大般涅槃經疏 32

English (machine translation) 32

Language: English

32.1

Composed by Master Guàndǐng of Zhāng'ān under the Sui

32.2

Re-edited by the Śramaṇa Zhànrán of Tiāntái under the Tang

"Kauṇḍinya" translates as "fire vessel," which is his family name. "Ājñāta" translates as "understood," which is his personal name. Its meanings are very numerous, but we may briefly present four points: First, he was the first to attain the Way and is the foremost elder seated on the left or the right. When the previous buddhas entered parinirvāṇa, he preserved and upheld the Dharma, and now, among the venerable and virtuous elders who have not yet passed away, he stands as the foremost head of the final assembly. The Buddha wished to make a good beginning and bring it to a good conclusion, and therefore addressed this person. Second, when the wheel of the Dharma was first turned, it was to him that the Buddha first dispensed the sweet dew [of the teaching]; and when the wheel of the Dharma is turned for the last time, it is again to him that the Buddha opens the secret treasury. Third, originally he practiced outside the principle [as a non-Buddhist] and was the very first to overturn heterodoxy; now, relying on this person, [the Buddha] refutes the non-Buddhists for the last time. Fourth, the Buddha first addressed him to enable the five persons to see the truths, and finally addresses him to enable the ten ṛṣis to see the principle. For these reasons, the chapter takes its title from this person. If one takes it as conferring the Dharma upon Kauṇḍinya: if it were for receiving and upholding the spoken teachings, it should be given to Ānanda; if it were for abiding, upholding, and continuing the lineage, it should be given to Kāśyapa; if it were for propagating and elucidating the great tenets, it should be given to Mañjuśrī. Yet of the great disciples, some had already passed into extinction, while others had not yet arrived; and the venerable and virtuous elder had witnessed the Buddha from beginning to end and was necessarily an elder capable of bearing the entrustment. Therefore [the Buddha] addressed him, circulating his final bequest. Kāishàn said: "The translation of the sūtra was not completed; it contains only the prologue and the main body. The main body in turn comprises three parts: first, a brief statement presenting the fundamental tenet; second, an extensive explanation discerning the fundamental tenet; and this chapter is the third, an exposition gathering the heterodox and returning them to the correct." Guāngzhái said: "Although the translation is not complete, the three divisions are provisionally sufficient, and this chapter is precisely the propagation section." He also said: "This chapter answers the thirty-seventh question: 'Now I wish to ask about the aggregates, yet I lack wisdom.'" Xīnghuáng said: "If it is an answer to a question, it captures a small part of the earlier intention but loses all the subsequent text. If it is said to be the propagation section, it captures the text commanding Ānanda, but loses the rest." If we appraise the various masters, each captures one aspect. If we cite Dharmakṣema's words: "The meaning of this sūtra is complete, but its text is not yet exhausted." If we cite the *Gṛhapati-saṅghanimantraṇa-sūtra*, it says: "Three chapters have not yet arrived." Furthermore, citing the text below where Ānanda is commanded, there are two matters: first, instructing him to transform Subhadra; second, that there should be an entrustment. Since the command to transform has been carried out, yet no entrustment is seen, one should know that it is incomplete. As for saying that there is a propagation section: first, a propagation that gathers the heterodox and returns them to the correct; second, an entrustment propagation. Although there is no text of entrustment, there is the gathering of the heterodox; hence it is said to have a propagation section. Now, clarifying that this chapter is still the function of nirvāṇa, its meaning is broad. In the present, it has the function of gathering the heterodox and gathering evil; in the future, it has the function of rescuing from evil and rescuing from heterodoxy. Whether one wishes to make it both the main exposition and the propagation, either is acceptable; whether one wishes to take it as fully translated or not fully translated, the two meanings do not obstruct each other. Now, clarifying the function of nirvāṇa: the previous chapter was the function of gathering evil; this chapter is the function of gathering the heterodox. Regarding the text, there are two parts: first, concluding the correct meditative contemplation; second, refuting the various heterodox doctrines. The essentials of cultivation do not exceed these two. Correct contemplation is one's own practice in seeking upward; refuting the heterodox is benefiting others in transforming downward. Correct contemplation is the goodness of active practice; refuting the heterodox is the goodness of cessation. Correct contemplation is the arising of understanding; refuting the heterodox is the extinction of delusion. Correct contemplation is the virtue of wisdom; refuting the heterodox is the virtue of severance. These are the meanings of the four siddhāntas. First, explaining correct contemplation also has two parts: first, correctly discerning the meditative contemplation; second, generally concluding with praise and censure. Here in the first part, it explains both the contemplation of permanence and impermanence, both relying on the aggregates as their sphere. That it does not discuss other dharmas is due to four reasons in total: first, the beginning and end of the teaching path; second, according with what is suitable for beings; third, concluding the beginning and end of this single sūtra; fourth, the beginning and end of all dharmas. First, regarding the beginning and end of the teaching path, the *Lotus Sūtra* says: "Formerly in Vārāṇasī, I turned the wheel of the Dharma of the four truths, discriminatively expounding all dharmas, the arising and ceasing of the five aggregates." The five aggregates are the five skandhas, and arising and ceasing is impermanence. Now entering nirvāṇa, he extinguishes the five impermanent ones and attains the five that are all permanent. Second, according with what is suitable is apparent. Third, regarding concluding the beginning and end of this single sūtra: when this sūtra opened its tenets, it immediately said, "I now bestow upon you permanent life, form, and strength"; now at the conclusion of the sūtra, it returns to conclude this intention. Discerning that the five aggregates are permanent, it wishes to explain that life, form, and peace are precisely the five aggregates. Fourth, regarding concluding the beginning and end of all dharmas: as for the substance of meditative contemplation, there is none that does not take the five aggregates as its beginning and sarvākārajñatā as its end. Therefore, sūtras such as the *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā* frequently state that form is empty, sensation and perception, etc., are empty, up to sarvākārajñatā. The five aggregates are its beginning, and nirvāṇa is its end, omitting what is in between. Another explanation states: "Form is an obstructive dharma; mind is a cognitive dharma. The Buddha is free of obstruction and free of cognition, and therefore has neither form nor mind. If he had form, he should be covered by a house and clad in garments. What is spoken of as form refers to discerning wisdom as luminous and pure, using form as an analogy." Now we clarify that this explanation contradicts the sūtra. The sūtra says, "By extinguishing this form, one attains permanent form"; one should also extinguish obstructive form to attain unobstructed form, and should extinguish cognitive mind to attain uncognitive mind. How could one still preserve a cognitive mind and then call that cognitive mind "form"? If form is an analogy for wisdom, what are sensation, perception, volition, and consciousness analogies for? How could one use the cow's footprint of the Small Vehicle to ride upon the great ocean? Another master says: "Speaking according to reality, the Buddha has neither form nor mind. The sūtra is cited: 'At that time, passing beyond the realm of mind, he abides in the activity of wisdom.'" Although he cites this sūtra, it turns out to harm his own position. What is the activity of wisdom—is it not the Buddha's mind? Furthermore, it is said that ordinary beings are termed "aggregates," but how could that be so for the Buddha? The Buddha is named by the five divisions—why is that? "Aggregate" means concealing and covering. The Buddha has no concealment or covering, so he is not an aggregate. For example, the cause is named the myriad practices, and the fruit is named the myriad virtues. This also contradicts the sūtra. The sūtra says: "One attains permanent form; sensation, perception, volition, and consciousness are also like this." How is this not the permanent aggregates, permanent form and mind? The text above says, "I now bestow upon you permanent life, form, strength, peace, and unimpeded eloquence"; this is precisely the permanently abiding aggregates covering the dharmadhātu. What obstruction is there that one should say they are not aggregates? The dharmakāya is neither permanent aggregates nor impermanent aggregates, and the dhātus and āyatanas are also like this; yet it can be permanent aggregates and can be impermanent aggregates. Here, addressing Kauṇḍinya directly, [the Buddha] speaks of the former meaning: refuting impermanent form and attaining permanent form is precisely the permanent aggregate of form. How can one contradict the sūtra by saying there is no aggregate of form? If one gives the perfect explanation, then impermanent form is itself permanent form, and sensation and the rest are also like this; that is, the impermanent aggregates are the permanent aggregates, and the dhātus and āyatanas are also like this. Although there are the two kinds—distinct and perfect—both equally elucidate the permanent aggregates, the permanent dhātus and āyatanas, and so forth. Second, concluding with praise and censure, the text is evident; by this means, heterodoxy is refuted.

32.5

From the passage beginning "At that time the non-Buddhists" below, the second [part] is the refutation of heterodox views, which also has two [subsections]: first, the circumstances of origin, and next, the refutation proper. Within the circumstances of origin there are two: first, plotting and deliberating, and next, seeking to contend in debate with the Buddha. The deliberations take five rounds, which can be seen [in the text]. From the passage beginning "At that time there were many" below, next is the desire to seek a contest of power. From the passage beginning "At that time in the assembly, Jāti..." below, the second is the refutation proper of the ten ṛṣis, which constitutes ten sections. This is one of them. Jātiśoṇa took Kapila as his patriarch and held that the effect pre-exists in the cause and that cause and effect are simultaneous. Thus the *Śataśāstra* says, "The disciples of Kapila recite the twenty-five principles of the *Sāṃkhya-sūtra*." Since here they are set forth in full, one knows this is so. This section has two [parts]: first, the debate, and second, their submission. The debate has four [parts]: first, determining the thesis; second, accepting the determination; third, the objection proper; fourth, the resolution and explanation. First, as for determining the thesis: "I have heard that Gautama's nirvāṇa is permanent; is it definitely so or not?" Next, replying, "It is so, it is so," is accepting the determination. Yet when has nirvāṇa ever definitely been permanent, impermanent, both permanent and impermanent, or neither permanent nor impermanent? Desiring to refute him by means of permanence, he therefore says, "It is so, it is so." From the passage beginning "The brāhmaṇa said" below, the third is the objection proper, which also has three [parts]: first, negating the Buddha's doctrine; next, the objection proper; third, inferring the intent and concluding. The first is as in the text. Next, in the objection proper there are five objections, which do not go beyond two points: the first four objections jointly reduce [nirvāṇa] to impermanence; the latter one objection argues that not only is it impermanent, but it is also devoid of bliss, purity, and self. The first clarifies that by cultivating the thought of impermanence one attains permanent nirvāṇa, [objecting that] an impermanent cause should not yield a permanent effect. Ancient [commentators] encountered this objection. That [opponent] says that nirvāṇa is an effect, and that cultivating a causal practice yields in return a habitual effect. Since the effect that is nirvāṇa is permanent, what could be the permanent cause for this? The same applies to self and purity. If he were to reply that my nirvāṇa is inherently a permanent effect, he falls into the view of spontaneous existence, and so on. In the second objection, beginning from "Gautama also says that by liberating oneself from desire and greed" below, he clarifies that by liberating oneself from desire and greed one attains nirvāṇa. Since the desire and greed that are liberated from are impermanent, the nirvāṇa that is able to liberate must also be impermanent. This objection is the clumsiest. In the third objection, beginning from "Gautama also says that because of being born from causes one is born in heaven" below, he directly clarifies that because it is produced from causes, it is therefore impermanent. Nirvāṇa is an effect, so it is born from causes and cannot be permanent. In the fourth objection, beginning from "Gautama also says that form is produced from conditions" below, he opens it into two difficulties: if nirvāṇa is identical with the aggregates, since the aggregates are impermanent, nirvāṇa is also like that; if it is apart from the five aggregates and distinct from the five aggregates, like empty space, it is ungraspable—how could sentient beings attain nirvāṇa? In the fifth objection, beginning from "Gautama also says that it is produced from causes" below, he clarifies that since nirvāṇa is impermanent and cannot be permanent, how could it merely be impermanent?—it also lacks bliss, purity, and self. From the passage beginning "If Gautama says it is both permanent and impermanent" below, the third is inferring the intent and concluding. The intent of the objection is: seeing that the Buddha's thesis of permanence cannot be maintained against objections, he feared the Buddha might shift his position to 'both permanent and impermanent', which would constitute speaking double words; and if one speaks double words, one is not named a Buddha. From the passage beginning "The Buddha said" below, the fourth is the resolution and explanation, the text of which has two [parts]: first, answering the objections proper, and next, answering the concluding objection. The first text also has two [subsections]: first, answering the first objection, and next, answering the third objection. As for why he does not answer the remaining three objections: because their objections reduce nirvāṇa to impermanence, the rest follow by analogy. He does not answer the second on the severed desire and greed, because desire and greed are impermanent—how could they make the severance impermanent as well? He does not answer the fourth, because nirvāṇa is permanent—why discuss whether it is identical or separate? He does not answer the fifth, because nirvāṇa is permanent—how could it lack bliss and purity? Now he first answers the first objection. The Buddha first questions him to make him set forth his own doctrine. Previously, he had resisted and would not disclose his doctrine; taking occasion from the other objections, the Buddha then made him set forth his doctrine: "Our Nature (prakṛti) is permanent; why should the Mahat and other phenomena not be impermanent?" If so, then the generating cause is permanent while the generated effects are impermanent. The Buddha then drew a parallel resolution: "If in your doctrine the cause is permanent and the effect is impermanent, why in my Dharma should the cause not be impermanent and the effect permanent?" and so forth. These twenty-five principles have similarities and differences with the *Śataśāstra*, which can be summarized under three [headings]: First, the names differ but the substance is the same. The treatise says, "From the Unmanifest (tamas/avyakta) arises intellection (buddhi); from intellection arises the ego-sense (ahaṃkāra)." Here it says, "From Nature (prakṛti) arises the Great (mahat); from the Great arises conceit (māna)." This is where names differ but the substance is the same: the Unmanifest is obscure and unknowable beyond eighty thousand kalpas. Here, "Nature" refers to the nature of the myriad phenomena, hidden and dormant beyond eighty thousand kalpas and impossible to know. What the treatise calls "intellection" is knowing the affairs of eighty thousand kalpas. What is here called "the Great" simply means capable of being great; knowing and conceit/ego are easy to understand. Second, the names and substance are both the same: these are the five great elements, five sense objects, five sense capacities, five action capacities, and the equal mind-sense. Third, both names and substance differ: the treatise says, "The spiritual self (puruṣa) is the master, which is one faculty." Here it says, "The stained (rajas), the gross (tamas), and the dark are also one faculty." This is a great difference. How can the three—stained, gross, and dark—be one? It is explained: the three do not arise together; taking one or another among greed and the rest, whichever is earlier or later, it makes up the twenty-four. Question: Since this Jāti took the doctrine of Kapila as his tradition, why are they not the same? Answer: During the Buddha's time, one did not see the three masters, but only saw their disciples; their disciples altered the original texts, and therefore what they expounded differed, having variations such as 'stained' and so forth. For example, Master Zhuāngyán said: In the Buddha-fruit there are no continuous, dependent, or causally accomplished provisionalities. Later, Yǎn of Zhāotí was his student, and he altered it, saying that in the Buddha-fruit there is no causal accomplishment, though there may well be continuous and dependent [provisionality]. Kāishàn said: The two truths are of the same substance. Later, Lóngguāng was his student, and he altered it to say that the two truths each have their own substance, and so forth. Among the five action faculties it mentions the male and female faculties; the treatise takes defecation and urination as the two faculties, each having its textual basis. The treatise is based on a single body, while the sūtra is based on two persons, and so forth. However, regarding this principle of Nature (prakṛti), some consider it to be the spiritual self (puruṣa), while others consider it to be the Primal Darkness (pradhāna); both have their reasoning. Primal Darkness relies on its being the beginning of the twenty-five principles, hence the dark principle. But it is also said to be permanent, which would make it the spiritual self; it is not yet determined how they differ. In that [passage] where it says that from conceit arise sixteen phenomena: these do not immediately produce sixteen phenomena, for there are no instances of the stained, dark, and gross arising all at once; they are produced according to whichever of them arises, and because this is indefinite, it is not stated beforehand. The sixteen phenomena are the five great elements, the five cognitive faculties, the five action faculties, and the equal mind faculty. Listing the names of the five faculties, it then says that touch refers to the body being touch. Question: Regarding the equal faculty, what the treatise master explains is that when the mental consciousness arises dependent upon the five faculties, they are the five cognitive faculties; since the mind cognizes everywhere, it is named 'equal'. The text says that these twenty-five phenomena are all produced from Nature; in reality, Nature produces twenty-four phenomena, and counting both the producer and the produced together makes twenty-five. According to his doctrine, Nature is permanent and what it produces is impermanent; the Buddha used his doctrine to draw a parallel resolution: "Why should it hinder my doctrine that the cause is impermanent while the effect is permanent?" From the passage beginning "In your doctrine, are there two causes or not?" below, the second answers his third objection, also first scrutinizing his doctrine one by one. The text says: "Is that which is revealed by an elucidating cause identical with the elucidating [cause] or not?" This means: must the effect revealed by an elucidating cause necessarily be identical with the elucidating [cause] or not? For instance, a lamp is an elucidating cause that reveals the effect of a pot or a basin. Is this elucidating cause identical with the revealed effect such as the pot or basin, or not? He says they are not identical. Why is that? Just as a lamp is called an elucidating cause, when someone quenches it and the fire is extinguished, how could that cause the pot to be destroyed? Nirvāṇa is also like this: although it emerges from an elucidating [cause], the fruit of nirvāṇa is permanent; you cannot say that because it is produced from a cause, it is therefore impermanent. If I answer according to your doctrine that since there are two causes, the effect revealed by an elucidating cause is not identical with the elucidating cause, my [Dharma] is also like this: this nirvāṇa comes about from an elucidating cause; the elucidating cause is impermanent, but the fruit of nirvāṇa is permanent. From the passage beginning "Therefore, what the Tathāgata speaks has two [aspects]" below, the second refutes his concluding objection drawn from intent. It clarifies that the Buddha has no double words; expounding the Dharma according to faculties, at times he speaks of existence, and at times he speaks of non-existence, intending to lead them to understand the correct Dharma of the middle way—how could this be double words? The later text further takes the eye and form generating consciousness to explain the meaning of what is spoken: that the Buddha's two words serve to elucidate a single word means that although the eye and form are two, they together produce consciousness, and because consciousness is one, it is called a single word.

32.6

From the passage beginning "The brāhmaṇa said" below, the second is their submission, which has six [parts]: first, requesting; second, expounding; third, affirming; fourth, sealing with approval; fifth, taking refuge; sixth, granting permission. First, he again requests the Buddha to speak. From the passage beginning "At that time the World-Honoured One" below, the second is that the Buddha immediately answers, saying that the truth of suffering is both two and one, up to the truth of the path being also like this. There are two explanations of this. First, Master Ài says: In terms of real phenomena, suffering and bliss are two, but in the path of continuity, the consciousness of suffering is ultimately refined to form this bliss, and thus they are one in meaning; hence it is said to be both two and one. The truth of the path follows this by analogy. Another master explains: The Buddha spoke the four noble truths, and Śoṇa was awakened to the path on the basis of these four truths; this should not merely be a provisional meaning of continuity. The reason this text exists is as in the "Distinction Chapter" of the *Large Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra*, where Subhūti asks the Buddha: "Is one ferried across by means of the truth of suffering, or is one ferried across by means of the knowledge of suffering, up to the knowledge of the path?" The Buddha answered: "It is not by the truth of suffering, the knowledge of suffering, or up to the knowledge of the path; I say that the equality of the four truths is called attaining the path." Furthermore, it says: "The equality of the four truths is precisely nirvāṇa." Thus the truth of suffering is the object and the knowledge of suffering is the wisdom; in the worldly path there are the two of object and wisdom. If one sees the unarisen, one does not see any distinction between object and wisdom, for all are of one mark; hence it is both two and one. From the passage beginning "The brāhmaṇa said" below, the third is affirming. When it says that for all ordinary persons the truth of suffering is two, while for the sages it is one: if one relies on Master Ài, how can this text be explained? Later, ordinary persons discriminate, and therefore see the duality of object and wisdom; the sages forget object and wisdom, for all is the one true [reality], and therefore it is said that for sages it is one. The fourth, sealing with approval, and the fifth, taking refuge, are as in the text.

32.7

Kauṇḍinya Chapter, Part One

32.8

Sixth, granting permission. The Buddha told Kauṇḍinya to permit his going forth, because Kauṇḍinya was the one given the final entrustment: "Since you are the senior elder, you must oversee the affairs of the Saṅgha." Regarding his attaining the fruit of arhatship: if one relies on Kāishàn, these are all manifested traces; if one relies on Zhuāngyán, he truly attained arhatship. Through the power of the Buddha's spiritual penetrations and the efficacy of his preaching of the Dharma, this person was immediately caused to pass from ordinary to sage, which is extraordinarily remarkable. However, the previous text already stated that he had attained right view, and here it states again that only after going forth did he attain arhatship; therefore we know that with the previous statement of right view, its depth is difficult to fathom—it could be that he had just attained the first fruit, or it could be that it was merely an expedience, and therefore only now did he attain the fruit of arhatship. Personally, I would say: turning away from heterodoxy and entering the correct is itself right view; why need one dispute the depth of the stage attained?

32.9

From "Vāsiṣṭha" onwards is the second person; this is a disciple of Ulūka Sāṃkhya. The text also has two parts: first, debating the meaning; and second, explaining his conversion and submission. The debate on the meaning has four rounds. The first two parts each have questions and answers, which can be examined. However, when he asked the Buddha, "Is nirvāṇa permanent?" the Buddha also answered, saying, "It is so." When it comes to the ultimate discussion of nirvāṇa, how could it ever be definitively permanent? He further asked, "Is the absence of afflictions nirvāṇa?" The Buddha also answered, "It is so." When did the Buddha ever say that the absence of afflictions is nirvāṇa? The earlier text did not say that having severed afflictions is nirvāṇa, but only that the non-arising of afflictions is nirvāṇa. Now, in addressing this non-Buddhist, it was appropriate to make this statement, because he was someone who harbored the view of annihilationism. However, regarding the four kinds of non-existence raised in the third round, his intention was to pose a challenge based on non-existence through destruction: if phenomena are non-existent through destruction, how could there still be permanence and bliss? What has not yet arisen is non-existence in the future; non-existence through destruction is non-existence in the past. The Buddha answered that it is the same as mutual non-existence; this was also spoken to address the non-Buddhist. If we discuss the correct principle, it is not completely mutual non-existence. Why is this? Originally, the mutual absence of an ox and a horse is termed "mutual non-existence"; now, explaining that within saṃsāra there is originally nirvāṇa, the correct principle is therefore not completely mutual non-existence. In the fourth round, he still raised another challenge: "If it is mutual non-existence, it should also be impermanent. Although within an ox there is no horse, one says there is a horse [elsewhere], and within a horse there is no ox likewise; an ox and a horse are ultimately non-existent originally and existent now. Nirvāṇa is also like this: if within nirvāṇa there is no saṃsāra and yet there is nirvāṇa, then it is non-existent originally and existent now, and is also impermanent." Now, the Buddha broke this down: although it is the same as mutual non-existence, it is also different, because within distinct non-existence there are three kinds of non-existence: first is mutual non-existence, second is non-existence prior and existence later, and third is returning to non-existence after already existing. One should know that nirvāṇa, while being distinct non-existence, lacks these three things; therefore it is permanent and blissful. In the text there are three parts: first, this explanation through doctrine; next, citing three illnesses and three medicines as an analogy; and third, citing an analogy to clarify the fruition. Next, the text says, "Honey can treat cold [illnesses]"; according to what physicians say, the nature of honey is actually cold. This is due to differences in local appropriateness; it is not necessarily always so. Furthermore, the analogy says that within the three kinds of illness there are not the three kinds of medicine, and within the three kinds of medicine there are not the three kinds of illness; previously, this text was used to prove that they do not share the same essence. If within wisdom there could be ignorance, then the medicine would possess the illness, which contradicts this statement. However, according to the old explanation of Zhuāngyán, it explains that within the uncontaminated there really is the delusion of existence and non-existence; what is said to be "non-existent" here is merely the delusion of grasping marks and the like. According to the explanation of Zhāotí: because the true uncontaminated really does not receive retribution, there is no need to speak of ignorance entering the essence of understanding. And when the Śrīmālādevī Sūtra speaks of "the ground of the entrenchment of ignorance being conditioned by uncontaminated karma as a cause," this speaks of resembling uncontaminatedness and guided uncontaminatedness; it does not speak of true uncontaminatedness. From "Vāsiṣṭha said, 'The Tathāgata has explained for me permanence and impermanence'" onwards is the second part, his conversion and submission. His text says, "Form is impermanent; the form of liberation is permanent." There are two explanations: first, since form is impermanent, my form of liberation then has no further form, and therefore it is permanent. The second says that liberation is itself form, and form is itself permanent; thus the earlier text says, "attaining the permanent form of liberation." The latter explanation is superior. Here, through Kauṇḍinya, the text of repentance is presented. Regarding the words "nǐ / mí Gautama clan": formerly it was read with the sound nǐ, meaning that he called you nǐ, hence saying "nǐ Gautama clan." Now, relying on the Western Chamber of Yěchéng, according to the Dharma Master, it should be read with the sound nǐ (苨). However, the translation of this was in the north, and northerners mostly say nǐ (苨), or also the sound of nǐ / wǒ. In the Mahāsaṃnipāta Sūtra this character is also used, where in that sūtra it is written with the person radical beside ěr (你). The text says "Gautama clan": if disciples of the Buddha address the Buddha as Gautama—as in the verse in the previous "Chapter on Manifesting Illness," which says, "Gautama of great holy virtue, we pray you arise and expound the Dharma"—this is an expression of praise. It clarifies that although for seven generations the Buddha belonged to the royal lineage of the Śākya clan, his original family arose from the great Gautama clan, whose lineage was exceedingly distant and did not begin today. If non-Buddhists intend to address him as Gautama, this does not consider his virtue, but merely speaks of his clan name; this is what is called slighting and disrespecting. Just as in worldly speech, when one does not address a person by rank but merely by clan name, it becomes slighting and disrespectful. It also says, "I also cannot long remain in this poisonous body; I now wish to enter extinction": this means that having original supernormal powers, he immediately attained the holy fruition; using the knowledge of the ultimate limit (prāntakoṭijñāna), he therefore entered nirvāṇa. The earlier text says that upon attaining arhatship, he was bestowed the three robes; by principle, having attained arhatship, one is already fully equipped with robes and bowl. Now, when it says he lacked them: if one is an "ehi" arhat, then one immediately has the three robes; since he attained arhatship on his own, he therefore required robes. Furthermore, this person was originally a renounced non-Buddhist, so he did not wait to have his hair shaved. How is this known? The earlier text said Jāti was a brāhmaṇa, whereas now Vāsiṣṭha is merely called a brahmacārin (fan-zhi); a brahmacārin is a renounced non-Buddhist, which is why it was further necessary to bestow the vessel of response (alms bowl) upon him.

32.10

"At that time, there was further in the assembly Śreṇika": this is the third non-Buddhist. The non-Buddhist Śreṇika was not merely one person; this one here is not the Śreṇika of the previous scroll, just as among the Buddha's disciples there were many who shared the name Kāśyapa. This section has four parts: first, the causal background; second, the refutation of attachments; third, the discussion of doctrines; fourth, the submission. Now, the Buddha's teaching is not fixed: sometimes he first clarifies the correct doctrine to enable the non-Buddhist to understand; sometimes he must first remain silent and wait for the other to establish his doctrine, and only then refutes it so as to proclaim the correct truth. Here it is appropriate to remain silent first, hence he does not answer the three questions. Furthermore, not answering has generally three meanings: First, it suits the capacity and conditions; though he does not answer, it is a response through silence. Second, asserting questions of existence or non-existence are all heterodox thoughts; thus in the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa there are fourteen difficult questions that the Buddha did not answer, such as whether [the world] is finite or infinite, permanent or impermanent, whether [the Tathāgata] exists after death or does not exist after death, and so on; that is why he did not answer. Third, the Buddha wished to let him state the core principles of his own established thesis and only then refute them. Previously, when the Tathāgata answered, he was constantly challenged by him and never succeeded in refuting him; therefore he remained silent. It is with these three meanings. From "Śreṇika said, 'If all sentient beings'" downward is the second part, the refutation of attachments. Within this there are two parts: first, establishing the thesis; next, the direct refutation. From here downward is establishing the thesis, which has generally three meanings: first, establishing that the self is all-pervading; second, establishing that the self is one; third, establishing that the self is an agent. 'Self' is just sentient being, person, and life-span; when 'self' is refuted, person, individual, and sentient being naturally fall away. Once 'agent' and 'knower' are refuted, 'initiator'—which belongs to the same category as 'agent'—is also refuted. Now we ask regarding the heterodox tenets: is it identical to the aggregates, or is it distinct from the aggregates? Here we say: holding that the self is an agent means that 'acting' is the aggregate of formations, taking formations to be the self. If holding that it is the knower or the seer, these are all taking the aggregates themselves to be the self. As for their holding that the self is an agent, although the actions performed are diverse, they are all identically an agent. From "The Buddha said to Śreṇika" downward is the second part, clarifying the direct refutation, which has two parts: first, directly refuting the first three; next, separately refuting the remaining three: the seer, the knower, and the experiencer. Concerning the first text, there are three parts: first, refuting all-pervasiveness; next, refuting unity; finally, refuting agency. The first has four turns: this first one begins by ascertaining his thesis. From "The Buddha said, 'If the self is all-pervading'" downward is the second, the direct refutation, clarifying that if the self is all-pervading, it should be in the five destinies; why would one need to cultivate good wishing to receive heavenly retribution and escape the evil destinies? In doing evil and in being born in heaven, the self should be constantly present, without need of cultivating good. Śreṇika said, "My self is of two kinds: first, the self of the active body; second, the self of the permanent body." Originally, Śreṇika posited the self of the permanent body; because he was refuted, he shifted it into two selves. From "The Buddha said, 'As you speak of the self'" downward is the third, where the Buddha further pursues the refutation. If the self of the permanent body is within the active body, and the active body is impermanent, the self of the permanent body should also be impermanent; if the self of the permanent body is not within the active body, then it lacks the meaning of all-pervasiveness. Because of this, Śreṇika further cited the simile of the house. The master of the house exemplifies the permanent body, and the house exemplifies the active body. When the house is burned, the master goes out. Just as the active body is impermanent, the permanent body departs. From "The Buddha said, 'As you speak of the self'" downward is the fourth, where he then pursues the refutation. He clarifies that since the self of the permanent body is all-pervading, the permanent is then impermanent; when in what is permanent, it is permanent, but when in what is impermanent, how could it not be impermanent? In this way, being all-pervading in matter and non-matter, since in non-matter it is just non-matter, how could it not be matter when in matter? The house and the master are different: one is burned and the other is not burned; they cannot be explained together. It may be so for the master and the house, but for the permanent body and the active body this is not the case; how can you say that when the active body is impermanent, the self departs? Now I must ask you: where does it go out to? Since the permanent body is permanent, its permanent essence is ever all-pervading; in going out, there is nowhere to go. From "If your intention is that all sentient beings" downward is the second, refuting the meaning of unity, which has altogether eight turns. From here downward is the first turn: since the self is one, what difference is there between the two selves, the father's self and the son's self? Next, Śreṇika defended, claiming that each person has one self, not that all people share a single self, hence the two selves of father and son are different. Once this was refuted, he immediately shifted his doctrinal thesis. From "The Buddha said, 'If you say that one person'" downward is the second, where the Buddha then pursued the refutation. If each person has one self, then selves are manifold and cannot be called permanent. If Śreṇika says that the karmic retributions of all sentient beings should be identical, and you say that each person has their own self, then since the self is all-pervading and there is nowhere it is not present, just as person Zhang's self would also come to be within person Wang's self, and person Wang's self would also come to be within person Zhang's self. If so, since selves mutually interpenetrate, there would be neither foolish nor wise, neither noble nor base. It would also be like: since Devadatta's self is in what is seen by the eye of Yajñadatta, the self of Yajñadatta would also be in Devadatta. Since the self of Yajñadatta is seen by the eye, the self of Devadatta should also be seen by the eye of Yajñadatta. Devadatta and Yajñadatta are personal names. Śreṇika defended: the self pervades all dharmas, but dharmas do not pervade one another; hence the two actions of Devadatta and Yajñadatta are different. From "The Buddha said, 'Are virtue and non-virtue'" downward is the third, where the Buddha again pursued the refutation. Are virtue and non-virtue not created by karma? This was to pin Śreṇika down. Some explain that in Śreṇika's holding that the self is an agent, the character 'karma' should be the character 'self'. The meaning may well be so, but there is no need to change the character; follow the character 'karma' in the text below. Since he held that the self is an agent, what is spoken of as karma's doing is just the self's doing. Next, Śreṇika's answer is apparent. From "The Buddha said, 'Virtue and non-virtue'" downward is the fourth, refuting again. Since both are identically made by the self, when Devadatta acts, Yajñadatta acts. Since the two actions are identical, the retributions should not differ; below, he cites that where karma is equal, the fruit should also be identical. Next, Śreṇika raised the light of a lamp to defend. From "The Buddha said, 'You speak of the light of a lamp'" downward is the fifth, pursuing the refutation of that simile. The light is beside the wick, yet it illuminates the hall, exemplifying that there is a place with boundaries and surfaces; the self should also have a location for visual consciousness. Since the self pervades virtue and non-virtue, virtue and non-virtue should also pervade the self; thus both would pervade each other. From "Śreṇika said, 'You cited the simile of the lamp'" downward, he again defends the simile. From "Good man, what I cited as a simile is a non-simile" downward is the sixth, again refuting that simile. Such a simile is a non-simile, hence we know that the light of a lamp cannot exemplify the self. If it exemplifies it, it is inauspicious for him and auspicious for the Buddha. Śreṇika said: you challenged first, and I defended again; this shows that the Buddha is also uneven. From "The Buddha said, 'As for my being uneven'" downward is the seventh, explaining that my being uneven breaks your being uneven to cause you to become even, which is my evenness; only when one attains equality together with all noble ones is it great evenness. Śreṇika defended: all sentient beings equally possess a self; that is my evenness. From "You also stated" downward is the eighth, where the Buddha further pursued the refutation of the meaning of equality. Since you say that one will receive bodies in the five destinies, how could the self be equal? From "If your intention is that the self is an agent" downward is the third, refuting agency, which has six parts: "Good man": this first text refutes it in terms of experiencing suffering. If the self is an agent, why would it make suffering for itself? If suffering is not made by the self, all dharmas should not be made by the self. From "Sentient beings' suffering and pleasure" downward is the second, clarifying grief and joy. From "You say that the self is permanent" downward is the third, clarifying that there are ten stages of life. From "If the self is an agent" downward is the fourth, clarifying that there are flourishing and decline, and sentient beings also have flourishing and decline. Since sentient beings are just the self, the self should flourish and decline; how could it be permanent? From "If the self is an agent" downward is the fifth, clarifying that it should not be sharp or dull. Why should this person be sharp in writing and dull in chess, while that person is sharp in chess and dull in writing? The remaining cases are all like this. From "If the self is an agent" downward is the sixth, clarifying that you yourself speak of selflessness, yet you doubt the existence and non-existence of the self.

32.11

From "If your intention is that apart from the eye there is seeing" downward is the second, refuting the remaining three meanings, hence called the separate refutation. Within this there are three parts: first, refuting the seer; next, refuting the experiencer; third, refuting the knower. First, refuting the seer itself has three parts: this first directly refutes it. To say that apart from the eye there is seeing means that the self is the agent of seeing. The Vaiśeṣikas hold that the soul causes cognition to know, yet the soul is distinct from cognition; this view is the same as the Sāṃkhya position that the soul itself can know, hence it says that apart from the eye there is seeing. This meaning is not so: if apart from the eye there is a self that can see, why is this eye needed? If apart from the self seeing, it uses the eye to be able to see, it is like saying that flowers can burn down a village because fire wrapped in flowers was thrown onto the roof, hence it is said that the flowers burned it; the soul's seeing through the eye is also like this: in the end it is the eye that sees, and the soul cannot see. From "Śreṇika said" downward is the second, his defense: just as a person holding a sickle can mow grass, by analogy the self, depending on the eye, can see visible form. According to the correct doctrine, it is merely a provisional self that enables the eye to see; there is definitely no real self that must depend on the eye to see. From "Good man, the sickle and the person are each different" downward is the third, refuting it again. The sickle and the person are not the same, so grass can be mowed. If apart from the sense faculty there is no separate self, it does not serve as an analogy. From "If your intention is that the body acts and the self experiences" downward is the second, refuting the experiencer. From "This is the action of my body, which is just my action" downward, he naturally clarifies it. From "Śreṇika said, 'My self is of two kinds'" downward is the third, refuting that the knower is the self, which has two parts: this first clarifies the attachment. From "The Buddha said, 'Good man, as for what is called the knower'" downward is the direct refutation. The self's knowing through cognition being demolished in the same way as the flower simile is still the previous point. Flowers can wrap fire, and fire can burn down a house, so it is called 'flowers burning it'. Although the soul is said to know, if it further uses cognition to know, in the end it is cognition itself that can know, and the soul cannot know. It was already refuted earlier, hence it is said that it is demolished like the flower simile. In the correct doctrine of the Buddha's teaching, there is also the meaning of a provisional self directing cognition to know, but it is not like a real self having the capacity to know by depending on cognition.

32.12

From "Śreṇika said: 'If there is no self...'" downward is the third [section], the debate on doctrines. Above, the Buddha refuted Śreṇika's propositions phrase by phrase. Now that his false views have been cleared away, he further debates this doctrine with the Buddha: is there definitely a self, or is there definitely no self? First, it questions the Buddha's doctrine of no-self; second, it re-establishes the doctrine of a self to challenge the Buddha's doctrine of no-self. If the Buddha's doctrine cannot be established, the doctrine that there is a self will become evident. There are naturally five exchanges. Here, Śreṇika's first question is: if there is no self, who is able to remember? The Buddha replied: If by virtue of remembering you know that there is a self, then now by virtue of forgetting you should know that there is no self. You cite remembering as proof that there is a self, yet the occurrence of forgetting and loss proves that there is no self. If temporary remembering reveals the presence of a self, then temporary forgetting should also reveal the absence of a self. Since the self is supposed to be autonomous, why would it remember evil and not remember good? Furthermore, it says: remembering what is not to be remembered, when right in the midst of concentration (dhyāna), one ought to reflect on and remember the object of concentration; why then does one further conditions other matters? Furthermore, it says: not remembering what is to be remembered, when precisely performing evil one still retains good phenomena; since there is a self, how could it be unfixed? From "Śreṇika [asked]: 'Who sees, who hears...'" downward is the second question: If there is no self, who is able to see and hear? The gist of the Buddha's answer is: it is because of the combination of sense faculties and sense objects that there is seeing and hearing; it is truly not by relying on a self that one is able to see and hear. He himself puts forward two similes. From "Śreṇika said: 'If there is no self...'" downward is the import of the third question, which interrogates it based on nominal designations: Why is it called 'I see, I hear'? Worldly people all say 'I see, I hear', 'my pain, pleasure, sorrow, joy', and so forth. The Buddha's answer has two imports: First, he turns it back against him, saying that if by 'I see and hear' one knows there is a self, then when another person commits an offense and says 'I did not see or hear it', there should also be no self. From "Next, like the four kinds of troops..." downward, he again puts forward nominal designations to correspond to 'I see and hear'. From "Śreṇika said: 'According to what you say...'" downward is the fourth question, asking further: If inner and outer combine, who produces the sound? The Buddha then replied: 'Conditioned by ignorance' means that, conditioned by the twelve links of dependent origination, they combine to form a body; because there is a body, consciousness stirs the wind, and the wind strikes the lips and tongue to produce the sound that speaks of 'self'. As the *Mahāprajñāpāramitā-śāstra* says: "The wind is named *ayuda* (udāna); touching the navel, it goes upward, reaching the teeth, lips, and tongue, and by vibrating them produces sound." A wind chime or heated iron is also like this. From "Śreṇika said: 'As Gautama says...'" downward is the fifth question, which clarifies: If one follows this principle, there is completely no self; by what condition does the Tathāgata possess permanence and bliss? Because there is a self, there are phenomena such as permanence; if there is no self, how could one attain such phenomena? The gist of the Buddha's answer is: attaining the permanent self requires that it be attained only after the body has been extinguished; how could one attain the permanent self in this very body?

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Linked texts (1)

大般涅槃經疏 — Classical Chinese