大般涅槃經疏 29

English (machine translation) 29

Language: English

29.1

Composed by Master Guàndǐng of Zhāng'ān under the Sui

29.2

Re-edited by the Tiāntái Śramaṇa Zhànrán under the Tang

The beginning of the fascicle answers his third concluding question: "The Tathāgata well knows faculties and natures; for what reason do you deliver indefinite teachings, causing them to argue?" The text has two parts: first, praising the depth of the principle; next, distinguishing doubt and adherence. Praising [the depth] also has two parts: first, explaining that indefinite teachings are the realm of the Buddha and therefore the principle is deep; it is not that the Buddha intentionally delivers indefinite and contradictory teachings to make them argue, but rather that because they do not comprehend, they adhere and argue. From "If someone in this case..." downward is, next, the admonition and exhortation, which also has two parts: first, exhorting them to give rise to doubt; next, admonishing them not to adhere. If one hears indefinite teachings and gives rise to doubt, this will inevitably lead to understanding, and for this reason there is an exhortation. If one hears indefinite [teachings] and adheres to them as correct, this will inevitably become the root of delusion, and for this reason there is an admonition. As for the first passage: indeed, doubt is the ford to understanding, and yet it is also the root of delusion. If it is the doubt among the ten fetters, that is doubt born of view; this doubt is not the ford to understanding and cannot destroy delusion. As for [the simile of] Mount Sumeru: one explanation says: afflictions are high and vast, like the towering breadth of Sumeru, and doubt is able to destroy them. Another says: afflictions are firmly entrenched, like the stable standing of Sumeru, and doubt is able to uproot them. Therefore it is taken as a simile. From "Kāśyapa addressed the Buddha..." downward is, second, distinguishing doubt and adherence, in two parts: the first two rounds question adherence; the latter four rounds question doubt. In the first two rounds, each has a question and an answer, as in the text. As for the meaning of the later question: not having seen nirvāṇa, how can one suddenly doubt whether it exists or not? The Buddha answers: saṃsāra is named suffering, and nirvāṇa is not suffering; one must, on account of suffering, doubt the non-suffering—is there definitely a non-suffering that can sever suffering? The second round adduces present affairs to question doubt: if seeing suffering causes one to doubt non-suffering, then when a person sees the first fruit [of the path], he should doubt whether it falls into suffering. In the Buddha's answer there are four parts: first, rebuking that this is a definite principle and should not be doubted: I have only definitely stated that this fruit does not fall, and have never said that it falls. It is also like saying that the Buddha is definitely all-knowing; how could one give rise to indefinite doubt regarding what is definite? Next, from "Why is this?" downward, revealing the characteristics of a doubting mind to make manifest non-doubt. Within this there are three similes, all saying that one first sees and afterwards doubts. Third, from "All sentient beings first see two objects..." downward, conclusively determining doubt and adherence. Fourth, from "Why is this?" downward, explaining the causes of doubt. Next, in the third round, the question has two parts: first, questioning nirvāṇa; next, questioning turbid water. When both such affairs and principles have never been seen, yet one still gives rise to doubt, why must one first see and only afterwards give rise to doubt? The Buddha answers: one also first conceptualizes and infers nirvāṇa and saṃsāra. Saṃsāra is what is to be treated, and nirvāṇa is the treatment; therefore it causes one to infer whether the treatment exists or does not exist. From "If you think..." downward answers the second [question on] turbid water, again in two parts: first, taking up the question and refuting it; next, from "Why is this?" downward, directly answering it. Taking other things previously seen to have shallowness and depth, one doubts the depth and shallowness herein. Next, the fourth round of question and answer is as in the text.

29.5

From "Kāśyapa addressed the Buddha..." downward is the third major section, explaining views that sever the good [roots], also in three parts: first, again presenting the person; second, explaining the arising of views; third, being able to sever the roots of goodness. Previously, Sunakṣatra was already presented; presenting him again now is because one is about to explain the arising of views, and therefore adduces the person again. From "Apart from these four things..." downward is, second, presenting his arising of views. The text has four parts: first, six recurrences explaining that there is no karmic action of giving; second, six recurrences explaining that there are no father and mother; third, three recurrences explaining that there is no cause and effect; fourth, nine recurrences explaining that there are no noble ones. Now, merit arises from conditions; when the conditions of giver and recipient join, merit is naturally produced. Just as when planting in a fertile field, where the conditions of rain from heaven and water from earth are complete, a sprout is then able to grow—how could it be allowed that giving to the poor still receives the retribution of poverty? Poverty is an inferior result, while giving obtains a superior retribution; one should not plant grain and have it turn into tares. If the field is barren and the harvest small, that is set aside and not discussed. In my personal view: if giving to the poor resulted in poverty, one should sow seed into the ground and in winter harvest water and soil. If one gives rise to views and severs the good, or severs the good and gives rise to views, this mostly happens in Jambudvīpa. The other three continents are weak, the gods are attached to pleasure, and the hells are burdened by severe suffering; none have firm resolution, and therefore rarely have this mind. In the first six recurrences: first, one recurrence uses the similarity of seed and fruit to explain the absence of cause. The second recurrence: the giver, the recipient, and the material wealth are all non-existent. The third recurrence: one gives to another person, and that person, obtaining the goods, performs good or evil. Since performing evil does not benefit the donor, good also does not benefit him. If a donor gives him a sharp knife causing him to kill another person, would this evil not redound to the donor? The fourth recurrence: since giving is giving an object, and the object is morally neutral, how could one obtain a good fruit? The fifth recurrence: the action cannot be seen; inferring giving from intention, if the intention cannot be seen, how could giving be seen? One only sees the fruit of good and evil. The sixth recurrence: there is neither actor nor receiver. If one cultivates merit for the deceased in the past, where is there a person who receives this merit? From "There is no father and no mother..." downward is, second, the six recurrences explaining that there are no father and mother, as in the text. Third, the three recurrences explaining that there is no cause and effect. In the second passage it says that practicing good brings death and rebirth in the three evil paths, while practicing evil brings death and rebirth among gods and humans. It is explained: this is entirely due to a single thought of good or evil at the time of death causing one to fall or ascend; the remaining unpaid [retribution] will ultimately not perish. Differentiating them across the three periods of present, next [life], and subsequent [lives], the principle can be comprehended. The rest can all be seen. Fourth, the nine recurrences are all as in the text.

29.6

From "When making this contemplation..." downward is, third, being able to sever the roots of goodness, which is also in two parts: first, explaining the severing of the good; next, examining sharp and dull [faculties], all as in the text. Question: An icchantika previously possessed the causal practice of wisdom, and should have the habitual fruit; why does he sever the good? Answer: He possesses only worldly wisdom, and lacks supramundane wisdom. Using worldly wisdom to sever supramundane good, he is also able to sever pure and ascending roots of goodness. In the mundane world, such cases are in fact not rare. Formerly, Vice Director Xu governed the people very well, but when he served as the magistrate of Shangyu, he committed an offense. He was unversed in answering questions; just as Tianzhu Yu thoroughly understood deep principles yet was unacquainted with worldly vernacular. These people of superior intelligence were obscure regarding mundane affairs. And this icchantika, although possessing worldly wisdom, how could he necessarily know the supramundane Dharma? (And so forth).

29.7

From "Kāśyapa addressed the Buddha" onward is the second [section] within the main section, explaining the production of good. The text has three parts: first, both the middle way and the production of good are explained together; second, the middle way alone is explained; third, the production of good alone is explained. In the first part, there are five rounds of questions and answers, which may also be divided into three: the first round explains the timing of producing good; the next round explains that the buddhadhātu is not severed; the third three rounds explain producing good on the basis of nature. In the first round, the question is as in the text. In the Buddha's answer there are two parts: first he explains the timing; next he explains the production of good. As for the first text, those of sharp faculties enter first, and those of dull faculties emerge later. By principle there should be persons of medium capacity who produce good while in the midst [of it], but while undergoing suffering in hell there is no respite in which they can produce it; therefore, it is not mentioned. From "Good is of three kinds" onward, severing good is discussed further in contrast to producing good. One severs only present good and does not sever past or future good; because of the existence of this good, it allows good to be produced. This also has three parts: first, stating the three times; next, explaining them; third, concluding. In the explanation there are two parts: regarding past good, the good has already become latent and cannot be severed. When causes have been extinguished but their fruits have not yet matured, the future has not yet arisen, so again it cannot be severed. Third, from "Therefore it is not named" onward, both are concluded together, again having two parts: first, explaining that the past and future times cannot be severed; next, explaining that present good can be severed. In the first text, both the past and future times cannot be severed. "Past" concludes that the past is not severed, and saying the word "fruit" concludes that the future is not severed. Next, from "severing the causes of the three times" onward, directly explaining the severing of the causes of the three times refers to directly severing present good causes; when present good causes are extinguished, there will be no future good, and because future good does not arise, it is conceptually spoken of as severed. Since there are no present or future ones, the past is also ceased, and is conceptually spoken of as severed; that is to say, one completely severs the good of the three times. Once habituated causes are exhausted, they also cannot lead to habituated fruits of the three times. In the second round of question and answer, it explains that the buddhadhātu is not severed. The question has two parts: first, asking whether the buddhadhātu belongs to the three times or not; next, asking whether the buddhadhātu can be severed or not. The first part begins by grasping the meaning, next determines the thesis, and finally concludes with objections. In determining the thesis there are four questions, which are objections concluding on the general and specific three times, yet they only challenge the sense of the specific three times. The first objection says: If it were past, since the buddhadhātu is eternal it is not past; how then can one say it is severed in the past? If it were future, there are two objections: one challenges it not to be future, and the second challenges it to be in the future. Since the buddhadhātu is eternal, what is eternal is not future. If it is not future, yet in the future all will attain sambodhi, how could it not be future? Present also has two objections: the first objection challenges it not to be present, because it is eternal. The second challenges it to be present. Why? Since the nature can be seen, how could it not be present? From "The Tathāgata has also said" onward is the second question, asking whether it can be severed or not, which also has two parts: first raising six matters, and then directly asking the formal question. The initial six matters are the six senses of the arising of causes for the question. There are two explanations: one says they are the revealing cause (vyañjaka-hetu); the second considers them the direct cause (pradhāna-hetu). Looking forward to the dharmatā below, these are the buddhadhātu of the nine stages; hence their numbers correspond. From "If the root of goodness is severed" onward, there are three questions in the second, formal inquiry: First, asking that if an icchantika possesses the buddhadhātu, he should not sever the good. This arises from the fourth among the six matters: that the buddhadhātu produces good. From "If there were no buddhadhātu" onward is the second question: If the buddhadhātu were severed, how could it be said that all completely possess it? This arises from the sixth among the six: that it can be seen. Since all can see it, how could it be severed? From "If one says that the buddhadhātu" onward is the third question, anticipating the intended answer to formulate an objection. If one claims that in former times all equally had it, and later it was naturally severed, then it would both exist and be severed; how could it be called eternal? This arises from the first among the six: being eternal. The Buddha's answer has two parts: first stating the four chapter headings, and next explaining them. In the explanation, he first explains three headings, still re-explaining and distinguishing them; only afterwards does he explain the [point of] setting aside (sthāpanīya). Explaining the first three answers thus has three parts. The text proceeds to re-explain and distinguish them, the answers being properly used to dispel the questions. The reason he re-explains them is that the earlier answers address the later questions, and the later answers address the earlier questions. The first answering of the later questions has four parts: 1. From "The Tathāgata's ten powers" onward, raising the seven items of the buddhadhātu; next, raising the six items of the final body (caramabhavika). Whether seven or six, all are the reasons for the answer. 2. From "As you previously asked" onward, directly citing the question. The questions were three, and here he cites the first question. 3. From "There is also the Tathāgata" onward, directly answering; first explaining that although existing it is non-existent, and next explaining that although non-existent it is existent, thus broadly answering the preceding three. 4. From "The Tathāgata's buddhadhātu is not past" onward, retrospectively answering the earlier question on the three times. The previous question asked: If the buddhadhātu is eternal, then it is not of the three times. Now the Buddha answers it, first distinguishing the differences in the buddhadhātu of the Tathāgata, the ninth, eighth, fifth abiding stages, and so forth. However, those who sever good all possess these sevenfold and sixfold natures, and they will attain them in the future; therefore, one cannot say it is a dharma not of the three times. In its own aspect it is not subsumed under the three times, yet because it is attained in the future, it is again said to be future. The text has five parts: 1. The buddhadhātu of the Tathāgata and the final body; 2. The buddhadhātu of the ninth abiding stage; 3. The buddhadhātu from the eighth abiding stage to the sixth abiding stage; 4. The buddhadhātu from the fifth abiding stage to the first abiding stage; 5. Concluding what was asked. The first also has four parts: first, the Tathāgata's nature is not of the three times; second, the nature of the final body has the three times, being seen a little in the present and seen completely in the future; third, reiterating that the Tathāgata's cause belongs to the three times while the fruit has yes and no: if the wholesome five aggregates, they still belong to the three times, but if the fruit of bodhi, it is not of the three times; fourth, reiterating that the final body belongs entirely to the three times and can be seen. From "The ninth abiding stage" onward, the second part treats the six items of the ninth abiding stage; it only says "can be seen," which differs from the previous. From "The eighth abiding stage" onward, the third part explains that from the eighth abiding stage to the sixth abiding stage, there are only five items, not being given the designation "eternal." From "The fifth abiding stage" onward, the fourth part explains that from the fifth abiding stage to the first abiding stage, there are only five items, saying "wholesome and unwholesome," which differs from the six items of the preceding final body. As for saying "seen a little": since that stage is high, one can see a little; because one sees the nature according to one's measure, it is said to be "seen a little." From the ninth bhūmi to the first bhūmi, since those stages are lower, they are not yet able to see the nature, but in the future they will certainly come to see it; hence it says "can be seen." As for the fifth bhūmi to the first bhūmi saying "wholesome and unwholesome": wholesome has the sense of cultivated and uncultivated; what is attained through cultivation is wholesome, and what is uncultivated is unwholesome. It also says they should be true and untrue. The explanation says: The real is the essence of the buddhadhātu; it was not non-existent, but already exists. Being real is solely on account of this truth; therefore, there is the difference between wholesome and unwholesome. An older explanation says: On the sixth bhūmi prajñā is manifest before one, but at times there is lapse of mindfulness; when there is lapse of mindfulness it is unwholesome, and without lapse it is wholesome. Question: Both the final body and the ninth bhūmi equally have six items, and among the six items both equally have the item of "eternal." From the eighth bhūmi to the first bhūmi there are equally five items; why is there not the single item of "eternal"? Someone explains: The final body is high in stage, while the ninth bhūmi is lower in stage, so it specially has "eternal." This still does not resolve the objection; hence, comparing it further with the lower stages from the fifth bhūmi to the first bhūmi which equally have the single item of "impermanent," the final body when viewed against the Buddha should also be impermanent. Someone answers: The Buddha speaks according to his own intention (svābhiprāya); one cannot force distinctions. The objection still has not been removed. Question: The final body has eternal and pure; why does it lack self and bliss? Answer: A bodhisattva constantly possesses the two wisdoms; because he transforms beings it is called eternal, and because both realm and wisdom are radiant it is called pure. True contrasts with false; real depends on empty. Lacking evil is named good. Because it is partially seen, it is little. Lacking the eight sovereign masteries, therefore it lacks self. Because the retribution body remains, therefore it lacks bliss. Now I say this explanation is not perfect; it will be specially explained later. From "These five kinds and six kinds" onward is the fifth part, concluding the response to the previous question. From "If someone says" onward explains the sthāpanīya answer; first explaining it directly, and next clarifying the question and answer. Sthāpanīya answers are of two kinds: setting it aside without answering is a sthāpanīya answer. Answering by counter-questioning is also a sthāpanīya answer. I personally comment: Taking setting aside as the answer is named a sthāpanīya answer.

29.8

From "Kāśyapa addressed the Buddha" onward is the third [part], explaining the production of good on the basis of the buddhadhātu. There are three rounds of questions and answers: first, explaining the nature of cause and fruit; next, directly explaining the production of good on the basis of the causal nature; third, resolving doubts. The question in the first round means: The Tathāgata's fruitional nature is not subsumed under the three times, and may well be the buddhadhātu; but causes and fruits in the causal stage belong to the three times—how can they be called the buddhadhātu? The Buddha's answer has two parts: first answering directly, and next concluding that the nature is obscured by afflictions. The first has three parts: 1. Distinguishing the two natures of cause and fruit, having that which belongs to the three times and that which does not belong to the three times; next, presenting the essences of the causal and fruitional natures; third, adducing proofs. The first also has two parts: first, stating the chapter headings of cause and fruit; next, explaining them. In the initial chapter heading, regarding the statement that the five aggregates have cause and fruit: among the five aggregates, affliction and karma are the causes, and the wholesome aggregates are the fruit. In the causal stage, the two vehicles belong to the three times; but great bodhi is not of the three times. The earlier text said, "When the Tathāgata had not yet attained bodhi, his causal nature belonged to the past; his future fruitional nature was not so, having that which belongs to past and future, and that which does not belong to past and future." Only now, reaching this point, is it explained. Next, explaining the cause: all ignorance, afflictions, fettering karma, and unwholesome five aggregates are the causal buddhadhātu. The wholesome five aggregates produced from ignorance, afflictions, and so forth are the fruitional nature. The unwholesome five aggregates are exclusively causal nature; the wholesome five aggregates pervade both cause and fruit: as cause they belong to the three times, and as fruit they do not belong to the three times. The earlier text said, "The fruitional nature both belongs to the three times and does not belong to the three times." Someone explains: The fruitional nature of the nirmāṇakāya belongs to the three times; the fruitional nature of the dharmakāya does not belong to the three times. From "Good son, all ignorance" onward, the second part presents the essences of cause and fruit, having two parts: first presenting the causal essence, next presenting the fruitional essence. As for the first text, it intends to explain that the nature of the middle way is identical to all dharmas; when viewed in terms of afflictions, it is called the cause. From "Ignorance and formations" onward, the second part presents the fruitional essence, again having two parts: first, explaining that the fruitional nature of the wholesome aggregates pervades cause, which is the fruit of the four fruits and the ten bhūmis, belonging to the three times. Next, explaining that the fruit of the aggregates resides solely in the fruit, which does not belong to the three times. From "Therefore in the sūtra I..." onward, the third part adduces proofs, again having two parts: first proving the cause, having dharma, simile, and application. From "Therefore I say" onward, the second part proves the fruit, also having dharma, simile, and application. Within the fruit, both the fruit within the cause and the fruit of bodhi are fully present. From "Present afflictions" onward is the second part, concluding that the nature is obscured by afflictions, returning to clarify that the middle way is covered by afflictions. It again has three parts: dharma, simile, and application.

29.9

From "Kāśyapa addressed the Buddha: The five kinds and six kinds" onward is the second round, directly explaining the production of good on the basis of the causal nature, first questioning and next answering. In the question, he first reiterates the previous sevenfold, sixfold, and fivefold buddhadhātu; next, in the direct question, the sense is that since it is in the future, how can it be said to exist and be able to produce good? The Buddha's answer has three parts: 1. A pair of similes; 2. A pair of applications; 3. A pair of conclusions. The first also has two parts: first, citing how due to past karma one presently receives pleasurable retribution; next, citing how because future karma has not yet arisen, it ultimately does not produce fruit. From "There are present afflictions" onward is the second part, the pair of applications, again having two parts: The first sentence applies to the previous past karma and present pleasurable fruit, namely applying to the present. Because of afflictions one can sever good, which must depend on the past. Now when it says "present afflictions," they were originally past, and now have come to the present. Next, from "If there were no afflictions" onward applies to the second simile that future karma has not arisen and ultimately does not produce fruit, namely applying to the buddhadhātu as cause and condition in the future being able to produce roots of goodness. From "Therefore one who has severed the roots of goodness" onward is the third part, the pair of conclusions, as in the text.

29.10

From "Kāśyapa said: How about the future?" downward is the third section, resolving doubts. The doubt is: "The future does not yet exist; how can it produce goodness?" The Buddha's answer also has two parts: first, a simile, and next, its application. The first passage first brings up the similes of a lamp and the sun. If one clings stubbornly with unbending obstinacy, the lamp and the sun, not having yet appeared, cannot dispel darkness; but if [understood as] dependent origination and provisional designation, even before the lamp and the sun have arisen, they can dispel darkness. Next, from "The buddhadhātu is also like this" downward, it applies this: sentient beings all possess future goodness that is capable of producing the buddhadhātu.

29.11

From "Kāśyapa addressed the Buddha: If one says that the five aggregates..." downward is the second part, which solely clarifies the middle way to establish the production of goodness. If sentient beings lacked the principle of the middle way, how could they produce goodness? It is because they possess the buddhadhātu that it supports and establishes them. The text has three parts: first, clarifying the middle way of neither internal nor external; second, the middle way of neither existent nor non-existent; and third, broadly clarifying the middle way in terms of all phenomena. One may also say that the first two directly clarify the essence of the middle way, while the last one broadly clarifies the function of the middle way. In the first text, there are two rounds of questions and answers. The first round is as in the text. In the next round, first Kāśyapa himself explains that this was not his own intention, but solely for the benefit of beings. The Buddha's reply has six further expositions: first, clarifying the middle in terms of understanding and delusion; second, clarifying the middle in terms of internal and external paths; third, clarifying the middle in terms of the internal and external of the fruit; fourth, clarifying the middle in terms of internal and external causes and conditions; fifth, clarifying the middle in terms of internal and external practice; and sixth, clarifying the middle in terms of the internal and external of the body. Within the six, there are two parts: the first briefly clarifies the broad meaning, hence it is in terms of understanding and delusion; the subsequent five broadly expand upon this 'neither internal nor external'. The first brief clarification also has three parts: first, indicating that it is the middle way; second, explaining; and third, concluding. This is the first, indicating it. From "Good son, for the sake of sentient beings..." downward is the second, the explanation, generally clarifying that it is for the sake of beings. "Neither internal" means not the internal six sense-faculties. "Nor external" means not the external six sense-objects. However, the subsequent five separately refute the two attachments. From "Therefore, the Tathāgata..." downward is the third, the conclusion. I personally note: This single sūtra is broadly divided into five chapters, all termed nirvāṇa. Nirvāṇa is simply the buddhadhātu. 'Three yet one' is the primary cause nature (正因性); 'one yet three' is the nature of the three virtues (三德性). Now, in clarifying that sentient beings possess the buddhadhātu, it encompasses both of these meanings. Zhāng'ān, arriving here, terms it the middle way—could there be a middle devoid of ultimate and conventional [truths] called the buddhadhātu? Therefore, the buddhadhātu is the middle way, and the buddhadhātu is entirely pervasive. Hence, the text above and below discusses pervasiveness in many places. Thus, coming to this point, it says 'neither internal nor external'. Saying 'double negation' means not only a double negation, but there should also be a double affirmation; hence the various passages below say 'both internal and external'. If there is no double affirmation, how can one speak of pervasiveness? Therefore, the text reproaches: "Ordinary sentient beings sometimes say the buddhadhātu is in the five aggregates, like a fruit in a vessel or like empty space." When people of the world say that the buddhadhātu belongs only to sentient beings, it is merely like a fruit in a vessel; they cannot even conceive of it as being like empty space, so how could they comprehend that it is neither internal nor external? Moreover, the sūtra text itself explains: it is because sense-faculties and sense-objects combine that it is called the middle way. If sense-faculties and sense-objects combine, are they not of one essence? Are they not mutually identical? Is the nature not pervasive? How could it be like a fruit in a vessel? Now I ask: Are walls sense-faculties? Are they sense-objects? Are they the combination of the two? Or are they the negation of both? If they are the negation of both, they are also not the five aggregates—why only walls? How lamentable are the people of the world! How painful are the lecturers! Please carefully take the six gates to encompass the entire work; may the entire work systematically subsume the entirety of Śākyamuni's lifetime, so that when looking toward the ten directions and the three times, in principle there are no two, and in phenomena there is not a hairsbreadth of discrepancy. What is lost is not light, which is why I am so earnest. From "Furthermore" downward, the second part broadly clarifies the middle way through five further expositions, all clarifying neither internal nor external. Herein are two: first, one further exposition first sets forth the two attachments; next, four further expositions directly conclude with the middle way. From "Good son, the buddhadhātu of sentient beings is neither existent nor non-existent" downward, the second text has two parts: first, clarifying the main tenet; and second, broadly refuting attachments. The first, clarifying the main tenet, also has three: first, clarifying neither existent nor non-existent; next, clarifying both existent and non-existent; and third, concluding with neither existent nor non-existent. The first also has three: first, proposing the two negations; next, explaining the two negations; and third, concluding the two negations. Next, as for both existent and non-existent, the text has three: proposing both, explaining both, and concluding both. Proposing and explaining are as in the text. From "Existent and non-existent" downward is the conclusion. From "Therefore the Buddha said..." downward is the third, concluding the two negations, as in the text.

29.12

From "Good son, if someone asks..." downward is the second part, broadly refuting attachments that run contrary to the middle, mostly by drawing upon similes in the text. The text has three parts: first, refuting through the simile of the seed; next, refuting through the simile of milk and curd; and third, refuting through the simile of salt's saltiness. Within the first, the seed, there are three: simile, application, and conclusion. I personally note: the application text has two parts: first, indicating; next, explaining. In the first, indicating, it says that sentient beings have a separate buddhadhātu—this meaning is not correct. Next, the explanation says that sentient beings are the nature and the nature is sentient beings; since it is neither internal nor external, it is also both internal and external, internal and external being non-dual. One may also say that form is the buddhadhātu and the buddhadhātu is form. Hence the previous second further exposition took the physical marks and characteristics as external, and the powers, fearlessnesses, etc., as internal; if form and so forth do not exist, the marks and characteristics also do not exist. The three further expositions below may be understood by analogy to this. Next, within the simile of milk and curd, there are two parts: first, directly making the simile of milk; next, further making the simile of the arising of consciousness for the sake of milk. The first also has three: first, directly establishing the middle way; next, refuting biased attachments; and third, concluding in terms of the principle of the nature. Within directly establishing, there is first a question, and next an answer. The answer has three parts: first, establishing; second, concluding that it is provisionally said to be both existent and non-existent; and third, explaining. "Good son" is the second, refuting biased attachments. It should also doubly refute existence and non-existence, but now it only refutes existence. The text has three parts: first, making the objection of the simultaneous mutual production of cause and fruit; next, clarifying the objection from analogy regarding the fruit existing within the cause; and third, clarifying the objection from analogy regarding the cause existing within the fruit. The first clarifies that since milk and curd are simultaneous, butter, ghee, etc., should also emerge all at once. Because they are simultaneous, it therefore further questions: if they do not emerge simultaneously, what produces the sequence? From "Good son, if there is..." downward is the second objection regarding the fruit existing within the cause, which also has two parts: first, making an analogy; next, objecting to the lack of analogy. The first, making an analogy, is: milk is the cause of curd and can produce curd, so water and grass, which are causes of milk, should also produce milk (and so forth). Next, from "Why is that?" downward is the lack of analogy. From "Good son, if one says that within milk..." downward is the third, the objection from analogy regarding the cause existing within the fruit. As for speaking of the objection from analogy: milk is the cause of curd, and curd is the fruit of milk. If milk is the cause of curd and there is fruit within the cause, then curd is the fruit of milk and there should be cause within the fruit. Within this, there are also two parts: first, directly raising the objection; next, concluding the objection, wherein are two: first, concluding that it was originally absent; next, concluding that it is neither existent nor non-existent. From "Good son, therefore the Tathāgata..." downward is the third, concluding with the principle of the nature, which also has two: first, concluding by departing from bias; and later, concluding with the middle way. Next, from "Good son, when four things combine..." downward is the second, raising the simile of the arising of consciousness to serve as a simile for the simile, which also has two parts: first, directly raising the simile of the arising of consciousness; next, from "The nature of curd in milk..." downward, again applying the simile with milk and curd, which also has two parts: first, directly applying it; next, refuting attachments. Refuting attachments also has two parts: first, restating the attachment; next, directly refuting it. Within the refutation are two: first, two proposition headings; next, explaining the proposition headings. The first—different causes, different fruits—is the first proposition heading. Next—not that one cause produces all fruits, nor that all fruits arise from one cause—is the second proposition heading. From "These four things..." downward is the second, explaining the two proposition headings. First, it explains the latter heading. Now, visual consciousness only produces visual cognition, and cannot produce auditory, olfactory, or other consciousnesses; how could it be that one cause produces all fruits? Milk's ability to produce curd is also like this. It must rely on multiple conditions; that which is produced by multiple conditions is non-existent. Later it explains the former proposition heading. First, it explains the proposition heading: not that one cause produces all fruits, nor that all fruits arise from one cause, as in the text. Next, from "Therefore, I, in..." downward, it retrospectively explains the previous proposition heading of different causes and different fruits. Because causes arise, one presumes existence; because causes cease, one presumes non-existence. Existence, cessation, and non-cessation are simply different causes and different fruits. From "Good son, like salt..." downward is the third, refuting through salt's saltiness, which also has two parts: first, directly raising the simile; next, further refuting attachments. Refuting attachments has two parts: first, restating the attachment; next, refuting the attachment. In the first, restating, it generally restates two attachments: first, restating the attachment that salt contains saltiness; second, restating the attachment that the seed contains the four great elements. Next, from "The nature of salt is also like this" downward, it directly refutes the two attachments, which also has two parts: first, refuting that the non-salty contains saltiness; next, refuting the four great elements. The first refutation also has two: first, denying it; next, from "Why is that?" downward, directly refuting it, which also has two parts: first, raising an interrogation; next, analogizing to other things. The intention of directly raising an interrogation is: if salt is placed into what is not salty and it becomes salty, one should know that it lacks an intrinsic nature. If it was originally without saltiness and now becomes salty, is it not originally non-existent? Next, it sets up the analogy. If one puts a sheng of salt into much water, it loses its original salty nature, while in the water there is also no salty nature. Since it does not exist in either place, how can there be a salty nature? Next, it analogizes that all things are like this. From "If one says that the external four great elements..." downward is the second, refuting the four great elements, which refutes the latter attachment, also having two parts: first refuting, and later analogizing (and so forth).

29.13

From "As I have preached the twelve divisions [of scripture]" onwards is the third part: extensively explaining the middle way in reference to all phenomena. It is also said to explain its function. This comprises three sections: first, the function of setting up teaching in dependence upon principle; second, the function of cultivating causes to advance toward the fruit; third, the function of practicing understanding to eradicate delusions. Within the first, teaching function, there are again two parts: first, a general indication; next, the explanation. Within the explanation there are again two: first, generally explaining the three kinds of speech; next, specifically explaining speech according to one's own intention. The first again has two: first, explaining the three kinds of speech with respect to past teachings; next, explaining the three kinds of speech with respect to the present teaching. First, within the past teachings, fully explaining the three kinds of speech constitutes three passages of text. First, speech according to oneself: as when the various bhikṣus each spoke of the causes of the body and the Buddha also spoke of his own, which is speech according to his own intention. As when the elder called it an illusion and the Buddha spoke of illusion following him, which is speech according to the other's intention. Speech according to both self and other can be known accordingly. From "Good son, as I..." onwards is the second: explaining the three kinds of speech with respect to the present teaching. The text also naturally has three, as written. From "Good son, the Tathāgata at times..." onwards next specifically explains [speech] according to one's own intention, in three sections: first, broad and brief [speech] according to one's own intention; next, explaining the seven types of [speech] according to one's own intention; third, explaining existence and non-existence [spoken] according to one's own intention. Regarding the first passage: in reference to a single phenomenon it is brief, and in reference to immeasurable phenomena it is broad. Next, the seven types also have two parts: first, listing them; next, explaining them. Within the explanation it naturally forms seven passages. First, speaking of the fruit within the cause: practicing goodness and seeing gods and humans, or practicing evil and seeing the hells, is this. Next, speaking of the cause within the fruit: seeing poverty and knowing stinginess, or seeing wealth and knowing generosity, is this. The remaining five are as in the text. Third, from "The Tathāgata furthermore has..." onwards explains existence and non-existence according to one's own intention, in three sections: first, directly explaining existence and non-existence; second, explaining sentient beings' failure to understand; third, making a four-phrase analysis. Regarding existence and non-existence, there are again two parts: first, regarding the existence and non-existence of the Tathāgata's buddhadhātu; second, explaining the existence and non-existence of the icchantika's buddhadhātu. First, explaining the Tathāgata also has two: first, explaining existence and non-existence; next, analogous explanation. The first again has two: first, explaining being absent of what exists; next, explaining being devoid of what exists. In the first passage: the ten powers, fearlessnesses, and so forth are all what originally did not exist and now exist. Next, explaining being devoid of what exists: unwholesomeness, indeterminate states, and all afflictions and so forth are all what once existed and now do not exist. Next, from "Just as existence, non-existence, wholesome, unwholesome..." onwards brings forward twenty-two pairs of dharmas, analogously pairing them with the preceding two matters. Contaminated and uncontaminated: contaminated is analogous to being devoid of what exists; uncontaminated is analogous to being absent of what exists. Mundane is analogous to being devoid of what exists; supra-mundane is analogous to being absent of what exists. And so forth below. Next, from "The icchantika's buddhadhātu..." onwards explains the existence and non-existence of the icchantika's buddhadhātu, which is entirely the inverse of the Tathāgata's existence and non-existence above: the Tathāgata has goodness, so the icchantika lacks it; the Tathāgata lacks evil, so the icchantika has it. From "Although I have preached..." onwards next explains sentient beings' failure to understand such speech of the Tathāgata, also in two parts: first, directly pointing out the lack of understanding; next, citing past cases as proof. The first text has two: first, the lack of understanding; next, citing the profound to illustrate the shallow. If even bodhisattvas of profound practice still do not understand on their own, how much less those of shallow capacity? Next, from "Once, at one time, I..." onwards cites proof. As for the Buddha preaching conventional truth and the śrāvakas failing to understand, there are two interpretations: one says that varieties of conventional truth involve karmic actions, and because cause and effect are profound and hidden, it is difficult to understand. The second says that the response body is conventional truth, hence the two vehicles do not understand it. Question: Where did the Buddha preach conventional truth such that five hundred [hearers] did not understand? One [master] says: Preached in the Avataṃsaka, where five hundred were deaf and mute. Another says: In foreign lands scriptures are many, but few have crossed over [to China]. The Great Master of Tiāntái explained this as having another reference. From "Or there is buddhadhātu..." onwards is the third: the four-phrase analysis, which has two parts: first, directly applying the four phrases; next, exhorting discrimination. As for old interpretations: the icchantika has it—having the nature of evil and deviant sensory realms. Persons of good roots have it—having the revealing causes of myriad virtues, also called conditional causes. Both persons have it—jointly having the direct nature, or the nature of sentient beings. Both lack it—lacking the fruit-of-the-fruit nature. Héxī says: The icchantika has it—having the evil five aggregates and unwholesome nature. Persons of good roots have it—having the wholesome five aggregates and wholesome nature. Both persons have it—both having the nature of the indeterminate five aggregates. Both lack it—both lacking the wondrous, transcendent nirvāṇa fruit-nature. This differs in words from the old ones, but the meaning is the same. [Master] Xīnghuáng explained this sequentially from one phrase to seven phrases: One phrase is simply the middle way. Two phrases are the Tathāgata's and the icchantika's buddhadhātu, as either existing or non-existing. Three phrases are the three kinds of speech: the Buddha's own speech that the icchantika has the nature, speech for others that the icchantika lacks the nature, and speech for both self and other that it both exists and does not exist. Four phrases are the four phrases here. Seven phrases are the seven kinds of sentient beings: the first two persons are evil, and the latter five persons are good. He also offered three interpretations: first, generally regarding various meanings; second, regarding inside and outside the principle; third, solely regarding within the principle. Generally regarding various meanings: the principle is neither wholesome nor unwholesome, yet has both wholesome and unwholesome functions; persons of good roots have it, having the wholesome function; the icchantika has it, having the unwholesome function. Both having it: each has one side. Both lacking it: each lacks one side. Next, regarding inside and outside the principle: buddhadhātu originally is neither attained nor unattained, but is called attained or unattained in reference to conditions. Outside the principle, the icchantika is 'having attainment'; inside the principle is 'non-attainment'. Persons of good roots have the nature of non-attainment; the icchantika has the nature of having attainment; both having it and both lacking it are as stated above. Next, solely regarding within the principle: the icchantika is Sunakṣatra, and the person of good roots is Rāhula; these are the two conversions, compliant and adverse. The icchantika has the nature of adverse conversion into unwholesome dharmas; the person of good roots has the nature of compliant conversion into wholesome dharmas; both having it and both lacking it are as stated above. This is held to be an explanation capable of untying what is difficult to explain. Now we clarify that if one wishes to construct the four phrases relying on this text: the icchantika has it, but has only sinking. The person of good roots has it, but has only emerging. Both persons have it: both are in the Ganges River. Both persons lack it: neither reaches the shore. If one wishes to formulate other interpretations, they would also be immeasurable; they are briefly set forth like this. Furthermore, regarding the three truths: the icchantika having it is the unwholesome causes of conventional truth. The person of good roots having it is the wholesome causes of transcendence. Both persons having it: both possess the retributive bodies of conventional truth. Both persons lacking it: both lack the causes and fruits of the middle way. Next, from "My various..." onwards exhorts discrimination, as in the text.

29.14

From "Just as in the Ganges River..." onwards is the second: the function of cultivating causes to advance toward the fruit. It also explains the middle way by means of a simile, containing simile, matching, and conclusion. The explanation of the simile has two parts: first, general; next, specific. It adduces the differences among the seven sentient beings, while buddhadhātu is one. From "Such a subtle and wondrous..." onwards matches the simile, combining and matching the previous chapter where the river is a simile for saṃsāra, whereas now the river is a simile for nirvāṇa. First, matching the general is as in the text. Next, from "The one who constantly sinks..." onwards matches the specific simile. Matching the first, the icchantika who constantly sinks, comprises four parts: first, matching turning one's back on the good. Next, from "Formulating this thought..." onwards matches tending toward evil. Third, from "Dwelling as in evil dharmas..." onwards matches abiding in evil. Fourth, from "This person is endowed with..." onwards matches being a person who has severed roots of goodness. From "Although I have further preached..." onwards matches the second person who temporarily emerges and then sinks again, also in four parts: first, initiating practice that goes contrary to principle, which is cultivating goodness for the sake of existence. Next, from "Why is it called sinking?" onwards is the second: explaining the meaning of emerging and sinking. From "Although this person has faith..." onwards is the third: explaining that practice is incomplete. From "Emerging and sinking again..." onwards is the fourth: specifically identifying the person. In regard to practice being incomplete, there are again two parts: first, directly identifying the five matters; next, the conclusion. The first five matters are: first, faith is incomplete; second, morality is insufficient; third, learning; fourth, generosity; fifth, wisdom and faith can be seen. In the second, morality, what is called the morality of deportment means lacking real virtue within and outwardly displaying frugality and restraint in order to gain others' respect. Morality following from morality means inside and outside correspond, not done for worldly affairs. Maintaining morality merely seeking real benefit is what is called morality following from morality. Seeking morality means seeking the three existences. Renouncing morality means renouncing the three existences. In the third, learning, regarding believing six divisions and not believing six divisions: Héxī says: sūtra, geya, vyākaraṇa, udāna, itivṛttaka, and upadeśa—these six are explicit and easy to understand, hence believed; the other six are profound and difficult to understand, hence not believed. Another person says: merely out of the twelve, believing six and disbelieving six. The rest can be seen. From "This person is not endowed with..." onwards is the second: conclusion. From "The second person..." onwards is the third: matching the person who attains abiding. According to principle, one should say the third person; why does it say this is the second person? It is explained: this second person, through accumulated practice, should come to become the third person, hence called the second. The Siṃhanāda chapter encompasses the five expedients and thirty minds as all attaining abiding; here it merely refers to the initial attainment of the stage, temporarily based on the Small Vehicle, which is the first two expedients: the stations of mindfulness and the stage of warmth. If made into seven expedients, it is the first four expedients: from the summit dharmas and acceptance dharmas on up to the first fruit, which then belongs to the person observing the directions. If based on the Great Vehicle, then it encompasses the thirty minds as the person observing the directions, and ascending to the bhūmis and above belongs to reaching the other shore. The text has four parts: first, original arising; second, identifying the person; third, explaining attaining abiding; fourth, discerning the practice method. The first three are at the end of this fascicle. Now, the first explains the original arising: because the preceding second becomes the present third, those who alter it to "the third" are mistaken. From "In my buddhadharma..." onwards is the second: identifying the person. One ought to identify a person of semblance understanding, yet here Śāriputra and Maudgalyāyana are both of true understanding. Traditionally there are two meanings: one says that this third person's stage extends upward to the arhat, which is why such persons are generally cited. The second is taking their initial state in the past as persons of semblance understanding who cultivated and attained entry into the true, but are listed now while still retaining their original semblance stage. From "What is meant by abiding?" onwards is the third: explaining attaining abiding. Question: In the river of nirvāṇa, four persons together attain nirvāṇa—arhats, pratyekabuddhas, bodhisattvas, and buddhas. In the river of saṃsāra, only the Buddha alone is the seventh person, while the other three have not crossed over. Someone explains: In the river of nirvāṇa, the three vehicles together attain nirvāṇa, so all are the seventh person. In the river of saṃsāra, the four fruits have not escaped the river of saṃsāra, hence cannot cross over. Although an arhat will have no subsequent rebirth, he still has this present life remaining, hence is not crossed over. Therefore, attaining nirvāṇa does not necessarily mean escaping saṃsāra; having crossed over saṃsāra, one necessarily attains nirvāṇa. Now evaluating this explanation: the phrasing of the explanation seems plausible, but its principle is not clear. We now ask further: As for the four persons together attaining nirvāṇa in the river of nirvāṇa, do the four persons equally see buddhadhātu or not? If he replies that they equally see the nature, this shows an utter failure to see the principle. If he replies that they do not equally see it, then they also do not equally attain nirvāṇa. How then could the preceding text have them together as the seventh? Since they are equally the seventh yet there are those who see the nature and those who do not see the nature, one knows that their nirvāṇas are different and their saṃsāras are not the same. Now examining the sūtra's intention: the river of saṃsāra extends throughout transformational death, where only the Buddha attains crossing over and all others remain in the river. The river of nirvāṇa is strictly within fragmented death, extending to the four persons—namely, the seven persons of the Small Vehicle. Therefore the Commentary says: "The stage of the arhat is called the stage of the Buddha." Furthermore, Kāśyapa sharing the couch of liberation with the Buddha is precisely this meaning. General and specific are alternately cited according to what suits the occasion; one must not rigidly cling [to either].

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大般涅槃經疏 — Classical Chinese