大般涅槃經疏 9.19

9.19

Next, from "Kāśyapa spoke again to the Buddha" onward is the debate. There are two rounds of questions and answers. In the first round, first comes the question, followed by the answer. In the first question, the text has two parts: it resembles raising three objections, and it resembles being based on afflictions, karma, and existence. First, stating that when the fire of afflictions is extinguished, the Tathāgata is also extinguished means: because of afflictions, there is a person; since afflictions are extinguished, how can there be a person, such that one says the Tathāgata is constantly abiding and unchanging? Next, the meaning states that when the red heat of glowing iron is quenched, none knows where it goes; indeed, it is propelled by karma, and when karma is extinguished, it cannot go anywhere—how can one speak of permanence, bliss, self, and purity? The text below says: "When the heat and redness of iron are extinguished, they no longer exist." Indeed, it is due to delusion and karma that there can be existence; when afflictions and karma are extinguished, how could there be wonderful existence? Next, the Buddha answers by saying that the iron is the ordinary person, whereas the Tathāgata is not so. Here we clarify two meanings of the ordinary person: non-Buddhists using mundane wisdom sever delusion but are born again, which is the ordinary person's impermanence. The [followers of the] two vehicles, having severed common delusions, give rise again to distinct delusions, which is also the ordinary person's impermanence. The Tathāgata is not so, not being identical to the two extremes; therefore he is called permanent (and so forth). From "Kāśyapa spoke again" onward is the second question and answer. This question traces back to the previous two ideas; first the question, then the answer. The meaning in the first question is: ordinary persons extinguish delusions yet are born again, and so are impermanent; since the Tathāgata is extinguished, he should also be born again and still be impermanent. Next, the Buddha's answer has two parts: first, censuring the error; second, turning the analogy. First, he censures that it should not be so. Why? The Buddha is not of the two types of ordinary persons; having long exhausted both common and distinct [delusions], how could he give rise to afflictions? Therefore, he says it should not be. Next, he answers by turning the analogy. The substance of an ordinary person is hot, like iron that is hard to melt; the Buddha's wisdom is fierce and blazing, like fire burning wood, which leaves ashes after it is extinguished—after afflictions are extinguished, there is nirvāṇa. When tearing clothes, beheading, or breaking a vase, the thing ceases before and the name arises after; after afflictions are extinguished, one attains nirvāṇa, which is not like your question.