大般涅槃經疏 26.7

26.7

From “Siṃhanāda said: ‘As the Buddha spoke in verse...’” onward, the second part directly clarifies cultivating the path. This has two parts: first, clarifying cultivating the path; second, clarifying the causes and conditions for cultivating the path. The first part also has two: first, an explanation; next, the debate. As for first citing the verse to ask, the first two lines concern cultivating the path, and the latter two lines concern attaining the fruit: being able to cultivate the three grades without regressing, one attains the fruit; the three grades are the cause, and approaching great nirvāṇa is the fruit. First, the verse is cited to ask; next, an answer is requested on each point. In the answer there are three rounds of explanation: the first round distinguishes the genuine from the false; the next round is specifically directed at destroying evil; the final round is specifically directed at generating the good. Regarding the genuine and the false, there are two parts: first the false, next the genuine. First, the false comprises three grades: the lowest of the low consistently cannot keep the precepts; the middle of the low keeps the precepts out of fear of the sufferings of the bad destinies; the highest of the low keeps the precepts to deliver sentient beings from suffering and affliction. These three are all false; on the present understanding, even this person cannot be apprehended. Next, as for the genuine: one who knows that all phenomena are empty and yet can keep the precepts, seeking the fruit of buddhahood for the sake of all sentient beings. The fruit cannot be apprehended, and even sentient beings do not exist, much less the fruit of buddhahood—this is called genuinely keeping the precepts. Next, as for being able to break the sixteen evil disciplines: this further explains the three grades in terms of extinguishing evil. As for “butchers” (kuíkuài), the old [commentaries] say: they are people who sell fish and meat or oversee troops. Another says: they are floggers. As for “body-less samādhi”: because the absorption of emptiness extinguishes physical form, it is called “body-less.” “Boundless mind” is the absorption of the sphere of consciousness. “Pure mass” is the sphere of nothingness. “World's edge” is [the sphere of] neither conceptualization nor non-conceptualization; because this absorption can know eighty thousand kalpas, this is taken as the edge. Moreover, because neither conceptualization nor non-conceptualization lies beyond the triple realm, it is called the “world's edge.” “World's severance”: since outside of eighty thousand kalpas one cannot know, one then takes it to be severed. “World's nature” is the primordial obscurity (pradhāna), which is the fundamental nature of the world. “World-man” (puruṣa): through the power of this absorption one can see the cosmic man in the waters at the beginning of the kalpa, that is, Viṣṇu. “Neither conceptualization nor non-conceptualization”: taking the contemplation of existence and non-existence as the essence of the absorption. From “Those who cultivate the precepts do so for bodily tranquility...” onward, the third part explains the three grades in terms of generating the good. “All realms of existence” means the three realms of existence and the twenty-five realms of existence. “All spheres” means the three realms and the eighteen dhātus, and so on. “All truths” means the twenty-five tattvas and the six categories (padārthas). From “Siṃhanāda said: ‘Unborn and unextinguished...’” onward, the second part is the debate. Due to previously cultivating the path, one sees the buddhadhātu and attains bodhi and nirvāṇa. Now he challenges [the concepts of] nirvāṇa and buddhadhātu in seven rounds of questions and answers in total: the first three rounds challenge nirvāṇa; the subsequent four rounds challenge the buddhadhātu. The first says: if what is unborn and unextinguished is nirvāṇa, then an ordinary person is also unborn and unextinguished, so this should be nirvāṇa. Because an ordinary person throughout a lifetime, from birth to old age, is not born again, it is called “unborn”; and because they are not yet extinguished, it is also “unextinguished.” Is this being unborn and unextinguished nirvāṇa, or not? Furthermore, it is said: if the challenge is made in terms of the characteristic of origination among the three characteristics [of conditioned phenomena], then in this single moment of thought, because origination has already originated, it is therefore “unborn”; and because it has not yet ceased, it is therefore “unextinguished.” Is this nirvāṇa, or not? In the answer, the Buddha first endorses it and then explains: since it is not nirvāṇa, it is because it has a beginning and an end. It is also necessary to further resolve the two explanations above to establish the meaning of beginning and end. Initial birth is the beginning, and the end of life is the end; the characteristic of origination in the three characteristics of a single thought is also like this: the initial arising is the beginning, and the cessation of the thought is the end. From “World-Honoured One...” onward, the second challenge clarifies that the phenomena of saṃsāra are also without beginning or end. Since the twelve links of dependent origination revolve without stopping, how could there be a beginning or an end? The Buddha answers: the phenomena of saṃsāra have causes and effects; the twelve links of dependent origination revolve without stopping, with the two causes of the past and the five fruits of the present, and so it is not nirvāṇa. The third round of challenge clarifies that within nirvāṇa there are also cause and effect. Since precepts, concentration, and wisdom can attain nirvāṇa, how could this not be cause and effect? The Buddha answers: nirvāṇa has a cause and is not an effect; moreover, it is an effect and is not that which is attained. Furthermore, the buddhadhātu is the cause of nirvāṇa, and yet it cannot produce the fruit of nirvāṇa (and so forth). The second section has four rounds of questions and answers debating the meaning of the buddhadhātu. The first round raises a challenge regarding whether it is shared or not shared: first marking two headings, and then explaining as in the text. The Buddha's answer also has two parts: first the principle, next the similes. In the initial principle, it is said that it is neither one nor two: because it is not one, it is not shared; because it is not two, it is not distinct. Even though it is so, in the end all sentient beings share it together. The Dilun masters say: all sentient beings share the identical essence of the ālaya-vijñāna dharmadhātu. If so, when one person attains it, many people should attain it. The Satyasiddhi masters say: each sentient being has their own buddhadhātu, but when buddhahood is achieved, their provisional wisdom is equal and they share the same dharmakāya, and the powers, fearlessnesses, and so forth are also like this. If so, if the buddhadhātu could be counted, it would be impermanent, which is directly open to this challenge. However, the buddhadhātu is impartial, neither one nor two, neither shared nor distinct. It is also like people today who maintain precepts and cultivate practice: they cannot be considered one, nor can they be considered different. Since each person cultivates individually, how could they be one? My understanding is their understanding, and their understanding is my understanding; therefore they are not different. Furthermore, just as the five kinds of buddhadhātu are neither one nor different: since sentient beings equally possess them, how could they be different? Since the five kinds are not identical, how could they be one (and so forth)? Question: Among the five buddhadhātus, how many do sentient beings possess? Answer: All of them, and none of them. If sentient beings lack the discernment of contemplative wisdom, they cannot manifest the objective realm; since the wisdom that manifests the objective realm is lacking, there is also no contemplated realm. Since the cause lacks a cause, how could they separately attain the fruit and the fruit of the fruit? Since there is neither cause nor fruit, how could there be neither-cause-nor-fruit? As for possessing all: because it must inevitably be attained, and because it manifests through conditions, it is therefore said that they possess all of them; although it is lacking at present, it will certainly be possessed. Next, the similes are as in the text. The second round challenges the simile of the kṣānti grass: if it is one, once one person cultivates it, other people should also attain it. The Buddha answers: the buddhadhātu is one, but as many people cultivate it, each person attains it without mutually obstructing one another. The third round asks: just as when many people are on a road, those in front obstruct those behind; the buddhadhātu is also like this: when the former person cultivates it, it should also obstruct the later person. The Buddha answers: roads, bridges, and physicians are only partial analogies; the path of the noble ones is not like this, and bridges and the like are also like this. The fourth challenge: the characteristics of the six destinies of devas and humans are not uniform; how can they share a single buddhadhātu? The Buddha answers: if poison is put into milk, through all five flavors the poison can kill everywhere. The buddhadhātu is also like this, pervading all places (and so forth).