大般涅槃經疏 9

English (machine translation) 9

Language: English

9.1

Compiled by Master Guàndǐng of Zhāng'ān under the Sui

9.2

Re-edited by the Tiāntái Śramaṇa Zhànrán under the Tang

'Four' is a number. 'Marks' means: as the sūtra discloses and distinguishes with four kinds of marks, the Great Nirvāṇa is clearly visible; hence its name is established from this. The preceding questions and answers all contained the three virtues, but their meaning was brief and unmanifest. This chapter answers the question: 'We pray the Buddha will uncover the subtle and secret, and expound it broadly for sentient beings.' It clarifies the four marks to explain prajñā, clarifies the three secrets to explain the dharmakāya, and clarifies the hundred phrases to explain liberation. Now explaining prajñā, it takes its title accordingly, hence it is called 'Four Marks'. Question: 'We pray the Buddha will uncover the subtle and secret,' and it also says, 'expound the secret.' What are 'uncovering' and 'expounding'? Older explanations say: Formerly, the dharmakāya and prajñā were taught without liberation; now nirvāṇa is uncovered as completely possessing the three virtues. This only explains 'uncovering', and does not clarify 'expounding'. Kāishàn says: The four marks answer uncovering the secret; manifesting illness answers expounding the secret. This points out the two passages, but does not determine their difference. Xīnghuáng says: Treated vertically, it is uncovering; treated horizontally, it is expounding. Formerly, the constant was covered by impermanence; now, impermanence is covered by the constant: they mutually cover one another, both past and present being concealments. Kāśyapa requested the Buddha to uncover, and the Buddha explained that both teachings, past and present, are skillful means of the two functions of nirvāṇa, together manifesting neither-constant-nor-impermanent. Furthermore, formerly the three dots were impermanent; now they are uncovered as constant. The former teaching straightforwardly said that righting oneself and righting others are the four marks; now they are uncovered as prajñā. Formerly, it straightforwardly said this body took a consort and fathered a son; now it is uncovered as the dharmakāya. Formerly, it spoke of conditioned liberation, which is the cognitive capacity of the mental ground above wisdom; now it is uncovered as liberation. These three are all constant and are all skillful means of nirvāṇa; this is vertically clarifying the marks of uncovering the subtle and secret. If explained horizontally: Formerly he wished to speak of the constant but could not speak of it, because of perverse views of constancy; now he first speaks of the constant, fully endowed with both functions. A later passage says: 'Formerly I spoke of remainder, like a river meandering; now I speak of without remainder, like a river not meandering.' Past and present complement each other to jointly reveal the one path; this is horizontally expounding the marks of the subtle and secret. This interpretation is not correct. The four propositions—constant, impermanent, both constant and impermanent, and neither constant nor impermanent—all conceal the correct principle. Therefore the Treatise says: 'The prajñāpāramitā cannot be grasped at any of the four extremes, because of burning by the fire of wrong views.' Furthermore, these four propositions are all gates of skillful means, like a king's secret words which only a wise minister can understand. Furthermore, these four propositions counteract the four attachments. Furthermore, these four propositions are all correct principle; hence it is said: 'Among all dharmas, all have the nature of peace and bliss.' If so, they all mutually cover one another; why say only that the constant and impermanent mutually cover one another, without mentioning the other two? When discussing their skillful means, why say only that the constant and impermanent are the two functions, while the other two are not skillful means? When discussing uncovering the secret, why say only that neither-constant-nor-impermanent is uncovered, without uncovering the other three propositions? This one-sided view collapses on its own, and the points between them are resolved together; one may reflect on this oneself. Now we explain: The four propositions all mutually conceal one another and are universally secret; the four propositions mutually remedy one another and are universally skillful means; the four propositions are identical to principle, can all uncover the secret, and are all named nirvāṇa. Understanding like this is called 'uncovering the secret'; expounding like this is called 'expounding the secret'. We may further distinguish them with the four propositions: There are uncovering without expounding, expounding without uncovering, both uncovering and expounding, and neither uncovering nor expounding. In terms of one's own practice, it is uncovering; teaching others is expounding. Clarifying both self and other is both uncovering and expounding; neither self nor other is neither uncovering nor expounding. The present four propositions encompass ordinary beings and sages, and are not confined solely to the Buddha. Furthermore, each and every proposition separately discusses uncovering and expounding: in one's own practice, revealing principle is called uncovering, and speaking of one's own realization is called expounding. Within expounding, there are two: distinguishing the characteristics of dharmas is called uncovering—such as dividing nirvāṇa into four marks being called uncovering the secret—and broadly expounding the general path is called expounding. Xīnghuáng only grasped this one phrase. In practicing for oneself and transforming others there are two: causing others to attain what one has attained oneself is called uncovering, and bestowing one's own Dharma upon others is called expounding. In neither self nor other there are also two: reaching the place of no reaching is called uncovering, and eternally having nothing to declare is called expounding. Distinguishing uncovering the secret and expounding the secret in this manner, their marks of distinction are also without distinction. Older commentators say: This chapter clarifies the three secrets and does not clarify the three virtues. Others also say: This chapter clarifies the three virtues and does not clarify the three secrets. Yet others say: Merely clarifying the three secrets uncovers the three virtues—uncovering the oral secret is prajñā, uncovering the bodily secret is the dharmakāya, and uncovering the mental secret is liberation; these three bases differ, forming three sections. Our school now uses these three sections to parse the text. However, calling them the three secrets also implies mutual containment, but judging by the predominance, they are determined as the three secrets.

9.5

Regarding the broad unfolding of prajñā in terms of the four marks: first, it refutes the one-sided; second, it reveals the perfect. How so? Formerly it was taught that prajñā is markless and free of marks; now it is made clear that prajñā is identical to marks and yet markless. Prajñā is simply the four marks, and the four marks are simply prajñā; identical to marks yet markless, one does not seek a separate marklessness. As for revealing the perfect: unfolding nirvāṇa to constitute the four marks, in the quiescence of nirvāṇa there is not even nirvāṇa, yet the four marks are not deficient. Although the four marks are unfolded, the four marks are one mark, which is great nirvāṇa. Unfolding the four from nirvāṇa is the conventional truth; the four marks being identical to the one mark is the ultimate truth. Because the one mark is identical to the four, it is not one; because the four marks are identical to the one, they are not four. Being neither one nor four is called great nirvāṇa; neither parallel nor separate, neither vertical nor horizontal, only then is the sense of the perfect revealed. Unfolding the dharmakāya in terms of the bodies of the ten realms also refutes the one-sided and reveals the perfect. Formerly it was taught that the dharmakāya is non-self; now, through non-self it is the self, and the self is identical to non-self, by analogy with prajñā (and so forth). Unfolding liberation in terms of the hundred phrases also refutes the one-sided and reveals the perfect. Formerly, freedom from the hundred negations and transcendence of the four propositions was called liberation; now liberation is identical to the hundred phrases, and the hundred phrases are identical to liberation; liberation is identical to negation, and negation is identical to liberation, by analogy with what was said before (and so forth).

9.6

Regarding the secret of speech, there are two parts: first, directly explaining the secret of speech; second, concomitantly explaining the two secrets of body and mind. Within the first, directly explaining the secret of speech, the text has two parts: first, explaining the four marks; second, examining nirvāṇa. The first also has two parts: first, explaining one mark as the four marks; second, explaining the four marks as one mark. The first has three parts: first, introducing; second, enumerating; third, explaining. The text itself forms four sections. However, rectifying oneself and skillfully understanding belong to self-practice; rectifying others and answering questions belong to transforming others. Within self-practice there is the intent to transform others; from the predominant aspect it is self-practice, and gathering in transforming others is also like this. Within the secret of speech there generally are body and mind, but it predominantly belongs to speech; body and mind are also like this. Introducing great nirvāṇa is the one; unfolding, revealing, and distinguishing are the four. Regarding rectifying oneself, there are two parts: first, explaining the Buddha's rectifying himself; second, using the analogy of a monk rectifying himself. First, 'if a Buddha, a Tathāgata' refers to the rectified person. 'Seeing' is rectified wisdom. 'Various causes and conditions' are the rectified conditions. Speaking in relation to the objective realm is the rectified teaching. In explaining the rectified person, two titles are raised: 'Buddha' is the rightly awakened one; 'Tathāgata' and 'Buddha' do not differ in meaning. These two titles suit the meaning of rectifying oneself, hence it says 'if a Buddha, a Tathāgata.' Furthermore, 'seeing' is function. The Buddha-eye illuminates the realm of causes and conditions; dharmatā is not a cause and thus not self, nor does it reside in conditions and thus is not other, not combined, and not uncaused; fully comprehending dharmatā is called 'seeing.' Because the seeing is rectified, what is spoken is also rectified.

9.7

Next, regarding the analogy of the monk: the Buddha's realm is difficult to understand, so the shallow is adduced to illustrate the deep and make it easy to comprehend. This also has three parts: first, seeing the fire; second, the vow; third, the conclusion. Regarding seeing a mass of fire: fire is born from conditions. Examining this mass of fire: does the fire arise from itself? Does it arise from fuel? Does it arise from both fuel and fire? Does it arise apart from fuel and fire? When the fire is extinguished, does it go to the east, south, west, or north? Arising, it has nowhere it comes from; extinguishing, it has nowhere it goes. The causes and conditions of the mass of fire cannot be grasped in the four [ways]; they are burned by wrong views. Contemplating the body is also like this: being, non-being, both being and non-being, and neither being nor non-being are all unobtainable; this is called right view.

9.8

Next, from 'he then makes this statement' onwards, based on seeing he establishes a vow: 'I would rather embrace this blazing mass of fire than ever hold wrong views; whether existence or non-existence, up to neither existence nor non-existence, I will also not teach falsely; regarding the twelvefold scriptures, the Buddha, the Saṃgha, and the Three Jewels, even embracing fire to burn my body I vow never to hold wrong views, and having my tongue cut with a sharp blade I vow never to speak falsely. If I hear others speak [so], I will also not believe or accept it,' making clear that his own right view is not shaken by the erroneous. 'Toward those who speak this, he also gives rise to pity,' making clear that his own vow is not submerged by wrong practices. If a monk's right view and right speech are like this, how much more so those of the Buddhas!

9.9

Third, from 'one should be thus' onwards, like contemplating the mass of fire to break the fixed attachment to the view of self, it concludes the rectification of oneself. Formerly there was a question: 'You unfold nirvāṇa into four marks, taking rectifying oneself and rectifying others as two marks. One should also unfold the one jewel into the three jewels, and self-awakening and awakening others should be two jewels. If the jewel is not unfolded into two, how could rectifying oneself and rectifying others be two marks?' Master Guān answered: 'The gateways of teaching are not the same; how could they all be made analogous? They are spoken differently according to conditions.' Now if we make an analogy of it: self-awakening and awakening others together concern the Buddha's wisdom and are only one jewel; rectifying oneself and rectifying others are considered in terms of the marks of self and other, and since the mark of other is not self, they cannot be one; as for self-awakening and awakening others, the wisdom is solely the Buddha's wisdom, so they cannot be two (and so forth).

9.10

Regarding rectifying others, the text has four parts: first, rectifying others through joy; second, rectifying others through non-self; third, rectifying others through permanence and bliss; fourth, rectifying others through the supreme truth. In the first passage, knowing, he deliberately asks. Causing you joy—is this not the mundane [siddhānta]? Subduing the worthy and noble with impermanence and non-self to make them generate roots of goodness—is this not the individual [siddhānta]? Supramundane permanence and bliss refuting worldly impermanence—is this not the therapeutic [siddhānta]? Entrusting the treasure to a good son when wishing to travel afar is the supreme truth [siddhānta]. Tracing the text to harmonize the meaning, the principle is exceedingly clear. In nursing an infant with milk, one may only let it taste butter; soft and hard food are both inadmissible. Rectifying others is also like this: from subtle to prominent, one rectifies them gradually. A woman being able to give birth exemplifies friendliness as the root of goodness. The infant exemplifies initial faith. Nursing with milk at birth exemplifies hearing the Dharma to nourish oneself. Tasting butter exemplifies praise and joy. Indulgent praise and beauty further worsen into sickness, hence it says, 'Giving the child too much butter, will it not shorten its life?' One must not give even too much butter, let alone hard or soft food! If joyful indulgence obstructs the Path, how much more so generating goodness and applying remedies; therefore one must deliberate. Tasting butter exemplifies the mundane [siddhānta], hence the text says, 'The Tathāgata speaks truly to make me joyful.' Furthermore, the woman's mind is suspicious that having too much butter prevents listening to the Dharma, so the Buddha explains it to enable her to focus her mind; this is the mark of rectifying others. Furthermore, when the infant is slightly older, milk is moderated and food is given; this exemplifies urging progress to generate various merits, which is the individual [siddhānta], the text saying, 'He also speaks of impermanence, suffering, emptiness, and non-self.' Furthermore, when the child grows older and can walk on his own, even hard food is digested, how much more so soft milk; this exemplifies merits becoming somewhat prominent, capable of enduring cutting, polishing, censure, and remedy, hence the text says, 'The supramundane three tastes break the worldly three tastes.' Furthermore, when the child is grown, entrusted with the estate and shown the treasure, this exemplifies generating goodness and breaking evil being complete, returning to the source and joining the ultimate to enter the supreme truth, hence the text says, 'One should entrust the treasure house to a good son.' Inferring from this sūtra text, one must apply the four siddhāntas. Regarding rectifying others through joy, the text has five parts: first, the woman's silent thought; second, the Tathāgata's deliberate inquiry; third, the woman praising the Buddha; fourth, asking whether the Dharma is little or much; fifth, concluding her joy. There are four traditional explanations. One says: while he was directly expounding the Dharma, this woman came. A second says: this is not so; the Buddha was already eighty years old at that time and addressed the woman as 'sister'; how could an elderly sister nurse an infant? It must cite a past event. A third says: the Buddha manifested as a woman, just like manifesting as a youth. A fourth says: there was no such woman at all; it is a hypothetical allegory. From 'the World-Honoured One is thus' onwards is rectifying others by generating goodness. Traditionally, these words were used to match the analogy above. It is also said that the woman addressed the Buddha as the World-Honoured One, or said that the Buddha called himself the World-Honoured One. Now, taking this text to conclude what preceded and introduce what follows: whether digested or not concludes what preceded; speaking of impermanence and so forth introduces what follows. The text has three parts: first, concluding the preceding joy; second, from 'also speaks' downwards is directly generating goodness; third, from 'if the Buddha' downwards examines those incapable of bearing the remedy (and so forth). From 'again told the woman' onwards is rectifying others through the therapeutic [siddhānta]; the text has two parts: first, restating incapability; second, explaining the remedy, using the supramundane three tastes to counter and break the worldly three tastes. Salty, sour, and bitter are the retributive tastes of ordinary beings; impermanence, suffering, and non-self are the tastes of the path of the worthy and noble; ordinary and noble together are called the worldly three tastes. Sweet, pungent, and bland are also the retributive tastes of ordinary beings; permanence, bliss, and self are the tastes of the supramundane path; together they are called the supramundane three tastes. This has a distinct meaning (and so forth). From 'again told the woman' onwards is rectifying others through the supreme truth; the text has two parts: first, taking the three siddhāntas as the bad son to whom the treasure house is not entrusted; later, the supreme truth is called the good son to whom the treasure house is immediately entrusted. Because it is not entrusted to śrāvakas, the ultimate truth is not taken as the supreme truth. Furthermore, taking śrāvakas as generating goodness, since it is not exclusively Mahāyāna, this is small and great shared in common to constitute the four siddhāntas. 'One should know that this family then has a Buddha': 'Buddha' has the meaning of permanence and also the meaning of awakening; awakening is the meaning of understanding. This person understands permanence, therefore his family has a Buddha.

9.11

The third is 'being able to respond appropriately according to questions'. The text has two parts: first, correctly explaining the ability to answer questions; second, proclaiming the prohibition of eating meat. In the first passage, the Buddha raised open-ended questions, which require open-ended answers. He only took the single case of giving as an initial example, and other cases should be analogized accordingly. If not giving is called giving, then not keeping the precepts should be called śīla, up to not having wisdom being called prajñā, and so forth. There are five phrases in the reply, which are analogously given two explanations. First: at first, one did not know that the other person does not eat fish or meat, and gave fish or meat as an offering; since the other person did not accept it, there was no loss to oneself, and yet it constituted a great giving. Second: having previously known that the other does not eat it, one offered it to highlight their virtue; this caused no loss to oneself and established fame for the other. Furthermore, seeing someone perform merit, rejoicing in it without obstruction is also great giving. Furthermore, seeing someone suffering and using expedient means to release them, without losing a single hair, is called great giving. From 'Kāśyapa addressed the Buddha' onward, the second part establishes the regulation prohibiting meat, which consists of six rounds of questions and answers. In the first round, the prohibition of meat is proclaimed. A master used ten meanings to explain why meat should be prohibited: First, all possess buddhadhātu and all should become buddhas. Second, the transformations of the buddhas and bodhisattvas are without fixed limits. Third, beings transmigrate as one's relatives. Fourth, they share the same four great elements and five aggregates. Fifth, semen and blood are impure. Sixth, one cannot bear it when reflecting on oneself, so why should one consume others? Seventh, originally having no enmity, one arbitrarily inflicts cruel harm. Eighth, it violates the bodhisattva's path of converting beings. Ninth, one eats little but accumulates much sin; if one does not abstain from meat, one hopes to share in [the sins of] the ten directions. Tenth, the retaliations of enmity are endless: if one kills one life, one pays for five hundred lives; therefore, it should not be eaten. Regarding 'like eating the flesh of one's own child': parent and child share the same body and natural affection; shedding tears, one swallows it without any attachment to its taste. One explanation says there was a past event: in the past, a king was on the road and, starving, ate his son's flesh to cross a perilous path. A second says the son gave up his own flesh to make an offering to his parents. A third says it is an analogy: 'just like eating the flesh of one's child'. A fourth says not only when eating meat does one think of it as a child's flesh, but whenever receiving offerings, including fruits and vegetables, all are the life-shares of others, so one contemplates them like a child's flesh, and so forth. In the second round, it is said that it cuts off the seed of great friendliness. There are three interpretations: first, the Buddha is great friendliness; second, the first bhūmi is great friendliness; third, the nature-stage is great friendliness. Great friendliness must depend on small friendliness as its seed; if one eats meat, one lacks small friendliness, hence it is said to cut off the seed. Another says that sentient beings themselves are the seed of great friendliness, definitely destined to become buddhas; the Avataṃsaka names sentient beings as 'children of the Buddha'; eating them is thus cutting off the seed of buddhahood. In the third round, the three kinds of pure meat are mentioned, which are not seeing, not hearing, and not suspecting. There are two interpretations: first, not seeing it being killed for oneself, and not hearing or suspecting are also like this. Second, if one does not see and does not hear, so long as it is an act of killing, it does not matter whether it was for oneself or not; but for not suspecting, it must specify 'for oneself'. In the fourth round, explaining the ten kinds of impure meat: the 'Brahmacaryā' chapter below lists human, snake, elephant, horse, pig, dog, chicken, fox, lion, and monkey. The monkey resembles a human; the snake resembles a dragon; the elephant and horse are treasures that aid the state; the pig, dog, and fox are vile beasts; the lion is the king of beasts; and human is one's own kind. The nine kinds of pure [meat] mean that seeing, hearing, and suspecting each have preliminary expedient means, subsequent expedient means, and the root [act], and so forth. The fifth round explains delicious food: if one follows another's words, it is delicious food; if one follows one's own mind, one does not speak of it as delicious. The sixth round says: the five bovine flavors, up to gold and silver vessels, none of them should be accepted.

9.12

The Buddha's reply has eight parts: First, he rebukes that one should not be like the naked Nirgranthas who starve themselves or gorge voraciously, which are either excessive or deficient; herein one should exercise discretion oneself. Regarding precious objects: since they arouse strong greed, they should not even be kept. Regarding the five flavors: since they do not constitute one's primary physical identity, one is permitted to accept them. How could it be like the Nirgranthas who prohibit them unconditionally? Second, he clarifies that one must understand the Tathāgata's intention in opening three and barring ten; how could it be identical to the views of those non-Buddhists? Because sentient beings cannot abstain abruptly, he first prohibited three kinds because they differed in character from what is outside the three kinds; next he prohibited ten kinds, and then what is outside the ten kinds; because one cuts off greedy thoughts, all are completely prohibited. Third, abruptly regulating that all disciples must completely abstain from all meat contrasts past [teachings] to proclaim the present one; whereas in the bodhisattva precepts the minor infractions had long been regulated, though appearing to eat meat to save sentient beings, [bodhisattvas] actually do not eat it. Fourth, he clarifies that eating meat leads to long-lasting resentment and enmity, so the path of converting [beings] cannot proceed and one becomes estranged from sentient beings, and so forth. Fifth, he clarifies that clinging to the Hīnayāna practice of eating meat, slandering the Mahāyāna abrupt prohibition, stirs up evil disputes. Sixth, he clarifies that eating meat gives rise to many evil deeds. Seventh, he makes exceptions for years of famine and soiled vessels. Eighth, the conclusion of the prohibition—all as stated in the text.

9.13

How to skillfully understand the meaning of causes and conditions is the fourth characteristic. Speaking generally, all sūtras and treatises whatsoever are teachings of nominal causes and conditions. Speaking specifically, the concrete phenomena of the Tripiṭaka are the teachings of causes and conditions. Here, the text specifically points to the Vinaya because when one wishes to institute a precept, one must first have the originating conditions, next clarify the essence of the precept, and afterward elaborate its characteristics; hence it is called 'causes and conditions'. The other two baskets have few [such accounts] and are not as extensive as this, so they are not specifically pointed to. In the text, there are two rounds of questions and answers. First, four hypothetical questions are posed: first, asking why it was not taught abruptly; second, asking about 'falling' (pātayantikā); third, asking about the Vinaya; fourth, asking about the mokṣa. The first one is general, and the latter three are specific. Why did the Tathāgata not abruptly teach the five sections and seven groups of precepts for disciples to practice, but waited until they committed a transgression before beginning to institute them? 'Prasenajit' is translated here as 'Harmonious Joy'. The king was very benevolent; when he was not drunk, he always harbored loving thoughts, but when he drank wine, those who should have died he judged should live, and so forth. When the Buddha was in his country and wished to institute the precept against theft, he asked the king: 'According to the law of the state, what amount of theft constitutes a grave crime?' The king replied, 'Five coins.' The Buddha relied on the state's law, and when instituting things based on circumstances, he often asked the king. Here, noting the ruler of the country has this intention. Regarding 'profound and wondrous meaning': why not abruptly teach the precepts of the sections and groups? Precepts are the Mahāyāna permanence, bliss, self, and purity, hence they are called profound and wondrous. The second asks about 'falling' without asking about precepts and Vinaya, but the reciters' meaning can encompass both. Mokṣa means liberation, and Vinaya means cessation; cessation simply encompasses liberation. In asking about mokṣa, Vinaya is also encompassed. The Vinaya has two meanings: first, weighing lightness and gravity; second, barring and prohibiting. Here, taking the side of barring and prohibiting, the meaning of precepts is also encompassed; precepts are barring and stopping, subsumed under the Vinaya. For the reciters, committing it to text is the Vinaya, and reciting it from memory by mouth is the recitation; they are one entity having two names. The Buddha answered the four questions, answering mokṣa once more, which older commentators took as five questions, and so forth. In the answers, they are not in sequence: first answering mokṣa, next answering falling, thirdly re-answering mokṣa, fourth answering Vinaya, and fifth answering the general question. First, answering mokṣa: contentment and pure livelihood are its meaning. Next, answering falling: falling applies generally to light and heavy; if one violates the five sections, one falls into the four destinies, so the meaning of falling is general. Furthermore, falling applies specifically to committing grave offenses, and so forth. Again, falling means 'causing to grow', which applies specifically to light offenses. Light offenses cause falling into two destinies, while grave offenses lead to hell. From 'Prātimokṣa' onward, thirdly, he re-answers mokṣa. From 'The Vinaya' onward, fourth, he answers Vinaya. The first phrase directly accords with entering the Tripiṭaka: entering precepts and deportment is the Vinaya piṭaka; profound sūtras are the Sūtra piṭaka; good meanings are the Abhidharma piṭaka. The Daśabhāṇavāra has only ninety [offenses of falling]. The Mahīśāsaka has ninety-two: first, not being permitted to go teach the Dharma to a nun who is not sick; second, diverting saṃgha property to oneself. Here saying ninety-one is again the difference between the broad and abridged versions of the doctrinal teachings. Fifth, from 'Or again, there is someone who breaks all precepts' onward answers the general question of why it was not taught abruptly. Why could the five sections not be instituted abruptly? It was feared people would break them in secret. If the five had been instituted abruptly, it was feared people would not dare to uphold them. Therefore, he proceeded gradually from light to heavy. 'Complete' means being complete in all evils. 'Exhausting all marks' means all goods. 'Having no causes and conditions' means no longer having the causes and conditions of the Buddhadharma, and also means denying causes and conditions.

9.14

From 'At that time there was a good son' onward is the second round of hypothetical questions asking why the Tathāgata did not teach beforehand. The text has two parts: first asking why he did not teach beforehand; next asking whether he intended to let them fall into ruin, which can be seen in the text. The Buddha's reply has two parts: first answering the criticism about falling into ruin; afterward answering the intention behind not speaking beforehand. Within this, there is an analogy and an application. In the initial analogy, the analogy of a wheel-turning king is made, which also has three meanings: first, speaking of the ten virtues illustrates the abrupt teaching; next, those who practice evil gradually abandoning it illustrates the gradual teaching; third, practicing the dharma of a sage king, namely renouncing the throne and going forth from the household, illustrates converging the gradual back to the abrupt. The application text is also like this. Within it are two parts: first, the direct application; next, bringing up the wheel-treasure to clarify the intention of opening and converging. Although there was an initial teaching, it applies to the abrupt meaning. Because it must depend on the bhikṣus, it applies to the gradual meaning; only then seeing the Tathāgata's Dharmakāya applies to the meaning of converging into the abrupt. Next, bringing up the wheel-treasure to illustrate that the Three Jewels are inconceivable clarifies that the Tathāgata's abrupt and gradual, opening and converging, whether speaking beforehand or not speaking, cannot be calculated or measured by sentient beings, and therefore are inconceivable.

9.15

From 'Furthermore, self-rectification' onward is the second section, clarifying that the four characteristics are one characteristic. Previously, to distinguish and display the Mahāparinirvāṇa, the one characteristic and the four characteristics were clarified. Now, clarifying that each single characteristic is mutually identical, and that the great nirvāṇa and so forth have no differences, he clarifies that the four characteristics are one characteristic. If they were definitively one or four, how could they be one and four? Therefore we know that being neither one nor four, one can speak of one and four. Others cite the Three Jewels of different substances and of one substance as an analogy. Now I clarify that this is not so: the Three Jewels of different substances belongs to the Hīnayāna and is not of this category. 'One being four and four being one' are both the intention of the Mahāyāna; the single-substance Three Jewels and the Three Jewels as a single substance can be analogized to it. It is also like the text above, where nirvāṇa is the general designation, and the three virtues are the specific designations, and so forth. In the text there are two parts: first, directly clarifying the four as one; afterward, cross-examining to resolve doubts. First, directly clarifying: realization is named self-rectification. Permanence destroying impermanence is rectifying others. Elaborating in response to questions is answering questions. Distinguishing the three dots constitutes causes and conditions. The names differ but the substance is the same, not being separate dharmas; hence it is one characteristic. The text above took the Dharmakāya as specific and nirvāṇa as general; now it takes nirvāṇa as specific and the secret treasury as general, and therefore it is different. However, when revealed it is named Dharmakāya, and when hidden it is named treasury; sometimes it is general, sometimes specific. Since liberation and prajñā are equal and without difference, by analogy it should also be like this. Next, in the cross-examination, there are doubts and interrogations, answers and resolutions, which can be examined. Question: Are the four characteristics and one characteristic the four siddhāntas? Answer: In principle it should apply, and observing the textual features, it can also be analogized accordingly. The Mahāparinirvāṇa is the paramārtha; speaking of permanence for the śrāvakas is antidotal; elaborating in response to questions is individual; and being completed by the three dots is worldly, and so forth.

9.16

From 'The Buddha addressed Kāśyapa' onward is the second part, the critical analysis. If nirvāṇa is identical to the four characteristics and equal without difference, why critically analyze nirvāṇa and not critically analyze the four characteristics? The names of the four characteristics differ from the past, while the name 'nirvāṇa' is the same as before. In the past, extinguishing causal fetters without environment or sentient beings was called nirvāṇa, so having extinguished the afflictions, there was no separate nirvāṇa; the present nirvāṇa, having extinguished the afflictions, possesses eternal dharmas. The past nirvāṇa extinguished all existences; the present nirvāṇa possesses wondrous existence. The past nirvāṇa had no environmental recompense; the present nirvāṇa possesses a Dharma that is revered as teacher. The past nirvāṇa had no sentient recompense; the present nirvāṇa possesses the Tathāgata. Without critical analysis, there would be no way to draw out the difference. The text has four parts: first, the Buddha's critical analysis; second, Kāśyapa's debate; third, his understanding; fourth, the confirmation.

9.17

First, the Buddha's analytical discrimination has two parts: first, five hypothetical objections are raised: 1. explaining the extinction of afflictions, 2. explaining the extinction of existence, 3. explaining the extinction of the environmental [reward], 4. explaining the extinction of the sentient-being [reward], and 5. comprehensively explaining the extinction of existence. All of these cite the past teachings and are entirely based on the Buddha's intention; they can be examined. Next, from "If someone raises such an objection" onward is the Buddha providing the response. This has three parts: first, a rebuke; next, the answer; third, concluding the differences. The initial rebuke contains both general and specific aspects. The general rebuke is that [the objections] are heterodox; because one objects to the perfect with the biased, it is called a heterodox objection. Next, from "Kāśyapa" below is the specific rebuke. That Kāśyapa should not [do so] means that one should not conflate it with impermanence merely because the names are identical; hence it says that one should not conceptualize in this way.

9.18

Next, the answer has three parts: first, answering the two questions on the extinction of afflictions and the extinction of the environmental [reward]. The text says "one who extinguishes afflictions"; "one who" refers to the agent. Since there are no afflictions, the environmental reward of the agent has no owner, and therefore it is not called a thing. If relying on the past meaning, pointing to this absence of things was considered nirvāṇa; if relying on the present meaning, it is merely that which is relinquished. From "For what reason?" downward, it clarifies that what is attained is ultimately pure, tranquility is bliss, and being unsurpassed is self and permanence, as in the text. The present nirvāṇa's relinquished and attained differ from the past. Next, from "completely extinguish all marks" onward answers the two questions on the extinction of existence and the extinction of the sentient-being [reward]. Marks are existence, which includes the sentient-being reward. If relying on the past meaning, extinguishing existence and extinguishing the fruition is itself nirvāṇa; if relying on the present meaning, it is merely that which is relinquished. From "without remainder" onward clarifies what is attained: having no remainder is bliss, being pure and white is purity, being permanent and abiding is permanence, and non-retrogression is self (and so forth). Third, from "the phrase 'a shooting star'" answers the fifth comprehensive question. The shooting star is the extinction of afflictions, which is nirvāṇa with remainder; having dispersed, it is soon extinguished and no longer in the five destinies, which is nirvāṇa without remainder. If relying on the past meaning, this was called nirvāṇa; if relying on the present meaning, it is merely that which is relinquished. All are permanently abiding and without alteration; this is what is attained, which differs from the past. Third, from "Furthermore, Kāśyapa" onward concludes and establishes their differences. In past nirvāṇa, there was no person of sentient-being reward; in present nirvāṇa, there are the buddhas. In past nirvāṇa, there was no environmental reward; in present nirvāṇa, there is the Dharma as teacher. In past nirvāṇa, there were no realms of existence; in present nirvāṇa, there is wonderful existence, namely veneration. In past nirvāṇa, having extinguished afflictions, there was no further dharma; in present nirvāṇa, there are permanently abiding dharmas. Because the Dharma is permanent, the buddhas are also permanent; this is still a brief statement; if stated fully, because the Dharma is bliss, self, and purity, the Buddha is likewise also thus (and so forth).

9.19

Next, from "Kāśyapa spoke again to the Buddha" onward is the debate. There are two rounds of questions and answers. In the first round, first comes the question, followed by the answer. In the first question, the text has two parts: it resembles raising three objections, and it resembles being based on afflictions, karma, and existence. First, stating that when the fire of afflictions is extinguished, the Tathāgata is also extinguished means: because of afflictions, there is a person; since afflictions are extinguished, how can there be a person, such that one says the Tathāgata is constantly abiding and unchanging? Next, the meaning states that when the red heat of glowing iron is quenched, none knows where it goes; indeed, it is propelled by karma, and when karma is extinguished, it cannot go anywhere—how can one speak of permanence, bliss, self, and purity? The text below says: "When the heat and redness of iron are extinguished, they no longer exist." Indeed, it is due to delusion and karma that there can be existence; when afflictions and karma are extinguished, how could there be wonderful existence? Next, the Buddha answers by saying that the iron is the ordinary person, whereas the Tathāgata is not so. Here we clarify two meanings of the ordinary person: non-Buddhists using mundane wisdom sever delusion but are born again, which is the ordinary person's impermanence. The [followers of the] two vehicles, having severed common delusions, give rise again to distinct delusions, which is also the ordinary person's impermanence. The Tathāgata is not so, not being identical to the two extremes; therefore he is called permanent (and so forth). From "Kāśyapa spoke again" onward is the second question and answer. This question traces back to the previous two ideas; first the question, then the answer. The meaning in the first question is: ordinary persons extinguish delusions yet are born again, and so are impermanent; since the Tathāgata is extinguished, he should also be born again and still be impermanent. Next, the Buddha's answer has two parts: first, censuring the error; second, turning the analogy. First, he censures that it should not be so. Why? The Buddha is not of the two types of ordinary persons; having long exhausted both common and distinct [delusions], how could he give rise to afflictions? Therefore, he says it should not be. Next, he answers by turning the analogy. The substance of an ordinary person is hot, like iron that is hard to melt; the Buddha's wisdom is fierce and blazing, like fire burning wood, which leaves ashes after it is extinguished—after afflictions are extinguished, there is nirvāṇa. When tearing clothes, beheading, or breaking a vase, the thing ceases before and the name arises after; after afflictions are extinguished, one attains nirvāṇa, which is not like your question.

9.20

Third, from "Kāśyapa" below is the understanding and acceptance, as in the text.

9.21

Fourth, regarding the endorsement: the inner palace is the realm of reigning and converting, allegorizing Jambudvīpa. The rear garden is the place of enjoyment and delight, allegorizing permanence, bliss, self, and purity (and so forth).

9.22

From "Kāśyapa asked again: 'I have already crossed over...'" onward is the second [section], broadly revealing the secret of the body. The varied forms of the six destinies serve as veils; all are performed by the holy one, and other people cannot do so. Now all are opened and revealed as the secret of the dharmakāya. Previously, prajñā was opened into the four marks, and the four marks were unified into nirvāṇa. Nirvāṇa is itself the dharmakāya and liberation; this completed one cycle of opening the secret of speech. Now, the dharmakāya is further opened to manifest diverse bodies, and the diverse bodies are unified as simply nirvāṇa, prajñā, and liberation. Others say that one thing conceals while another thing reveals, that one thing is displayed while another thing is hidden, and therefore each is separately opened and separately displayed, never related to each other. How could the principle be so? It is merely concealing within opening, merely opening within concealing. Masters of the *Satyasiddhi* say: this is provisional skillfulness, incomprehensible to the ordinary person. We now clarify: if this is not understood, what else could be understood? Masters of the *Daśabhūmika* say: this is the function of the dharmadhātu. We now clarify: how could there be a function apart from essence? Others clarify that the mutual containment of the vast and the minute is the magical art of the sage; we now clarify: what magical art is not dependent origination? Dependent origination is identical to emptiness, identical to the provisional, and identical to the middle; only those who should be saved are able to see it—how is it not dependent origination? Wonderful wisdom of dependent origination can contain the immeasurable within a single dust mote, and contain a single dust mote within the immeasurable; it can extend or contract past and present, pull and cast here and there, sovereign and unobstructed. Zhuang Zhou penetrated the essence and transformed into a butterfly; he also recognized his own dream traveling to the ends of heaven. If even muddled stupor can be like this, how much more so for one of ultimate virtue!

9.23

The text has two parts: first, opening the secret of the body; next, the debate. Opening the secret has two parts: 1. the question, 2. the answer. The question has four parts: 1. grasping the import, 2. raising the actual objection, 3. concluding the question, 4. requesting the answer. The first is as in the text. Second, regarding the objection: 'Yaśo[dharā]' here means 'Renowned'; 'Rāhula' here means 'Born in the Palace' (and so forth). The third and fourth are as in the text. The answer has three parts: first, a general negation; next, an admonition to listen; third, the proper answer. The first is as in the text. Next, from "This great nirvāṇa" below is the admonition to listen. From "If there is a bodhisattva" onward is the proper answer. The proper answer also has two parts: first, generally citing bodhisattvas dwelling in the great nirvāṇa, which has eight restatements; afterward, specifically citing Śākyamuni. The first text also has two parts: the first seven restatements provide the proper explanation; the final one provides the general conclusion. Within the first, the ancient explanations of bodhisattvas dwelling in the great nirvāṇa were threefold. One said: this is the Buddha, who in response acts as a bodhisattva, manifesting as a causal person to be capable of dwelling in the fruition; therefore it says 'dwelling in the great nirvāṇa'. The second said: not so; if this were the Buddha, it would still be the Buddha in nirvāṇa, so why say a bodhisattva dwells in nirvāṇa? Regarding 'dwelling', there are two kinds: 1. dwelling in faith, 2. dwelling in reality. Since he is a causal person, it is merely dwelling in faith. Someone objected to these two explanations: if he is the Buddha responding as a bodhisattva, this is still the Buddha dwelling in nirvāṇa and has nothing to do with a bodhisattva; if it is dwelling in faith, how could he perform such great deeds? Indeed, the essence of nirvāṇa transcends cause and fruition; although it is neither cause nor fruition, it can be both cause and fruition. If one views nirvāṇa from the perspective of a causal person, one says nirvāṇa is the cause because the causal person dwells in it; if one views nirvāṇa from the perspective of a fruition person, one says nirvāṇa is the fruition because the fruition person dwells in it. This is just as true nature is neither cause nor fruition, yet is fruition and cause (and so forth). We now clarify that the bodhisattva of the perfect teaching, from his initial arousal of the aspiration, constantly contemplates nirvāṇa and practices the path; therefore the text above says: "All sentient beings peacefully dwell within the secret treasury." Why should a bodhisattva of the perfect teaching be unable to dwell in the great nirvāṇa? The reason a bodhisattva is elucidated is to cite the cause to make manifest the fruition. If the cause is already like this, how much more so the fruition! This meaning is naturally established. Why say the Buddha responds as a bodhisattva, and why say that a bodhisattva cannot produce all these transformations? The text below says: "A bodhisattva dwelling in the great nirvāṇa cultivates diverse practices." Why would he be unable to dwell in the great nirvāṇa and its diverse supernatural transformations? Therefore, we do not adopt those explanations. These seven restatements all proceed from the lesser to the greater: first directly raising one Sumeru entering a mustard seed, up to the ten directions entering a dust mote; looking at them successively, they increasingly reveal the wonder of the inconceivable. Next, the general conclusion can be understood. From "Good son, I have long dwelt..." onward, Śākyamuni is specifically cited next. The text has three parts: 1. briefly explaining the method of the teaching path, 2. broadly discerning the places of skillful means, 3. general conclusion. The first is as in the text. Next, from "In this three-thousand[fold world]" onward broadly discerns the places of skillful means. This also has three parts: first, generally explaining the dispensing of transformation in the three-thousandfold world; second, specifically explaining the dispensing of transformation in Jambudvīpa; third, generally concluding all the skillful means. Specifically regarding Jambudvīpa, it also has four parts: 1. the responsive manifestation in this life, 2. explaining other lives, 3. re-explaining this life, 4. re-discerning other lives (and so forth). First, within this life, regarding 'Māyā': the *Bhadrakalpika Sūtra* translates it as 'Extremely Wonderful', the *Ruìyìng* translates it as 'Wonderful', and it is also translated as 'Mother of Great Wisdom'. Regarding taking seven steps in each of the ten directions: Héxī states: when an elephant king is newly born, he takes seven steps; the Tathāgata manifests taking steps identical to an elephant king. Yěchéng states: to manifest transcending the six destinies, he took seven steps. The *Dàshànquán Jīng* says: "Taking seven steps in each direction corresponds to the seven factors of awakening, awakening those not yet awakened." Regarding the statement about being the supreme field of merit in the southern direction: Héxī states: in the Sanskrit text, the south is the right; the right is the convenient hand, clarifying that the Buddha-Dharma takes pure precepts as convenient, hence it is the supreme field of merit. Kāishàn states: the south is the yang direction, able to give birth to all things; hence it is called the field of merit. Regarding manifesting seven steps in the west: Héxī states: the west is the rear, hence it says that with births exhausted, this is the final body. Kāishàn states: the west is the autumn direction, meaning the land of death. Regarding the north: Héxī states: the Sanskrit text says 'supreme/conquering', hence it says already having crossed over birth and death. The east is the foremost of all directions, taking growth as its meaning. From "In Jambudvīpa I manifest leaving home" onward is the second part, discerning other lives. If following the manifestation of leaving home in one direction, one attains buddhahood in this very life; now it mentions the four fruitions, so it refers to other lives. Furthermore, it is probably because the impressions and perceptions of sentient beings differ; if taking it as this life, this matter also exists, as people of the two vehicles all say the Tathāgata is an arhat. The *Treatise* states: "In the śrāvaka Dharma, the stage of an arhat is called the stage of a buddha (and so forth)." From "In order to liberate..." onward is the third part, re-discerning the matter of attaining buddhahood in this life. Śuddhodana is also written as Yuètóután, translated here as Pure and White, and also as Pure Rice (and so forth). Gautama: the *Samantapāsādikā* translates it as 'Extirpating Evil', and the *Āgama* says 'Pure and Virtuous'. From "I also manifested..." onward is the fourth part, re-discerning other lives (and so forth).

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大般涅槃經疏 — Classical Chinese