大般涅槃經疏 24.7

24.7

From "Good son, the buddhadhātu..." below is the fourth, clarifying the middle way in terms of cause and fruit; it has three: first, clarifying that there are cause and fruit; second, clarifying that it is neither cause nor fruit; third, clarifying that it is both cause and fruit, and neither cause nor fruit. One should only clarify neither cause nor fruit—how can one speak of cause and fruit? If one does not clarify cause and fruit, what is there to distinguish as negated? The first passage has doctrine and simile. Within the doctrinal explanation, it discusses two causes and two fruits: the two causes are called cause and cause-of-cause; the two fruits are called fruit and fruit-of-fruit. Investigating the intent of this passage: one cannot take the cause of the cause-aspect as cause-of-cause, but one can take the fruit of the fruit-aspect as fruit-of-fruit. One can take the fruit of the cause-aspect as cause-of-cause, and take the fruit of the fruit-aspect as fruit-of-fruit. Why is this? The single cause is the object; the double cause is the contemplation. The single fruit is bodhi; the double fruit is nirvāṇa. The object is merely a cause; it does not proceed from a cause to become a cause; it is merely a cause and not a cause-of-cause; because the wisdom of contemplation proceeds from a cause to become a cause, it is able to be the cause-of-cause. Bodhi is merely a fruit; it does not proceed from a fruit to become a fruit; it is merely a fruit and not a fruit-of-fruit; because nirvāṇa proceeds from a fruit to become a fruit, it is able to be the fruit-of-fruit. The meaning within the simile is not like this. In the simile, ignorance is taken as the cause-of-cause: ignorance in its own essence is a cause, and furthermore acts as a cause for compositional factors, hence it is a cause-of-cause. Consciousness in its own essence is a fruit, and furthermore acts as a fruit for compositional factors, hence it is a fruit-of-fruit. If one matches the doctrine by this simile, the object would be the cause-of-cause, and bodhi should be the fruit-of-fruit. Yet they do not correspond: the essence of the object is not a cause, and does not proceed from a cause to become a cause; it is merely a cause and not a cause-of-cause. The essence of the wisdom of contemplation is not a fruit, and does not proceed from a fruit to become a fruit. If so, the simile and the doctrine are at variance. Answer: it is taken as a partial simile. I personally consider: it also does not wholly take ignorance, compositional factors, and consciousness as similes for object, wisdom, bodhi, and nirvāṇa; it merely first adduces that ignorance, compositional factors, and so forth also have the names of cause, fruit, cause-of-cause, and fruit-of-fruit; hence in the passage below, it fully presents the four propositions: buddhadhātu and nirvāṇa are the first two propositions, and the twelve links of dependent origination are the third proposition. That it is called partial is because the names are the same but the meanings are different; hence it is called partial. If one wishes to take object and wisdom as two causes, and bodhi and nirvāṇa as two fruits: then the essence of the object is a cause, and furthermore acts as a cause for wisdom, hence it is called cause-of-cause; the essence of wisdom is a cause, and furthermore acts as a cause for the two fruits; by analogy, the two fruits are also like this. Following the cause to construct this, it should also be visible. From "For this reason" below is the second, clarifying that neither cause nor fruit is the correct nature of the middle way. Here the ten negations are not redundant; in the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* there is "neither cause nor fruit." From "It is cause and not fruit" below is the third, clarifying that it is both cause and fruit, and neither cause nor fruit. Kāishàn proposed five natures: "is cause and not fruit" is the objective nature; "is fruit and not cause" is the fruit-of-fruit nature; "is cause" is the revelatory cause; "is fruit" is the bodhi-fruit; "neither cause nor fruit" is the correct nature. Yet that school takes sentient beings as the correct nature, which does not correspond with the meaning of neither cause nor fruit. Zhuāngyán proposed four natures: "is cause" is the revelatory cause; "is fruit" is nirvāṇa; "is cause" is the primary cause; "is fruit" is bodhi; "neither cause nor fruit" is no longer a nature, but merely negates the preceding meanings. Master Guān also proposed five natures: "is cause and not fruit" is the objective nature; "is fruit and not cause" is the fruit-of-fruit nature; "is cause and is fruit" are the revelatory cause nature and the bodhi nature. As for the revelatory cause: viewed in relation to the objective realm, it is a fruit; viewed in relation to bodhi, it is a cause. If so, the bodhi nature should also have two perspectives: viewed in relation to the revelatory cause, it is a fruit; viewed in relation to the fruit-of-fruit, it is a cause. "Neither cause nor fruit" is the correct nature. Xīnghuáng only named it the correct dharma and the correct nature, not permitting it to be called the primary cause. In the present sūtra there is the name "primary cause"; why not permit it? However, these five natures are merely the difference of expansion and combination. The correct nature is not dual, whereas the conditioned nature is dual. The dual are cause and fruit: expanding cause brings out cause-of-cause; expanding fruit brings out fruit-of-fruit; combining the four makes two, the so-called cause and fruit; combining the two makes one, combining the conditioned into the correct, and the correct has no further number. From "For this reason" below is the third, concluding in praise of its profound depth; it also has three: first, a brief praise; second, an extensive praise; third, a general conclusion. The first, the brief praise, distinguishes that ordinary beings and Hinayānists do not see it, and only the Buddha can see it.