaining past lives, and next, recollecting the past. The distinctions are to be understood based on what came before, so they will not be fully stated here in brief. From "Furthermore, how..." below, the third part re-explains [knowing] the minds of others, which also has two parts: first, horizontally knowing the six destinies, and next, vertically knowing the sixteen moments of mind. This text explains the sixteen, which conforms to the Abhidharma definition. The treatise says: "In the path of seeing, there are immeasurable moments of mind; this mind is swift and sharp, and is termed the mind of immediate succession." The *Satyasiddhi-śāstra* says: "When a śrāvaka wishes to know the third moment of mind, he only sees the sixteenth moment of mind. When a pratyekabuddha wishes to know the third moment of mind, he only sees the seventh moment of mind. Only a bodhisattva is able to know them completely." Those of the small vehicle have dull faculties; wishing to know the coming and going of the third moment of mind, and also wishing to know the subsequent moments of mind, by the time they wish to know it, it has already reached the sixteenth moment of mind. A person of the intermediate vehicle has slightly sharper faculties; wishing to know the passing of the third moment of mind, they succeed in knowing the seventh moment of mind. The bodhisattva is not like this: knowing and following them comprehensively, there is not a single moment of mind that he does not know. This is a shared doctrine among the three vehicles, in which three kinds of persons differ yet are the same. These sixteen moments of mind are not the meaning of the present sūtra. The previous knowing of the six destinies is knowing the extreme of existence; the subsequent sixteen moments of mind are knowing the extreme of non-existence. Through the essence of the middle way, which is neither existent nor non-existent, one is able to know both existence and non-existence.

22.5

From "Furthermore" below, the third virtue is explained. The old commentary says: here benevolence is explained, completing the preceding "Chapter on Pure Conduct" (and so forth). Within this, first the topic is indicated, and next it is explained. Within the explanation, there are two parts: first, explaining, and next, concluding. Regarding the meaning in the initial explanation: the virtues here ought to fully explain the four [immeasurable] minds, yet it exclusively explains friendliness because, first, some say it is merely a textual abbreviation and the meaning should contain all of them; second, some say that friendliness is indeed the root of all good dharmas, so why should it not encompass them? That is to say, it is the three minds; letting go of the partial to obtain the complete, by bringing up one, the three are known, so they are omitted and not stated. The explanatory text is divided into two: first, setting forth the two chapter headings of relinquishment and attainment, and next, explaining them. Within the explanation, first there is an inquiry raised, and next, the explanation. Within the explanation, there are altogether five turns: first, in terms of the two truths; second, in terms of the ordinary and the noble; third, in terms of an icchantika versus the Tathāgata, which is the good and the bad; fourth, in terms of the low and base versus the bodhisattva, which is the superior and the inferior; fifth, non-attachment. Next is the conclusion, as in the text.

22.6

Next, the fourth virtue is explained; the text is divided into two: first, explaining the virtue, and next, discussing its meaning. The first has four parts: first, indicating; second, listing the chapter headings; third, explaining; fourth, concluding. [Master] Yěchéng said: "The first two pertain to the stages before the bhūmis, and the latter eight correspond to the eight bhūmis. The previous statement that the roots are deep refers to the stage of nature, which is also the emptiness of persons. Entering the first reliance with a determinate mind is also the emptiness of dharmas. Among the latter eight, the first—not regarding the field of merit—is the perfection of dāna on the first bhūmi; the tenth—severing the two extremes—is the eighth bhūmi." This interpretation is incorrect; now, all of these are the virtues of true realization. From "How are the roots deep?" below is the third part, explaining; in the text, the fifth and sixth are combined into a single explanation. In explaining the first heading, the text is divided into three: indicating, explaining, and concluding. In the initial matter, five meanings are fully possessed: first, the fundamental; second, the roots are deep; third, the roots are vast; fourth, the roots are long; fifth, the roots are superior. Non-negligence is the fundamental. If spoken of generally, practicing good in all ways is non-negligence; if spoken of specifically, the initial examination of the mind is non-negligence; having both of these meanings constitutes the fundamental. Next, the root of anuttarasamyaksaṃbodhi is that the roots are deep. Deeply plumbing dharmatā to its ultimate limit is the truth; this is the root of bodhi, and hence it is called "deep." That all the good roots of all buddhas are based on non-negligence is that the roots are vast. Because they are able to increase and grow, the roots are long. Being superior among all goods, the roots are superior. It cites thirteen metaphors in all to illustrate its superior aspects. From "What is non-negligence?" below, it cites ten roots in all to re-explain that the roots are long. Possessing these ten meanings, it is deep, solid, and difficult to uproot. Personally, I say: since "long" and "superior" are explained through many meanings, examining the other three reveals they are also like this. The remaining four all have ten and all have thirteen.

22.7

From "How [is one resolute] regarding the body..." below, the second chapter heading is explained; the text is divided into three: indicating, explaining, and concluding. The indication is as in the text. The explanation is divided into two: first, determining the body; second, determining the mind. First, in determining the body: viewing the body as existent, it is a vessel of birth-and-death; viewing the body as non-existent, it is a vessel of nirvāṇa. Now, viewing the body as neither existent nor non-existent directly reveals that the middle way is the vessel of [anuttarasammyak]saṃbodhi; this is called the determination of the body. Next, the mind is also like this. If it is narrow and small, it acts for oneself as mind. "Alteration" has two meanings: if discussing the cultivation of causes, arising and ceasing impermanence is called alteration; if discussing the experiencing of fruits, the birth-and-death of alteration is called alteration. Śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas have their minds characterized according to persons; this belongs to the side of the unconditioned. The mind of Māra belongs to the heaven of Māra. The mind seeking its own pleasure applies to all heavens. The mind delighting in birth-and-death applies to the three realms. These three minds pertain to the side of existence and are not resolute. Seeking friendliness that is friendly toward non-existence, and seeking compassion that is compassionate toward existence—this is being resolute.

22.8

From "How does one not regard the field of merit..." below, the third chapter is explained. The text is divided into three: indicating, explaining, and concluding. In the preceding "Chapter on the Four Reliances," in maintaining and upholding the Buddha's Dharma, one had to distinguish between upholding and violating [precepts]; here, in one's personal practice, one should apply equality. Furthermore, the previous part admonished the renunciants to observe their moral conduct; this part admonishes householders to cultivate signless generosity. "A different station of mindfulness" means being different from the two extremes and correctly contemplating the middle way. "Precept-holding non-Buddhists" refers not only to holding precepts, but also to attaining superior concentrations. The text below says: "Giving to a non-Buddhist who has cut off fetters surpasses [giving to] a precept-holding monk." A precept-holding monk merely subdues the evils of the desire realm, hence [the non-Buddhist] is said to surpass him by comparison. Although giving is of four types and all attain a pure retribution, it is because there is neither giving nor retribution that it is a pure retribution.

22.9

From "How does one purify the Buddha land..." below, the fourth chapter is explained. The text is also divided into three: indicating, explaining, and concluding. The indication is as in the text. In the explanation, bodhi is fundamentally the karma of purifying the land. The ten virtues here are not merely the ten virtues, but are practiced in conjunction with the bodhicitta, just as in the previous answer to the question of Fearlessness. However, regarding the ten virtues, it explains that a similar cause obtains a similar fruit. Obtaining flowers and fruits by avoiding false speech explains that falsehood is without reality, like flowers without fruit; now, not speaking falsely has a real karmic retribution, and at the time of receiving the retribution, one elicits fine flowers and fruits. From "How does one extinguish..." below, the fifth and sixth chapters are explained together; because the momentum of their meanings is interrelated, they are combined into one explanation. Interpreters differ on this. One says: here the chapter opens by explaining three kinds of residue; the first two items explain the fifth, extinguishing residues, and the latter item explains the sixth, severing conditions of karma. The second says: the residual retribution of defilements explains extinguishing residues, the residual karma explains severing conditions of karma above, and the remaining single item is merely a surplus addition. Regarding the text, there are three parts: first, setting forth the three chapter headings; second, explaining them in sequence; third, concluding. In the second part, explaining the three headings: first, defilements are explained. If categorized by habit and retribution, then the habitual cause is defilement, and the retributive cause is karma; now distinguishing the difference between habit and retribution, it says "residual retribution of defilements." However, eliciting retribution is due to karma; defilements merely moisten this karma. According to the *Mahāprajñāpāramitōpadeśa*, defilements alone can also obtain retribution. From "What is residual karma?" below, the second part explains severing conditions of karma above, comprehensively explaining the karma of ordinary beings and the two vehicles. Regarding the statement that a srotāpanna receives the karma of seven existences: although a srotāpanna has completely severed the delusions of view, there are still delusions of thought that moisten rebirth among humans and devas; [going] to seven human and seven deva realms, their back-and-forth combined count is merely seven existences, while their back-and-forth separated count is fourteen existences. A sakṛdāgāmin receives the karma of two existences: a sakṛdāgāmin has only one life each among humans and devas. These two lives are a separated count; if combined, it is merely one existence. Question: Why is the first fruit counted together, and the second fruit separated? The explanation says: they are simply shown mutually. An anāgāmin receives the karma of form existences: an anāgāmin has completely severed the thoughts of the desire realm, but the remaining delusions of the form realm remain; hence it says receiving the karma of form existences. However, there are five kinds of anāgāmin, yet it only mentions the one who ascends the flow. Those who ascend the flow are of two kinds: first, reaching Akaniṣṭha; second, reaching the formless [realm]. Therefore, the sūtra says: "Those who delight in debating doctrine are born in the five pure abodes; those who delight in dhyāna concentration are born in the formless realm." Now, being born in Akaniṣṭha means traversing through all four dhyānas; if one does not attain extinction in the first dhyāna, one is reborn in the second dhyāna; if not extinguished in the second dhyāna, one is born in the third dhyāna; if not extinguished in the third dhyāna, one is reborn in the fourth dhyāna, where one is finally extinguished. Within this, there are again three types: jumping, half-jumping, and all-traversing. If born into the formless realm, it is called parinirvāṇa in the formless realm (and so forth). If born in the formless realm, one is not reborn again, but is extinguished upon birth, unlike taking rebirth in the four dhyānas of the form realm; therefore, it omits mentioning receiving formless karma and only speaks of receiving form karma, because there is no intermediate rebirth. It is also said that whether with preparation or without preparation, rebirth is the same as in the form realm, so it is also not mentioned. From "What is residual existence?" below, the third part explains eliminating residual existence above. Regarding "transforming the two fruits without karma and without defilements," [Master] Zhuāngyán said: "An arhat transforms into a sixth-bhūmi bodhisattva, and a pratyekabuddha transforms into a seventh-bhūmi bodhisattva; hence it says 'and transforms the two fruits.'" Now I clarify that this is the doctrine of the shared teaching, not the explanation of the present sūtra. Kāishàn said: "There is no such thing as this transformation; originally a dull-rooted arhat, he transforms into a sharp-rooted one; the pratyekabuddha is also like this; through repeated habituation, he transforms into the two fruits." Now I clarify that this is still the two vehicles, and entirely not the present sūtra. Héxī said: "The preceding phrase 'the two fruits' means obtaining the path and obtaining the fruition; transforming the candidate for arhatship, one obtains the fruit of an arhat; the pratyekabuddha is also like this. The text itself says 'attainment and fruition'; how could one not make this interpretation?" Now I clarify that this is still the doctrine of the two vehicles, not the meaning of the present sūtra. Another interpretation says: the causes of defilement are exhausted, and the retributive fruits are also gone, yet they are not extinguished at present simply because of the residual force of transmigration. However, since karma is eliminated, only these two fruits are an encumbrance to a bodhisattva; therefore, it says "transforming." Transforming is relinquishing; this is still another's interpretation, irrelevant to the present sūtra. [Master] Xīnghuáng said: "Regarding transforming the two fruits, the fruit-bodies of the two vehicles experience cold, heat, hunger, and thirst; these fruits are eliminated, hence it says transforming the two fruits." This is also the Hinayana meaning. Now I clarify: this fruit is not born, and naturally ends when exhausted. Why use the sūtra to transform it? Answer: Although the fruits of the three realms are exhausted, the fruits outside the realms are just being born. Speaking of transforming fruits means transforming the fruits outside the realms. Now I clarify that this is the doctrine of the separate teaching, and not the perfect meaning.

22.10

From "How does one cultivate a pure body..." below, the seventh chapter is explained. It also has three parts: indicating, explaining, and concluding. First, indicating. Next, in the explanation, the "Chapter on Siṃhanāda" explains that either one karma produces one mark, or one karma produces two or three marks; here it explains that a hundred merits complete a single mark. The text is divided into two: first, explaining the karma of marks, and next, explaining the karma of secondary characteristics. What non-Buddhists worship each points to a single mark, whereas the Buddha gathers all marks together in one body. "Twelve days" refers to the twelve days of zi, chou, and so forth. Héxī said: "In one year there are twelve auspicious days suitable for offering sacrifices to seek blessings." Furthermore, cultivating the marks and characteristics also contains the meaning of the four siddhāntas: first, the essence of the Dharma King should adorn itself with marks and characteristics; all buddhas are like this, and this is the mundane [siddhānta]. Causing those who see them to give rise to faith and produce goodness is the individual [siddhānta]. Possessing all the secondary characteristics on one body to refute non-Buddhists is the counteractive [siddhānta]. Because physical form is pure, prajñā is pure; because prajñā is pure, physical form is pure; this is the primary meaning [siddhānta]. The text cites four metaphors, which perhaps correspond to these (and so forth).

22.11

From "How does one fully comprehend the conditions..." onward is the eighth section. Here there are also three parts: stating [the topic], explaining it, and concluding. The opening is as in the text. In the explanation, others say: knowing that causes and conditions combine is conventional truth. This interpretation is not correct. Not seeing material form (rūpa) is the cessation of the saṃskāra-link; not seeing the conditions of form is the cessation of ignorance (avidyā); not seeing the substantial nature of form is the cessation of consciousness, name-and-form, the six sense bases, contact, and sensation; not seeing the arising of form is the cessation of craving, clinging, becoming, birth, and so forth; not seeing the cessation of form is the cessation of old age and death. Not seeing a single characteristic is not seeing the emptiness of the twelvefold conditioned arising; not seeing the viewer is not seeing the provisional nature of conditioned arising. When both the real and the conventional are negated, both truths are obliterated, and one also does not see the middle. Such is the thorough penetration and full comprehension of conditions—how could it be merely the conventional truth? All phenomena are likewise.

22.12

From "How does a bodhisattva..." onward explains the ninth section. The text has three parts: stating [the topic], explaining it, and concluding. The statement is as in the text. Next, in the explanation, the text has two parts: first, clarifying leaving enemies behind; next, distinguishing and identifying the enemies. In the first part on leaving enemies behind, there are again two: first, leaving enemies behind for oneself; next, leaving enemies behind for others. The first passage means that staying far away from defilements is leaving enemies behind for oneself. Next, the five abodes are leaving enemies behind for others. Next, from "What are the enemies?" onward, it distinguishes and identifies the enemy adversaries. Héxī's explanation of the eight Māras states: the four evils such as slandering the Vaipulya sūtras are the four Māras, which are the Māras of saṃsāra; the four [wrong views] such as impermanence and non-self are the Māras of nirvāṇa, and so forth.

22.13

“How does one keep far away” is the tenth section, which also has a statement, an explanation, and a conclusion. The statement is as in the text. In the explanatory text, craving and defilement within the twenty-five realms of existence are taken as the two extremes, which are the two dharmas of cause and effect. I personally consider: because one destroys the three kinds of delusions within the twenty-five realms of existence, one is free from the two extremes. Héxī takes karma and defilement as the two extremes. I personally consider: only if one says that the three delusions have three kinds of karma does it accord with the present meaning. Merely taking the delusions and karma within the triple realm as the two extremes completely misses the present meaning. Once this meaning is grasped, it applies analogously to all dharmas: existence and non-existence, eternalism and annihilationism, defilement and purity, bondage and liberation—all are the two extremes.

22.14

From "At that time, Bright [Virtue King]..." onward is the second part, debating the meaning, which contains questions and answers. The gist of the question is: if a bodhisattva fully cultivates the ten matters, why does the Tathāgata not cultivate a pure land? The Buddha's answer has four parts: first, "In the causal stage I was equipped with the ten matters, and so were all the sages"; second, from "If this world were to..." onward, he rebukes his question; third, from "In the west..." onward, he shows him the unsurpassable pure land; fourth, from "In order to transform sentient beings..." onward, he appears in an impure land to transform sentient beings. All are as in the text.

22.15

From "Furthermore..." onward is the fifth merit, and the text has three parts: stating [the topic], explaining it, and concluding. The statement is as in the text. In the explanation there are two parts: first, explaining; next, debating the meaning. In the first explanation, older commentaries offered three views on the five matters. Yěchéng said: they apply throughout the external ordinary beings and the thirty mind-stages; since the text says 'not being born in borderlands' and 'having complete sense faculties,' these are the proof. The second view says: this virtue is not shallow. Why? From the stages (bhūmis) upward, all inner realization is expressed through external events. The statement that sense faculties are complete refers not to ears and eyes, but to the supramundane faculty of faith as the foremost. The borderlands are not worldly frontiers devoid of the Buddhadharma, but being free from annihilationism and eternalism. The devas' protection and mindfulness means taking the Buddha as deva. Being revered by the fourfold assembly means being a field of merit for creatures. The third view, Kāishàn's, says: this refers to a bodhisattva who has ascended the stages but is still reborn in the desire realm, hence the text speaks of having complete [faculties], etc. If spoken of in terms of being undefiled, one attains transformation-birth retribution; yet this bodhisattva still possesses defilement (āsrava), hence he now undergoes rebirth. Although he has these five, his mind does not cling to them, taking non-attachment precisely as the essence. Now I evaluate these. Kāishàn's view is entirely the bodhisattva doctrine of the Tripiṭaka [Teaching]. The first master's application to the pre-stage levels is the initial mind of the Separate Teaching, and has nothing to do with the sūtra's meaning. The middle view of ascending the stages is the meaning of the path of realization. In the text there are two parts: first, clarifying the merit; next, debating the meaning. In the first part on merit, there are a statement, an explanation, and a conclusion. The statement is as in the text. In the explanation, the first four of these five are fruition retributions, and the last one is a habit-fruition. Next, in the debate on the meaning, first comes the question; next the Buddha answers, again in two parts: first praising the question, next giving the direct answer. In the answer there are two parts: first is the section on superiority and inferiority; next, from "Good son..." onward, reveals the characteristics of superiority and inferiority. First, the five topics are raised: 'fixed' is bliss; 'superior' is self; 'permanence' and 'purity' are evident; 'different' is the uncommon middle way; 'undefiled' is realizing the middle way; 'benefit, peace, and bliss' and so forth are transforming others. Next, the text states 'free from thirsting craving,' which explains 'fixed' and explains 'bliss.' 'Saṃsāra is cut off and does not continue' explains 'permanence.' 'Attaining the state of being a bodhisattva' explains 'purity.' 'Severing all poverty in wholesome dharmas' explains 'superior' and explains 'self.' 'Without division and without fruition' explains 'different' and explains 'uncommon,' and concurrently explains 'undefiled' and 'benefiting sentient beings.' The Buddha taught that the five matters are obtained through the great nirvāṇa. Human teachers explain them as applying throughout the inner and outer thirty mind-stages; one should know that prior to the stages it is not called 'attaining.' The Buddha himself stated they are undefiled, yet Kāishàn said they are defiled. Since this openly opposes the Buddha's words, how could it fail to confuse and mislead later generations? Therefore, we know that human interpretations are entirely unreliable; future scholars must simply rely on the sūtra itself.

22.16

From "Good son..." onward is the sixth merit. Older commentaries explained the vajrasamādhi. If discussed in terms of the ten stages, it is the very final mind; if discussed in terms of the three patiences, it is the supreme patience: retreating, one is not a bodhisattva, being termed 'Equal Enlightenment'; advancing, one is not Wondrous Enlightenment—this is the diamond-mind bodhisattva. One explanation says: it is endowed with the two understandings of emptiness and existence. A second says: it takes only the understanding that illuminates existence, not the understanding of emptiness, for the understanding of emptiness is not yet complete. Zhuāngyán says: the diamond-mind severs delusions completely, citing this text: 'Just as the seven suns shining together on Mount Yugandhara burn everything away,' hence one knows Equal Enlightenment severs delusions completely. Kāishàn's explanation: the diamond-mind merely suppresses ignorance; upon reaching the Wondrous Enlightenment of a buddha, severing this single thought of slight delusion, one immediately attains buddhahood. The Śrīmālā Sūtra says, 'The Buddha's bodhi-knowledge can sever it'; this text speaks of suppression as 'exhaustion.' The diamond-mind's understanding is only then full; that the understanding of emptiness is not yet complete is proven by citing the Twenty-Two Encounters Sūtra and the Queen [Śrīmālā] Sūtra, extensively discussing its meaning. Master Guān says: one cannot definitively determine its rank; it should be analogized to prajñā running through all the stages. Furthermore, the tenth stage is too elevated; what stage then would the fifth merit be? They should not be so vastly disparate. As long as one accords with samādhi, no distinction of high or low is made. Older commentaries also explained: only after attaining the hundred samādhis on the tenth stage does one attain śūraṅgama, and only then enter vajrasamādhi; advancing, it is not the fruit of buddhahood; retreating, it is not the lower stages—it resides solely in ultimate study. This is also not so. This single samādhi also has general and specific aspects: specifically, it is based on ultimate study; generally, it spans all stages and also extends to the path of resemblance. How is it different from diamond prajñā spanning the initial and final stages? Since prajñā is general, how could samādhi be specific? Why? In its entire substance it is hard like a diamond; in its entire substance it is quiescent like samādhi; in its entire substance it is sharp like prajñā. Therefore the sūtra says: 'The vajrasamādhi has three names'; below it also says: 'The five names of the buddhadhātu.' If one argues that the final mind has severing or no severing, this is merely two schools clutching at each other's throats. For the benefit of conditions, it is described as severing or not severing, but in actual principle it is neither severing nor non-severing (and so forth). Now I state: the Zhuāngyán school's citation of the simile of Mount Yugandhara is one-sided. Why? When the seven suns appear, they do not only burn Mount Yugandhara, but everything blazes completely. Yet now, the text does not take blazing completely as the simile, but burning the grass while preserving the mountain; this does not liken the final mind of the tenth stage to severing delusion. It takes the seven suns first emerging, first illuminating Yugandhara so that its grass burns. This clarifies that this samādhi is the merit of the first stage, which initially severs delusions; hence burning grass is used as a simile. There are statement, explanation, and conclusion. The first is as in the text. Next, in the explanation there are three parts: first, briefly explaining the samādhi; second, extensively explaining the samādhi; third, explaining its name. In the brief explanation there are again two: first, explaining one's own virtues; next, distinguishing the transformation of others. In one's own virtues there are again two: first, explaining the ability to sever; next, raising what is not. Being able to break apart entirely is the ability to sever; seeing all phenomena is raising what is not. From "abiding in this samādhi, although giving to sentient beings..." onward is the second part, clarifying the transformation of others. From "just as diamond..." onward is the second part, explaining extensively, which again has two: first, extensively explaining one's own practice; later, extensively explaining transforming others. Extensively explaining one's own practice has three parts: first, the ability to sever; second, the ability to see; third, reiterating the ability to sever. In the first part on the ability to sever, eight similes in all are presented: the first simile is the ability to sever, and the latter seven similes are praises. From "Good son, if there is a bodhisattva who abides..." onward is the second part, extensively explaining the ability to see: the first simile is the ability to see, and the next three similes are praises. From "Good son, just as Mount Yugandhara..." onward is the third part, reiterating the ability to sever, which also has three similes: the first simile is the ability to sever, and the next two similes are transcending effort. From "If there is a bodhisattva who abides..." onward is the second part, extensively explaining transforming others, divided into four: first, transforming one's body to be like a buddha; second, returning to the original place; third, severing others' delusions; fourth, manifesting through the three secrets. Manifesting again has four: first, the secret of speech; second, the secret of body; third, reiterating the secret of speech—the former was one sound appropriately understood differently, while now it clarifies one Dharma appropriately understood differently; fourth, from "bodhisattva..." onward, the secret of mind. From "Why is it named..." onward is the third part, explaining the name. There are three similes: first, non-fixity likens signlessness; next, lack of uniform value likens lack of suffering; finally, freedom from bitter poison likens fearlessness. The conclusion is as in the text.

22.17

Chapter on the Noble Virtue King, Part 5

22.18

The opening of the fascicle clarifies the seventh merit. Kāishàn took these next two merits as the second cycle: because of drawing close to good spiritual friends and initially hearing the correct Dharma, in terms of stage this is shallow; below, taking the nine matters as the substance of the eighth merit, he analyzes the liberation of mind and wisdom, explaining the meaning to be exceedingly profound. Now I say this is not so. All of these are merits obtained when first realizing what one had not heard and hearing it. The Buddha gave the seventh and eighth rounds of exposition to clarify the penetrating understanding of the dharmas that are the proximate causes of nirvāṇa, enabling one to serve as a good spiritual friend for sentient beings. How could one cast aside their inner virtue and the function of transforming others, and adopt an interpretation of externally seeking teachers and exemplary models for one's own practice? Even if one seeks good spiritual friends for oneself, this is also expressing principle through external phenomena. For instance, when Vimalakīrti was mindful of the Buddha, Siṃhaghosa and others all came to expound the Dharma, and departed after speaking. When one hears the Dharma, contemplates it, and cultivates it through such spiritual friends, how could it be shallow?

22.19

As for the text, it has three parts: first, stating the topic; next, explaining it; third, concluding. The statement is as in the text. Next, the explanation has two parts: first, explaining the four matters; next, debating the meaning. The first also has two parts: 1. stating the topic; 2. explaining it. Stating the topic also has three parts: 1. clarifying what is right; 2. pointing out what is wrong; 3. properly enumerating the names. Clarifying what is right is as in the text. Next, in pointing out that ascetic practices are wrong, there are two explanations: one says it refers to the useless ascetic practices of non-Buddhists; the second says it means that merely cultivating ascetic practices within the Buddhadharma cannot attain the Way, but must take the wisdom category as primary, with the other practices assisting it. The third, enumerating the names, is as in the text.

22.20

From "For instance, suppose a person..." downward is the second part, the detailed explanation, which again has two parts: first, a general explanation, and second, a specific explanation. In the first, the general explanation, three similes are raised: the first two are similes for the bodhisattva, and the last one is a simile for the ordinary person. In the first simile for the bodhisattva, it first illustrates their own practice, which also possesses the four things. Because the bodhisattva resides in the causal stage and the noble dharmas are not yet complete, they also need good friends, listening to the Dharma, and practicing (and so forth). The next simile illustrates the bodhisattva's transforming of others. Transforming others also requires the four things: being stimulated by the buddhas, they carry out practices in accordance with the teaching (and so forth). The final simile illustrates the ordinary person. Ordinary persons have heavy sins, so it is said that they are like a leper (and so forth). Each of these three similes has its application. In the first simile, heat illustrates craving; cold illustrates delusion; fatigue illustrates conceit; lower [purgatives] illustrate anger; vomiting illustrates doubt; and the various evils collectively illustrate the five sharp [afflictions] (and so forth). Question: If the bodhisattva has exhausted both the sharp and dull [afflictions], how could they have this disease? Answer: This relies on the shared to point to the distinct. The distinct delusions of a bodhisattva are only exhausted when reaching buddhahood; how could they be without disease? In my private view: The shared and distinct delusions share the same name and are one in substance; they are two or three different similes.

22.21

From "Just as when raising a disciple..." downward is the second part, specifically explaining the four things, which again has two parts: first, the brief, and second, the detailed. The initial brief explanation of the good friend again has four parts: first, the good friend; second, listening to the Dharma; third, contemplation; and fourth, practice. The first again has four parts: first, praising, which has a simile and its application, as in the text. From "A good friend is..." downward is the second, identifying the person. The persons have five distinctions: first, bodhisattvas; second, buddhas; third, pratyekabuddhas; fourth, śrāvakas; fifth, believers among humans. From "Why is it called..." downward is the third, distinguishing their stages. It first explains five stages: first, teaching them to abandon evil and practice good; second, acting in accordance with what is spoken; third, cultivating bodhi; fourth, practicing morality and giving; fifth, acting not for oneself but for others. Some match these to the previous five persons, but it does not necessarily have to be so. From "Just as in the sky..." downward is the fourth, the benefit of obtaining a good friend. Although the new moon cannot yet be seen, one cannot say it does not exist. When one first draws near to a good friend, one might think there is not yet any benefit, but in fact one has already been moistened. From "If one can listen..." downward is the second part, explaining the person who listens to the Dharma, which again has two parts: first, listening to the three sūtras, and second, attaining the three understandings. The three sūtras refer to the twelve divisions, the vaipulya Mahāyāna, and this sūtra. Examining the sense of this text, it seems like the teachings of the beginning, middle, and end of a single teaching period (and so forth). Next, from "with single-minded attention listening to the Dharma..." downward explains the three understandings, namely the eightfold noble path, the eleven kinds of emptiness, and the great nirvāṇa. Some match the three understandings to the previous three teachings; we now explain that it is not necessarily entirely so. In each and every teaching, all three understandings are fully generated, for the text states: "Because of cultivating it, one attains the great nirvāṇa." If someone is able to cultivate the eightfold noble path, that very thing is the buddhadhātu and attains the great nirvāṇa; if someone merely hears of nirvāṇa without cultivating it, how could they ever attain sambodhi? From "For instance, a sick person..." downward explains the third, contemplation. The later text takes the five sense objects, the four characteristics, and impermanence as the ten characteristics; here it takes the five sense objects, the three characteristics, and male and female as the ten; this is merely a difference in doctrinal approaches. From "What is called practicing according to the Dharma..." downward explains the fourth, as in the text. From "Good sons, the foremost, true..." downward is the second part, broadly explaining the four dharmas, which is also divided into four. This is the first, where the explanation of the person of the good friend is brief while the text is extensive. First is an exposition of the Dharma, followed by seven similes. In the initial exposition of the Dharma, there are three types of speech; all of them are the Tathāgata skillfully discerning faculties and capacities: if gentle words should be used, he speaks of wholesome dharmas; if scolding is required, he speaks harsh and stinging words; if both are required, he uses both together. Among the seven similes, some are prior similes and some are subsequent similes (and so forth). From "How does one listen to the Dharma?" downward is the second, broadly explaining listening to the Dharma, which again has two parts: first, an explanation, and second, citing evidence. In the explanation, there is both Dharma and similes. Among the similes, there are four similes. From "Therefore I, in..." downward is the second, citing evidence, which again has two parts: first, generally citing various sūtras, and second, citing two incidents. First, generally citing various sūtras. Second, from "Because of listening to the Dharma, the srotāpanna..." downward cites two incidents as evidence. First, it explains the incident of the first fruit, which is when Sudatta fell ill, heard Śāriputra's four teachings and ten consolations, and immediately his illness was cured. The four kinds are precisely the four dharmas here. As for the ten consolations, the old [commentary] says: the eightfold noble path and the knowledge of destruction and of non-arising. However, the first fruit lacks these two knowledges. They defended this by saying: the destruction of [the view of] seeing the truths is the knowledge of destruction, and the non-arising of [the view of] seeing the truths is the knowledge of non-arising. This statement is groundless. Héxī says: the eightfold noble path, right knowledge, and right liberation. This comes from the Āgamas and must not be interpreted otherwise. "Having no eyes" refers to ordinary persons; "having one eye" refers to the Dharma eye; "having two eyes" refers to Dharma wisdom. Alternatively, "having no eyes" refers to ordinary persons with distracted minds; "having one eye" refers to the divine eye; "having two eyes" refers to divine wisdom (and so forth). From "Just as I in the past..." downward is the second, citing the incident of Śāriputra. The Buddha sent Ānanda to preach the Dharma for him; Ānanda had attained the first fruit, and one of a higher fruit does not submit to listening to the Dharma of a lower fruit, so he had people carry his bed to go to the Buddha's place to listen to the Dharma, whereupon he was cured. From "How does one contemplate?" downward is the third, broadly explaining contemplation, divided into five: first, abandoning the five desires; second, abandoning the four inversions; third, abandoning the four sufferings; fourth, knowing the cause of abiding; fifth, understanding permanence. As for the first passage, when the mind contemplates the Dharma, how could it still have any mind to focus on the five desires? If one has not yet heard the Dharma, one falsely presumes the self to be permanent; once one has contemplated, the inversion of a permanent self is eliminated. The mention of "destruction" here simply means death. From "What is called practicing according to the Dharma?" downward is the fourth, broadly explaining practice, which again has three parts: first, explaining the two wholesomenesses of cessation and action; second, explaining the understanding of emptiness and impermanence; third, explaining the seven kinds of knowledge and vision. Knowledge and vision again has three parts: first, stating the topic headings; second, explaining; third, analyzing and distinguishing. First, stating the topic headings. Next, in the brief listing, two headings—the real and the unreal—are raised. The real has the seven kinds of knowledge and vision, while the unreal does not. From "What is called knowing..." downward is the second, the explanation. The first is knowing nirvāṇa, which again has two parts: first, briefly setting forth the three kinds of nirvāṇa, and second, explaining them. First, the Buddha's nirvāṇa; second, that of ordinary persons; third, that of śrāvakas. The latter two are both merely partial cessations. In first explaining the Buddha's nirvāṇa: although the Buddha possesses myriad virtues, only eight are mentioned in brief. "Exhaustion" means that all afflictions are exhausted. "Wholesome nature" means that all deeds performed by the Tathāgata are wholesome. "Actual" means not false. "True" means not spurious. The remaining four are as in the text. As for the eight items of the non-Buddhists' nirvāṇa: if it is a non-Buddhist with a distracted mind, they do not pertain to this text. Here, it takes the attainment of the concentration of neither-perception-nor-non-perception: because they can be freed from the delusions of the lower planes, it is named liberation, and thus has a wholesome nature; but it is not ultimate, true, actual, permanent, blissful, self, or pure. Therefore it is said to lack them. As for the six items of the śrāvakas, there is mutual granting and deprivation: because they do not equal the Buddha, they are deprived of permanence and self, possessing only six items; because they surpass non-Buddhists, they are granted bliss and purity. This is based on nirvāṇa with remainder, hence it speaks of the untainted eightfold noble path. Because the body and wisdom remain, it speaks of peace and bliss. Because the fetter of defilement is severed, it speaks of purity. From "If there are sentient beings..." downward is the second part, explaining the topic headings above. It does not explain the first one, but only the latter two. Because the Buddha's nirvāṇa is abundantly discussed in this sūtra, there is no need to expand on it further, whereas the latter two need explanation. This first part explains the ordinary persons' nirvāṇa. From "What are the six characteristics..." downward explains the two vehicles: the text explains that it is neither true nor actual; because they have attained the untainted eightfold noble path, it is spoken of as pure and blissful; and because they will in the future attain the great nirvāṇa, it is impermanent. Afterward, it still concludes with the distinctions. Next is the explanation of the second topic heading, knowing the buddhadhātu. Below, in the "Kāśyapa Chapter", five kinds of distinct natures are explained: first, the Buddha's buddhadhātu has seven items: (1) permanent, (2) self, (3) blissful, (4) pure, (5) true, (6) actual, and (7) wholesome. Second, the buddhadhātu of the last bodily existence has six: (1) permanent, (2) pure, (3) true, (4) actual, (5) wholesome, and (6) minimally seen. Third, the buddhadhātu of the ninth dwelling also has six: five are no different from the preceding, and the sixth is visible. What is explained here is not the Buddha's buddhadhātu, because the meaning is different. Kāishàn says: These two are both the buddhadhātu of the ninth stage. If it is the "Kāśyapa Chapter", it makes distinctions according to stage: from the first stage to the fifth stage there are five natures; from the sixth stage to the seventh stage there are five natures; the eighth and ninth stages have six natures; the tenth stage also has six natures. The buddhadhātu of the last bodily existence has seven; this is how he divides and determines it. Now this text does not explain six or seven according to stage, but comprehensively covers the causal stages of the ten stages, which cannot be divided up and matched to the various stages. Rather, one must simply know that it broadly distinguishes the ten stages, and that seeing in the future and being capable of realization are not yet fully attained; below the Buddha, this is universally explained in this way. Fourth, from the eighth dwelling down to the sixth dwelling, there are five items, which do not differ in the name "permanent". Fifth, from the fifth dwelling down to the first dwelling, there are five items, differing only in wholesome and unwholesome. Next, the explanation of the third, knowing the Tathāgata's characteristics, possesses both the unified essence and distinct essences: it first explains the essence of permanence and bliss; next, stating that showing the path can be seen is the distinct essence. Next, the explanation of the fourth, the section on knowing the Dharma, also possesses two meanings: one is the unified Dharma of permanent, blissful, self, and pure; later, impermanence and so forth are the distinct essences. Next, the explanation of the fifth, the section on knowing the Saṅgha: permanence and bliss are the unified Saṅgha, while the characteristics of disciples are the distinct Saṅgha. Next, the explanation of the sixth, knowing the dharmatā: the essence of the dharmatā is neither cause nor effect, neither existent nor non-existent; if based on its function, it universally pervades all fruits and each has different meanings. Next, the explanation of the seventh, knowing space: this was not spoken of earlier, yet there are words concluding the practice. It again has three parts: first, explaining true emptiness; second, distinguishing phenomenal emptiness; third, explaining the emptiness of nirvāṇa. Emptiness is indeed without difference, but according to dharmas it is divided into three. Alternatively, there are only two emptinesses, because nirvāṇa inherently belongs to the first. First, explaining true emptiness, hence it speaks of seeing with the wisdom eye—this seeing is non-seeing. From "Good sons, emptiness is called the absence of dharmas" downward is the second, explaining the emptiness of phenomenal cessation, raising this as a simile. From "Good sons, the nature of sentient beings..." downward is the third, explaining the emptiness of nirvāṇa. The text says that because of light it is called space; there are two explanations: one says that space cannot be seen, but merely has the function of allowing light to pass through. If it were merely empty, there would be no visible form of light; if form is seen because of space, then where there is obstruction, form is not seen; because space has no obstruction, one sees light and form. The second says that space is not what is seen by the conscious mind; the conscious mind sees light, which guides and generates the mental faculty of practice, and only then is one able to see space.

22.22

From "Although nirvāṇa is blissful..." downward is the third part, analyzing and distinguishing. Distinguishing the previous four kinds constitutes four parts of the text. First, distinguishing nirvāṇa: because it is a distinct virtue, it is exclusively the bliss of tranquility and cessation. Next, distinguishing the Buddha: since he is a person and a person unifies the dharmas, he possesses two blisses: realizing nirvāṇa, he has the bliss of tranquility and cessation; having wisdom that illuminates objects, he has the bliss of awareness and knowledge. Third, distinguishing that since dharmatā is pervasive, it possesses three blisses. Fourth, distinguishing that the buddhadhātu of the middle way can be seen in the future, and therefore possesses the bliss of bodhi. This is spoken with respect to the direct cause.

22.23

From "At that time, Brightness..." onward is the second [section], debating the doctrine. The questioning consists of two parts: first, the direct question; second, concluding with an objection. The initial direct question consists of three parts: first, asking whether the place where defilements are severed is nirvāṇa; second, asking whether the place where defilements are severed is not nirvāṇa; third, re-asking whether the place where defilements are severed is nirvāṇa. The first text also has two parts: first, taking up the essential meaning and respectfully questioning its correctness; second, the direct objection. The objection also has two parts: first, relying on the reply to Māra; second, relying on [the fact that] bodhisattvas also sever this delusion. This objection follows from the previous statement that simply the place where all buddhas sever defilements is termed nirvāṇa. According to reason, one should only object to the severing of defilements; stating that the "place" is not nirvāṇa is due to fearing that the Buddha might shift his thesis, thus proactively refuting the Buddha's intent by raising an objection based on the "place". As for the first, relying on the reply to Māra: if severing defilements were nirvāṇa, then when he first attained the Way and had already severed defilements, that would have been nirvāṇa—why wait until he had disciples of wide learning before finally entering nirvāṇa? And as for saying that "after three months is nirvāṇa", one should know that the initial severing of defilements was not yet nirvāṇa. The words of the reply to Māra appear in the Dīrgha Āgama. As for the second, citing the bodhisattva to object: if severing defilements must be nirvāṇa, then bodhisattvas also sever them, so that should also be nirvāṇa. From "If severing defilements is not nirvāṇa..." onward is the second objection; this refutes the Buddha's intent and is not the main objection, so the text is not lengthy. If severing delusion is not nirvāṇa, why did he formerly tell the brāhmaṇa: "My present body is precisely nirvāṇa"? If the body is it, then severing [defilements] is not nirvāṇa; if severing is it, then the bodily place is not. From "The Tathāgata at another time..." onward is the third [part], re-objecting that the place of severing is nirvāṇa, which again has three parts: first, still relying on the reply to Māra. When it says "three months", because the calendar systems differ, one could also say "after two months, three months, or four months": the fourth month is that of the Zhou era, the third month is that of the Yin era, and the second month is that of the Xia era. Here, saying "three months" uses the Yin era. Second, saying it is not so: for example, in the eleventh month of this year, Māra urged the Buddha to depart, and the Buddha replied, "After three months I shall enter nirvāṇa." The second relies on the time at the site of awakening; the third relies on speaking to the wrestlers and others to raise the objection. "At that time" has two explanations: one says "at that time" refers to the time at the site of awakening. Since it was already nirvāṇa at that time, why is it necessary to enter nirvāṇa in the latter part of tonight? The second says "at that time" means that on the morning of the fifteenth day of the second month it was already nirvāṇa, so why only now speak of entering nirvāṇa in the latter part of the night? The Buddha's reply consists of two parts: first, directly answering and concluding their fault. It is purely words of truth and sincerity, already not false; how much less could he utter falsehood when extending his broad and long tongue? Furthermore, the Tathāgata well understands the faculties and conditions [of beings], providing benefit in accord with the occasion: sometimes saying severing is nirvāṇa, sometimes saying severing is not nirvāṇa—these are all the Buddha's teachings, none of which are not real. Second, directly answering the three objections, though not in order: first answering the first objection, second answering the last objection, third answering the middle objection. Answering the first has two parts: first, answering regarding Māra. The reply to Māra was that he did not know nirvāṇa and regarded silence as extinction. The Buddha accorded with his sentiment; how could that be the essence of nirvāṇa? From "Good son..." onward, second, is answering the objection concerning bodhisattvas, explaining that buddhas and bodhisattvas share commonalities yet have distinctions: the Buddha has nirvāṇa, while the bodhisattva does not, because the latter is the Saṅgha jewel; therefore it is said that the Three Jewels each have distinct characteristics, yet it is said that they do not differ in the two matters of being eternal and pure. The subsequent two explanations are also like this. From "Good son, at that time I..." onward is the second [part], answering the third question that re-objects to the place of severing: first explaining that he declared nirvāṇa to extinguish evil, and second explaining that he declared nirvāṇa to generate good. In the initial extinguishing of evil, first is the doctrinal explanation, and next is broadly presenting five similes. Next, from "Good son, the Tathāgata foresaw..." onward is the time of generating good, so he declared it to be nirvāṇa. From "Good son, there is what is called nirvāṇa..." onward is the third [part], answering the middle objection that the place of severing is not nirvāṇa, clarifying that there is that which is and that which is not. If one does not see the buddhadhātu and only severs defilements, it receives the name nirvāṇa, but is not the great nirvāṇa; if one sees the buddhadhātu and severs defilements, it is the great nirvāṇa. Since right and wrong are like this, how can it be exclusively one way? It again has two parts: first, distinguishing right and wrong; second, broadly explaining the great nirvāṇa. There are eleven repetitions in total. Traditionally, people cite the first text here saying: "'Parini' means 'not', and 'vāna' means 'weaving'." They take this as the translation. In the text there is entirely no phrasing of "vāna". Furthermore, the two characters "weaving" (zhi 織) and "consciousness" (shi 識) differ in various editions of the sūtra. The remaining ten passages have textual features that can be seen. Third, concluding, as in the text (and so on).

First 23 of 28 passages. Read on

Linked texts (1)

大般涅槃經疏 — Classical Chinese