大般涅槃經疏 4.18

4.18

Third, the subsidiary discussion: why is it called a subsidiary discussion? First, explain the name; next, comment on the text. Explaining the name also has three parts: first, explaining the name; second, presenting the intention; third, critical examination. First, explaining the name: regarding "subsidiary discussion," formerly presenting the offering was primary, while conditioned and unconditioned are subsidiary. Moreover, the assembly at the time were bystanders; the assembly did not yet understand, so for the bystanders there was a discussion. Again, the real wisdom of the two persons is primary, while expedients are subsidiary; raising these questions and answers was their skillful means, hence it is called a subsidiary discussion. Again, the realm of the Tathāgata is primary, and the two functions are subsidiary. What is discussed now is the discussion of the two functions; hence it is called a subsidiary discussion. This is the meaning of the four siddhāntas; reflect upon it. Presenting the intention: why is there a subsidiary discussion? Because of the presentation of the offering, the Buddha bestowed permanence to shatter impermanence, and also explained that the two offerings are equal and without difference; those of sharp faculties had a profound understanding of neither permanence nor impermanence, while the deluded gave rise to views of superiority and inferiority, scorning impermanence and exalting permanence. Furthermore, because of the request to stay, the Tathāgata used not staying to shatter staying, and also explained that the realm of all buddhas is inconceivable; those of sharp faculties immediately understood neither staying nor not staying, while the deluded again considered not staying superior to staying, turning around in delusion and self-bewilderment, unable to attain understanding. For this reason, Mañjuśrī used impermanence and not staying to scold his request to stay, and Cunda used eternal abiding to challenge his impermanence and not staying; their mutual opposition made manifest that it was not the principle, and hence it is said, "Let us set aside conditioned and unconditioned for now," pointing ahead to the Tathāgata who would explain it extensively later. Pointing out the correct to reveal the incorrect is distinctly clear and understandable; for this reason, there had to be a subsidiary discussion. Furthermore, above, Cunda himself said that he was equal to Mañjuśrī the Dharma Prince and others; the assembly harbored doubts, thinking that Mañjuśrī was an ancient buddha whose practice was far-reaching and whose understanding was profound, capable of questioning and answering; whereas Cunda was of an initial resolve, whose stage was shallow and whose understanding was slight—though above he had been able to ask, they had not yet seen him answer, so how could he claim to be equal? For this reason there was a subsidiary discussion. Mañjuśrī being deep fell into defeat, while Cunda being shallow achieved victory; shallow victory is not victory, and deep defeat is not defeat; being neither defeated nor victorious reveals their equality. Grounded in these facts and principles to reveal the intention of the subsidiary discussion, the general outline is visible; it does not require much further explanation. Critical examination: Question: Mañjuśrī clarifies the samādhi of emptiness as the true Dharma, which should be the unconditioned; Cunda discusses non-existence against existence, where non-existence depends upon existence to be established, so it should still be existence. How can you say that Mañjuśrī clings to existence and Cunda clings to non-existence? Answer: Mañjuśrī supports the emptiness of the former teachings, which, compared to the great, is existence; Cunda supports the present teaching, discussing non-existence against existence, where existence being removed leaves no non-existence, which still turns out to be non-existence. Furthermore, Cunda has only just completed the perfection of giving, so his practice is shallow and he should not be said to be victorious; Mañjuśrī is an ancient buddha and therefore deep, so he should not be defeated. Answer: Conforming to what is appropriate for sentient beings, they serve as hammer and anvil to one another; it is not a fixed victory or defeat. Being defeated without being defeated does no harm to the deep; being victorious without being victorious adds nothing to the shallow. Mañjuśrī setting it aside for now means both victory and defeat are cast off. Moreover, Mañjuśrī holds to the former, which in terms of the former is correct, but compared to the present is incorrect; Cunda holds to the present, which in terms of the present is correct, but compared to the former is incorrect. If one constructs a four-cornered proposition: each clinging to the two functions to reveal the essence is 'both are correct'; each clinging to the two functions and harming the essence without [understanding] is 'both are incorrect'; each discerning essence and function has one correct and one incorrect; accessing the essence through function is 'neither is correct nor is either incorrect'.