大般涅槃經疏 27

English (machine translation) 27

Language: English

27.1

Composed by Master Guàndǐng of Zhāng'ān under the Suí dynasty

27.2

Re-edited by the Tiāntái Śramaṇa Zhànrán under the Táng dynasty

The beginning of the fascicle is the second part, clarifying that concentration and wisdom assist each other and are also identical to each other; equanimity should also be mentioned, but is merely omitted for brevity. Furthermore, equanimity has no separate dharma; when concentration and wisdom are balanced, that is called equanimity. In the text, there is first a question and then an answer. The intention of the question says: Wisdom can sever afflictions, so why is concentration needed? Raising a one-sided, distinct objection seeks an explanation of complete integration. First, Siṃhanāda cites the Buddha’s sūtras to raise an objection; we thus know it refutes neither outsiders nor the questioner, but simply refutes the sūtras that the Buddha taught according to conditions. The Buddha’s sūtras do not go beyond the four teachings; examining the intention of this doctrine, it precisely uses the Perfect to refute the Separate. Once the Separate is refuted, the rest can be known by parallel.

27.5

Next, within the Buddha's answer, the opening text has two parts: first a general refutation, and next a specific refutation. In the first general part, proclaiming generally that this doctrine is incorrect, what does it not encompass? Whether heterodox clingings, the Hinayāna teaching, the common teaching, or the gradual teaching, all fall within being incorrect. This is merely rectifying internal stagnations, not refuting external heterodoxies.

27.6

Next, the specific refutation has two parts: first, analysing according to the Dharma; second, revealing the perfect integration of non-abiding concentration and wisdom. In the first part there are seven [perspectives]: first, in terms of non-difference; second, in terms of non-existence; third, in terms of no locus; fourth, in terms of non-deficiency; fifth, in terms of immutability; sixth, in terms of no agentive capability; seventh, in terms of no making. Regarding the first, the refutation in terms of non-difference, the text has two parts: first, discussing the identity of essence; next, adducing analogies to illustrate this identity of essence. Why? Those who are deluded all maintain that defilements and wisdom are like water and fire, or enemies and bandits, and that one must cultivate wisdom to destroy defilements. From the separate teaching down, none are not like this. Therefore, Siṃhanāda, holding this [view], formulated an objection, hoping to hear something different. The Buddha uses the perfect [teaching] to refute the separate [teaching]. What is wisdom? What is defilement? They are simply the understanding and delusion of the dharmadhātu; understanding and delusion are of the same essence, not two and not distinct. When in delusion, the entire essence is delusion, and outside delusion there is no wisdom; when in understanding, the entire essence is understanding, and outside understanding there is no delusion. The sūtra says: 'Defilement is itself bodhi; bodhi is itself defilement.' The sūtra also says: 'Outside the nature of phenomena (dharmatā), there are no further phenomena. If there were phenomena outside it, it would not be the dharmadhātu.' If so, when there are defilements, there is no wisdom—how could there be any talk of destruction? If there is wisdom, there are no longer defilements—what would there be left to destroy? Yet to say that wisdom can destroy defilements—for this reason he adduces that when it is light there is no darkness, and when it is dark there is no light, to serve as an analogy for this perfect Dharma. This principle and this text are brilliantly clear and luminous, and should not be interpreted otherwise. From 'who has wisdom' downward is the second part, refuting in terms of non-existence, which has two sections: first, reproving the person and the Dharma; next, concluding that there is no destruction. As for the first section, from the Tripiṭaka [teaching] upward down to the separate teaching, they are unable to realize the perfect integration of the dharmadhātu, to empty the self and forget objects: the two vehicles still retain 'my robes' and 'my alms-bowl,' and bodhisattvas purify lands and transform people; both self and other are preserved, and both wisdom and severance are realized—this posits a 'who' and cannot reach 'no who'. The Buddha reproves them with the perfect Dharma: this very wisdom is defilement—who would use defilement to sever defilement? This very defilement is wisdom—who would use wisdom to sever wisdom? When even defilements cannot sever defilements, how could wisdom sever wisdom? Therefore he concludes that if there is none, there is nothing to be severed. From 'Good son, if one says wisdom' downward is the third part, refuting in terms of no locus, which has two sections: first, jointly explaining arriving and not arriving; next, jointly concluding that there is no destruction. Why? Wisdom is the dharmadhātu. Even supposing there were defilements outside the dharmadhātu, and one used the wisdom within the dharmadhātu to destroy the defilements outside: would it destroy without arriving at that place, or would it destroy upon arriving at that place? If it could destroy without arriving at that place, then ordinary people, not having arrived there, should also be able to destroy [them]. If it could destroy upon arriving at that place, would it be able to destroy in the first thought-moment, or in a later thought-moment? If it cannot do so in the first thought-moment, it cannot do so in a later one either. Therefore he concludes that to say destruction occurs either by arriving or by not arriving is incorrect. Outside the dharmadhātu there is no other phenomenon; therefore, there is no locus. From 'Furthermore, vipaśyanā' downward is the fourth part, refuting in terms of non-deficiency, which has two sections: first, directly refuting according to the Dharma; next, adducing analogies. As for the meaning of the first Dharma [passage], wisdom is the dharmadhātu, completely fulfilled and lacking nothing; wisdom is itself discipline, concentration, and the rest without any difference—how could it suddenly have an accompaniment outside the dharmadhātu to jointly destroy defilements outside the dharmadhātu? Since there is no destruction with an accompaniment, neither can it do so alone; therefore he adduces the analogy of the blind. Whether alone or accompanied, neither sees form; 'alone or accompanied' carries the sense of deficiency. From 'Good son, just as the solid nature of earth' downward is the fifth part, refuting in terms of immutability, which has two sections: first, adducing a parallel category to refute; next, concluding the refutation. Just as the nature of the four great elements cannot be moved or altered, and no single thing can change or alter the four elements to make them lose their original nature, defilements are also like this, sharing the same nature with wisdom. The nature of wisdom is inherently severed, and the nature of defilement is also inherently severed; how could severance sever severance? Next, the concluding text states: 'Vipaśyanā definitely cannot destroy defilements.' From 'Good son, just as the salty nature of salt' downward is the sixth part, refuting in terms of no agentive capability, which has four sections: first, taking away; second, granting; third, taking away again; fourth, granting again. First, adducing salt and honey transforming others to be like themselves is to deny that wisdom can be like salt and honey. Regarding phenomena that are not extinguished, wisdom cannot forcibly extinguish them; this denies to wisdom the efficacy of severing delusion. Next, from 'if one says' downward, citing salt's ability to make things salty grants that wisdom can extinguish others. Wisdom is itself extinguished thought-moment by thought-moment; how could it cause others to be extinguished? Just as a drowning person is himself sinking, how could he keep others afloat? Third, from 'Good son, there are two kinds' downward takes it away again, directly taking it away on the grounds of inherent extinction. Wisdom is inherently extinguished and cannot cause defilements to be extinguished. Fourth, from 'if one says that wisdom can extinguish' downward grants it once more, adducing the cinders of fire and the hewing of an axe, where the locus of their extinction cannot be found. The former pairing of granting and taking away makes clear that wisdom of impermanence, suffering, emptiness, and conditional cultivation is itself impermanent—how could it sever delusion? This is distinctly apparent. The latter pairing of granting and taking away reproves [the idea by showing] that neither the locus of that which severs nor that which is severed can be seen; this refutes the view that outside the dharmadhātu there is a separate delusion to be severed by wisdom. Why is no locus seen? It is like the cinders of fire or the mark of an axe: since there are no cinders or marks, there is no delusion to be destroyed. Since there is no delusion, whom does wisdom destroy? The text and meaning are clear in using the perfect to refute the separate. From 'Good son, all' downward is the seventh part, refuting in terms of no making, which is also called the general summary of the preceding. Here it explains that the nature of all phenomena is intrinsically empty—who causes them to arise and cease? Since there is no maker, how could wisdom destroy defilements?

27.7

From 'if one cultivates concentration' downward is the second part, revealing the perfect integration. Non-abiding concentration and wisdom are both the dharmadhātu; not only can wisdom sever delusion, but concentration also severs delusion. The text has four sections: first, explaining that concentration and wisdom mutually contain each other and also contain all phenomena; second, explaining that concentration and wisdom are identical to each other—being identical to stillness, they can sever; being identical to severance, they can be still; third, explaining the names and characteristics of concentration and wisdom; fourth, explaining their sovereign mastery in adapting to the occasion. The setting forth of these four headings corresponds to the intent of the four siddhāntas: the full endowment of concentration and wisdom with the three bodhis corresponds to the supreme truth (paramārtha); identical to stillness and able to sever corresponds to remedial action (pratipakṣa); the names and characteristics of concentration and wisdom correspond to the worldly (laukika); and benefiting according to the occasion corresponds to for the sake of the person (prātipuruṣika). Regarding the first, that concentration and wisdom mutually contain each other, the text has three sections: first, concentration being endowed with wisdom, referring to correct cognitive vision; second, concentration being endowed with worldly phenomena such as arising, ceasing, and impermanence, as cited for verification; third, being endowed with the three bodhis. Since concentration as the dharmadhātu contains [them] like this, wisdom and equanimity are also like this. Next, from 'a bodhisattva is endowed with two dharmas' downward explains that concentration and wisdom are identical to each other; if one were to say they merely support each other, this meaning would be too distant. It also has two parts: first, concentration being wisdom; second, wisdom being concentration. In the first section, eight analogies are adduced in all to show that concentration being wisdom is wondrously able to sever delusion; next, from 'furthermore, regulating and gathering the five sense faculties' onward explains that wisdom being concentration dwells in safety amidst danger and can bring benefit while in deficit, and so on. The first analogy is 'like mowing the jān grass'; the character is pronounced jiān. The Shijing says, 'White flowers, the jān grass,' and also says, 'Do not discard the jān and the kuǎi.' The Erya says, 'White flower is wild jān.' Guo Pu says, 'It is a kind of cogon grass.' A 'crucible' (gānguō) is a vessel for melting metal, an earthen cauldron. The character should be written as 𩰭, both pronounced gē. It is called gān because the mouth is narrowed. The next text also has two parts: first, directly explaining; next, from 'Good son' downward explaining the function, both being as in the text. From 'characteristics of concentration' downward is the third part, explaining names and characteristics, which is to name what is nameless. Based on the single dharmatā, three characteristics are spoken of, and according to the three characteristics, three names are established; the names and characteristics are all the dharmadhātu, containing all phenomena. Because concentration has no fixed characteristic of concentration, it is called empty; because wisdom penetrates pure dharmas, it is without wish; because equanimity has neither agent nor object, it is signless. From 'if there is a bodhisattva' downward is the fourth part, skillful application with sovereign mastery according to the occasion. The text has two sections: first, proclaiming the proper and improper times; afterward, further questions and answers. In the answers, the proper and improper times of the three dharmas are explained, which are the four siddhāntas of one's own practice. When one experiences joy and the like, giving rise to arrogance, one should cultivate concentration—this is skillful application for the sake of the person; when one is vigorous and the like, giving rise to remorse, one should cultivate wisdom—this is skillful cultivation as a remedy; when the two dharmas are balanced, one should cultivate equanimity—this is skillful cultivation of the supreme truth; when defilements arise, one should recite and practice the six recollections—this is skillful cultivation of the worldly. The sūtra says: 'Cultivating the three characteristics, through these causes and conditions, one accomplishes signless nirvāṇa.' Since it mentions causes and conditions, these are the skillful cultivation of the siddhāntas serving as the causes and conditions that accomplish great nirvāṇa. Furthermore, the appropriateness of cultivating concentration is the gate of existence; the appropriateness of cultivating wisdom is the gate of emptiness; the appropriateness of cultivating equanimity is the gate of neither emptiness nor existence; and the appropriateness of cultivating the twelvefold scriptures, the six recollections, and the like is the gate of both emptiness and existence: through the causes and conditions of the four gates, one accomplishes great nirvāṇa. Moreover, one should skillfully enact the four siddhāntas for transforming others; I cannot multiply words here, but practitioners must possess them fully, and so forth.

27.8

From "Good sons, if there are bodhisattvas who cultivate" onward is the third [section], on the power and function of cultivating the path, which has two parts: first, explaining how experiencing joy leads to attaining nirvāṇa; second, explaining how leaving suffering behind transforms hindrances. The first part also has two [sections]: first, explaining the attainment of nirvāṇa; next, debating the doctrine. The doctrinal debate consists of two rounds of questions and answers. The first question takes up the point that cultivating the three dharmas brings about the attainment of nirvāṇa, and thus asks about its marks. The text has two [parts]: first, it cites that being devoid of the ten marks is called great nirvāṇa. But since the causal response had concluded, this essential purport was already grasped, while the remainder was not yet understood, so he further asks about the ten dharmas. Kāishàn took this extinction of the fires of defilement to be called "extinction and deliverance" (mièdù), using it to translate nirvāṇa. Zhuāngyán took the separation from all discursive thought to be called nirvāṇa, criticizing Kāishàn by saying: "The exhaustion of seed-bonds (zǐfù) is called extinction and deliverance, while the exhaustion of fruit-bonds (guǒfù) is called nirvāṇa. How can one take a passage on seed-bonds to translate the fruit of nirvāṇa?" Kāishàn defended himself, saying: "Fully preserved in the foreign language, the exhaustion of both seed- and fruit-bonds is called liberation, and both extinctions—with remainder and without remainder—are called extinction and deliverance; but the translators of the sūtra skillfully alternated their phrasing, retaining this phonetic rendering as extinction and deliverance for the exhaustion of seed-bonds, and retaining that phonetic rendering as liberation for the exhaustion of fruit-bonds." However, the ten answers here all answer regarding the perfect virtues of nirvāṇa; the two masters each clung to a single line and stirred up disputes, which is giving rise to afflictions based on interpreting doctrines, and is also akin to touching the elephant (and so forth). From "Siṃhanāda" onward, Siṃhanāda questions again. Having already heard the ten meanings, he does not yet know how many dharmas the practitioner must cultivate to attain nirvāṇa. Next, from "The Buddha said" onward, the Buddha answers. The purport of the answer is that the aforementioned ten dharmas were merely the distinctions among the fruits of the fruits of nirvāṇa. If one wishes to practice, one must further be endowed with ten dharmas. Therein are three parts: presentation, explanation, and conclusion. From "Siṃhanāda said: 'As the Buddha previously declared'" onward is the second [major section], explaining how leaving suffering behind transforms hindrances, which also has two parts: first, explaining the karmic hindrances that are transformed; next, explaining the curative path that can transform them. First, there are two rounds of questions and answers: the first round explains that because karma is indeterminate, hindrances can be transformed; the next explains that because karma is indeterminate, the path can be cultivated. The first question and answer has two [parts]: first, inquiring about wholesome karma; next, inquiring about unwholesome karma. The initial inquiry into wholesome karma has five [points]: first, explaining its inexhaustibility; second, explaining its certainty; third, reiterating its inexhaustibility; fourth, reiterating its certainty; fifth, drawing a comparison to conclude the question. The first point also has three parts: first, the opening words; second, grasping the purport; third, concluding the question. The initial address to Cunda is the reason for posing the question. From "Gradually, as the Buddha" onward, he grasps the purport. Giving to an animal yields a hundredfold [reward], and to an icchantika a thousandfold: for the animal, the previous cause was evil and the present retribution is base; for the icchantika, the previous cause was wholesome and the present retribution is superior; hence there is the difference of a hundred and a thousand. Above it was said that killing an animal incurs a minor offense, while killing an icchantika incurs no offense; how is this reconciled? Answer: animals have no fault of severing wholesome roots and slandering the Dharma, whereas icchantikas have this fault. From "Great Being Cunda" onward, he concludes the question. Next, from "World-Honoured One, in the sūtra it is further said" onward, he asks about certainty, which also has two [parts]: first, grasping [the meaning]; next, directly questioning regarding Cunda. If the intention was profound and the cause superior, this karma is fixed; how could he become a Buddha? Third, from "World-Honoured One, in the sūtra it is said" onward, he reiterates inexhaustibility. Fourth, from "World-Honoured One, in the sūtra it is said" onward, he reiterates certainty. Fifth, from "Furthermore, Aniruddha" onward, he draws a comparison to conclude the question.

27.9

Next, from "World-Honoured One, if the wholesome fruit" onward is the second [part], which cites the inexhaustible unwholesome karma of four persons: how could they attain bodhi? From "The Buddha said" onward is the answer, which also has two [parts]: first, praising the question; second, answering. The answer also has two parts: first, the causal occasion; next, the direct answer. First, praising the profound power of karma is the causal occasion for answering the question. Yet, the Buddha's ten powers also have no superiority or inferiority; it is simply appropriate here. Furthermore, whether karma is light or heavy, determinate or indeterminate, and so forth, is difficult to fathom and cannot be understood by others; hence it is called "great." From "There are sentient beings" onward is the direct answer, which again has four parts: first, unfolding the provisional; second, revealing the real; third, explaining the provisional; fourth, explaining the real. First, unfolding the provisional means declaring it to be determinate for the sake of those who lack faith. From "All performed karma" onward is the second, revealing the real. The natures of karma differ: there is light and heavy, determinate and indeterminate; how could it be uniformly determinate? From "Or there may be a person" onward explains the provisional. It is solely because those of perverse views lack faith that he spoke determinately for them. From "Or heavy karma" onward explains the real, which again has two parts: first, pointing out the two kinds of persons—the foolish and the wise. From "All sentient beings" onward is the second, pointing out both kinds of transformation. The wise transform the heavy into the light and the determinate into the indeterminate; the foolish transform the light into the heavy and the indeterminate into the determinate.

27.10

From "If it is so" onward is the second round of questions and answers, explaining that because karma is indeterminate, one can cultivate the path. The intention of the question is twofold: first, if unwholesome karma is indeterminate, what is the use of the holy life to seek nirvāṇa? Second, if wholesome karma is indeterminate, why likewise use the holy life to seek nirvāṇa? The Buddha's answer to this question is extremely extensive; because the doubts and confusions it shatters are numerous, it cannot but be detailed. If one does not comprehend this, none of the practices will be accomplished. Therefore, the text of this passage is somewhat long. The text has four parts: first, directly explaining that because karma is indeterminate, one cultivates the path; second, explaining that if karma were determinate, there would be many faults; third, explaining both the determinate and indeterminate natures of karma; fourth, concluding that because it is indeterminate, one cultivates the path.

27.11

The first [part] also has two: first, explaining indeterminacy; next, the mutual displacement between good and evil. The first has two: first, if it were determinate, one would not labor to cultivate the path; second, because it is indeterminate, one can cultivate the path. From "If one can keep away from" onward explains the mutual displacement between good and evil: because evil is indeterminate, one can do good; because good is indeterminate, one can do evil. From "If all karma determinately yields fruit" onward is the second, explaining that if it were determinate, there would be many faults, which also has two: first, explaining that if it were determinate, there would be no cultivation of the path; next, explaining that because it were determinate, there would be many faults. Regarding the first, there are also two: first brief, next extensive. In the brief treatment there are two: first, explaining that if it were determinate, there would be no need to cultivate the path; next, explaining that if one does not cultivate the path, there is no liberation. From "If all karma" onward is the second, the extensive explanation, which is also two: first, extensively explaining that if it were determinate, there would be no need to cultivate; next, from "If a person keeps away from" onward, extensively explaining that if one does not cultivate, there will be no time of liberation.

27.12

From "Good sons, if all karma were determinate" onward is the second [section], explaining that if karma were determinate, there would be many faults, which also has two [parts]: first, explaining the fault of karma being determinate; next, explaining the fault of the person and the time being determinate. The former text also has two: first, directly explaining that there would be faults, meaning that once one performed wholesome or unwholesome karma, one would forever experience good or evil with no time of cessation. Next, from "If the fruit of karma were thus" onward concludes that there would be no cultivation of the path. From "A human performs and a human receives" onward is the second, explaining the fault of the person and the time being determinate, which also has two: first, directly explaining the fault; next, concluding that one would not need to cultivate the path. The former also has two: first, explaining the fault of the person being determinate. If karma were determinate, the high and low, the attractive and ugly among humans, gods, and the six destinies would forever remain constantly so and could not be altered. From "Karma performed in youth" onward is the second, explaining the fault of the time being determinate. Karma performed in youth would also have to be experienced in youth, and likewise for maturity and old age. Next, from "If karma has no loss" onward concludes that there would be no cultivation of the path.

27.13

From "Good son, there are two kinds of karma" below is the third [part], broadly clarifying that karma is both fixed and unfixed, which also has two parts: first, announcing the two topics of fixed and unfixed; next, explaining them. Now, karma comprises four alternatives: (1) the retribution is fixed but the time is unfixed; (2) the time is fixed but the retribution is unfixed; (3) both are fixed; (4) both are unfixed. Here they are combined into two topics: where the retribution is fixed but the time is unfixed, and where both time and retribution are fixed, these together enter the heading of the topic of the fixed; where the time is fixed but the retribution is unfixed, and where both time and retribution are unfixed, these together enter the heading of the topic of the unfixed. The reason for this is that the main intention is in all cases primarily based upon the retribution being fixed. From "Fixed karma has two kinds" below is the second [part], explaining the headings of the topics, which also has two parts: first, explaining the heading of the fixed topic, which is very extensive; next, explaining the heading of the unfixed topic, which is extremely brief, consisting of only twelve characters. The initial explanation of the heading of the fixed is further divided into two topics: (1) fixed retribution and fixed time, and (2) fixed retribution and unfixed time. From "When conditions unite, one receives it" below is the explanation. First, it explains that the retribution is fixed while the time is unfixed. "Unfixed time" means that among the three times of the present [life], the next life, and subsequent lives, that which ought to be received but is not received will never be received; its time is necessarily unfixed. "Fixed retribution" means that the good or bad retribution is fully determined and only awaits the coming together of conditions; as soon as conditions unite, one receives it without the slightest discrepancy. From "If it is done with a determined mind" below is the second, explaining where both are fixed, which also has three parts: (1) explaining fixed retribution; (2) explaining fixed time; (3) concluding both together. The first text also has three parts: (1) clarifying fixed karma; (2) reverting back to being unfixed; (3) resolving doubts and demonstrating its transformation. This first part directly clarifies the fixed. There are further four matters that adorn it: (1) faithful mind, (2) rejoicing, (3) making a vow, and (4) making offerings. This is based on good karma, adorned by these four matters. Bad [karma] is likewise analogous: (1) believing in badness, (2) rejoicing, (3) making a vow, and (4) making offerings to bad companions; by these it adorns those with bad understanding. From "Roots of goodness" below is the second [part], clarifying that when this karma encounters conditions, it turns around and reverts back to being unfixed, which also has three parts: (1) a wise person transforms the heavy into the light; (2) a foolish person transforms the light into the heavy; (3) concluding that it is unfixed. From "A bodhisattva does not have hell karma" below is the third [part], resolving doubts and demonstrating its transformation. Fearing that beings might harbor doubts, seeing various noble persons born into hell, and wonder: "Is this not fixed karma?"—therefore it is now explained that they truly do not have that karma, but are born therein solely through the power of their vows for the sake of delivering sentient beings. The conclusion states that this fruit of retribution is not received in the present, the next, or subsequent lives. What is meant by "demonstrating transformation" is that although the preceding text spoke of the foolish and the wise transforming karma, no proof was yet seen; now it is clarified that noble persons enter bad realms to convert beings, and if karma could not be transformed, being there would be of no benefit; since there is benefit, one must know that it can be transformed. Within this there are also two parts: first brief, next extensive. From "I recall that in the past, with Devadatta" below is the second, explaining fixed time, which also has two parts: first, explaining present retribution; next, concluding both the next and subsequent lives together. Present retribution also has two parts: first, clarifying being harmed by Devadatta as a matter of the present [life]; next, being harmed by King Kali. The Small Prajñā says Gelī; the Sūtra of the Wise and the Foolish says Jiālì; the Commentary says Jiālí: they are all the same person, differing in their Sanskrit pronunciation. As for "patience is called precept": in the sequential mutual subsumption of the six perfections, none says that patience is precept; why does it now say that patience is called precept? This is because precepts and patience mutually reinforce each other; if patience is internally luminous, precepts are also externally pure. As for patience, it is merely bearing with killing, stealing, sexual misconduct, and false speech, and precepts merely guard against these; therefore patience has the power to complete precepts, which is why it is said that patience is called precept. Now, clarifying that patience as the dharmadhātu contains all dharmas cannot be fully expounded, so one aspect is temporarily raised, which is why it says patience is called precept. The Shuowen says: "Yì means cutting off the nose; yuè means cutting off the feet." From "Good karma with retribution in the next life or subsequent lives" below is the second, concluding both retributions together. From "When the bodhisattva attains bodhi" below is the third, concluding both fixed retribution and fixed time together, which also has two parts: first, concluding both together; next, concluding time alone. As for the first text: when an icchantika commits the evil karma of the five heinous deeds, although it cannot have present retribution, nor can it receive subsequent retribution, it must have retribution in the next life; here both time and retribution are fixed. Where the text says that at the time of attaining bodhi all karmas are received as present retribution, at this time the bodhisattva cuts off all afflictions and has no subsequent retribution; remaining in only this one life, he attains the fruit of buddhahood, and therefore it is said that he receives present retribution. Another explanation says: if the words "one life" are taken to be identical to fragmented [samsāra], it is not called present retribution; because advancing by one grade of wisdom and elimination is called "one life," even though it is one life, it is still called present retribution. One says: only the dharmakāya Buddha has this present retribution. Another says: it is the trace-body Buddha that has this present retribution, referring to the transformation body. From "If karma definitely receives retribution in the present life" below is the second, concluding fixed time alone. Precisely because the time is fixed, one receives only present retribution and cannot receive it in the next life or subsequent lives. Furthermore, the karma cultivated for the thirty-two marks does not receive present retribution because this karma is difficult to accomplish and must serve as the cause for buddhahood; hence none of it receives present retribution. The twelve characters from "If karma does not obtain the three kinds" below directly explain the heading of the unfixed topic; since this can be understood by contrast with the preceding, it is not expounded at length. From "If one says that all karmas definitely obtain" below is the fourth, concluding that because it is unfixed, there is cultivation of the path, which also has two parts: first, concluding that [asserting] it to be fixed is a fault; next, from "all sentient beings" below, concluding that [its being] unfixed is an attainment.

27.14

From "There are two kinds of people" below is the second [part], clarifying the path that remedies and is able to transform hindrances, which also has three parts: first, the persons who transform hindrances; next, the practices that transform hindrances; third, clarifying the characteristics of transformation. The first, on persons, also has two parts: first, the doctrinal explanation; next, citing twelve analogies. The first and last two analogies have applications; the ten in the middle have no applications. Among the middle ten analogies, the ninth analogy mentions "lacking a spare axle"; there are two explanations. One says: when riding a carriage on a long journey, one must keep an axle in reserve as a spare to prepare against breakage, just as when the Son of Heaven drives a carriage, there are spare oxen to substitute for the weary. The second explanation says that this character is an error and should be "spokes and axle" (fúzhóu); if one wishes to ride a carriage, one must have these spokes and axle. From "Siṃhanāda said" below is the second, clarifying the practice of transforming hindrances, in which there are questions and answers. The initial question has two parts: first, grasping the main point; next, the direct question. The intention of the question is: What kind of light karma is received heavily? What kind of heavy karma is received lightly? The Buddha answers, which also has three parts: first, presenting the two persons—the foolish and the wise—and the unfixed nature of light and heavy; next, citing six repetitions of "furthermore"; next, explaining with the analogies of the fourteen good sons and many miscellaneous analogies. The first text also has two parts: first, presenting the persons; next, the doctrinal explanation broadly clarifying their characteristics. Regarding "body, precepts, mind, and wisdom": spoken of comprehensively, these are merely the two matters of precepts and wisdom. If so, cultivating these precepts and wisdom can make heavy karma light, while lacking these two matters makes light karma heavy. Spoken of separately, it therefore says: cultivating the body, cultivating precepts, cultivating the mind, cultivating wisdom. "Body" is the seven actions [of body and speech]; "precepts" guard the mental ground; "cultivating the mind" is quiet concentration; "cultivating wisdom" is prajñā. The "seven kinds of pure precepts" are the precepts of the seven actions. "Not cultivating the mind" means not cultivating the three kinds of marks, which are the three marks of entering, staying, and exiting; nor can one contemplate the three marks of arising, staying, and cessation as being without arising, without staying, and without cessation. "Not cultivating wisdom" means not cultivating brahma-conduct; brahma-conduct contains three dharmas, with wisdom as primary. Next, as for the six repetitions of "furthermore": the first is plain to see. In the text of the second, "bodily categories" refers to categories such as the five skandhas, five faculties, and four great elements. "Inferior precepts" refers to the chicken, dog, cow, and pheasant precepts. It is also said that upholding precepts for the sake of heavenly five desires constitutes inferior precepts. As for "marginal precepts," Héxī says: the five precepts of non-Buddhists do not fall within the Buddhadharma; only the internal is called the middle, hence they are called "marginal." Alternatively, it is said that they exhaust the margins of evil desires; upholding precepts of pleasure exhausts the margin of pleasure, and upholding precepts of suffering exhausts the margin of suffering. The remaining four are as in the text. Among the fourteen good sons, the second mentions the "Fire Deva": fire is the mouth of the devas. If one makes offerings to it, smoke from roasting fish and meat rises to the heavens without burning, and the devas receive this smoke, which is why it is the mouth of the devas. Furthermore, non-Buddhists serve fire, taking fire as their master, and they also use this fire to make offerings to their master; out of veneration for their master, they call fire the mouth of the devas. In the final miscellaneous analogies, "tula down" means willow catkins. "Body" means eight feet [in height]. "Marks" are the five wrappings. "Cause" is food and drink, etc. "Fruit" is the past five precepts bringing about the body as retribution. "Aggregate" is the aggregate of the form skandha. "One body" means combining those provisional and real [factors] into a single body. "Two bodies" means that which is obtained from the harmony of the four great elements. "This body" is one's own body; "other" is the other's body. Furthermore, "this body" is that which is obtained through karmic power; "other body" is the physical remains. "Cessation of the body" means not abiding from moment to moment. "Equality of the body" means that someone contemplates the body as being equal to empty space. It is also said that each of the six paths has a body, hence it says "equal." "Bodily cultivation" is the dharma that is cultivated; the "cultivator" is the person capable of cultivation—again, these are person and dharma. The subsequent [explanations of] precepts and wisdom should be understood analogously.

27.15

From "Siṃhanāda said: That person" below is the third [part], clarifying the characteristics of the transformation of karma, in two rounds of questions and answers. The first asks how light [karma] is transformed into heavy, and the second asks how heavy [karma] is transformed into light. The answers are as in the text.

27.16

Siṃhanāda Chapter, Part 6

27.17

At the beginning of the fascicle, the fourth [section] is the encouragement to cultivate, the text of which has two parts: (1) encouraging by citing the teaching; (2) encouraging by citing persons. In the first, citing the teaching, there is first a question, followed by an answer. The questions are threefold: (1) asking whether, due to the power of buddhadhātu, all should equally attain nirvāṇa, so why are there distinctions among the six paths? (2) asking that since there is buddhadhātu, one ought naturally to attain bodhi, so what use is cultivating the path? (3) asking that since there is buddhadhātu, it should immediately be able to draw in and obtain bodhi. In the first question, he first grasps the main point and next poses the question, as in the text. From "World-Honoured One" below is the second question, which also has four parts: (1) grasping the sūtra; (2) making an analogy; (3) applying the analogy; (4) concluding the objection, as in the text. From "If an icchantika" below is the third question, which also has three parts: teaching, analogy, and application, as in the text.

27.18

Next is the Buddha's reply, which has two parts: first, the direct answer; next, the general conclusion. The first has four parts: 1. answering the objection regarding equally obtaining nirvāṇa; 2. answering the objection regarding attracting bodhi; 3. answering the objection regarding not needing to cultivate the path; 4. answering again the objection regarding attracting [bodhi]. Answering the first has a simile, an application, and a conclusion. In the simile, the general idea is first given: seven people beside a river are all equipped with hands and feet; although their hands and feet are the same, there are those who cross and those who do not cross. Next, the seven people are listed separately. Of the first [group of] seven people, the first two are external ordinary beings, the next one is an internal ordinary being, and the latter four are noble persons. External ordinary beings are the utterly evil icchantikas and next those who are about to stand firm but regress; hence they make two people. For internal ordinary beings, there are the five expedient means; they are taken together as one because, though differing in superiority and inferiority, neither has yet realized the truth. The noble persons make four because: śrāvakas do not affect [habitual] latencies; pratyekabuddhas affect latencies; bodhisattvas affect latencies and furthermore transform sentient beings; the Buddha's habitual latencies are completely exhausted. If one does not interpret it this way, there is no way to draw distinctions. Above, it was said that sentient beings all possess the buddhadhātu; why do sentient beings not equally obtain nirvāṇa? To make it clear, another [simile of] seven different people at one river is presented. Throughout this sūtra, a total of six rivers are spoken of, namely: the rivers of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa, the rivers of defilements and buddhadhātu, and the rivers of wholesome dharmas and unwholesome dharmas—paired two by two. Concerning saṃsāra, it is discussed in terms of being able to get out or not being able to get out; concerning nirvāṇa, it is discussed in terms of being able to enter or not being able to enter; concerning defilements, it is discussed in terms of being able to sever them or not being able to sever them; concerning the buddhadhātu, it is discussed in terms of being able to see it or not being able to see it; concerning unwholesome dharmas, it is discussed in terms of being able to abandon them or not being able to abandon them; concerning wholesome dharmas, it is discussed in terms of reaching the ultimate or not reaching the ultimate. Here, the Gaṅgā River is specifically explained, allegorizing saṃsāra. The "Kāśyapa Chapter" takes the great nirvāṇa as the river, where the combinations and separations of the seven people in the river are different. This passage explains seven people, while a later chapter explains seven [types of] sentient beings. Here, the four fruits are combined into one, and the fourth separates the three vehicles into three people; in a later chapter, the four fruits are separated into four people, and the pratyekabuddha, bodhisattva, and Buddha are combined into the seventh person; they will be further distinguished below. As for "washing and bathing," it allegorizes leaving the household life and receiving the precepts, purifying one's own body. "Fearing bandits and robbers" allegorizes defilements. "Gathering flowers" has two explanations: one says that the flowers of the seven purities are indeed seeking the cause; the second says that roaming among the flowers of awakening is indeed seeking the fruit. Leaving the household life ought to be emerging from the river, yet speaking of entering the river is to show that saṃsāra and nirvāṇa are not distinctly separate, and that one must seek nirvāṇa within saṃsāra. From "the first person" onward, the seven people are listed separately. Drowning is the icchantika: lacking goodness in the past, their past cause is already inferior, and they have no faith in the present, so they do not learn to float. The second person is one who is about to stand firm but regresses, possessing great physical strength: their past goodness was deep, but they do not cultivate in this life, which is termed not learning to float and being able to sever roots of goodness. The third person is the one who attains stability, which allegorizes the internal ordinary being. "Having submerged, has emerged" means they previously underwent submersion. The fourth person is the four fruits, allegorized by the four directions. As for the four directions, a later passage allegorizes the four truths by the four directions, which is not the allegorical use here. The text states: "Not knowing the place of exit, they therefore observe the directions." Because in the past they did not know the place of exit, they did not observe; now knowing the place of exit, it says they observe the directions. Furthermore, not knowing the place of exit of the Great Vehicle, they therefore grasp the lesser fruit. The fifth person is the pratyekabuddha, of whom it is also said that observing the directions surpasses the four fruits; because of their sharp faculties, they do not grasp the four fruits, but merely for the sake of personal realization it says they depart, and because they equally fear saṃsāra, it says they are afraid. The sixth person is the bodhisattva; "departing without stopping" means not stopping in saṃsāra. "Staying in a shallow place" means the mind is at ease in saṃsāra; from the perspective of their mind, it is called a shallow place. The seventh person is the Buddha. From "Good sons, the great river of saṃsāra" onward, the second part applies the simile. First, it applies the general simile. Fearing the bandits of defilements matches the previous fear. Arousing the intention wanting to cross matches the previous entering the river. Leaving the household life and shaving the head matches the previous washing and bathing. Wearing the Dharma robes on the body matches the previous gathering flowers. From "having already left the household life" onward, the second part applies the specific similes of the seven people. First, applying the constant submerging: this is the icchantika, which is here briefly matched. From "there are six causes and conditions" onward is the detailed application. As for "monks of the five divisions," there are two explanations: one says that the five assemblies speak of faults to each other; the second says they are the Vinayas of the five divisions. More than a hundred years after the Buddha's parinirvāṇa, King Aśoka held an assembly; the elder Sthavira established doctrines, and the Mahāsāṃghika great assembly differed, splitting into two divisions. Later, the Sthavira division further produced two divisions, namely the Haimavata and the Sarvāstivāda. After the Haimavata ceased, the Sarvāstivāda further practiced the Mahāsāṃghika and produced three divisions, namely the Mahīśāsaka, Dharmaguptaka, and Kāśyapīya; together with the Sarvāstivāda and Mahāsāṃghika, they make the five divisions. The Tathāgata foresaw their mutually disputing right and wrong, and the Mahāsaṃnipāta Sūtra also foretold the five divisions; as the Samayabhedoparacanacakra detailed the split into twenty divisions, this is not essential to the present text, so it is not cited. From "the second person" onward applies to those who are about to stand firm but regress. These are external ordinary beings who can also sever roots of goodness, yet differ from the constantly submerged. From "the third person" onward, this applies to the internal ordinary beings who attain stability. Both the lesser and greater stages are included within it; is this not the shared stage of the three persons of the Shared Teaching? If one adopts the Distinct meaning, because the Great Vehicle teaching differs, they ought not to be in the same stage. The text says: "Faith that the Tathāgata is omniscient, eternal, and unchanging, and that all sentient beings possess the buddhadhātu." One [explanation] says: this is the initial practice of the three vehicles being not ignorant of dharmas, as the Śrīmālā[devī-siṃhanāda-sūtra] explains. This passage has many connections. If one has faith that the Tathāgata is eternal and unchanging and that sentient beings possess the buddhadhātu, it resembles the Distinct meaning: cultivating expedient practices with the mind of great nirvāṇa and entering the expedient stages—below, Subhadra attaining the fruit is precisely this meaning. As for the fourth person, the four are combined into one: only severing the principal [defilements] without affecting the latencies. The fifth person is the pratyekabuddha: affecting only a tiny amount of latencies. The sixth person is the bodhisattva: able to affect many latencies and furthermore transform sentient beings. The seventh person is the Buddha: the latencies are completely and utterly exhausted. For this reason, the distinction among the four persons is divided; this is the Shared meaning. Since both passages are present, one cannot exclusively assert either. Now, inferring in one way, it is simply the Shared meaning. Both indicate the saṃsāra of portion and limit as the river, and arousing the mind to seek crossing with the mind of great nirvāṇa, yet there are seven kinds of distinctions and differences. The meaning of equally having the buddhadhātu and the meaning of equally accomplishing nirvāṇa also succeed in answering the question; it is appropriate to explain it this way. From "Beside this Gaṅgā River" onward, the third part concludes the simile, answering the question of why they should equally obtain nirvāṇa. Having hands and feet fully equipped answers that their buddhadhātu is identical. Learning to float or not learning to float, obtaining crossing or not obtaining crossing, answers the question of why they do not equally obtain nirvāṇa. The text has two parts: first, explaining that those who do not cultivate do not attain it, and that this is not the fault of the Tathāgata. The dharma and simile are as in the text. Next, explaining that those who cultivate will definitely attain it, adducing three similes to illustrate it; again there are two parts: first, the similes; next, the application, as in the text. From "You say that sentient beings" onward, the second part skips ahead to answer the third question, which also has two parts: first, restating the question with praise and censure. If one can cultivate, one will definitely attain it without doubt, which is why there is praise; if one is unwilling to cultivate, self-reliantly presuming that one has the nature and wishing to attract it, one is censured as incorrect. Next, from "It is like a person" onward is the direct answer, which has two parts: first, answering that those who cultivate will definitely attain it, adducing the simile of drawing water from a well. The well allegorizes the body of the five aggregates; thirst and exhaustion allegorize the mind weary of suffering and seeking joy; the depth of the well allegorizes that the principle of the nature of the body is profound and, though unseen, definitely exists; drawing water allegorizes seeing the nature through cultivation. From "The buddhadhātu is also like this" onward is the application, as in the text. Next, from "sesame seeds" onward allegorizes that if one does not cultivate, one does not attain it. The application is as in the text. From "As you have said, there is a sick person in the world" onward, the third part answers the second question retrospectively, which also has two parts: first, rebuking their erroneous citation of the sūtra. There are different explanations of the "sixth dwelling": one says it is the sixth dwelling among the ten dwellings; the second says it is the sixth ground among the ten grounds, where prajñā manifests directly and there is the sense of recovering spontaneously. The Buddha rebukes him, saying: when I said that one who encounters illness recovers spontaneously, I spoke for the bodhisattvas of the sixth dwelling, not for ordinary beings—showing that his citation was misapplied. Next, from "Like empty space" onward is the direct answer, which adduces three similes in total. Some say: this adduces the empty space seen by worldly eyes as a simile, and some take the emptiness of the ultimate truth as a simile. Some say: it is precisely the emptiness within principle that is neither internal nor external. The Mūlamadhyamakakārikā says: "Empty space is neither existent nor nonexistent, neither internal nor external." This allegorizes the buddhadhātu. Next, regarding what the text calls "wealth and property": when wealth is in another place, although it is not presently in use, if one goes to take it, one obtains it. This allegorizes that although the buddhadhātu cannot yet be seen, if one cultivates, one will immediately encounter it. Later, regarding what the text calls "creating karma": creating allegorizes the initial mind, karma allegorizes cultivation, and the fruit allegorizes seeing the nature. Within this there are six phrases: 1. not internal; 2. not external; 3. not existent; 4. not nonexistent; 5. not originally non-existent and now existent; 6. not arising without a cause. From "Not this one creates and this one receives" onward, the second part explains that those who cultivate will definitely attain it. There are five phrases, explained in sequence. The first says: it is not that this aggregate creates karma and this aggregate receives the fruit; if this one creates and this one receives, it would be a single aggregate, and being one would be eternal. Furthermore, it is not that subsequent aggregates exist without relying on this aggregate, which would be annihilation. The character "not" in the second phrase governs what follows; that is, "not that this one creates and that one receives" means it is not that this aggregate creates karma and that aggregate receives the fruit. Héxī says: if a human creates and a deva receives, there would be a cause without a fruit, and a fruit without a cause; having a fruit without a cause is an eternalist view, and having a cause without a fruit is an annihilationist view. There should also be "that one creates and this one receives," but its absence is understandable. "That one creates and that one receives" is identical to the first phrase. The fourth, having neither creator nor receiver, having no cause and effect whatsoever, is inadmissible. "The harmony of time and season" is the fifth phrase. From "The buddhadhātu of sentient beings" onward applies the simile. First, applying the six phrases of creating karma: it applies only five, not applying "not arising without a cause." First, it applies the fifth phrase. Neither internal nor external applies the first pair. Neither existent nor nonexistent applies the second pair. From "neither this nor that" onward applies the second [point], the marks of those who cultivate definitely attaining and experiencing the fruit. Previously there were five phrases, which are now completely matched. First, "neither that nor this" matches two phrases: "neither that" matches "not that that one creates and that one receives"; "neither this" matches "not that this one creates and this one receives." "Not coming from elsewhere" matches "not that this one creates and that one receives." "Not without causes and conditions" matches the above "neither creating nor receiving." From "Nor is it that all sentient beings" onward matches the previous "arising from the harmony of time and season." From "Good sons" onward, the fourth part answers the third question again. The previous questions and answers had explanations by Dharma and explanations by simile; here it directly answers the simile. First, it rejects his question. Next, in answering the initial rejection: a lodestone cannot attract iron. Next, from "For what reason?" onward explains the reason for not attracting, which again has two parts: first, the explanation; next, the simile. In the first passage, a stone has no mind or consciousness, so how could it attract? Just as mallows and sunflowers have no mind yet follow the sun from east to west, and plantains have no ears yet blossom upon hearing thunder—these are all different dharmas arising that can follow or hear; amber attracting mustard seeds is also like this; how could one use this as an analogy for the buddhadhātu? Now explaining "different dharmas arising and different dharmas perishing": because different dharmas exist, different dharmas arise; all dharmas are produced by causes and conditions; causes and conditions are termed "different" in relation to dharmas; when there are different causes and conditions, there are all dharmas; hence it is said that because different dharmas exist, different dharmas arise. It is also like water and earth being the conditions for a sprout: when do the sprout, water, and earth ever have minds to comprehend the arising of dharmas, saying, "I give you birth, you may receive birth"? Merely by having these different conditions, the sprout is able to grow. It is also like fire being completely extinguished due to the causes and conditions of water: water and fire also do not mutually comprehend: "I arise, you perish." Next, citing mallows and sunflowers facing east and west toward the sun: how could they have minds to do this? Therefore, similes are further made for the simile, adducing five similes in total. Next, from "The lodestone attracts" onward, there are two parts: first, matching simile to simile; next, from "sentient beings' buddhadhātu" onward, further matching by dharma the dharma allegorized, which is the buddhadhātu. The text has three parts: 1. explaining that the cause does not attract the fruit; 2. explaining that the buddhadhātu has no abiding place; 3. broadly distinguishing the buddhadhātu. The first text also has three parts: first, directly applying the simile of the lodestone. Next, adducing the twelve links of dependent origination to reveal the meaning of non-attraction: ignorance is the cause and volitional formations are the fruit, up to birth being the cause and death being the fruit—how could ignorance attract volitional formations? It is also like this with the buddhadhātu being unable to attract bodhi. Third, from "There are Buddhas" onward directly reveals non-attraction.

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大般涅槃經疏 — Classical Chinese