大般涅槃經疏 25

English (machine translation) 25

Language: English

25.1

Composed by Master Guàndǐng of Zhāng'ān under the Sui

25.2

Revised by the Śramaṇa Zhànrán of Tiāntái under the Tang

The opening of the fascicle is the second part, exhorting cultivation; first is the exhortation to cultivate, and second is the discussion of doctrines. Above it was said that from the hearing-seeing of the tenth abode up to the eye-seeing of the Buddha, if one wishes to see through hearing and see with the eyes, one should uphold the twelve divisions of scriptures; therefore there is an exhortation to cultivate. From "Siṃhanāda said..." below is the second part, the discussion of doctrines, with six rounds of questions and answers: the first round clarifies the meaning of seeing; the middle four rounds clarify the practices capable of seeing; and the last concludes and establishes it. In the first passage, there is first a question and next the answer. In the initial question, it was said above that the Tathāgata transcends ordinary beings wondrously. How can there be seeing and hearing? Therefore the question was raised. Next, in the answer from "Good man..." below, there are two parts: first clarifying that it is truly unknowable; next, from "If one wishes to observe..." below, clarifying that there is also that which can be known. Above, eye-seeing was taken in terms of ultimate realization, and hearing-seeing in terms of partial realization; here, hearing-seeing is taken in terms of the practice of ordinary beings, while eye-seeing is taken when the power of the path is strong. The physical body is weak; earlier, the "Chapter on the King of Virtues" stated that seeing the Buddha newly born or leaving household life without penetrating the wondrous origin is entirely a distorted view. Now, beholding the Tathāgata take seven steps upon birth and knowing this to be an expedient means constitutes seeing the Buddha. Each has its basis, and they must not be treated as uniform. In this there are three parts: first stating the topic, second explaining it, and third concluding. The first statement is as in the text. In the explanation, the text has six rounds: first, the two karmas of body and speech; second, the two excellences of form and sound; third, physical supernormal power and mental supernormal power; fourth, receiving a body and expounding the Dharma; fifth, patience of body and speech; sixth, physical form and vocal preaching. The first five can be understood. In the sixth passage, at the end of the text on hearing and seeing, it says that expounding the middle way for the Brahmā King is in terms of the explicit teaching; expounding the four truths so that five people attain the first fruition is in terms of the esoteric teaching; expounding the middle way so that immeasurable bodhisattvas attain the forbearance of non-arising up to the stage of one lifetime remaining. Furthermore, those of dull faculties hear the four truths of arising and cessation, and those of medium faculties hear the four truths of non-arising, and thus do not hear the exposition of the middle way. Those of sharp faculties hear the exposition of the immeasurable and unconditioned four truths, which is the exposition of the middle way. There are five rounds explaining the middle way: either discussing the middle way by mutually relinquishing both, or discussing the middle way by mutual completion, or discussing the middle way by mutually illuminating both. In private opinion: mutually relinquishing both belongs to the two teachings; mutual completion belongs to the distinctive teaching; mutually illuminating both belongs to the perfect teaching; this can be traced in the text. From "The marks of the Tathāgata's mind..." below is the third part, concluding and establishing, as in the text.

25.5

From "At that time, Siṃhanāda..." below is the second part with four rounds of questions and answers, clarifying the practice that enables seeing. In the first round, there is first a question, then an answer. The question also has two parts: first questioning with reference to the Saṅgha jewel, then raising an objection based on the Buddha's words. The first passage is a question about the people of the four reliances: the mind is the internal root, and conduct is the external trace. As for "the first two kinds," because the first two may be confused with the latter two, they are unknowable. From "As the Buddha has spoken..." below is the second part, directly raising the objection concerning the Buddha. Leaving aside the Saṅgha jewel which is already hard to know, how much more so the Tathāgata? Merely seeing the physical body and hearing the preaching of Dharma, how can one know this is the Tathāgata based on these two matters? The Buddha's answer also has two parts: first answering concerning the Saṅgha, then answering concerning the Buddha. The first answer concerning the Saṅgha has three parts: first, repeating the question. From "Because they are hard to know..." below, next knowing through four conditions. From "Being endowed with four matters..." below, third, concluding and establishing, which can be understood. From "Morality is of two kinds..." below is the second part answering the question concerning the Buddha. There are also six rounds: the first round, is upholding morality ultimate or non-ultimate? From "Furthermore, there are two kinds..." below is the second round, is it for gain or not for gain? The latter four rounds are all as in the text, and can be traced.

25.6

From "Siṃhanāda said..." below is the next round of question and answer. Earlier it was said that by upholding the bodhisattva precepts one attains seeing the buddhadhātu; does one make a demand, or does one not make a demand? If one makes a demand, it is the method of commerce; if one does not make a demand, one practices without aspiration. Not knowing how it is, this question was raised. The Buddha's answer has two parts: first, initiating the fourteen propositions. Dharmatā is naturally so and its aspects are adjacent to each other; functioning spontaneously in accord with reality, it does not involve making a demand. If the mind does not regret, upholding morality is not shallow. Next, from "Upholding morality..." below, the mind spontaneously matures, one attains seeing the buddhadhātu, and abides in great nirvāṇa (and so forth).

25.7

The third exchange of questions and answers. Within the question, there are also three parts: first, acknowledging the import; second, raising a challenge; third, concluding. The first is as in the text. Next, in raising the challenge, it first challenges: Śīla is the foundation of all practices; it has an effect but no cause, so it should be real and permanent. Nirvāṇa lies at the end of all practices; it has a cause but no effect, so it should be impermanent. Finally, it uniquely concludes on one side, which is visible (and so on). The Buddha's answer: first, praising; second, answering. Within the praise, there are three parts: first, praising the depth of the cause; second, praising the power of upholding [śīla]; third, admonishing [him] to listen. The first is as in the text. In the next text, the reason that Śāntalabdha's time was long while Śākyamuni's days were short is due to what was appropriate to conditions; for example, the sixty small kalpas of Candrasūryapradīpa were like the span of a meal here (and so on). Second, the Buddha answers. First, answering the question that upholding śīla has no cause: there are the doctrine, the analogies, and the application. In the doctrine, there are two parts: first, declaring that it has a cause; second, preventing [the fallacy of] infinite regress. First, 'having a cause' means taking listening to the Dharma, good friends, and so forth as the causes of śīla. From 'Faith is caused by listening to the Dharma' onward, the second part prevents the challenge of fearing infinite regress; hence it points out that the two dharmas mutually serve as cause and effect. Next, from 'For example' onward, three analogies in all are raised. The first is formulated as an analogy to prevent infinite regress. Many teachers say: The pure-living Nirgrantha does not place his vase on the ground; three pieces of wood serve as a tripod to support the single vase; the vase stands by virtue of the tripod, and the tripod is completed relying on the vase. Second, Emperor Wu of Liang said: 'The Nirgrantha eats cow dung with his mouth and exposes his defiled genitals nakedly; what pure conduct does he have that could be praised? The tripod is what is nowadays called a suction tube (ke-wu) for drawing water, also called a windlass (lu-lu); installed over a well, they alternately go up and down, which is precisely the meaning of mutually serving as cause and effect.' As for saying 'Nirgrantha', it points to the fact that his household has this tripod. Next, the twelve links of dependent origination are raised as an analogy. If one definitely specifies three time periods, using it as an analogy here is inconvenient; taking saṃsāra's endlessness, the meaning of mutual [causation] is established. Third, the eight characteristics in the Hīnayāna are raised as an analogy: the primary arising is simply called 'arising' (jāti), while secondary arising is called 'arising of arising' (jāti-jāti). The masters of the Tattvasiddhi Śāstra refute the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma's doctrine of primary and secondary arising, explaining this text by saying: 'The lifespan of one period is the primary arising; momentary arising and ceasing is the secondary arising. Because of one period, there are moments; because of moments, there is one period.' They do not thoroughly understand the text, and furthermore do not permit the use of the Abhidharma doctrine. This should not be so; refutation and establishment are suited to the occasion, so how can borrowing an analogy be mistaken? In my private view: The ancients took one period and moments as mutually generating each other—why should that not be acceptable? However, it does not equal the kṣaṇa; the eight characteristics are within a single kṣaṇa as both arising and the arising of arising. Therefore, within a single kṣaṇa, the primary characteristic is the cause, and the secondary characteristic is the cause of the cause; the secondary characteristic is the fruit, and the primary characteristic is the fruit of the fruit. This is precisely mutual causation and mutual fruition. Just as with a single faithful mind: this very faithful mind is the mind that listens to the Dharma, and this very mind that listens to the Dharma is the faithful mind; though they are the same single thought-moment, they are mutually causal to one another. Since they are mutually causal, they mutually accomplish the fruits. From 'Faith and listening to the Dharma' onward, it applies the analogies, answering the former first challenge and clarifying that śīla has a cause. From 'It is a fruit and not a cause' onward, it answers the latter challenge, clarifying the answer that nirvāṇa is a fruit and has no cause. The latter also has three parts: first, stating the two headings: one, it is a fruit; two, it is not a cause. Next, from 'Why is it called a fruit?' onward, it explains the heading of 'being a fruit'. Because it is a supramundane fruit, it is called a superior fruit. Because it is a fruit of cultivation, it is [the fruit of] a śramaṇa. Because the fruit of a brāhmaṇa is the fruit of buddhahood, it says 'severing birth and death'. Because it is an absolute fruit, it says 'free from afflictions'. Afflictions are called 'faults beyond faults' (guo-guo) because their essence is the cause of death—one fault further obtains the fruit of suffering, hence they are called 'faults beyond faults'. Furthermore, fundamental ignorance can obscure principle and can also obstruct wisdom, so it is a 'fault beyond faults'. From 'Nirvāṇa has no cause' onward, the second part explains the heading of 'not being a cause'. 'Having no arising and ceasing' means having no worldly cause. 'Having nothing done' means having no retributional cause. 'Not conditioned' means having no generative cause. The three phrases 'constant, unchanging', etc., signify having no relative cause. Third, from 'Good son' onward, it concludes the meaning of having no cause.

25.8

Next is the fourth exchange of questions and answers. The question has three parts: first, acknowledging the import and respectfully demurring; second, raising the six kinds of non-existence to make a challenge; third, concluding. Next, 'absolute non-existence' is merely rhetorical momentum, not the primary intent; it primarily takes 'occasional non-existence' to make the challenge. When speaking of 'having a cause', there are the cause of cultivation (bhāvanā-hetu) and the elucidating cause (vyañjaka-hetu); when speaking of 'having no cause', there are no generative cause (janaka-hetu) and no retributional cause (vipāka-hetu). Therefore, it raises 'occasional non-existence' to make the challenge. Like rain and drought in pools and ponds, like clouds obscuring and dispersing around the sun and moon, the presence and absence of causes seems similar to this. 'Non-existence due to scarcity' means non-existent because it is scarce, not entirely non-existent. 'Non-existence due to non-acceptance' means non-existent merely because it is not received, not that the dharma itself does not exist; non-acceptance of evil is also like this, and non-confrontation is likewise so. The latter three kinds of non-existence all have the sense of mutual non-existence. Third, concluding, as in the text. The Buddha's answer has two parts: first, clarifying 'having no cause'; second, clarifying 'having a cause'. First, answering 'having no cause' has three parts: first, rejecting five to adopt one; second, rejecting all six analogies together; third, concluding 'having no cause'. First, 'rejecting five to adopt one' means: you took absolute non-existence as the primary challenge, which is not yet entirely correct but has a small portion that is correct, and therefore it is adopted; how much less could the five analogies be compatible? Next, rejecting all six analogies together: the six are worldly dharmas, which cannot be matched against supramundane dharmas; and the reason for reiterating the rejection of absolute non-existence is that it falls into nihilism, no-self, and no-mine, and thus contradicts nirvāṇa. Nirvāṇa has a self, so it is stated again. Third, from 'Good son' onward, concluding the intent as in the text. From 'It is a cause and not a fruit' onward, the second part answers that nirvāṇa is a cause and not a fruit. The text has two parts: first, stating the heading; second, explaining it. Stating the heading clarifies that nirvāṇa is a cause: taking the buddhadhātu as the cause is precisely the elucidating cause. It also singles out that it is not a cause, meaning not a generative cause; and states that it is not a fruit, meaning not the minor fruit of a śramaṇa. The earlier reference to the 'fruit of a śramaṇa' pointed to the fruit of buddhahood as the fruit of a śramaṇa and brāhmaṇa. From 'Causes are of two kinds' onward, the explanatory text has three parts: first, clarifying that there are the two causes, generative and elucidating; second, raising three analogies to illustrate them; third, raising doctrinal categories in three turns to apply them. In the application, direct connection is consistently used for the generative cause, and indirect connection for the elucidating cause. Although this explains an inconceivable dharma, it is briefly necessary to make distinctions. In the previous turn, phenomena and principle were contrasted: the six pāramitās are phenomena and serve as the generative cause; the buddhadhātu is principle and serves as the elucidating cause. Next, concentration and distraction are contrasted; afterward, horizontal and vertical are contrasted (and so on). In the initial text, mentioning 'bodhi' is intended to clarify taking the fruit through the cause, and also raising the fruit to establish the cause. Question: Nirvāṇa has no cause, yet generatively and elucidatingly two causes are doctrinally spoken of; should generative and elucidating two fruits not also be doctrinally spoken of? Answer: What is accomplished by the elucidating cause is precisely the elucidated fruit; what is brought forth by the generative cause is precisely the generated fruit. Why should there not simultaneously be two distinct fruits? The generated fruit is impermanent, while the elucidated fruit is permanent. People of the world consider this pairing unacceptable. This is an inconceivable dharma-gate; what could not be acceptable? For now, let us resolve it using the Śūraṅgama: for example, a magician dies in front of the multitude, and after obtaining wealth and property, comes back to life again. The 'two birds flying together' in the present sūtra is precisely this meaning. From 'Near is...' onward, the text states that the Buddha's bodies are of two kinds: one is permanent, and two is impermanent (and so on). From 'Siṃhanāda' onward, third, there is one turn of question and answer that concludes and establishes the fundamental tenet. This question arises from the earlier seeing with the eyes and seeing by hearing the Tathāgata's buddhadhātu. As the nature of the buddhadhātu transcends form and non-form, how can it be seen? The Buddha's answers to this are two; both are answered repeatedly, and both open up two meanings; hence there are the visible and the invisible, as in the text.

25.9

From 'The buddhadhātu is neither internal nor external' onward is the second major section in this chapter. Previously it was explained in terms of the buddhadhātu; here it is explained in terms of the middle way. The text has three parts: first, briefly setting forth the middle way; second, extensively refuting one-sided attachments; third, concluding with praise of the buddhadhātu. First, setting forth the middle way has three phrases. In the first phrase, 'neither internal nor external', an old explanation says: 'It is not definitively inside the bodies of sentient beings, hence it says neither internal; nor is it separate from sentient beings, for this very conscious spirit attains buddhahood, hence it says neither external.' Master Guān's explanation says: 'Because it is not inside the bodies of sentient beings, it says neither internal; nor is it outside the bodies of sentient beings, hence it says neither external.' Now, neither is correct: the old explanation makes choices like an inchworm, and the next explanation is like a bird stripped of both wings. Why is this? Sentient beings' five aggregates are dharmas produced by causes and conditions, which are immediately empty; not existing in the conventional truth, they are therefore 'not external'. These dharmas are immediately provisional; not existing in the ultimate truth, they are therefore 'not internal'. These dharmas are immediately the middle; therefore, they do not simultaneously reside in the two truths. These dharmas pervade all places, so they do not uniquely abide in the truth of the middle way. These dharmas are inconceivable, neither vertical nor horizontal, neither combined nor separate; how could a one-sided statement express them? An earlier passage says that the all-awakened is called the buddhadhātu. The various masters speak one-sidedly; not being the all-awakened, it is then not the buddhadhātu, and cannot be called the middle way. Complete with the three dots [of the letter i], it is called the all-awakened, which is named the buddhadhātu, and only then is it the middle way. Simply through 'immediately empty, hence not external, not abiding in conventional truth'—relying solely on this meaning—one naturally refutes what the various masters say. Setting forth the second phrase: 'Although it is neither internal nor external, it is not lost or destroyed.' This in turn establishes the above meaning. The old [view] says: 'Because it is not external, it is not lost; because it is not internal, it is not destroyed. If it were definitively external, it would scatter and be lost east and west; if it were definitively internal, it would be foul and decayed like a dead body; hence it says neither lost nor destroyed.' Master Guān says: 'Originally having no completion, it is therefore not destroyed; originally having no acquisition, it is therefore not lost.' Now I clarify: the two masters failed to establish the explanation of the first phrase, and their interpretation of the latter phrase has no footing. This phrase explains and establishes the preceding 'neither internal nor external', and being furthermore immediately the middle, it is therefore said to be 'not destroyed'; being furthermore doubly illuminating, it is therefore said to be 'not lost'. Setting forth the third phrase: 'Therefore it is said that sentient beings all possess it.' Master Guān says: 'Although neither internal nor external, nor existent or non-existent, it is provisionally named as existent.' Now, explaining it in mutual connection with the preceding 'not lost and not destroyed', it pervades all places and is therefore called 'all possess it'.

25.10

From “Siṃhanāda said” onwards is the second [section], which extensively refutes extreme attachments. The text has two parts: first, refuting the attachment that the effect exists within the cause, thereby establishing the previous “neither internal”; second, refuting the attachment that the effect does not exist within the cause, thereby establishing the previous “nor external.” If these attachments are eliminated, the middle way of the buddhadhātu being neither lost nor destroyed can all be understood. Concerning the refutation of the existence of the effect within the cause, there are further four points: 1. relying on Buddhist teachings; 2. relying on worldly sentiments; 3. relying on contributory causes; 4. relying on direct causes. First, regarding reliance on the teachings: proximately relying on the preceding text, thus it is said that all sentient beings possess the buddhadhātu; distantly relying on the preceding chapters, [such as] the poor woman’s treasure and the wrestler’s forehead jewel. These are all internal possessions—how could one say it is not internal? Regarding worldly sentiments: worldly people seeking curd take milk, and seeking oil take sesame; if there were no oil or curd, why would people take them? Adducing contributory causes: if there were no direct [cause] internally, why would external conditions be needed? Just as grain without a sprout requires no water or soil. Adducing direct causes: it is due to having external conditions that the direct [cause] is enabled to arise. These all rely on [the premise that] the effect exists within the cause, showing that sentient beings all possess the buddhadhātu and that its nature should be internal. Regarding the first, reliance on the teachings, there are six rounds of questions and answers. The first round cites the beginning of the chapter and the “Chapter on the Tathāgata Nature” as the question. The Buddha replies by explaining that milk is identical to emptiness, and therefore its existence is not definitively asserted; he merely says curd is produced from milk, and milk is identical to the provisional, so it exists through causes and conditions, as in the text. The second round of questions and answers asks that all phenomena have their respective seasons: curd exists within milk and awaits the right time to be produced, just as grain has a sprout that only emerges when spring arrives. The Buddha's reply has three parts: first, making a direct negation of emptiness by deprivation, thus stating that at the time of milk there is no curd; second, making a concession in reply: if it existed, why would it not obtain two names? As in the text; third, from “causes are of two kinds” onwards, further showing that milk is identical to the provisional, and therefore it is said to exist. The third round of questions and answers [asks]: if milk has no curd, why is it not produced from horns? This adduces a non-cause to raise an objection. The Buddha temporarily concedes in reply that horns also produce curd. The fourth round of questions and answers takes this up as an objection: why does a person seeking curd not take horns? The Buddha replies that milk is the direct cause, which is why they take it; horns are a contributory cause, which is why they do not take them. The fifth round adduces a non-effect to raise an objection. The Buddha first concedes in reply that milk also produces trees, as in the text. Next, he deprives in reply: if it were produced by a single cause, it might be as objected; but it requires two causes to be produced—milk is not the direct cause of a tree, and causes and conditions are each distinct, so how could it produce a tree? This can be seen by examining the text. The sixth round of questions and answers directly asks how many causes the buddhadhātu of sentient beings has. The Buddha replies that it also possesses two causes: the direct [cause] refers to sentient beings, and the contributory [causes] refer to the six pāramitās. The Zhuangyan school relies on this passage to explain that the provisional designation is the direct cause of the buddhadhātu. Master Guan does not accept this, saying that contributory causes are not only the six pāramitās, but also include objects of cognition and the factors of awakening, which are all contributory causes. How could the direct cause be merely a provisional designation? It also includes the five aggregates and the conscious spirit, etc. I now explain: Zhuangyan regards assembling the aggregates into a sentient being, which relies on the external; Master Guan takes the five aggregates, which relies on the internal. How could either be correct? The earlier text says that the buddhadhātu is neither internal nor external, neither lost nor destroyed. Now, when considering sentient beings as the direct cause, is the provisional designation of sentient beings definitively internal or definitively external? Seeking it internally or externally, it cannot be found; it remains neither internal nor external. Though neither internal nor external, there are the six pāramitās. When the physical body of their aggregates is generated, it is neither lost nor destroyed; all sentient beings possess the aggregates—this returns to the earlier meaning and should not be explained otherwise. Although I have analyzed the text in this way, one may reflect further on it.

25.11

From “Siṃhanāda said: ‘I now definitely know…’” onwards is the second [part], raising objections based on worldly sentiments that cling to existence. The Buddha’s reply has two parts: first, directly refuting the attachment; second, showing the correct principle. The first text has two parts: first, making three rounds; second, refuting it once more. Regarding the first three rounds: the first round asks about taking milk and not taking water, raising the question based on milk possessing curd. The Buddha’s reply has two parts: first, negating the question; second, presenting a counter-objection. The first is as in the text. In the second, the counter-objection, it says: regarding your statement that one who seeks curd takes milk and does not take water, by comparison, it is like a person seeking a face taking a sword. Not adducing a mirror is done in order to make horizontal and vertical comparisons. Furthermore, a mirror can also serve as a sword, as the immortal Sun Bo bent a sword to make a mirror and straightened a mirror to make a sword (and so forth). The second round takes up the attachment that the sword contains a face to make an objection. The Buddha replies: if it definitely contained a face, why is it inverted, being vertically long and horizontally short? If it has one’s own face, why is it narrow and long? It is truly not narrow and long, yet one sees it as narrow and long. If by relying on one’s own face one sees another face, why does one not see the face of a donkey or a horse? The third round continues with a counter-explanation: when the eye’s rays reach the sword, one sees the image of one’s own face, not the image of a donkey or horse’s face. Furthermore, when the eye’s rays reach the sword, they conform to the sword's vertical length and horizontal breadth, which is why one sees it. The Buddha’s reply has three parts: 1. refutation by deprivation: the rays truly do not reach it; 2. refutation by concession: if they hypothetically reached it, there would be many faults; 3. concluding deprivation. The first deprivation is as in the text. From “If the rays reach…” onwards is the refutation by concession, which has four faults: first, if the rays reach fire, the fire should burn the eyes; since the eyes are not burned, we know the rays do not reach fire. Second, if the rays reach what is far, why should doubt suddenly arise? Third, if the rays reached it, one should not see objects inside crystal, for crystal obstructs the eye from seeing external objects; regarding fish and stones in an abyss, the water should obstruct the eye, so how could the eye reach them? Fourth, if the rays could see without reaching, why do they not see outside a wall? If they saw outside a wall, they should see external objects. From “Therefore…” onwards is the third, the concluding deprivation. From “Good son…” onwards is the second, refuting once more. Because the above was not yet detailed, he refutes it once more. This text also has three parts: 1. concession; 2. deprivation; 3. concluding rebuke. The first, concession, has three points: 1. one should demand curd and a foal; 2. one should disrupt children and grandchildren; 3. it should contain fifty feet. Since he adduced worldly sentiments as his attachment, the Buddha also uses worldly sentiments to refute it. If milk contained curd, the seller of milk should demand the price of curd. Even conceding that it contains curd, the five flavors should also exist at the same time. If there is no sarpirmaṇḍa, why is there curd alone? A seller of a mare should demand the price of a foal. The foal would again contain a foal, foal after foal without end; if that is not the case, we know the horse has no foal. Worldly people take a wife for their son; if the wife had a child, she could not be called a maiden. A maiden has no child, and one who has a child is not a maiden. If a maiden had a child, the child would again have a grandchild, grandchildren without end, and all born of the same womb would simultaneously be brothers. Could the world possibly be like this? If that is not the case, we know the maiden has no child. If a seed contained a tree, it should fully possess fifty feet, already towering beyond the clouds, with entwined boughs and connecting foliage spread out in the eight directions; if that is not the case, we know the seed has no tree. From “The color and taste of milk are different…” onwards is the second, refutation by deprivation. The difference in color: milk is white, curd is yellow. The difference in taste: milk is sweet, curd is sour. The difference in effect: milk remedies heat, curd remedies cold. Since these [qualities of curd] do not exist [in milk], how could there be curd? From “Just like ingesting ghee…” onwards is the third, concluding rebuke, explaining that when one should ingest ghee in the future, one already suffers from its foul odor now; it also explains that when one should have dregs and warm [liquor] in the future, one is already sated and obtains curd to eat now. How could there be such a thing? From “Just as there is a person…” onwards is the second, showing the correct principle. The text has four parts: 1. adducing similes to show the correct principle; 2. citing verses as proof; 3. applying it to sentient beings below; 4. exalting it to the realm of the Buddhas. First, adducing three similes has two parts: first, the similes; next, the application. In the first simile, showing absence of inherent nature and that things exist through provisional conditions, the simile is as in the text. From “All phenomena…” onwards is the application of the simile. From “For this reason…” onwards is the second, citing verses to establish proof. Taking merely the first two lines suffices to prove the absence of inherent nature. If an inherent nature definitely existed, what originally did not exist should not now exist, nor should what originally existed now not exist. What originally existed should eternally exist; what originally did not exist should eternally not exist. Since it is indefinite, why say that milk has the nature of curd? The latter two lines follow upon this. This verse appears for the fourth time to substantiate the present meaning. From “If all sentient beings…” onwards is the third, applying the emptiness of the body of sentient beings to show the correct principle, naturally having the teaching, simile, and application. The reiterated simile is as in the text. From “The buddhadhātu of sentient beings is the realm of all Buddhas…” onwards is the fourth, exalting it to the Buddha, as in the text. Observing the sūtra text above, having finished the refutations through concession and deprivation, it clarifies that the buddhadhātu is identical to emptiness. Next, adducing three similes, it clarifies that the buddhadhātu is provisional. Next, citing verses as proof, [it shows that] the buddhadhātu is both empty and provisional. Next, clarifying that the body of sentient beings is empty, it compares it to the buddhadhātu pervading all places. Citing the realm of all Buddhas, it clarifies that the buddhadhātu is the middle. Examining the text, it is completely fitting. It also closely corresponds with the earlier text's statement that the buddhadhātu is called paramārtha-śūnyatā, and emptiness is called wisdom, etc. In my personal opinion: Zhāng'ān, relying on the sūtra, fully knew that the buddhadhātu pervades all places, but was not yet willing to state it openly, considering that people of the time did not yet believe in its existence, so how could he show its omnipresence? Since the buddhadhātu fully possesses the three meanings of emptiness and so forth, which are the three truths, then none of all phenomena are other than the three truths and none are other than the buddhadhātu. Were it not so, how could it be said that empty space exists within the bodies of sentient beings? Since sentient beings have it, how could other places lack it? If other places lacked it, it could not be called empty space. Contemplate this, contemplate this!

25.12

From "Siṃhanāda said" onward is third, relying on auxiliary conditions' ability to bring [the fruit] forth. If the fruit within the cause were completely non-existent, what use would auxiliary conditions be? Here there are again five exchanges of question and answer. The intent of the first question: if milk lacks the nature of curds, what use are conditioning causes? Empty space has no nature, and does not await the two causes. The answer is as in the text. In the second exchange, the conditioning cause (pratyaya-hetu) is shifted to the name of a revealing cause (vyañjaka-hetu). In the question there are three similes, followed by citing the simile of milk to correspond, as in the text. The Buddha's answer has four parts: first, explaining that the nature itself is the revealing cause; second, explaining that the revealer should reveal itself; third, that it should be able to reveal both; fourth, citing the primary cause as the resolution. First, saying that the nature itself is the revealer: the revealer fundamentally reveals something to make it emerge; if it already possesses the nature, the nature itself is the revealer, so why would it need another revealer? If milk already has the nature of curds, the nature itself is the revealer, so why need yeast and warmth to reveal and bring it forth? Next, from "If it is a revealing cause" onward, directly says that if yeast and warmth are the revealer, they should be able to reveal themselves; if they cannot reveal themselves, how can they act as a revealing cause for the milk? Initially, if they revealed themselves, they should be able to reveal themselves and produce curds, without needing to reveal milk to make milk produce curds. Next, from "If it is said that the revealing cause has two" onward, is third: it should be able to reveal both. Yeast and warmth would themselves be able to reveal and produce curds, and furthermore be able to reveal milk to produce curds. Next, from "If there are two" onward, is fourth: citing the primary [cause] as the resolution. If one wishes to explain that yeast and warmth can reveal both, milk should also be able to act as both primary [causes]: acting as the primary [cause] of curds for itself, and furthermore acting as the primary [cause] for yeast and warmth. The intent of the third question: although there were four objections previously, it directly clings to the third, revealing oneself and revealing another; hence it says "I together with eight people," just as counting others as seven, with oneself completing eight—this is counting oneself and counting others. The other is also like this, revealing itself and revealing another. The Buddha's answer has two parts: first, refuting the attachment; second, showing the correct doctrine. The first refutation also has two parts: first, refuting that if it were so, it would not be a revealing cause; next, from "Why is this?" onward, explaining it. Indeed, wisdom can count one's own form and furthermore count others' forms; form cannot count itself and count others. The revealing cause is like form: how could it reveal itself and furthermore reveal others? There is a separate factor that reveals itself and reveals others, so it is said that the revealing cause is not a revealing cause. Next, from "All sentient beings" onward, is second: showing the correct doctrine, intending to explain that it is not fundamentally definitively existent, but comes to exist by relying on conditions. In the fourth exchange, he further shifts the objection, citing back the Buddha's words, explaining that because there is milk and there are curds, one knows it exists. The Buddha's answer has two parts: first, generally citing three types of answers—a shifting answer, which answers according to the question; a silent answer, which sets the question aside; and a doubtful answer, which is an indeterminate answer. Later, he directly uses the shifting answer, as in the text. From "Siṃhanāda" onward is the fifth exchange: not accepting the teaching of future existence, he therefore poses this objection. The question has two parts: first, deferentially raising an objection; next, the direct question, which has three parts: doctrine, simile, and correspondence. The Buddha's answer has two parts: first, the simile; next, the correspondence. The simile has four parts: first, explaining past existence; second, explaining future existence; third, re-explaining past existence; fourth, re-explaining future existence. Future existence is simply "to-be existence," which would suffice to answer the question; that he furthermore explains the past must be because the different Buddhist schools vary and the multiple views are not one. The Sarvāstivādins assert that all three time periods exist: having existed, will exist, and currently existing. The Dharmaguptakas assert that the past and future are non-existent, and only the present exists. The refutation of existence above is concluded. If we use them now, they are only conventional designations used in accord with worldly convention. Furthermore, how could the actions of the Dharma King be fathomed by human sentiment? Previously it was said that when planting a mandarin orange, the shoot is sweet and when ripe it is sour; the later sour taste is fundamentally based in the former sweetness, proving past existence. Nowadays, that this orange is sour at first and sweet later is either because products differ according to the land, or because taking the time of over-ripeness as "later," at this time the taste is sour. From "Sentient beings' buddhadhātu" onward corresponds to the simile, directly explaining that future existence means that sentient beings will attain it.

25.13

From "Siṃhanāda" onward is fourth, clinging to existence based on the primary cause; in all there are four exchanges of questions and answers. The first exchange also has four parts: first, the doctrine; second, the simile; third, the correspondence; fourth, the conclusion. In the initial doctrine, the phrase "primary-cause buddhadhātu" refers to the middle way's primary nature. From "Nyagrodha" onward, adducing the simile, also has four parts: first, directly adducing the simile; second, incidentally adducing the Gautama clan; third, corresponding to the simile; fourth, from "Just as" onward, matching the simile to the clan name to raise an objection. The intent of the objection: if a nyagrodha seed lacked the tree's nature, why would it be named a nyagrodha seed? It should be called a khadira seed. If milk lacked the nature of curds, it also would not be called milk, and should produce something else entirely. From "The buddhadhātu is likewise" onward is the correspondence. The Buddha's answer has two parts: first, citing eight things that cannot be seen: if the nyagrodha seed has the tree's nature, why is it not seen? Next, from "If you say subtleness and obstruction" onward, further refutes two things, again with two parts: first, a general denial; next, from "Why is this?" onward, the direct refutation. Within the refutation are also two parts: first, refuting subtleness; next, refuting obstruction. In the first refutation of subtleness: indeed, the marks of a tree are extremely coarse, so how could they not be seen? If it were fundamentally subtle, it should not later become large; if it is large later, it should also have been large at the beginning. Next, in refuting obstruction: if the nyagrodha seed obstructs the nyagrodha tree so that it cannot be seen, the obstruction should always obstruct, and it should always be impossible to see. The second exchange of question and answer: in the question he again cites the two causes: the revealing cause reveals what is absent, so how can the primary [cause] be absent? Truly, because it reveals the subtle into the large, it can be seen. The Buddha's answer has five levels: first, explaining that neither fundamental existence nor fundamental non-existence requires a revealer. From "If the nyagrodha" onward is second, raising a non-fruit as an objection, objecting to fundamental non-existence: if the nyagrodha seed fundamentally lacked the coarse marks of a nyagrodha tree, it would also lack the coarse marks of a khadira, so why does it not produce a khadira tree? From "If subtle" onward is third, objecting that coarseness should be visible. Fourth, citing the mark of burning as a parallel: if the tree fundamentally possessed its nature and later produced the tree, it should also fundamentally possess the mark of burning and later be burned. Since the nature of the seed is burned, it should not produce a tree. Fifth, further taking the intent to refute its arising first and perishing later: the text cites the simultaneous arising and perishing of all phenomena; as for the simultaneous arising and perishing of the nyagrodha seed, how could it arise first and only perish later? Since arising and perishing are simultaneous, if it could arise first and perish later, it should also be able to perish first and arise later. The third exchange of question and answer raises a non-cause as a question: if they equally lack the nature, why does it not yield oil? Next, the Buddha says: it can also yield oil. When the seed is pressed, juice comes out, and the juice is simply oil. The fourth further asks: it should also be able to be called sesame oil. The Buddha answers: it varies according to conditions, and receives different names. It cannot be named sesame oil, but can be named nyagrodha oil. The buddhadhātu of sentient beings is also like this: in sentient beings there is buddhadhātu, while in grasses and trees there is no buddhadhātu, but there are natures of grasses, trees, and the like.

25.14

From "Siṃhanāda said" onward, the second [part] refutes the attachment to there being no effect within the cause. Since this is not an external doctrine, there is only a single round of question and answer. The question has three parts: first, grasping the purport; second, the main objection; and third, the concluding praise. Grasping the purport and reverently accepting it: [Siṃhanāda] grasps the purport that there is no effect, no longer raising doubts. Since there cannot be an effect within the cause, there is also no buddhadhātu among sentient beings. This doctrine being credible, sentient beings then attach to definite non-existence as the real. Since it is definitely non-existent, one can no longer say that all possess the nature; therefore it says, "this doctrine is not so." That it is "not so"—is this not attaching to non-existence? From "Why is that?" onward, the second part is the main objection, which again has two parts: first the objections, then the answers. The first text makes seven points altogether: (1) based on karmic practice, (2) based on cutting off goodness, (3) based on the arising of the mind [aspiring to awakening], (4) based on retrogressing and not retrogressing, (5) based on cultivating the myriad practices and six pāramitās, (6) based on retrogressing from the myriad practices, and (7) based on the jewel of the Saṅgha. First, the objection regarding karmic practice: humans and devas have no [permanent] nature, but only karmic conditions; by the five precepts one attains human [birth], and by the ten virtues one attains deva [birth]; a deva can become a human, and a human can become a deva. Bodhisattvas are also like this: they achieve buddhahood solely through karmic conditions, not on account of a buddhadhātu. Second, the objection regarding cutting off goodness: if sentient beings possessed a nature [of goodness], the good could not be cut off and they would not fall into the hells; through the power of buddhadhātu, they should be prevented from [falling into] the hells. Buddhadhātu is permanent; how could the permanent be cut off? Since goodness is cut off, one knows it is impermanent; if it is impermanent, there is no buddhadhātu. Third, the objection based on the first arising of the mind: if there were originally a nature, the mind should have arisen originally; since the mind only newly arises, one knows there was originally no nature. Moreover, buddhadhātu involves no arising; what arises is not the nature. Fourth, the objection based on retrogressing and not retrogressing: if there were originally a nature, there should be no vivartika (retrogression), but only avivartika (non-retrogression); there should only be non-retrogression, not retrogression. Since there is retrogression, one knows there is no buddhadhātu. Fifth, the objection based on the myriad practices: if there were originally a nature, what need would there be for the myriad practices? Cultivating the myriad practices shows that there is no buddhadhātu. Sixth, the objection based on retrogressing from the myriad practices: buddhadhātu is permanent; how could there be retrogression? Since seeing the three evil destinies leads to retrogression, one knows there is no buddhadhātu. Seventh, the objection based on the three jewels: as the Buddha stated that the three jewels are permanent, since the Saṅgha is permanent, it should only ever remain abiding; how could there be progressive cultivation to attain buddhahood later? Progressive cultivation means impermanence; being impermanent, it lacks the nature; why then say that all sentient beings possess it? Next, from "The Buddha said" onward, he directly answers the seven objections, though not in sequence: the first answers the first question on karmic practice; the second answers the third question on the arising of the mind; the third answers the sixth question on retrogression from the myriad practices; the fourth answers the second question on cutting off goodness; the fifth answers the fifth question on the myriad practices; the sixth answers the seventh question on the jewel of the Saṅgha; and the seventh answers the fourth question on retrogressing and not retrogressing. Here, answering the first question, there are only eight characters that completely answer it. The purport of the question was that since humans and devas depend on karma and are unrelated to buddhadhātu, achieving buddhahood should likewise depend on karma and be unrelated to buddhadhātu. The Buddha answers: humans and devas do not require buddhadhātu; it is merely due to karma that they cycle back and forth, which has nothing to do with buddhadhātu. Because buddhadhātu is permanent, becoming a buddha is also permanent; thus one knows buddhadhātu exists. From "You say" onward, the second answers out of order the third question on the arising of the mind, first reiterating the question, then giving the direct answer. From "You say, why is there retrogression?" onward, the third answers out of order the sixth question on retrogression from the myriad practices, explaining that in reality there is no retrogression; it is simply taking longer to attain that is called retrogression. It does not answer regarding the myriad practices because the answer below will address it. From "This bodhicitta is truly not the buddhadhātu" onward, the fourth belatedly answers the second question on cutting off goodness, explaining that bodhicitta is not the buddhadhātu. Icchantikas do not give rise to bodhicitta, yet their buddhadhātu is not cut off. From "Good son, as you say" onward, the fifth answers the fifth question on the myriad practices, comprising two parts: first, directly answering; second, further drawing out the meaning to challenge [the fact that] earlier there were no such words. One explanation says: earlier there should have been this question, but the translator omitted it. A second explanation says: originally there was no such question; it simply extracts the meaning. From "Good son, you say that the jewel of the Saṅgha" onward, the sixth answers the seventh question with four iterations: first, there are two kinds of harmony; second, harmony of the twelve divisions of scriptures; third, harmony of the twelve links of dependent origination; fourth, harmony of all buddhas. All explain that the permanence of the Saṅgha refers to the unified Saṅgha [of the ultimate], not the present conventional Saṅgha of phenomena. From "Good son, you say that if sentient beings have buddhadhātu" onward, the seventh belatedly answers the fourth question on retrogressing and not retrogressing. The text has two parts: first, reiterating the question to admonish them to listen; second, directly answering his objection that if they have buddhadhātu, how could there be a difference between vartika and avartika? The text of the answer has four parts: (1) explaining the practice of retrogression, (2) explaining the vow of non-retrogression, (3) explaining both persons—the retrogressing and the non-retrogressing, and (4) explaining again the practice of non-retrogression. The Buddha's intended answer is: whether there is retrogression or non-retrogression does not concern the buddhadhātu; it is solely due to the differing strength or weakness of aspiration that there comes to be retrogression or non-retrogression. Although there is retrogression, it is not a loss; taking longer to attain is called retrogression. First, in treating the practice of retrogression, there are again four parts: (1) explaining the thirteen dharmas, (2) explaining the six dharmas, (3) explaining the five dharmas, and (4) explaining the two dharmas. The first, the thirteen dharmas, is as in the text. Next, among the six dharmas, there is "engaging in worldly affairs": for one who has left home to train in the Path to engage in mundane matters is a huge impediment. As for "mundane matters", everything outside true cultivation is termed mundane. In the Spring and Autumn [period], Zang Wenzhong had three acts of unbenevolence; making his concubines weave and sell rush mats, he was rebuked by a neighboring state, which said: "A grand master of your state has lost his virtue, contending for profit with the common people." If mundane people still warn against greed, how much more should those who run about tilling and trading desist from the Path? Even if rebuked and censured, how could it be fully expressed? Furthermore, every single phrase should be treated in terms of contemplative wisdom; as the text would be cumbersome, it is not written down, allowing one the freedom to grasp the meaning. Now, contemplative understanding means that not only is wielding a spade or an axe called worldly affairs, but letting the mind gallop through the five dusts and six desires while seated is itself worldly affairs. Moreover, focusing exclusively on emptiness, signlessness, and wishlessness is also worldly affairs; contemplating the distress of the multitude and using compassion to console and deliver them is also worldly affairs. Only when one can, without thought, be mindful of non-thought, neither thought nor non-thought, awakening within the one mind, is it truly not worldly affairs. Personally, I would say: when the Great Master interpreted the sūtras, having finished unpacking each phrase according to the text, he immediately provided a contemplative understanding for each phrase; though not essential to the [literal] text, it was simply so that practitioners of the Dharma might generate contemplation following the words, and thus he explained it everywhere. Second, from "How so?" onward, the second explains the vow of non-retrogression. For "vowing to be a teacher of the mind", there are two explanations. One says: it is simply the two thoughts, earlier and later; if the earlier thought gives rise to evil and the later thought drifts along with the current, this is not a teacher of the mind; if the earlier thought gives rise to evil and the later thought is able to halt it, this is a teacher of the mind. The second explanation: using a provisional person to restrain the mind, not acting in accordance with the mind. In the provisional person thus constructed, the person is the teacher of the mind. What is explained now is too superficial; the text above says that what all buddhas take as their teacher is the so-called Dharma. When the mind focuses on the Dharma, the Dharma is the teacher of the mind, deep or shallow at will. From "Good son, one cannot" onward, the third explains both persons, the retrogressing and the non-retrogressing, directly replying to his question, with similes and application, as in the text.

First 14 of 18 passages. Read on

Linked texts (1)

大般涅槃經疏 — Classical Chinese