大般涅槃經疏 24

English (machine translation) 24

Language: English

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Composed by Master Guàndǐng of Zhāng'ān under the Sui

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Re-edited by the Tiāntái Śramaṇa Zhànrán under the Tang

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Siṃhanāda Chapter, Part One, Section Two

From "Furthermore, good son" onward is the second part, specifically raising the ubiquitous meaning, which should pervade all. It specifically raises four kinds of middle way that are ubiquitously present: first, inverted high and low; second, saṃsāra; third, annihilation and permanence; fourth, cause and effect. Another interpretation says: these four are the eight negations of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā: neither high nor low is neither coming nor going; neither cause nor effect is neither one nor different; the other two can be known. One master says: the Dharma gates are immeasurable; why must it be like this? Now we clarify that first, high and low correspond to the inversions of ordinary beings, who arbitrarily conceptualize high and low and do not see the middle way. The buddhas embody them as neither high nor low, attaining the vision of the middle way. Second, saṃsāra is explained in terms of the ubiquitous practice of the six perfections: since they do not sever the afflictions of ignorance and craving, seeking Buddhahood with a deluded mind, between these two there are birth, aging, sickness, and death, and they do not see the middle way. The buddhas embody them as neither birth nor death, attaining the vision of the middle way. Third, annihilation and permanence: explained in terms of the two vehicles' revulsion toward saṃsāra, which turns away from permanence to enter nirvāṇa, tending toward annihilation, so they do not see the middle way. The buddhas embody them as neither permanent nor annihilated, and within the teachings of the two vehicles they are able to see the middle way. Fourth, the contemplative wisdom of the twelve links of dependent origination is the cause, and attaining bodhi is the fruit; cultivating the cause to achieve the fruit in shallow and deep stages corresponds to the stages prior to the bhūmis in the Separate Teaching, where they do not see the middle way. The buddhas embody them, knowing they are neither cause nor fruit, and within the bodhisattva teachings they can see the middle way. The previous text says: "Within all dharmas there is the nature of peace and bliss." The Contemplation of Samantabhadra Sūtra says: "Vairocana pervades all places." Just as Jīvaka took up grass and made medicine, the Buddha is also like this: pervading all dharmas, there is none that is not the middle way. The middle way is itself buddhadhātu. You asked what its meaning was? Its meaning is like this. The brief correspondences being concluded, we now further comment on the text. First, stating that there are three kinds of ways begins by announcing the three headings. Next, from "The low" onward explains them. The low refers to the heterodox views of non-Buddhists who mistakenly regard Brahmā as nirvāṇa; in reality, it is not nirvāṇa but still saṃsāra, hence it is called low. That which is called the high refers to ordinary beings who have not escaped the eight inversions; regarding the impermanent as permanent, the permanent is a superior dharma and should attain a superior fruit, hence it is called high. That which is called the middle refers to the wisdom of paramārtha-śūnyatā; seeing the impermanent as impermanent, seeing in accordance with reality, unlike non-Buddhists it is not called low, and unlike ordinary beings it is not called high; rather, because it is above the two extremes, it is said to be high, and again because it is not different from the Buddha, it is said to be high.

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From "Furthermore, the original limit of birth and death" below is the second [section], clarifying the meaning of the middle way that neither arises nor dies. The text has two [parts]: first, clarifying the middle way; next, presenting understanding and delusion. The first has three: first, proclaiming the middle way; second, clarifying its ability to destroy birth and death; third, concluding with [the assertion that this] is [the buddhadhātu]. From "buddhadhātu, ignorance, and the existence of craving" below, [one might ask:] since the middle is merely compositional factors, consciousness, name-and-form, the six sense bases, and so forth, why does [the sūtra] say there are birth, aging, and death? The explanation says: a later passage states that consciousness in the present life is called future birth, and the present six sense bases and so forth are called future aging and death; the middle is precisely the meaning of birth and death. As for stating "the middle way": two causes flank one fruit, with the one fruit dwelling in the middle; to discuss the middle in this way is the wonderful middle, the meaning of destroying birth and death. Why is it that merely causes and conditions, cause and fruit, neither arising nor ceasing, are called the middle way? Now we make an easy explanation: ignorance and craving are present and past views—the path of afflictions. Pointing to the path of afflictions, it is prajñā itself; the middle is the path of suffering, which is the dharmakāya itself; the dharmakāya is the middle way itself. If it is the middle way, then there is no birth and death; because there is no birth and death, it is called destroying birth and death. From "For this reason" below is the third, concluding it as the buddhadhātu: since it is the middle way, how could it not be the buddhadhātu? From "Because all sentient beings" below is the second, presenting understanding and delusion, which has doctrine, simile, and application. Within the doctrine, it first clarifies the deluded: not seeing it, it is impermanence; next it clarifies those with understanding: being able to see it, it is not impermanence. This statement is properly used to concurrently answer the third objection. The objection stated: for what reason is it called permanent, blissful, self, and pure? Because one sees the buddhadhātu, it is permanent, blissful, self, and pure. From "For example" below, a simile is made for those with delusion and understanding, the same as the earlier simile of the poor woman. The application is as in the text.

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From "Furthermore, sentient beings give rise to views" below is the third, clarifying the middle way through neither annihilation nor permanence; it also has three: first, proclaiming the chapter heading; second, explaining it; third, concluding it. In the opening chapter heading, it clarifies ordinary beings, bodhisattvas, and the two vehicles: beforehand and afterward it presents the incorrect, and in the middle clarifies the correct. Next, from "Although the buddhadhātu is permanent" below is the explanation. It also has three: first, it explains ordinary beings, who, being veiled by ignorance, give rise to [views of] annihilation and permanence. Next, from "Moreover, having not yet crossed" below, it explains the two vehicles: simply because the hare and the horse do not reach the bottom of the river. The two vehicles' wisdom is biased, sinking into emptiness to realize attainment, failing to see that the buddhadhātu is neither impermanent nor annihilated. From "One who contemplates the twelve links of dependent origination" below is the third, explaining the section on bodhisattvas. The twelve links of dependent origination are the object of contemplation; the bodhisattva contemplates the object and generates wisdom; taking the object and wisdom together, both are called the middle way.

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From "Good son, the buddhadhātu..." below is the fourth, clarifying the middle way in terms of cause and fruit; it has three: first, clarifying that there are cause and fruit; second, clarifying that it is neither cause nor fruit; third, clarifying that it is both cause and fruit, and neither cause nor fruit. One should only clarify neither cause nor fruit—how can one speak of cause and fruit? If one does not clarify cause and fruit, what is there to distinguish as negated? The first passage has doctrine and simile. Within the doctrinal explanation, it discusses two causes and two fruits: the two causes are called cause and cause-of-cause; the two fruits are called fruit and fruit-of-fruit. Investigating the intent of this passage: one cannot take the cause of the cause-aspect as cause-of-cause, but one can take the fruit of the fruit-aspect as fruit-of-fruit. One can take the fruit of the cause-aspect as cause-of-cause, and take the fruit of the fruit-aspect as fruit-of-fruit. Why is this? The single cause is the object; the double cause is the contemplation. The single fruit is bodhi; the double fruit is nirvāṇa. The object is merely a cause; it does not proceed from a cause to become a cause; it is merely a cause and not a cause-of-cause; because the wisdom of contemplation proceeds from a cause to become a cause, it is able to be the cause-of-cause. Bodhi is merely a fruit; it does not proceed from a fruit to become a fruit; it is merely a fruit and not a fruit-of-fruit; because nirvāṇa proceeds from a fruit to become a fruit, it is able to be the fruit-of-fruit. The meaning within the simile is not like this. In the simile, ignorance is taken as the cause-of-cause: ignorance in its own essence is a cause, and furthermore acts as a cause for compositional factors, hence it is a cause-of-cause. Consciousness in its own essence is a fruit, and furthermore acts as a fruit for compositional factors, hence it is a fruit-of-fruit. If one matches the doctrine by this simile, the object would be the cause-of-cause, and bodhi should be the fruit-of-fruit. Yet they do not correspond: the essence of the object is not a cause, and does not proceed from a cause to become a cause; it is merely a cause and not a cause-of-cause. The essence of the wisdom of contemplation is not a fruit, and does not proceed from a fruit to become a fruit. If so, the simile and the doctrine are at variance. Answer: it is taken as a partial simile. I personally consider: it also does not wholly take ignorance, compositional factors, and consciousness as similes for object, wisdom, bodhi, and nirvāṇa; it merely first adduces that ignorance, compositional factors, and so forth also have the names of cause, fruit, cause-of-cause, and fruit-of-fruit; hence in the passage below, it fully presents the four propositions: buddhadhātu and nirvāṇa are the first two propositions, and the twelve links of dependent origination are the third proposition. That it is called partial is because the names are the same but the meanings are different; hence it is called partial. If one wishes to take object and wisdom as two causes, and bodhi and nirvāṇa as two fruits: then the essence of the object is a cause, and furthermore acts as a cause for wisdom, hence it is called cause-of-cause; the essence of wisdom is a cause, and furthermore acts as a cause for the two fruits; by analogy, the two fruits are also like this. Following the cause to construct this, it should also be visible. From "For this reason" below is the second, clarifying that neither cause nor fruit is the correct nature of the middle way. Here the ten negations are not redundant; in the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* there is "neither cause nor fruit." From "It is cause and not fruit" below is the third, clarifying that it is both cause and fruit, and neither cause nor fruit. Kāishàn proposed five natures: "is cause and not fruit" is the objective nature; "is fruit and not cause" is the fruit-of-fruit nature; "is cause" is the revelatory cause; "is fruit" is the bodhi-fruit; "neither cause nor fruit" is the correct nature. Yet that school takes sentient beings as the correct nature, which does not correspond with the meaning of neither cause nor fruit. Zhuāngyán proposed four natures: "is cause" is the revelatory cause; "is fruit" is nirvāṇa; "is cause" is the primary cause; "is fruit" is bodhi; "neither cause nor fruit" is no longer a nature, but merely negates the preceding meanings. Master Guān also proposed five natures: "is cause and not fruit" is the objective nature; "is fruit and not cause" is the fruit-of-fruit nature; "is cause and is fruit" are the revelatory cause nature and the bodhi nature. As for the revelatory cause: viewed in relation to the objective realm, it is a fruit; viewed in relation to bodhi, it is a cause. If so, the bodhi nature should also have two perspectives: viewed in relation to the revelatory cause, it is a fruit; viewed in relation to the fruit-of-fruit, it is a cause. "Neither cause nor fruit" is the correct nature. Xīnghuáng only named it the correct dharma and the correct nature, not permitting it to be called the primary cause. In the present sūtra there is the name "primary cause"; why not permit it? However, these five natures are merely the difference of expansion and combination. The correct nature is not dual, whereas the conditioned nature is dual. The dual are cause and fruit: expanding cause brings out cause-of-cause; expanding fruit brings out fruit-of-fruit; combining the four makes two, the so-called cause and fruit; combining the two makes one, combining the conditioned into the correct, and the correct has no further number. From "For this reason" below is the third, concluding in praise of its profound depth; it also has three: first, a brief praise; second, an extensive praise; third, a general conclusion. The first, the brief praise, distinguishes that ordinary beings and Hinayānists do not see it, and only the Buddha can see it.

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From "For what reason" below is the second, extensively explaining the profound depth, which has six: first, clarifying that dependent origination is profoundly deep; second, clarifying that because ordinary beings do not see it, it is profoundly deep; third, that only the Buddha can see it; fourth, reiterating its profound depth and being difficult to see; fifth, reiterating the ability to see; sixth, presenting both seeing and not seeing together. In the first, stating "neither permanent nor annihilated": each proposition by analogy constitutes the middle way to clarify its profound depth. Although extinguishing thought-moment by thought-moment is non-permanence, there being no loss is non-annihilation; neither annihilated nor permanent is the profound depth of the middle way. Although there being no agent is non-existence, there being karmic activity is not non-existence; this is the inconceivable, profoundly deep middle way. From "All sentient beings" below is the second, clarifying that ordinary beings do not see it. From "The ten abodes" below is the third, that only the Buddha can see it. Bodhisattvas see partially; the Tathāgata sees completely. However, since the ten abodes partially see its end, they should also partially see its beginning. Now, in alternatingly revealing and hiding [these aspects], it specifically says that with one transformation at the tenth stage one immediately becomes a Buddha; being close to the place of the end, it is therefore said that they can see its end; the beginning is remote and obscure, hence it says they do not see it. An old interpretation says: the ten abodes destroy fundamental ignorance, and future fruits do not arise, hence it says they know the end; birth and death are long and distant, and their beginning is difficult to know. Xīnghuáng says: that self-nature is non-existent is easy, but that which arises from causes and conditions is non-existent yet existent is difficult. Now it is said: the ten abodes possess the counteractive path; being able to partially sever [it], they partially see its end, but cannot partially see its beginning. For example, a robust man crushes bandits, yet does not know the root origin from which the bandits arose. I personally consider: one could also say that what the first abode severs, because it severs its beginning, is therefore called seeing the beginning. Because it also begins to sever, it is also called seeing the beginning. Therefore we know that the stage of the worthy not only fails to see the middle way, but also fails to see ignorance; hence from the side of first beginning to sever, it is named seeing the beginning. The bodhisattva of equal enlightenment has one remaining grade [of delusion]; what remains is called the end; because the end is not yet severed, they do not see the end; because it is the end of severing, it is also called seeing the end. Therefore we know that equal enlightenment not only fails to see the final tathatā, but also fails to see the final grade of ignorance; hence only the Buddha severs it, and only the Buddha can see it. That the Buddhas see the beginning and see the end means they ultimately know there is neither beginning nor end, and ultimately illuminate their beginning and end. In the text, it proceeds from the side of the arising of delusion, and for that reason is the reverse of this: "beginning" refers to the fundamental grade, and "end" refers to the final termination, because it is the coarsest and most obvious. "Seeing" refers to knowing and seeing: possessing the wisdom capable of counteraction is therefore named seeing. Because the wisdom of the first abode is shallow, it only sees the final termination, hence it is said to see the end; not yet having the wisdom to counteract the fundamental grade, it is said not to see. From "All sentient beings" below is the fourth, reiterating the failure to see. From "Therefore I..." below is the fifth, reiterating the ability to see. From "The wisdom contemplating the twelve links..." below is the sixth, presenting both seeing and not seeing together; it also has two: first, proclaiming the four chapter headings; next, explaining the four chapters. Three types do not see; only the highest of the high can see. One may use this meaning to analogize with the earlier three—[the samādhi of] stability, joy, and practice—none of which sees; the meaning is clear. Question: regarding the ten abodes seeing partially, is it only the tenth abode that sees partially, or do the ninth abode down to the first abode also see partially? Old interpretations have two views: one says that only the tenth abode sees partially, and the ninth down to the first abode do not see partially. The second says that from the first abode to the tenth abode all see partially, but one must view them from two perspectives: from the first to the ninth abode, viewed in relation to the two vehicles, it is partial seeing; viewed in relation to the tenth abode, it is not seeing. Someone objected to the former interpretation, saying: the two vehicles do not see, yet each attains bodhi. Since the nine abodes do not see, what kind of bodhi do they attain? Advancing, they are not identical to the Buddha; retreating, they are not the two vehicles; they should distinctively attain a single bodhi (and so forth). Now it is clarified: if pointing to the abodes as stages (bhūmi), and saying that all ten abodes see partially, this is the distinctive [teaching's] meaning. If the abodes are not stages, and the ten stages see while the ten abodes do not see, this is also the distinctive [teaching's] meaning. If saying that the ten abodes are the ten stages, and both stages and abodes see partially, this is the perfect [teaching's] meaning. If saying that the ten abodes are not the ten stages, and the ten abodes also see partially, this is also the perfect [teaching's] meaning. If saying that the ten abodes are not the ten stages, and stating that the nine abodes do not see while the tenth abode sees partially, this is the meaning of the distinctive [teaching] connecting to the common [teaching]. People do not recognize this, and are often obstructed in the text and the meaning (and so forth). From "For this reason" below is the third, generally concluding its profound depth. That is, the five buddhadhātus: the twelve links of dependent origination being named buddhadhātu concludes the causal nature; paramārtha-śūnyatā concludes the cause-of-cause nature; the middle way concludes the primary cause nature; being named Buddha concludes the fruit nature; nirvāṇa concludes the fruit-of-fruit nature. The text and meaning are complete; this conclusion is extremely wonderful.

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From "At that time Siṃhanāda..." below is the second [section], discussing the doctrine. This doctrine arises from the concluding remark above that sentient beings' karmic actions are extremely profound: if sentient beings and the Buddha are equal and non-dual, what use is there in cultivating the Path? At first it seems to be one question, but because the Buddha gives two answers, it forms two questions. In the Buddha's answers below, first he answers that the Buddha and the buddhadhātu are equal, and second he answers concerning the cultivation of the Path; hence we know there are two questions. The Dilun masters say: "Sentient beings are the Buddha; being fully endowed within delusion, they then have no need to cultivate the Path." This directly meets that objection. If, as the Chengshi masters say, the fruit of buddhahood lies in the future, then it does not meet this objection. Yet one cannot say that they are immediately the Buddha; here one should answer in terms of non-differentiation and differentiation. Because there is non-differentiation, they are immediately the Buddha; because there is differentiation, they are not yet fully endowed. Just as when a father begets a son, their surname has no difference, but because his functional capacities are not yet fully endowed, he requires adornment; having been adorned, he is later fully endowed. However, if one only clarifies the buddhadhātu, what does it have to do with being fully endowed or not fully endowed? Since being fully endowed relies on conditions to become complete, the buddhadhātu must also rely on conditions to become complete. If one says that the buddhadhātu lies in the future, this is based on the fruit-nature and fruit-of-fruit nature. If one says that the buddhadhātu lies in the present, this takes the cause-nature and cause-of-cause nature. If one says that the buddhadhātu is neither future nor present, this takes the direct-cause nature. If each considers itself correct, it is like blind men touching an elephant. If one perceives this meaning, there will be no dispute over future versus present. The Buddha's answer has three parts: first, refuting the question; second, the direct answer; third, citing proof. Refuting the question is as in the text. The direct answer has two parts: first, answering that there is non-differentiation and also differentiation; second, answering what use there is in cultivating the Path. The first answer has three parts: first, the direct answer; second, quoting the verse; third, citing milk and curds as an analogy. The meaning here is that based on the essence there is no difference, but according to conditions differentiation is established. The first passage has the statement of doctrine and the analogy. In the doctrinal statement, what is meant by "not yet fully endowed" is that it merely possesses the principle, while phenomenal functions are not yet complete; thus it says "not fully endowed," not that total absence is called not fully endowed. From "For example..." below is the second, the analogy, which has two parts: first the analogy, then the application. The first analogy also has two parts: first citing the bad analogy, next citing good and evil as parallel cases. The first passage means that one will certainly fall [into hell]. Just as one who kills his mother feels remorse: though his body has not yet fallen, he will certainly go without doubt. Sentient beings are also like this: they possess the principle of the buddhadhātu and will certainly attain it in the future. Next, the Buddha further cites that one who practices the ten good deeds is said to see gods and humans, and one who practices the ten evil deeds is said to see hell; this is also a future retribution. From "All sentient beings..." below is the second, applying the analogy. All sentient beings do not yet have the major and minor marks, but [are said to have them] because they will attain them in the future. One explanation says: they will attain the fruit of the major and minor marks in the future. Another explanation says: they will attain the fruit-buddhadhātu in the future. How can the buddhadhātu be future? If it is future, it is subsumed under the three times and is therefore impermanent, so one should not speak of a future-fruit buddhadhātu. As for the second part, answering by quoting the verse: a brief explanation of the verse's meaning has already been given in the preceding text. This verse appears four times: first, answering permanence and impermanence; second, answering attainment and non-attainment. Below, in twenty-six, it answers to refute fixed natures; here it answers that existence and non-existence are unfixed in order to clarify the middle way. If one only explains existence and non-existence separately, neither will accord with the verse's purport; permanence and impermanence and so forth should also be like this. Here, in accordance with the sūtra, one should explain in terms of difference, non-difference, both difference and non-difference, neither difference nor non-difference, non-oneness and non-difference, and the inconceivable, and only then will it accord with the purport of the verse. The remaining cases of permanence, impermanence, and so forth are also like this. Now, the prose explains "originally existent" as meaning that the three times are all originally existent, as in the text. Based on this, saṃsāra and nirvāṇa should each be originally existent and each be non-existent at present. If saṃsāra is originally existent, it is fully endowed with immeasurable afflictions; if saṃsāra is originally non-existent, there is originally no nirvāṇa. If nirvāṇa is originally existent, nirvāṇa's original existence did not just occur now; if nirvāṇa is originally non-existent, one has long since attained buddhahood and is free of all afflictions. Although saṃsāra is both originally existent and now non-existent, and originally non-existent and now existent, they are all bundled together as existent, because looking from nirvāṇa toward saṃsāra, saṃsāra has something attained. Although nirvāṇa is both originally existent and now non-existent, and originally non-existent and now existent, they are all bundled together as non-existent, because looking from saṃsāra toward nirvāṇa, nothing is attained. Moreover, the very "originally existent" is "now non-existent," not discussing non-existence apart from existence; the very "originally non-existent" is "now existent," not discussing existence apart from non-existence. These first three propositions are differentiation and are subsumed within the three times. The existence of "originally existent" is non-existence; the non-existence of "now non-existent" is not non-existent. Being neither existent nor non-existent, an existent phenomenon of the three times has no such basis. This single proposition is non-differentiation and is not subsumed within the three times. Further, re-clarifying the four propositions in terms of root and branch, there are naturally two roots and two branches; one root and one branch; branch and not root, root and not branch; and neither root nor branch. The text above states that a son born to a lodger is driven out by the master of the house. The master of the house is the object; how could saṃsāra not be the root? The one son is correct contemplation; how could nirvāṇa not be the branch? The text states that the great parinirvāṇa is originally present of itself. Furthermore, the tathāgatagarbha supports and establishes [all things]; how could nirvāṇa not be the root? Being deluded about the principle gives rise to afflictions; how could saṃsāra not be the branch? If each has its root, then each has its branch; for this meaning there are two roots and two branches. Furthermore, saṃsāra has no end, taking the beginning of nirvāṇa as the end of saṃsāra; nirvāṇa has no beginning, taking the end of saṃsāra as the beginning of nirvāṇa. Looking toward each other like two rivers, they mutually serve as end and beginning; this is one root and one branch. Furthermore, saṃsāra, whether root or branch, is bundled together under the name of branch because it is false and lacks a foundation; hence it is branch and not root. Nirvāṇa, whether root or branch, is entirely named root because it is real and devoid of falsity; hence it is root and not branch. Branch-root is not root; root-branch is not branch; neither root nor branch, not subsumed under the three times. Once the four propositions distinguishing root and branch are established, by analogy, being endowed and unendowed, attainment and non-attainment, permanence and impermanence, are all unfixed, and the inconceivable is also like this. That the four propositions are unfixed and inconceivable is precisely the three truths neither combined nor separate, as explained before. From "For example, a person..." below is the third, citing the analogy of milk and curds to prove future existence. This means discussing the existence of buddhadhātu with respect to the existence of mind; it does not take mind itself to be buddhadhātu. How is this different from sentient beings possessing the principle of buddhadhātu, so that when they later attain buddhahood, one does not take the sentient being to be the Buddha's mind? The Buddha's mind is also like this: it only says that having a mind constitutes [possessing] buddhadhātu; the mind is not itself the buddhadhātu.

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From "The ultimate is of two kinds..." below is the second: one must cultivate the Path. This directly answers the earlier question of what use there is in cultivating the Path. Sentient beings equally possess the direct nature of the One Vehicle, and they must cultivate the adornment of the six perfections; if they do not cultivate them, they will not attain the direct nature. Others say: "The One Vehicle is the myriad good practices." Now in this text, the One Vehicle is taken as the direct nature of the middle way; this single pure path can convey sentient beings to become buddhas, hence it is named the One Vehicle—how could it be identical to the myriad good practices? The text has two parts: first, stating the section headings; second, explaining them. The initial section headings have two pairs and four items. In the explanation that follows, it first explains taking the six perfections as the adornment and the One Vehicle as the ultimate; next, it explains the mundane and supramundane. First, the six perfections and the One Vehicle have no distinct essences, but are merely explained differently according to their meanings; among them there are analogies and applications. The first analogy says that although the retributions in Trāyastriṃśa and Uttarakuru are superior, people there cannot see the buddhadhātu. Since they are covered by ignorance and cannot see it, they must cultivate the Path. From "Furthermore, the buddhadhātu..." below explains the latter two items, again in two parts: first, explaining only the supramundane ultimate; next, explaining both the mundane and supramundane ultimates together. The first part also has three: first, bringing out the essence; second, explaining the name; third, citing similar categories. The first is as in the text. In the second, explaining the name, it says that śūraṅgama is translated as "firm." *Upādhyāya* is translated as "cultivating and regulating the mind." Yet this samādhi has general and specific aspects: the specific resides in the ultimate mind, while the general pervades all the bhūmis. From "Just as one samādhi..." below is the third, citing similar categories. "Awakening" is named the concentration awakening, that is, the concentration limb of awakening among the seven limbs of awakening. "Right" is named right concentration, that is, the right concentration among the eightfold right path. It also says that "awakening" is named the concentration awakening, that is, the concentration awakening among the eight [qualities of] great persons. Śūraṅgama is also like this, having five names (and so forth). From "Good man, all sentient beings..." below is the second, explaining both the mundane and supramundane ultimates together: the lower and intermediate are the mundane ultimate, while the superior concentration is the supramundane ultimate. Therein are two parts: first, explaining the three concentrations in full; next, re-explaining the superior concentration. In the first explanation of the three concentrations, it first explains that the superior concentration is precisely the buddhadhātu, either called the revealing cause or called the direct cause; the intermediate concentration is the form-realm concentration; the lower concentration is the mental-concomitant concentration. The Sarvāstivāda masters say: ten mental concomitants arise together, called the universal factors, pervading the five categories, namely good, evil, indeterminate, unshared, defiled, and so forth. The Chengshi says: phenomena arise with ten mental concomitants, conventionally explained as ten. Or it is said: the ten residences of the desire realm are simply the ten mental concomitants—the three evil paths, humans, and the six desire heavens. From "All sentient beings have..." below re-explains the supramundane, which is the śūraṅgama, named the "valiant aspect samādhi" in the *Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa*. From "Good man, at one time I..." below is the third, answering by citing proof. This clarifies that the Tathāgata observes whether the capacities of beings are ready: at times he teaches that the Buddha and buddhadhātu are non-different, at times he teaches that they are different, at times he teaches cultivation of the Path, and at times he teaches non-cultivation. For example, knowing the capacities of non-Buddhists, he should preach the self, or he should preach non-self (and so forth). The text has two parts: first, directly citing the past to corroborate the present; next, further reconciling and synthesizing. The first, citing the past to corroborate the present, also has two parts: first, citing the past; next, corroborating the present. Citing the past also has three parts: first, clarifying the bathing; second, the non-Buddhists' debate; third, the assembly gaining benefit. From "This buddhadhātu..." below is the second, corroborating the present. Directly stating that the buddhadhātu is non-self yet taught as self, one should not hold to it fixedly; this answers the question regarding cultivating the Path. From "The Tathāgata, due to conditions..." below is the second, reconciling and synthesizing. The Tathāgata is completely sovereign: he either takes self as non-self, or non-self as self. Furthermore, another explanation says: in the cause it is buddhadhātu, hence it is said to be non-self; in the fruit it is buddhadhātu, hence it is said to be self (and so forth).

24.11

From "At that time Siṃhanāda..." onward, the third part answers the fourth question above, which consists of two parts: first, stating the question; second, giving the direct answer. First, in stating the question, there is an extensive statement by the vajra-holding warrior. The direct answer consists of two parts: first, the direct answer; second, the concluding praise. Within the first, the direct answer, seven parables are raised in total, broadly conveying three intentions: the first three parables illustrate that [the buddhadhātu] exists yet is not seen; the middle single parable illustrates that it is equally possessed by all; the third set of three parables illustrates that it is seen by depending upon conditions. These three intentions follow in sequence. Although it is said to exist yet not be seen, is it unknown whether it is unseen because it definitely exists, or unseen because it definitely does not exist? The next single parable illustrates that it definitely exists. Since it definitely exists, why is it not seen? The next answers that one must await causes and conditions, and only then is it seen. In the first three parables, each first gives the parable and then the application. The first is the parable of the blind person, which illustrates that ordinary beings at the bottom are like the blind and thus do not see. Form illustrates the buddhadhātu. The Abhidharma masters explain form as having twenty kinds: blue, yellow, red, white; high, low, crooked, straight, square, round, long, short; light, shade, bright, dark; smoke, cloud, dust, fog. Some add empty space as the single revealing form of space, like a film over the eye. The second is the parable of eye disease, which illustrates that the bodhisattvas have a slight film over their eyes and cannot see form; this illustrates that the bodhisattvas, having afflictions, do not see the buddhadhātu, differing from the previously mentioned blind person. In the application of the parable, the bodhisattvas of the ten stages are first cited; afterwards, four kinds of persons are further cited: ordinary beings, the two vehicles, the ten abodes, and the Tathāgata. The Tathāgata sees completely, the bodhisattvas see partially, and two do not see at all. From "Just as the new moon..." onward, the third parable also illustrates that sentient beings who have not severed delusion do not see, while those who have severed delusion do see. Just as the moon on the first day cannot be seen, but gradually becomes visible, the buddhadhātu is also like this: this principle is fundamentally present, but the afflictions of sentient beings prevent them from seeing it; as delusion is gradually exhausted, it gradually comes to be seen. The text states that all sentient beings possess the nature of great compassion, the ten powers, and so forth. Ancient masters said that it is possessed in the future, not yet present in actuality, citing the passage below: "Only after destroying [the nature of] an icchantika is it obtained." Masters of the Daśabhūmika School explain: the buddhadhātu of the true spirit is like gold wrapped in dirty cloth; great friendliness, great compassion, the ten powers, and the marks and signs are completely present in reality, but obscured by delusions; if one removes the afflictions, one will see it, just as removing the dirty cloth reveals the gold. Master Guan says: these two interpretations undermine each other. If it is only possessed in the future, this sūtra text says that sentient beings possess great compassion, the ten powers, and the four fearlessnesses. Since it says all possess them, how could one say it is in the future? If one says it exists presently, like gold covered by cloth, then since the buddhadhātu is valiant, why does it not dispel delusion? Clinging either to future or present is merely contentious debate. It simply possesses this principle, so it cannot be relegated to the future; it is obtained only through cultivating the path, so it cannot be called presently actual. Those three interpretations rely on one-sided stances and do not accord with the perfect purport. Why? The buddhadhātu is not one, two, or three, yet for sentient beings it is distinguished through four gates: sometimes it is said to be paramārtha-śūnyatā, like the emptiness of Kapilavastu; sometimes it is said to be not empty, which is wisdom, like the poor storehouse and the forehead jewel; sometimes it is said to be both empty and existing, like a jar of water or wine; sometimes it is said to be neither existing nor empty, termed the middle way. The intention is to make one awaken to the non-four through the four, and abandon grasping the four in seeking comprehension. The treatise masters point to the future, so this grasping is [the gate of] non-existence. The Daśabhūmika masters speak of being obscured by delusion, so this grasping is [the gate of] existence. What Master Guan stated is the gate of grasping both existence and non-existence. Now we explain that the buddhadhātu is like the king seeing the elephant, while what the various masters saw is entirely identical to the blind touching it (and so forth). In applying the last parable, regarding the "three kinds of destroying afflictions," ancient masters held two interpretations. The first says: the afflictions of the two realms, view and thought, are afflictions of the defiled land within the triple world; habit-energy is the affliction of the pure land between the two realms; ignorance is the affliction beyond the triple world. Bodhisattvas of the seventh stage sever the afflictions between the two realms, which are utilized for adornment. The second interpretation says: [afflictions severed by] seeing the truth are the first affliction, [afflictions severed by] cultivation are the second affliction, and habit-energy is the third affliction. The original fundamental aspects of ignorance are identical in number with habit-energy, so they are not mentioned separately. From the first to the third stage, one severs view; from the fourth to the sixth stage, one severs thought; those of the seventh and eighth stages sever both habit-energy and ignorance. This is Kāishàn's interpretation. Another master challenged these two interpretations: The text completes the statement of the three kinds of destroying afflictions, but does not identify how afflictions are destroyed. It only gives three names, which contradicts the sūtra. If one discusses the intention of destruction, it should be as in the Dàzhìdù Lùn where the three contemplations remedy the three kinds of illnesses, and also like the Benye Jing where entering emptiness from provisionality is called the contemplation of the two truths, and entering provisionality from emptiness is called the contemplation of equality. Taking the two contemplations as expedients, one is able to enter the contemplation of the paramārthasatya of the middle way; using these three contemplations one can destroy afflictions. Furthermore, the conventional truth destroys the illness of inherent nature, and the ultimate truth destroys the illness of provisionality. These two truths only speak of subduing as severing; if one is neither ultimate nor existing, this is the contemplation of the middle way, which simultaneously removes both illnesses of nature and provisionality, and is termed severing afflictions. Now we explain that this meaning is not so. The previous two interpretations contradict the sūtra; Master Guan refuted their contradiction of the sūtra, but we now challenge his interpretation as biased. If after the three kinds of destroying afflictions one sees the buddhadhātu, when one destroys the defiled land afflictions of view and thought, and destroys the intermediate pure land afflictions, does one see the nature or not? If one sees the nature, people of the two vehicles also destroy view and thought, so why do they not see it? If they do not see the nature, that contradicts the sūtra. Kāishàn says: destroying views is the first, destroying thoughts is the second. Srotāpannas up to the four fruits all destroy view and thought; do they see the nature or not? If they see the nature, this is impossible; if they do not see it, that contradicts the sūtra. Furthermore, the contemplation of the two truths and the contemplation of equality are both expedients; if one does not enter the middle way, one also does not see the nature, which again contradicts the sūtra. The conventional truth destroying inherent nature and the ultimate truth destroying provisionality are subduing and not severing, and again one does not see the nature, which also contradicts the sūtra. Only those who sever afflictions through neither conventional nor ultimate see the nature. Although three kinds of destroying afflictions are named, two kinds of destruction do not see the nature, and only one kind of destruction sees it. The sūtra declares that all three kinds of destroying afflictions see the buddhadhātu; if one kind of destruction sees it and two kinds of destruction do not see it, how can they correspond? Now we clarify: when the seventh stage cultivates expedients and the eighth stage has path and contemplation flowing concurrently, destroying ignorance and seeing the buddhadhātu, this is the distinct [teaching] connecting the shared [teaching], which is one kind of destroying afflictions and seeing the buddhadhātu. If entering the prajñā of principle is called the abodes, destroying the afflictions of the four abodes to produce merit is called the ten practices, destroying dust-and-sand delusions does not yet see the buddhadhātu, the ten dedications subdue ignorance, and ascending to the stages destroys ignorance and sees the buddhadhātu. This is the gradual destruction of delusions in the distinct teaching, which is another kind of destroying afflictions and seeing the buddhadhātu. If one perfectly contemplates the dharmadhātu, afflictions are precisely bodhi; at the initial aspiration of mind, one immediately achieves right awakening and enters the rank of the bronze wheel, and when ascending the first abode, one destroys ignorance and sees the buddhadhātu. The meaning of these three kinds of destroying delusions is luminous, and all see the nature, which accords with the sūtra text; how could the various virtuous masters know this? Furthermore, when one emptiness is all emptiness, the three truths are all empty; this contemplation destroys the afflictions of the five abodes and can see the buddhadhātu. Furthermore, when one provisionality is all provisionality, the three truths are all provisional; this contemplation also destroys the afflictions of the five abodes and can see the buddhadhātu. Furthermore, when one middle is all middle, the three truths are all middle; this contemplation also destroys the afflictions of the five abodes and can see the buddhadhātu. These three kinds, both in number and meaning, precisely accord with the sūtra, which the various virtuous masters were also unable to know: the previous three kinds of destroying delusion are based on the distinct purport, while the latter three kinds of contemplation are based on the perfect purport. From "Good sons, the twelve links of dependent origination..." onward, the second part contains one parable, which illustrates that it is equally possessed by all; first the parable, then the application. The previous parable was in terms of the external, while the present parable is in terms of the internal, containing four sections: first, stating equal possession; second, identifying the essence of dependent origination; third, explaining possessed completely or not completely; fourth, concluding equal possession. First, in explaining equal possession, speaking of "both internal and external" refers only to humans, not to external objects. Mind is internal, while form is external; because both form and mind are possessed, it says internal and external. It is also said: being in the womb is internal, and exiting the womb is external. Personally, I note: the text itself speaks of internal and external covetous seeking and performing internal and external affairs. However, in this text, it is not meant that the twelve links serve as the meditative object of contemplation, but simply that the twelve are taken as the buddhadhātu. For example, the twelve links are distinguished branch by branch to enable sentient beings to recognize the aspects of transmigration across the three periods of time; how could it be that at the time of ignorance there is only ignorance? Therefore, one knows that up through old age and death, the twelve are always complete. Hence the application below states that the buddhadhātu is also like this; how could it be that when one is a sentient being, there is only a sentient being? How much more so is it that each and every sentient being in every thought completely possesses the causes and conditions of the environment and sentient beings of the ten realms and hundred realms; therefore, within each realm there is nothing that is not the buddhadhātu. Thus the words "internal and external" contain many meanings. From "What are the twelve..." onward, the second section identifies the essence of dependent origination, explaining the twelve branches in detail. Past [existence] completely possesses cause and effect; why are the two causes taken and not the effect? The past effect has already recompensed previous causes, therefore it is not taken. Thus the two causes produce the present five effects, and the present three causes are taken to produce the future two effects. There are two interpretations of the consciousness branch: first, the first seven days of conception in the womb are consciousness; at that time form exists, but form is not yet manifest while the function of consciousness is already manifest, hence it receives the name consciousness. Second, simply taking the first thought of entering the womb: although form is present, form is not yet complete. Yet it is named consciousness because consciousness is the master of retribution, and therefore it is called consciousness. Also, reaching the second thought is the name-and-form branch. This interpretation is slightly superior. Entering the five parts of the womb explains the fourth branch, name-and-form, also called the five vesicles: the two hands, two feet, and the head. "The four faculties not yet complete" means there are only body and mind, but not yet eye, ear, nose, or tongue. Regarding "name-and-form," there are two interpretations: first, the form aggregate is form, and the other four aggregates are named name. Second, simply this form along with the name of the sentient being, therefore it is called name-and-form. Next, being complete with the four faculties is the fifth branch; since it is complete with the four faculties, the six faculties are all complete, hence it is called the six sense bases. From this point onward, coarse and subtle aspects arise. If subtle aspects arise, it is the conscious mind within the womb, not yet having perception or feeling; if coarse aspects arise, it is when first emerging from the womb, not yet able to grasp fire or touch poison, like an infant of one or two months not distinguishing pain and pleasure. Below, the sixth branch, contact: if subtle arising aspects, it is the perceiving mind within the womb not knowing pain and pleasure; if coarse arising aspects, it is at one or two years of age, already able to grasp fire or touch poison but not yet having understanding, holding an object in hand without distinguishing precious from cheap. Habitually practicing a single craving is the seventh branch, feeling; after the five effects, if subtle aspects arise, it is the feeling mind within the womb. Speaking of "a single craving" means generating thought and attachment toward a single pleasurable condition. If coarse aspects arise, it is at three or four years of age, only knowing craving for food, not yet knowing the five desires. Habitually approaching the five desires is the eighth branch, craving, which is the beginning of the three causes. If subtle aspects arise, it is the beginning of the volitional mind within the womb. Regarding the volitional mind, there are three: the first is craving, the middle is grasping, and the last is becoming. If coarse aspects arise, it is at eight or nine years of age, gradually knowing sensual craving. Covetous seeking internally and externally is the ninth branch: at ten-odd years old, having grown a bit larger, one is increasingly able to covetously seek, and volition slightly increases. From "performing internal and external affairs" onward, the tenth branch arises: at ten-odd years old, the body grows up, spanning a full hundred years. From "consciousness in the present world" onward, the eleventh branch is the beginning of the future two effects, corresponding back to the period of the present consciousness branch, namely the single thought of first conception. From "name-and-form in the present" onward, the twelfth branch corresponds back to the time of present name-and-form and so on, namely the future branch of old age and death. Consciousness, name-and-form, six sense bases, and so on are all the future two effects; the future two effects are still the present consciousness, name-and-form, and six sense bases, but their names are changed to designate them. Regarding whether complete or incomplete, concerning the form realm lacking the three feelings, there are two interpretations: first, among the three feelings it does not have painful feeling, hence it is said to lack three. It also lacks the perception associated with painful feeling, hence it is said to lack three kinds of contact. It also lacks the volition associated with painful feeling, hence it is said to lack three kinds of craving. If the form and formless realms do not completely possess the twelve, why does the text say they can also be said to completely possess the twelve? Dying as a kalala and being born in the form or formless realms, although they do not completely possess the twelve, the wheel of suffering has not ceased. Transmigrating through the three realms, they ultimately complete the twelve. Second interpretation: based on the fourth dhyāna up to the formless realm, there is no longer suffering or pleasure, nor is there neutral equanimity, hence it is said to lack three feelings. Since the formless realm lacks form, it does not completely possess the twelve. From "Because it is definitely obtained..." onward, the fourth concludes that all completely possess the twelve. Since the wheel of suffering has not ceased, viewing it broadly from beginning to end, it is said that all completely possess them. The buddhadhātu is also like this. Second, the application of the parable: the six destinies and four modes of birth all possess the twelve links, which illustrates that all sentient beings equally possess the buddhadhātu. From "The snowy mountains have an herb..." onward, the third set of three parables explains that it is seen only upon waiting for conditions. This consists of three parts. In the first text, there are the parable and the application. Within the application, there are two parts: first, the direct application; second, explaining the principle. Explaining the principle also has three parts: first, stating nine chapter-headings, each heading having three phrases, totaling twenty-seven phrases. Second, the explanation: in the explanation, three matters are extensively introduced that are not in the headings, totaling thirty-six phrases listed. The final two instances of "good sons" form the third part, the general conclusion (and so on). The second raises the parable of black iron; the third raises the parable of the seed. The first two parables each have the parable first and then the application, while the latter parable has no text for application. From "This great nirvāṇa..." onward, the second part provides the concluding praise, as in the text.

First 11 of 15 passages. Read on

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大般涅槃經疏 — Classical Chinese