大般涅槃經疏 4.19

4.19

The text divides into two: first, the side discussion; second, the return to the main theme. The side discussion also has three parts: first, Mañjuśrī's reproof and exhortation; second, Cunda's reproof and exhortation; third, Mañjuśrī's praise. In the first part, Mañjuśrī's reproof and exhortation, there are also two: first the reproof, and next the exhortation. First, in the reproof, he takes up the wording of [Cunda's] request: 'You should not now utter such words,' which is the reproof. Next: 'You should now contemplate... you ought to train in this way,' which is the exhortation. Next, Cunda's reproof and exhortation also has two parts: first, he reproves both [Mañjuśrī's] speaking and contemplating; next, he exhorts both [as to] speaking and contemplating. Regarding the dual reproof, there are also two: first, he reproves the errors of his speaking and contemplating; next, he concludes together the faults of his contemplating and speaking. First, in reproving the errors of his speaking and contemplating, there are also two: first he reproves the speaking, and next he reproves the contemplation. First, in reproving the speaking, there are also three: 1. One should not bring down the superior title to make it identical with inferior titles; 2. One should not cite inferior phenomena to make them identical with superior phenomena; 3. He concludes with its loss and insult. Regarding the first passage: the Tathāgata is universally the ultimate title of all buddhas; because past and present are not different, he is called 'Tathāgata'. How could one equate the supremely venerable with conditioned formations (saṃskāras)? Conditioned formations are a base designation of saṃsāra, lowly and base, with the toil and burdens of the multitude of existences. If one equates the Tathāgata with conditioned formations, bringing down the permanently abiding to make it transient cessation, and bending nirvāṇa to make it saṃsāra, how could that be right? Next, from 'just as a water bubble' onward, he adduces three seen things and one heard thing: one should not equate inferior phenomena with superior phenomena. Superior phenomena are the four virtues; inferior phenomena are the four inversions. The water bubble is a metaphor for impermanence, and the carriage wheel is a metaphor for suffering. 'I have heard that the lifespan of the gods is extremely long': the gods with extremely long life are those of naivasaṃjñānāsaṃjñāyatana; because naivasaṃjñānāsaṃjñāyatana has no form and cannot be seen, he says 'I have heard.' Adducing the long in contrast to the short: the short refers to miscarriage and abortion, which adduces impurity. Question: How is the formless realm impure? Answer: Although it is not bad form, it is reproved by the worthy and the noble, so it too is impure. 'Like a village headman who has lost his power' is a metaphor for non-self. One should know that one ought not adduce the phenomena of the four inversions to equate them with the phenomena of the four virtues. Third, from 'the World-Honoured One is also thus' onward, he demonstrates its loss and insult. If one brings down the superior to equate it with the inferior, then one loses the venerable title among devas and also loses the superior phenomena of the four virtues. If one cites the inferior to equate it with the superior, then one insults the superior name of the buddhas and the World-Honoured One, and also insults the superior phenomena of permanence and so forth. From 'Therefore, Mañjuśrī' onward, it reproves his contemplation, which also has three parts: 1. One should not contemplate the superior name as identical with inferior names, as the text says: 'Do not contemplate the Tathāgata as identical with conditioned formations.' 2. One should not contemplate inferior phenomena as identical with superior phenomena, as the text says: 'Do you speak knowing this, or speak without knowing it? If you know that the Tathāgata is not conditioned formations yet forcibly speak of them as identical, you make lower phenomena identical with higher phenomena. If you do not know that the Tathāgata is not conditioned formations yet say they are identical, you are benighted and confused about higher phenomena, mixing them with lower phenomena.' 3. He demonstrates its loss and insult. If one makes the Tathāgata identical with conditioned formations, then he cannot be called the Deva of Devas, and one loses the venerable and superior name as well as the venerable and superior phenomena. If one makes conditioned formations identical with the Tathāgata, then one insults the venerable and superior name, and also insults the venerable and superior phenomena (and so on). Next, from 'just as a human king' onward, two metaphors conclude together the faults of his contemplation and speaking. The first metaphor concludes the fault of contemplation; the next metaphor concludes the fault of speaking. The first passage also has two parts: first the metaphor, and next the application. In the first metaphor, the king is a metaphor for sentient beings, and the champion wrestler is a metaphor for the Buddha. The champion wrestler performs achievements for the king, and the Buddha carries out transformation for sentient beings. When the king sees that the champion wrestler has many skills, he generously grants him fiefs and stipends; sentient beings, receiving the Buddha's profound grace, make offerings with the four requisites. The champion wrestler subdues things through skill and virtue, not by exerting sheer power; the Tathāgata uses only wisdom and spiritual penetrations, not the strength of Nārāyaṇa. The Buddha is complete in merit; why do you now conceptualize, discriminate, and contemplate the Tathāgata as identical with conditioned formations? Is it not clear that this concludes the fault of contemplation? Next, the metaphor of the short lifespan concludes the fault of his speaking, which also has two parts: first the metaphor, and next the application. In the first metaphor, the parents are a metaphor for sentient beings, the child is a metaphor for the Buddha, and the physiognomist is a metaphor for Mañjuśrī. Sentient beings evoking the Buddha is like the parents; the Buddha responding to their capacities is like giving birth to a child. The Buddha in truth has a long lifespan, but Mañjuśrī speaks of it as short—is this not reproving the fault of speaking? This passage is clear. Next, from 'just as a poor woman' onward, it is a dual exhortation of speaking and contemplation. Formerly it was said that the poor woman is a metaphor for giving rise to understanding, and the husband is a metaphor for protecting the Dharma. Kāishàn says: the poor woman is a metaphor for giving rise to understanding, and the husband is a metaphor for abandoning delusion. Yěchéng says: the poor woman is a metaphor for protecting understanding, and the husband is a metaphor for shame and conscience. Zhāotí says: the poor woman is a metaphor for speaking of the Buddha as unconditioned, and the husband is a metaphor for covering the Buddha's being conditioned. Now, the woman is a metaphor for friendliness, giving birth to a child is a metaphor for speaking, the husband is a metaphor for firmness, and traveling afar is a metaphor for contemplation. The metaphorical text itself reveals this, and it follows from what came before; it is not mere speculation. However, setting the noble to instruct the ordinary, it addresses the superior to admonish the inferior; it is not truly reproving and exhorting Mañjuśrī. Furthermore, exhorting ordinary people at the ground level is of no benefit, and the ultimate noble ones do not require exhortation. Those who are neither above nor below—who have already aroused the aspiration [for awakening] but have not yet reached sufficiency—are precisely those who need reproof and exhortation; the metaphorical text is clear in itself (and so on).