大般涅槃經疏 25.8

25.8

Next is the fourth exchange of questions and answers. The question has three parts: first, acknowledging the import and respectfully demurring; second, raising the six kinds of non-existence to make a challenge; third, concluding. Next, 'absolute non-existence' is merely rhetorical momentum, not the primary intent; it primarily takes 'occasional non-existence' to make the challenge. When speaking of 'having a cause', there are the cause of cultivation (bhāvanā-hetu) and the elucidating cause (vyañjaka-hetu); when speaking of 'having no cause', there are no generative cause (janaka-hetu) and no retributional cause (vipāka-hetu). Therefore, it raises 'occasional non-existence' to make the challenge. Like rain and drought in pools and ponds, like clouds obscuring and dispersing around the sun and moon, the presence and absence of causes seems similar to this. 'Non-existence due to scarcity' means non-existent because it is scarce, not entirely non-existent. 'Non-existence due to non-acceptance' means non-existent merely because it is not received, not that the dharma itself does not exist; non-acceptance of evil is also like this, and non-confrontation is likewise so. The latter three kinds of non-existence all have the sense of mutual non-existence. Third, concluding, as in the text. The Buddha's answer has two parts: first, clarifying 'having no cause'; second, clarifying 'having a cause'. First, answering 'having no cause' has three parts: first, rejecting five to adopt one; second, rejecting all six analogies together; third, concluding 'having no cause'. First, 'rejecting five to adopt one' means: you took absolute non-existence as the primary challenge, which is not yet entirely correct but has a small portion that is correct, and therefore it is adopted; how much less could the five analogies be compatible? Next, rejecting all six analogies together: the six are worldly dharmas, which cannot be matched against supramundane dharmas; and the reason for reiterating the rejection of absolute non-existence is that it falls into nihilism, no-self, and no-mine, and thus contradicts nirvāṇa. Nirvāṇa has a self, so it is stated again. Third, from 'Good son' onward, concluding the intent as in the text. From 'It is a cause and not a fruit' onward, the second part answers that nirvāṇa is a cause and not a fruit. The text has two parts: first, stating the heading; second, explaining it. Stating the heading clarifies that nirvāṇa is a cause: taking the buddhadhātu as the cause is precisely the elucidating cause. It also singles out that it is not a cause, meaning not a generative cause; and states that it is not a fruit, meaning not the minor fruit of a śramaṇa. The earlier reference to the 'fruit of a śramaṇa' pointed to the fruit of buddhahood as the fruit of a śramaṇa and brāhmaṇa. From 'Causes are of two kinds' onward, the explanatory text has three parts: first, clarifying that there are the two causes, generative and elucidating; second, raising three analogies to illustrate them; third, raising doctrinal categories in three turns to apply them. In the application, direct connection is consistently used for the generative cause, and indirect connection for the elucidating cause. Although this explains an inconceivable dharma, it is briefly necessary to make distinctions. In the previous turn, phenomena and principle were contrasted: the six pāramitās are phenomena and serve as the generative cause; the buddhadhātu is principle and serves as the elucidating cause. Next, concentration and distraction are contrasted; afterward, horizontal and vertical are contrasted (and so on). In the initial text, mentioning 'bodhi' is intended to clarify taking the fruit through the cause, and also raising the fruit to establish the cause. Question: Nirvāṇa has no cause, yet generatively and elucidatingly two causes are doctrinally spoken of; should generative and elucidating two fruits not also be doctrinally spoken of? Answer: What is accomplished by the elucidating cause is precisely the elucidated fruit; what is brought forth by the generative cause is precisely the generated fruit. Why should there not simultaneously be two distinct fruits? The generated fruit is impermanent, while the elucidated fruit is permanent. People of the world consider this pairing unacceptable. This is an inconceivable dharma-gate; what could not be acceptable? For now, let us resolve it using the Śūraṅgama: for example, a magician dies in front of the multitude, and after obtaining wealth and property, comes back to life again. The 'two birds flying together' in the present sūtra is precisely this meaning. From 'Near is...' onward, the text states that the Buddha's bodies are of two kinds: one is permanent, and two is impermanent (and so on). From 'Siṃhanāda' onward, third, there is one turn of question and answer that concludes and establishes the fundamental tenet. This question arises from the earlier seeing with the eyes and seeing by hearing the Tathāgata's buddhadhātu. As the nature of the buddhadhātu transcends form and non-form, how can it be seen? The Buddha's answers to this are two; both are answered repeatedly, and both open up two meanings; hence there are the visible and the invisible, as in the text.