大般涅槃經疏 26

English (machine translation) 26

Language: English

26.1

Compiled by Master Guàndǐng of Zhāng'ān under the Sui

26.2

Re-edited by the Tiāntái Śramaṇa Zhànrán under the Tang

At the opening of the third section of the fascicle, bondage and liberation are explained. Although sentient beings possess the buddhadhātu, they are covered by delusion and cannot perceive it; they must cultivate the ten thousand practices, so that understanding arises and delusion is exhausted, whereupon the principle of the buddhadhātu becomes evident. Hence bondage and liberation are explained. The text has five rounds of questions and answers. In the first round of question and answer, the initial question has two parts: first, taking up the underlying principle to proclaim that there is none; next, from "these five aggregates" downward, raising a challenge based on arising and ceasing. If the real nature is unarisen and unceasing, then there is no bondage or liberation. If the conditioned nature does not abide from thought-moment to thought-moment, there is likewise no bondage or liberation. The essential nature of this delusion arises and ceases in an instant; how could this delusion bind sentient beings? Since there is no bondage, there is likewise no liberation. There are the phenomenon, the parable, and the application. The answer has two parts: first, the admonition and permission; next, the main answer, which also has two parts: first, explaining bondage, and later, explaining liberation. As for the first, explaining bondage, there are three parts: first, the death-aggregate; second, the intermediate aggregate; third, the birth-aggregate. Under the first, the death-aggregate, there are three: the phenomenon, the parable, and the application. The initial phenomenon is as in the text. Next, in the parable, it says that once the sun has set in the west, although residual light shines eastward, it ultimately never returns to the east. When a person's life is about to end, although residual breath remains, they ultimately will not revive. When this aggregate ceases, that aggregate arises in succession; this is explaining birth right within death. From "sentient beings" downward is the application, which again has two parts: first, the direct application; next, like a lamp arising and darkness ceasing, citing another parable again. Next, from "like a wax seal stamping clay" downward is the second part, explaining the intermediate aggregate (antarābhava), which again has two parts: first the parable, and later the application. The wax is a parable for the death-aggregate; the clay is a parable for the intermediate aggregate. That "the seal is destroyed and the impression is formed" is a parable that if the death-aggregate ceases, the intermediate aggregate immediately arises. That "the impression does not come out of the clay" means that this body does not emerge from the intermediate aggregate, nor is it without a cause, nor does it come from somewhere else; it appears by relying on the death-aggregate. Its location cannot be sought; it exists solely through causes and conditions. Question: Are there also those who do not undergo the intermediate aggregate? Answer: Speaking generally, all undergo it. Just as the Court of Judicial Review determines the sentencing and executes the punishment, so too is the intermediate aggregate: it scrutinizes and determines good and evil, so that the evil fall and the good ascend. If there are those who distinctly follow fierce good or evil, such as those [guilty of] the five heinous offenses who fall directly, or those [practicing] the ten good deeds who ascend directly—just as a spear leaves the hand and instantly reaches the other side—then the intermediate aggregate is not spoken of. From "when the present aggregates cease" downward is the second part, applying the parable: first the direct application, and next the two eyes and three foods. The first again has two parts: first the direct application, and next presenting the parable to match the application. Second, as for clarifying the two eyes and three foods: there is naturally no solid food; since this is a change of retribution, how could there be cooked grain to form mouthfuls? Since there is the aggregate of ideation, there is food of volition; because there is a body, there is food of contact; and because there is mind, there is food of consciousness. In the *Kośa* the intermediate aggregate and so on are broadly explained, and ancient masters had treatises on the four foods and the like, which are not essential here. From "when the parents unite" downward is the third part, explaining the birth-aggregate. Speaking generally, all six destinies have the birth-aggregate; taking just the human destiny for now, it first explains the arising of the three afflictions, and next explains the endowment with the four inversions, which constitute bondage; one must not object by saying that because it ceases from thought-moment to thought-moment, there is no bondage. As for the three afflictions: first, craving; second, aversion; third, conceiving [the self] as possessing, which is the view of self and is also delusion.

26.5

From "if this person attains" downward is the second part, explaining liberation, which also has four parts: first, explaining nearing, listening, reflecting, and practicing, all as in the text. From "Siṃhanāda said: 'There are no thorns in the sky'" downward is the second round: first the question, and later the answer. The initial question again has two parts: first, presenting a counter-parable, bringing up that there are no thorns in the sky; later, bringing up that there is no binder in the aggregates, so how could there be tying and binding? Above, the "Virtue King" [chapter] says, "The mind originally lacks greed; how could greedy desire bind the mind?" This is precisely that meaning. The answer has two parts, namely, the phenomenon and the parable. As for the first, the phenomenon: discussing it in terms of principle, it means that because of continuity it is not annihilated, and because of disintegration it is not permanent; being neither annihilated nor permanent, it is neither bondage nor liberation. If one has not realized this principle, then there are bondage and liberation. Adducing the house and adducing the fist, one discusses binding with reference to when the palms are joined, and one discusses opening with reference to when the palms are separated; when they were originally not joined, one discusses neither binding nor opening. The three terms, such as "tying and binding," have precisely this meaning. Bondage pertains to the provisional, release pertains to the real, and neither bondage nor release pertains to the middle way; this is the characteristic of the mutual identity of the three truths. From "Siṃhanāda said: 'Like the eye'" downward is the third round: first the question, and next the answer. This question follows on the preceding text of the answer to raise a challenge. Previously it said that name-and-form binds sentient beings, and sentient beings bind name-and-form. Name-and-form is merely sentient beings; how could it bind itself? Just as a knife does not cut itself. Therefore he later challenges again: if sentient beings are merely name-and-form, it is still name-and-form binding name-and-form; how could name-and-form bind sentient beings? The answer is as in the text. From "Siṃhanāda said: 'If name-and-form is binding'" downward is the fourth round of question and answer. The question is as in the text. In the answer there are the phenomenon, the parable, and the application. In the initial statement of the phenomenon, because the arhat's seeds are rotted, there is no bondage; because the retribution remains, there is bondage. As for saying that they have not yet seen the buddhadhātu: looking at it from the Mahāyāna, both seed and fruit are bondage; the Hīnayāna does not hold this. Next, the parable and the application are as in the text. From "Siṃhanāda said: 'The lamp and the oil'" downward is the fifth round, which also has first the question, and next the answer. The intention of the initial question is: the Buddha previously said that the lamp is a parable for sentient beings and the oil is a parable for afflictions; now challenging this statement, there are two explanations. One says: the lamp brings together many phenomena, so that the light, oil, vessel, and so forth together form one lamp; the light is called the lamp's light, and the vessel is called the lamp's vessel. The other says: the light and the oil are distinct; one strictly takes the light to be the lamp. The lamp is of the nature of fire, and the oil is of the nature of wetness; it strictly takes the latter meaning to raise the challenge. The lamp and the oil are each distinct in nature, while sentient beings and afflictions are originally not distinct; how can this serve as a parable? The Buddha's answer has two parts: first, adducing eight parables; later, applying the parable of the lamp. The eight parables have two parts: first, listing the headings; next, explaining them. Moving from small to large is a direct parable; moving from large to small is a reverse parable. "Present" means taking present affairs as a present parable; the preceding reverse and direct are also present affairs, but setting aside the aspects of reverse and direct, one takes other present affairs. "Discrepant" means completely not of that category. "Prior" means the parable first, followed by the application. "Posterior" means the phenomenon first, followed by the parable. *Dì* [渧] has the sound *dì* [帝]. *Dī* [滴] has the sound *dī* [的]. Prior and posterior can be understood. Here it should have the tone *yǎng* [養]; looking down from above is *yǎng*, and looking up from below has the sound *yàng* [樣]. A comprehensive parable is one that exhausts its beginning and end.

26.6

From "Siṃhanāda said: 'The five aggregates of sentient beings'" downward is the fourth major section, explaining the cultivation of the path. Since there is bondage, how can one attain release? Therefore, the cultivation of the path to release its bondage is discussed. The text has four questions and answers: first, explaining that the path can be cultivated; second, directly explaining the cultivation of the path; third, the function of cultivating the path; fourth, exhorting cultivation. As for the sequence of these four: although all dharmas are ultimately empty, the path can be cultivated, and therefore one directly cultivates it. Cultivation can cut off delusion, and therefore there is an exhortation. The first round has three questions and answers. The first question asks: if the five aggregates and sentient beings, both persons and dharmas, are empty, why is there cultivation? The Buddha answers: the various minds continue from thought-moment to thought-moment without interruption. Although they cease from thought-moment to thought-moment, afflictions are linked in succession; therefore there is cultivation. Therefore the second asks again: if the mind ceases from thought-moment to thought-moment, how can there be cultivation of the path? The Buddha answers: although it ceases from thought-moment to thought-moment, cultivation of the path can be discussed, just as a lamp, although ceasing from thought-moment to thought-moment, can dispel darkness. From "you say that it ceases from thought-moment to thought-moment" downward, the meaning is taken up again for explanation: you say there is no growth, but this is not so. Later, six parables are adduced, all explaining that there is growth, as in the text. The third round of questions further follows on the preceding six parables to raise a challenge. Although ceasing from thought-moment to thought-moment, it can dispel darkness, and so forth. Cultivating the path is also like this: although not yet complete at first, over time it can destroy delusion. Siṃhanāda takes this up to challenge further: for a person of the first fruit, the five aggregates of wholesome dharmas should also continue similarly and be born in a pure land; how could they suddenly arrive in an evil land and be born into a family of sheep slaughterers? The Buddha answers: although born in an evil land, they do not lose the name; "name" refers to the outflow-free, and the outflow-free is always present, whereas the aggregates are not so. Wholesome aggregates and evil aggregates are obtained through karma; they are not drawn and summoned by outflow-free dharmas. Therefore the Buddha answers that they are not similar: that although born in an evil land, they do not commit evil is because they are sustained by the power of the outflow-free. In the answer, the phenomenon comes first, also presenting six parables. Mount Gandhamādana is a parable for the initial body; the lion is a parable for the outflow-free of the darśanamārga; the snowy mountains are a parable for the evil five aggregates; the flying birds and running beasts are a parable for the various evil dharmas. Furthermore, Mount Gandhamādana is a parable for wholesome aggregates, and the snowy mountains are a parable for evil aggregates; that the birds and beasts of the snowy mountains all dare not stay is a parable that, within both wholesome and evil lands, evil dharmas do not arise. This concerns the meaning of the two causes of habituation and retribution: the habituation-cause has similar kinds that constantly arise and ultimately do not commit evil, whereas the retribution-cause pulls along the fruit of a different kind, and therefore one is born in an evil land. The existence of a person is a parable for the body of a srotāpanna; immense wealth and property is a parable for the merit of cutting off delusion through the outflow-free of the darśanamārga. Having only one son refers to the first fruit among the four fruits. Furthermore, between the two paths of seeing and cultivation, it is solely the path of seeing; hence it is called "one son." Having already passed away previously means that the outflow-free of the darśanamārga is not currently manifest, and upon emerging from contemplation it is absent. That his son, and so forth, [has a son] means that the outflow-free of cultivation arises dependent on the path of seeing; hence it says that his son has a son. Being again in another land means that the outflow-free of cultivation, viewed in relation to the path of seeing, is called "another land." Suddenly passing away means that the srotāpanna passes away at the end of seven lifetimes. The grandson, having heard this, returning to take possession of the property means that within the path of cultivation one still receives and continues the preceding merit of the path of seeing. Although knowing that the wealth and goods are not his own means that it is the outflow-free of the path of seeing, not the outflow-free within cultivation. That there is no hindrance or guarding means that although seeing and cultivation are distinct, they are identical in being outflow-free.

26.7

From “Siṃhanāda said: ‘As the Buddha spoke in verse...’” onward, the second part directly clarifies cultivating the path. This has two parts: first, clarifying cultivating the path; second, clarifying the causes and conditions for cultivating the path. The first part also has two: first, an explanation; next, the debate. As for first citing the verse to ask, the first two lines concern cultivating the path, and the latter two lines concern attaining the fruit: being able to cultivate the three grades without regressing, one attains the fruit; the three grades are the cause, and approaching great nirvāṇa is the fruit. First, the verse is cited to ask; next, an answer is requested on each point. In the answer there are three rounds of explanation: the first round distinguishes the genuine from the false; the next round is specifically directed at destroying evil; the final round is specifically directed at generating the good. Regarding the genuine and the false, there are two parts: first the false, next the genuine. First, the false comprises three grades: the lowest of the low consistently cannot keep the precepts; the middle of the low keeps the precepts out of fear of the sufferings of the bad destinies; the highest of the low keeps the precepts to deliver sentient beings from suffering and affliction. These three are all false; on the present understanding, even this person cannot be apprehended. Next, as for the genuine: one who knows that all phenomena are empty and yet can keep the precepts, seeking the fruit of buddhahood for the sake of all sentient beings. The fruit cannot be apprehended, and even sentient beings do not exist, much less the fruit of buddhahood—this is called genuinely keeping the precepts. Next, as for being able to break the sixteen evil disciplines: this further explains the three grades in terms of extinguishing evil. As for “butchers” (kuíkuài), the old [commentaries] say: they are people who sell fish and meat or oversee troops. Another says: they are floggers. As for “body-less samādhi”: because the absorption of emptiness extinguishes physical form, it is called “body-less.” “Boundless mind” is the absorption of the sphere of consciousness. “Pure mass” is the sphere of nothingness. “World's edge” is [the sphere of] neither conceptualization nor non-conceptualization; because this absorption can know eighty thousand kalpas, this is taken as the edge. Moreover, because neither conceptualization nor non-conceptualization lies beyond the triple realm, it is called the “world's edge.” “World's severance”: since outside of eighty thousand kalpas one cannot know, one then takes it to be severed. “World's nature” is the primordial obscurity (pradhāna), which is the fundamental nature of the world. “World-man” (puruṣa): through the power of this absorption one can see the cosmic man in the waters at the beginning of the kalpa, that is, Viṣṇu. “Neither conceptualization nor non-conceptualization”: taking the contemplation of existence and non-existence as the essence of the absorption. From “Those who cultivate the precepts do so for bodily tranquility...” onward, the third part explains the three grades in terms of generating the good. “All realms of existence” means the three realms of existence and the twenty-five realms of existence. “All spheres” means the three realms and the eighteen dhātus, and so on. “All truths” means the twenty-five tattvas and the six categories (padārthas). From “Siṃhanāda said: ‘Unborn and unextinguished...’” onward, the second part is the debate. Due to previously cultivating the path, one sees the buddhadhātu and attains bodhi and nirvāṇa. Now he challenges [the concepts of] nirvāṇa and buddhadhātu in seven rounds of questions and answers in total: the first three rounds challenge nirvāṇa; the subsequent four rounds challenge the buddhadhātu. The first says: if what is unborn and unextinguished is nirvāṇa, then an ordinary person is also unborn and unextinguished, so this should be nirvāṇa. Because an ordinary person throughout a lifetime, from birth to old age, is not born again, it is called “unborn”; and because they are not yet extinguished, it is also “unextinguished.” Is this being unborn and unextinguished nirvāṇa, or not? Furthermore, it is said: if the challenge is made in terms of the characteristic of origination among the three characteristics [of conditioned phenomena], then in this single moment of thought, because origination has already originated, it is therefore “unborn”; and because it has not yet ceased, it is therefore “unextinguished.” Is this nirvāṇa, or not? In the answer, the Buddha first endorses it and then explains: since it is not nirvāṇa, it is because it has a beginning and an end. It is also necessary to further resolve the two explanations above to establish the meaning of beginning and end. Initial birth is the beginning, and the end of life is the end; the characteristic of origination in the three characteristics of a single thought is also like this: the initial arising is the beginning, and the cessation of the thought is the end. From “World-Honoured One...” onward, the second challenge clarifies that the phenomena of saṃsāra are also without beginning or end. Since the twelve links of dependent origination revolve without stopping, how could there be a beginning or an end? The Buddha answers: the phenomena of saṃsāra have causes and effects; the twelve links of dependent origination revolve without stopping, with the two causes of the past and the five fruits of the present, and so it is not nirvāṇa. The third round of challenge clarifies that within nirvāṇa there are also cause and effect. Since precepts, concentration, and wisdom can attain nirvāṇa, how could this not be cause and effect? The Buddha answers: nirvāṇa has a cause and is not an effect; moreover, it is an effect and is not that which is attained. Furthermore, the buddhadhātu is the cause of nirvāṇa, and yet it cannot produce the fruit of nirvāṇa (and so forth). The second section has four rounds of questions and answers debating the meaning of the buddhadhātu. The first round raises a challenge regarding whether it is shared or not shared: first marking two headings, and then explaining as in the text. The Buddha's answer also has two parts: first the principle, next the similes. In the initial principle, it is said that it is neither one nor two: because it is not one, it is not shared; because it is not two, it is not distinct. Even though it is so, in the end all sentient beings share it together. The Dilun masters say: all sentient beings share the identical essence of the ālaya-vijñāna dharmadhātu. If so, when one person attains it, many people should attain it. The Satyasiddhi masters say: each sentient being has their own buddhadhātu, but when buddhahood is achieved, their provisional wisdom is equal and they share the same dharmakāya, and the powers, fearlessnesses, and so forth are also like this. If so, if the buddhadhātu could be counted, it would be impermanent, which is directly open to this challenge. However, the buddhadhātu is impartial, neither one nor two, neither shared nor distinct. It is also like people today who maintain precepts and cultivate practice: they cannot be considered one, nor can they be considered different. Since each person cultivates individually, how could they be one? My understanding is their understanding, and their understanding is my understanding; therefore they are not different. Furthermore, just as the five kinds of buddhadhātu are neither one nor different: since sentient beings equally possess them, how could they be different? Since the five kinds are not identical, how could they be one (and so forth)? Question: Among the five buddhadhātus, how many do sentient beings possess? Answer: All of them, and none of them. If sentient beings lack the discernment of contemplative wisdom, they cannot manifest the objective realm; since the wisdom that manifests the objective realm is lacking, there is also no contemplated realm. Since the cause lacks a cause, how could they separately attain the fruit and the fruit of the fruit? Since there is neither cause nor fruit, how could there be neither-cause-nor-fruit? As for possessing all: because it must inevitably be attained, and because it manifests through conditions, it is therefore said that they possess all of them; although it is lacking at present, it will certainly be possessed. Next, the similes are as in the text. The second round challenges the simile of the kṣānti grass: if it is one, once one person cultivates it, other people should also attain it. The Buddha answers: the buddhadhātu is one, but as many people cultivate it, each person attains it without mutually obstructing one another. The third round asks: just as when many people are on a road, those in front obstruct those behind; the buddhadhātu is also like this: when the former person cultivates it, it should also obstruct the later person. The Buddha answers: roads, bridges, and physicians are only partial analogies; the path of the noble ones is not like this, and bridges and the like are also like this. The fourth challenge: the characteristics of the six destinies of devas and humans are not uniform; how can they share a single buddhadhātu? The Buddha answers: if poison is put into milk, through all five flavors the poison can kill everywhere. The buddhadhātu is also like this, pervading all places (and so forth).

26.8

From “sixteen great nations” onward, the second part clarifies the causes and conditions for cultivating the path. This also has two parts: first, clarifying the conditions for the path; second, clarifying the causes of the path. The first, conditions for the path, also has three: first, the condition of place; second, the condition of time; third, the condition of persons. Without the proper place, the proper time, or good spiritual companions, it cannot be attained; hence it is said to await the place, await the time, and await companions. Regarding the place, there are also two: first, the place of the city; second, the place of the trees. Regarding the place of the city, there are also two: first, the question; next, the answer. The intent of the question: it is said that among the sixteen great nations, there are six great cities; why does the Tathāgata remain in this small city? The answer has two parts: first, a rebuke; next, the correct explanation. As for the initial rebuke of the question: the place where the Buddha resides should not be called small. Raising three similes, the Tathāgata, the World-Honoured One, is the most venerable among humans; the place where he dwells is therefore venerable. “If a gentleman dwells there, what uncouthness could there be?” From “I remember in the past...” onward, the second part is the correct explanation, which also has two parts: first, repaying gratitude to the land; second, expelling the heterodox factions. The first, repaying gratitude, also has three: first, repaying the initial generation of the thought of bodhi; second, repaying the four immeasurables; third, repaying the great vows, as in the text. Next, expelling the heterodox factions also has two: first, visiting all six great cities; later, clarifying that upon arriving here he subdued them. Having exhausted the heterodox and fully manifested the orthodox, there is then quiescent nirvāṇa. The six cities make six sections. The first is arriving at Rājagṛha: the heterodox teachers were confusing and misleading sentient beings, causing them to fall into the three bad destinies, so he had to come here to drive them away. Furthermore, because the ruler of the country had invited him, the Buddha did not break his word, and therefore went to Rājagṛha. The heterodox teachers, knowing their own arts to be shallow, fled to Śrāvastī; the Buddha thereupon converted the three Kāśyapa brothers and the two who had gained superknowledges. From “At that time in that city there was an elder...” onward, this is the second part: going to Śrāvastī to pursue the heterodox teachers. In the text there are three parts: first, clarifying the origin of going there; second, mutually testing spiritual powers, directly addressing going there. The heterodox teachers did not dare to resist in Rājagṛha, but upon reaching Śrāvastī they still sought a face-to-face debate. “Śaṇḍāna” is a man from Rājagṛha, translated here as “Hùmí” (Protecting Wealth). “Jeta” is translated here as “Victor Clan.” “Sudatta” is a man from Śrāvastī, translated here as “Virtuous Warmth.” Question: The Buddha's name was heard throughout the ten directions, and Sudatta was also one of the six great laymen; why did he only first hear the Buddha's name when staying overnight to arrange a marriage? Answer: Initially it was not that he had not heard it, but that it was vague and fleeting; now that the faculties for the path were mature, hearing it made his hairs stand on end all over.

26.9

Chapter on Siṃhanāda, Part Four.

26.10

Beginning the fascicle is the second part: arriving at the city to test spiritual powers together. The text has three parts: first, the conditions for the test; second, the test itself; third, the benefit to the assembly. The first also has four: first, requesting a test; second, the king's refusal; third, requesting again; fourth, the king's consent. Why they requested: having already been expelled previously from Rājagṛha, now that [the Buddha] came again to the city of Śrāvastī, they were deprived of fame and lost gain, which was intolerable to them, so they appealed to the king to request a test. Regarding the first, there are two parts: first, praising the king with artful words and flattering looks; second, belittling the Buddha with dramatic agitation and fierce slander. As for “his years are still young”: since the Buddha attained the path at thirty, at that time he was only thirty-some years old. Since his asceticism lasted only six years, they said his “learning is shallow.” As for “he was not truly born into the royal clan”: they claimed the Buddha was an illusory transformation and definitely not of the royal clan. As for “plundering the fathers and mothers of others”: the Buddha taught people to leave the household life, which is plundering the children of fathers and mothers, and also severing the lineage of the fathers and mothers of others. Disallowing marriage is also plundering the parents of other households (and so forth). From “The king said: ‘Venerables...’” onward, the second is the king's refusal. “The six teachers replied: ‘How could there be no harm?’” is the third, requesting again. From “The king said: ‘Excellent!’” onward, the fourth is the king's consent. Although the king privately consented, he still had to consult the Buddha. From “The Buddha said: ‘Excellent!’” onward, the second is the test itself, which also has two parts: first, instructing the king to make many preparations; second, directly manifesting spiritual transformations, as in the Xianyu jing (and so forth). Third, the assembly at that time gained benefits. Here, it does not explain an exchange of back-and-forth debate; it simply displays rare and extraordinary wonders. The heterodox teachers, beholding the transformations and knowing their own inadequacy, fled to the city of Sāketa. Question: Why was there no exchange of debate? Answer: Among the three wheels, the wheel of spiritual powers was appropriate at that time. The assembly at that time and the followers of the heterodox teachers gained benefits, while the heterodox teachers themselves were not yet convinced. From “At that time, the six teachers in their minds...” onward, is the third part: the Buddha again went to that city. Question: The Buddha possesses great compassion and does not distress sentient beings; why did he pursue the six teachers from place to place without allowing them a foothold? Answer: He wished to shatter divergent views and rescue countless people to cross over from heterodoxy, removing the bonds of saṃsāra and attaining great nirvāṇa. If this is not pity, what else could be loving-kindness and compassion? From “Thereupon the six teachers gathered together again...” onward, is the fourth part: proceeding to Vaiśālī. The Tathāgata went again, expounding various teachings for Āmrapālī, the Licchavis, and others. This [Āmrapālī] is the mother of Jīvaka and the queen of Bimbisāra; since she possessed great beauty, he admonished the bhikṣus to practice the mindfulness of the body. Next, he spoke on non-negligence for the Licchavis to smash their pride. By the law of that country, they always elected the wise and capable as rulers and the rest took part in deliberations; therefore it is translated as “border lords,” and also said to be “successively participating in state affairs.” From “At this time, the six teachers...” onward, is the fifth: going again to the city of Vārāṇasī. From “When the six teachers heard this...” onward, is the sixth: going again to the city of Campā.

26.11

From the passage beginning with "At that time, the six masters, having traversed the six cities..." onward, it secondly explains that upon reaching Kuśinagara they were pursued everywhere and did not know where to go. They had considered Kuśinagara to be small and narrow, intending to maintain their safety and abide there, not anticipating that the Buddha would come. In this text there are three parts: first, false teachings; second, true teachings; third, debate between the false and the true. The first part concerns the heterodox masters arriving at the city of Kuśinagara, where they extensively spoke of the Buddha's faults, causing people to give rise to heterodox views. The sūtra text says: "Since the mother was an illusion, the child could not be otherwise." What is the meaning of this? The meaning is: the human process of birth naturally has its standard norms; why then was he born from the right armpit? Is this not an illusory mother giving birth to an illusory child? In the second part, the Buddha arrives and expounds the true [teaching]. Repelling the false and returning to the true, the false and the true each proceed on their own courses.

26.12

From the passage beginning with "At that time the six masters further spoke..." onward, it thirdly presents the joint debate between the false and the true. In all, there are seven rounds of questions and answers: the first six rounds are the main debate, and the last round is their submission. This is the first round. First, the heterodox position is established, taking the seer to be the self, which is one among the sixteen views of a self. The Buddha refutes it with three arguments: First, he requires the six sense faculties to function together. Above, they brought up the window as a simile, and now he turns it back to challenge them: When a person is inside a window, seeing forms and hearing sounds, they apprehend all six sense objects together; since you take the self to be in the eye and capable only of seeing forms but incapable of universally apprehending all the sense objects, you must know you are mistaken. Next, he requires that the old and the young not differ: just as inside a window, even for up to a hundred years, seeing outside is clear and distinct, so too if the self is in the eye, seeing objects for a hundred years should likewise be clear and distinct; if an old self in the eye does not match a young one, how can a window be used as a simile? Third, he requires both the internal and the external to be seen: a person inside a window sees both the inside and the outside; why then does the self in the eye not see the inside? From "The six masters further said: 'If there is no self...'" onward is the second round; this further inquiry is not a proper objection, but because the previous challenge was severe, they inquire about the self again. The reply from "The Buddha said: 'There are forms...'" onward also has three parts: first, pointing out causes and conditions; second, refuting the heterodox self; third, concluding with the true self. This first part indicates that it is by relying on various causes and conditions that one sees forms; it was never seen by a self, but they merely give rise to false views and claim it exists. From "If the six masters say..." onward, the second part refutes their heterodox self, also in three parts: first, declaring it is not so; next, under "Why is that?", specifically bringing out the various faults: the self takes sovereignty as its meaning, so it should only be born into the brāhmaṇa caste; why then does it further undergo the different destinies of the six paths? Since form has no self, feeling, perception, volitional formations, and consciousness are all without a self; third, from "Because there is no self..." onward, concluding with the faults of the six masters. From "The Tathāgata..." onward, the third part concludes by indicating the true self, also in two parts: first, briefly indicating it; next, distinguishing it in contrast. The meaning of the first text is: since he had earlier refuted form, feeling, and so forth as being without a self, they would then ask whether the Tathāgata is these forms and so forth or not; now, anticipating their intention, he answers: the Tathāgata's self is no longer bound by form, nor is it bound by feeling, perception, volitional formations, or consciousness, and it is endowed with the four virtues; the self of which you speak does not escape the four bonds. Next, he further concludes and also distinguishes it in contrast with the outsiders. The heterodox outsiders say that the self arises from causes and conditions, and is therefore impermanent; the Tathāgata's self is not attained through causes and conditions, and is therefore permanent, blissful, self, and pure. From "The six masters said: 'Gautama...'" onward is the third round; the heterodox masters shift their thesis—or, as some say, it represents a different school—taking omnipresence as the self, rather than taking form as the self. From "The Buddha said..." onward, the Tathāgata refutes it. There are two intents: first, directly refuting it with respect to omnipresence; next, examining it further in terms of oneness and difference. The first text also has two further rejoinders: The first rejoinder questions omnipresence: since the self is omnipresent, it should not be that one initially does not see, but one should see constantly. Next, he questions that if the self is omnipresent, it should pervade the five destinies; why then fear the three evil destinies and observe precepts and goodness for the sake of a human or heavenly body? Next, in terms of oneness and difference, there are also two parts: first, raising the two thematic headings; next, explaining each one. The questioning regarding oneness is as in the text. Regarding the questioning about multiplicity: in each and every body there is a distinct self, and the self possesses sovereignty; why then are sharpness and dullness, foolishness and wisdom unequal? From "Gautama, the self of sentient beings..." onward is the fourth round, where the heterodox masters attempt a rescue again: the self is one, and it is also ever-pervading; sentient beings cultivate karma which naturally has differences, so the karmic fruits are not the same. The Buddha refutes them, saying: since the self is both omnipresent and permanent, how could wholesome and unwholesome deeds alternate? Then both sin and merit should be coexistent; thus it is said that performing evil should entail good, and performing good should entail evil; if they do not coexist, then it is not omnipresent. Furthermore, the self possesses sovereignty, so good and evil should occur of their own accord, and so forth. From "Gautama, just as in a single room..." onward is the fifth round, where the heterodox masters again attempt a rescue by using the simile of lighting a lamp: although they share the same illumination, the physical lamps are each different; the self is ultimately omnipresent, but the applications of good and evil differ, just as in a single room one might light a hundred thousand lamps, and so forth. The Buddha's refutation also has two parts: first, declaring it is not so; next, three kinds of refutations: first, refutation based on conditions; second, refutation based on the illumination emerging from a different place; third, refutation based on light and darkness coexisting. The first refutation says: if your lamp is a simile for phenomena and the light is a simile for the self, the light depends on the lamp; where there is much oil and wick, the lamp's light is bright; if so, the self depends on karma, and when karma is exhausted, the self dies; since karma is narrow and small, the self cannot be omnipresent. The second questions the place: light emerges from the lamp; if so, the self emerges from karma, which means that karma possesses the self, not that the self possesses karma. The third is that when the lamp is first lit, it coexists with darkness; if so, your permanent self should all reside within the impermanent self, and the impermanent self should also reside within the permanent self. From "Gautama, if there is no self..." onward is the sixth round, where the outsiders inquire further. The Buddha's reply also has two parts: first, refuting the heterodox self: since the self is permanent, how can it act? How could that which is permanent have action? Even if it were made to act, why does it not act virtuously, but sometimes acts evilly? Since good and evil are variable, it is impermanent. Next, he clarifies the true self, which is the Tathāgata, permanently abiding and unimpeded. The seventh and final round is the heterodox masters taking refuge and submitting, and the Tathāgata concludes the topic, as in the text.

26.13

From the passage beginning with "Good son, for this reason..." onward, it secondly explains the place of the trees, also in two parts: first, concluding the preceding and introducing the following; next, directly explaining the place. The first is as in the text. From "The pair in the eastern direction..." onward, the second part directly explains the place of the trees, comprising three aspects: first, expressing the principle; second, protecting the Dharma; third, the benefit of the Dharma flavor. First, expressing the principle: the principle is the four virtues. For what reason is the east used as an analogy for permanence, impermanence, and so forth? One explanation says: it casually takes up an item without a fixed determination; the east could also be used to analogize bliss and non-bliss. A second explanation, by Hexi, says: two trunks withering expresses the cessation of the responsive and transformation body; two trunks flourishing expresses the eternal abiding of the Dharmakāya. Moreover, the Bodhi tree also grew on one side and withered on the other, and when the Buddha-Dharma perishes, both trunks will wither. If so, why must this necessarily refute permanence, impermanence, and so forth? However, the Buddha transforms beings in accord with conditions, which must have a rationale. Hexi says: regarding the eastern pair expressing permanence and impermanence, the Great Sovereign Deva worshipped by the heterodox outsiders abides in the eastern direction and his teachings are practiced in the west; now the Buddha-Dharma's permanence refutes their impermanence, so it is said that the eastern pair expresses permanence and impermanence. The southern direction expresses the self: the south is the right side, and the right hand acts with convenience, analogizing the sovereign functioning of the self. The western direction expresses bliss: practicing the Buddha's teaching in the western direction brings about bliss, expressing the bliss of the Buddha-Dharma. The north is the pure direction and is also the place of leaving home, so it expresses purity within the Buddha-Dharma. It is also said: the Sovereign Deva faces east, so his right hand is in the south; all of these are meant to refute the four inversions of the heterodox outsiders and express the four virtues of the Buddha-Dharma, which is why this correlation is made. From "The sentient beings here, for the sake of the twin trees..." onward, the second aspect is protecting the Dharma, first citing the matter and then clarifying the principle. As for the matter: the Buddha entered nirvāṇa beneath the trees, and the Four Great Heavenly Kings constantly protect these trees, not allowing outsiders to damage their branches and leaves. In ancient times, the Earl of Zhao governed with benevolent administration, regularly hearing lawsuits beneath a small sweet-pear tree. When he had passed away, the common people remembered his benevolence and loved his tree, composing the poem "Do Not Clip, Do Not Chop." How much more so for the Tathāgata's śāla trees! From "The flowers and fruits are ever luxuriant..." onward, the third aspect clarifies the benefit of the Dharma flavor, first with a simile and next by matching and explaining it. As for the flowers and fruits: the blooming and adornment of the flowers arouse love in those who see them, analogizing the Dharmakāya as serene, ever-abiding, and immutable; therefore flowers are used to express the self. The fruit expresses bliss: its flavor is sweet, complete with color and fragrance, and seeing, hearing, smelling, touching, tasting, and eating it are all universally blissful; the Dharmakāya is likewise so, and all sentient beings share in this bliss.

26.14

From the passage beginning with "Siṃhanāda said: 'Why does the Tathāgata...'" onward, it secondly explains the conditions of the time, also in two parts: first, the time of the second month; next, the time of the fifteenth day. As for the first, the time of the second month, there is a question and an answer. The answer comprises two parts: first, citing an analogy to clarify the matter; next, matching the simile to clarify the principle. In the first text: if relying on the Xia calendar, it is the second month; if relying on the Zhou calendar, it is the fourth month. When sentient beings are joyful, they all hold to permanence, so this breaks attachment and enables awakening to the Path. It is also said that regarding "among the six seasons," there are two explanations. Hexi says: in foreign lands, two months make one season, and a year has six seasons; thus the three seasons of spring, summer, and winter each have an earlier and later part. The Suvarṇaprabhāsa states: "If spoken of by twos, it completes the six seasons; if spoken of by threes, a year has four seasons." Here it precisely takes them by twos to complete the six seasons. Zhaoti says: taking the two seasons of spring and winter, each having the first, middle, and last month, it therefore speaks of six seasons; the text brings up the first month of winter to contrast with warm spring, and so forth. From "Speaking of the second month..." onward, the second part matches the simile to clarify the principle. The two Dharmakāyas are the real and responsive bodies. Hexi says: the permanent body and the impermanent body both illuminate the world. The fruit analogizes the four fruits. One explanation says: these are the four fruits of the Hīnayāna, because the Great can encompass the Small. A second explanation says: these are the four virtues. From "Siṃhanāda said..." onward, the second part clarifies the time of the day, likewise first with a question and next an answer. Regarding the question: the Dīrgha Āgama states that he left home on the eighth day and entered nirvāṇa on the eighth day; here it says the fifteenth day, which is perhaps because the responsive perceptions [of beings] differ, and it also reflects the sovereignty of the Tathāgata's physical secret. Next, the Buddha's reply has two parts: first, with respect to the fundamental; next, with respect to the traces. First, regarding the fundamental: wanting to clarify that the wondrous fundamental is perfectly consummate, he therefore uses the fifteenth day as an analogy. From "Just as on the fifteenth day..." onward, it addresses the traces.

26.15

From the passage beginning with "Siṃhanāda said: 'What kind of bhikṣu...'" onward is the third part, clarifying the personal conditions. Within this, there are also two parts: first, setting forth the persons; next, discussing the doctrine. In the first part, clarifying the persons, there is a question and an answer. As for the term "adorn": this person is endowed with virtues and practice, of wide learning and broad vision, skillful in demonstration and exposition, and thus capable of adorning the twin trees. It also means being complete in virtuous conduct, worthy of reliance, and thus obtaining this condition. The Buddha's reply has two parts: first, clarifying the six persons in the stage of causes. As for the six persons, they are either a summary statement, or what is suitable for beings, or contrasted with the six masters above; hence he merely cites six. Question: Why not take bodhisattvas to adorn the twin trees? Answer: Bodhisattvas travel and transform beings without a fixed stay, not constantly following the Buddha; these six persons constantly follow and attend the Buddha, so they obtain this personal condition. Furthermore, these bhikṣus are themselves bodhisattvas, and so forth. When the text says that Śāriputra does not grieve upon hearing of nirvāṇa and does not rejoice upon hearing of permanent abiding: the Āgama states, "Śāriputra, hearing that the Buddha wished to enter nirvāṇa, could not bear to see the Buddha leave the world, and so entered extinction beforehand." How can it say that he did not grieve upon hearing of nirvāṇa? In his reply the Buddha recounts his virtuous fruits, showing that this is precisely the meaning of a bodhisattva, and must not be interpreted with a Hīnayāna intent. From "If there is a bhikṣu who is able to speak..." onward, the second part clarifies the person in the stage of fruition, which is none other than the Tathāgata. Setting forth the persons is concluded above.

26.16

Next, from “I only pray” onward is the doctrinal discussion, consisting of three rounds of question and answer. Although the first is not an objection in the strict sense, it may still be called a question. From “The Buddha said” onward is the answer, which has two parts: first clarifying the fundamental and next examining the traces. The fundamental has two aspects: first, briefly explaining non-abiding; second, extensively explaining non-abiding, which again has two parts: first the doctrine, and next an analogy. In the first part on the doctrine, there are two points: first explaining abiding, and here explaining non-abiding. Therein, what is called “empty space” means that the sublime essence is not existent; therefore it is called empty space. Regarding “the vajrasamādhi is the Tathāgata,” older interpretations say: when fully completing studies on the tenth stage, one is not yet a Buddha; turning the vajra mind within the uninterrupted path is called being a Buddha. Now, relying on this text, it says this is the Tathāgata. This term applies to both cause and fruit, just as the śūraṅgama applies to cause and fruit. Regarding “dāna-pāramitā and the rest,” it does not mean that the six practices alone can achieve the fruit. The previous text says it is the body perfected with the six pāramitās, and the factors of awakening are likewise. From “Just as empty space” onward, the second part explains non-abiding in terms of an analogy, which again has two parts: first the analogy, and next its application. The analogy itself is as in the text. In the application, differences are inversely used to distinguish space, and space is non-abiding. Therein, regarding the bodhisattvas of the six abodes falling into the three evil paths due to afflictions, some say these are six mental states, and some say six stages. In my personal view, it is likely the six stages. From “Good son, now the Tathāgata here” onward, the second part clarifies the traces. Within the path of expedient means, he returns to quietude; sentient beings, not seeing him, consider the Buddha to have entered nirvāṇa. From “Siṃhanāda” onward is the second round of question and answer: Why does the Tathāgata not constantly benefit sentient beings instead of entering quietude? The Buddha extensively answers with his intention. The “unshared Dharma-treasury” means it is not shared with the practitioners of the two vehicles. Therein, whether to eliminate evil or to generate good, it is according to the intention of the four siddhāntas that he must enter quietude. From “Siṃhanāda said” onward is the third round of question and answer, asking: Why is nirvāṇa called markless? The Buddha answers in three parts: first directly explaining the ten markless states; next explaining the faults of having marks; third, explaining the benefits of marklessness.

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Linked texts (1)

大般涅槃經疏 — Classical Chinese