大般涅槃經疏 27.6

27.6

Next, the specific refutation has two parts: first, analysing according to the Dharma; second, revealing the perfect integration of non-abiding concentration and wisdom. In the first part there are seven [perspectives]: first, in terms of non-difference; second, in terms of non-existence; third, in terms of no locus; fourth, in terms of non-deficiency; fifth, in terms of immutability; sixth, in terms of no agentive capability; seventh, in terms of no making. Regarding the first, the refutation in terms of non-difference, the text has two parts: first, discussing the identity of essence; next, adducing analogies to illustrate this identity of essence. Why? Those who are deluded all maintain that defilements and wisdom are like water and fire, or enemies and bandits, and that one must cultivate wisdom to destroy defilements. From the separate teaching down, none are not like this. Therefore, Siṃhanāda, holding this [view], formulated an objection, hoping to hear something different. The Buddha uses the perfect [teaching] to refute the separate [teaching]. What is wisdom? What is defilement? They are simply the understanding and delusion of the dharmadhātu; understanding and delusion are of the same essence, not two and not distinct. When in delusion, the entire essence is delusion, and outside delusion there is no wisdom; when in understanding, the entire essence is understanding, and outside understanding there is no delusion. The sūtra says: 'Defilement is itself bodhi; bodhi is itself defilement.' The sūtra also says: 'Outside the nature of phenomena (dharmatā), there are no further phenomena. If there were phenomena outside it, it would not be the dharmadhātu.' If so, when there are defilements, there is no wisdom—how could there be any talk of destruction? If there is wisdom, there are no longer defilements—what would there be left to destroy? Yet to say that wisdom can destroy defilements—for this reason he adduces that when it is light there is no darkness, and when it is dark there is no light, to serve as an analogy for this perfect Dharma. This principle and this text are brilliantly clear and luminous, and should not be interpreted otherwise. From 'who has wisdom' downward is the second part, refuting in terms of non-existence, which has two sections: first, reproving the person and the Dharma; next, concluding that there is no destruction. As for the first section, from the Tripiṭaka [teaching] upward down to the separate teaching, they are unable to realize the perfect integration of the dharmadhātu, to empty the self and forget objects: the two vehicles still retain 'my robes' and 'my alms-bowl,' and bodhisattvas purify lands and transform people; both self and other are preserved, and both wisdom and severance are realized—this posits a 'who' and cannot reach 'no who'. The Buddha reproves them with the perfect Dharma: this very wisdom is defilement—who would use defilement to sever defilement? This very defilement is wisdom—who would use wisdom to sever wisdom? When even defilements cannot sever defilements, how could wisdom sever wisdom? Therefore he concludes that if there is none, there is nothing to be severed. From 'Good son, if one says wisdom' downward is the third part, refuting in terms of no locus, which has two sections: first, jointly explaining arriving and not arriving; next, jointly concluding that there is no destruction. Why? Wisdom is the dharmadhātu. Even supposing there were defilements outside the dharmadhātu, and one used the wisdom within the dharmadhātu to destroy the defilements outside: would it destroy without arriving at that place, or would it destroy upon arriving at that place? If it could destroy without arriving at that place, then ordinary people, not having arrived there, should also be able to destroy [them]. If it could destroy upon arriving at that place, would it be able to destroy in the first thought-moment, or in a later thought-moment? If it cannot do so in the first thought-moment, it cannot do so in a later one either. Therefore he concludes that to say destruction occurs either by arriving or by not arriving is incorrect. Outside the dharmadhātu there is no other phenomenon; therefore, there is no locus. From 'Furthermore, vipaśyanā' downward is the fourth part, refuting in terms of non-deficiency, which has two sections: first, directly refuting according to the Dharma; next, adducing analogies. As for the meaning of the first Dharma [passage], wisdom is the dharmadhātu, completely fulfilled and lacking nothing; wisdom is itself discipline, concentration, and the rest without any difference—how could it suddenly have an accompaniment outside the dharmadhātu to jointly destroy defilements outside the dharmadhātu? Since there is no destruction with an accompaniment, neither can it do so alone; therefore he adduces the analogy of the blind. Whether alone or accompanied, neither sees form; 'alone or accompanied' carries the sense of deficiency. From 'Good son, just as the solid nature of earth' downward is the fifth part, refuting in terms of immutability, which has two sections: first, adducing a parallel category to refute; next, concluding the refutation. Just as the nature of the four great elements cannot be moved or altered, and no single thing can change or alter the four elements to make them lose their original nature, defilements are also like this, sharing the same nature with wisdom. The nature of wisdom is inherently severed, and the nature of defilement is also inherently severed; how could severance sever severance? Next, the concluding text states: 'Vipaśyanā definitely cannot destroy defilements.' From 'Good son, just as the salty nature of salt' downward is the sixth part, refuting in terms of no agentive capability, which has four sections: first, taking away; second, granting; third, taking away again; fourth, granting again. First, adducing salt and honey transforming others to be like themselves is to deny that wisdom can be like salt and honey. Regarding phenomena that are not extinguished, wisdom cannot forcibly extinguish them; this denies to wisdom the efficacy of severing delusion. Next, from 'if one says' downward, citing salt's ability to make things salty grants that wisdom can extinguish others. Wisdom is itself extinguished thought-moment by thought-moment; how could it cause others to be extinguished? Just as a drowning person is himself sinking, how could he keep others afloat? Third, from 'Good son, there are two kinds' downward takes it away again, directly taking it away on the grounds of inherent extinction. Wisdom is inherently extinguished and cannot cause defilements to be extinguished. Fourth, from 'if one says that wisdom can extinguish' downward grants it once more, adducing the cinders of fire and the hewing of an axe, where the locus of their extinction cannot be found. The former pairing of granting and taking away makes clear that wisdom of impermanence, suffering, emptiness, and conditional cultivation is itself impermanent—how could it sever delusion? This is distinctly apparent. The latter pairing of granting and taking away reproves [the idea by showing] that neither the locus of that which severs nor that which is severed can be seen; this refutes the view that outside the dharmadhātu there is a separate delusion to be severed by wisdom. Why is no locus seen? It is like the cinders of fire or the mark of an axe: since there are no cinders or marks, there is no delusion to be destroyed. Since there is no delusion, whom does wisdom destroy? The text and meaning are clear in using the perfect to refute the separate. From 'Good son, all' downward is the seventh part, refuting in terms of no making, which is also called the general summary of the preceding. Here it explains that the nature of all phenomena is intrinsically empty—who causes them to arise and cease? Since there is no maker, how could wisdom destroy defilements?