大般涅槃經疏 32.12

32.12

From "Śreṇika said: 'If there is no self...'" downward is the third [section], the debate on doctrines. Above, the Buddha refuted Śreṇika's propositions phrase by phrase. Now that his false views have been cleared away, he further debates this doctrine with the Buddha: is there definitely a self, or is there definitely no self? First, it questions the Buddha's doctrine of no-self; second, it re-establishes the doctrine of a self to challenge the Buddha's doctrine of no-self. If the Buddha's doctrine cannot be established, the doctrine that there is a self will become evident. There are naturally five exchanges. Here, Śreṇika's first question is: if there is no self, who is able to remember? The Buddha replied: If by virtue of remembering you know that there is a self, then now by virtue of forgetting you should know that there is no self. You cite remembering as proof that there is a self, yet the occurrence of forgetting and loss proves that there is no self. If temporary remembering reveals the presence of a self, then temporary forgetting should also reveal the absence of a self. Since the self is supposed to be autonomous, why would it remember evil and not remember good? Furthermore, it says: remembering what is not to be remembered, when right in the midst of concentration (dhyāna), one ought to reflect on and remember the object of concentration; why then does one further conditions other matters? Furthermore, it says: not remembering what is to be remembered, when precisely performing evil one still retains good phenomena; since there is a self, how could it be unfixed? From "Śreṇika [asked]: 'Who sees, who hears...'" downward is the second question: If there is no self, who is able to see and hear? The gist of the Buddha's answer is: it is because of the combination of sense faculties and sense objects that there is seeing and hearing; it is truly not by relying on a self that one is able to see and hear. He himself puts forward two similes. From "Śreṇika said: 'If there is no self...'" downward is the import of the third question, which interrogates it based on nominal designations: Why is it called 'I see, I hear'? Worldly people all say 'I see, I hear', 'my pain, pleasure, sorrow, joy', and so forth. The Buddha's answer has two imports: First, he turns it back against him, saying that if by 'I see and hear' one knows there is a self, then when another person commits an offense and says 'I did not see or hear it', there should also be no self. From "Next, like the four kinds of troops..." downward, he again puts forward nominal designations to correspond to 'I see and hear'. From "Śreṇika said: 'According to what you say...'" downward is the fourth question, asking further: If inner and outer combine, who produces the sound? The Buddha then replied: 'Conditioned by ignorance' means that, conditioned by the twelve links of dependent origination, they combine to form a body; because there is a body, consciousness stirs the wind, and the wind strikes the lips and tongue to produce the sound that speaks of 'self'. As the *Mahāprajñāpāramitā-śāstra* says: "The wind is named *ayuda* (udāna); touching the navel, it goes upward, reaching the teeth, lips, and tongue, and by vibrating them produces sound." A wind chime or heated iron is also like this. From "Śreṇika said: 'As Gautama says...'" downward is the fifth question, which clarifies: If one follows this principle, there is completely no self; by what condition does the Tathāgata possess permanence and bliss? Because there is a self, there are phenomena such as permanence; if there is no self, how could one attain such phenomena? The gist of the Buddha's answer is: attaining the permanent self requires that it be attained only after the body has been extinguished; how could one attain the permanent self in this very body?