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Source: pramana-mt · Machine translation by Gemini 3.8 Flash (2026-10-21) of in.bauddha.taisho.1768 · Machine output without human authorship: no copyright is claimed (CC0 1.0). The original text keeps its own…

1 — 258 parts

Text

Regarding this sūtra, there are two editions, southern and northern, differing in scope. The old northern edition has either thirty-three or thirty fascicles, and only thirteen chapters. The southern text has thirty-six fascicles and twenty-five chapters.

1.3

The text and meaning within them are vast and broad; how could they be described in full? Therefore the sūtra says: "After one or two Ganges [sands of aeons], one only begins to catch a faint glimpse of it; after three or four Ganges [sands of aeons], one is finally able to understand a fraction of its meaning." Emperor Wu of Liang said: "As for nirvāṇa, its principle surpasses the myriad goods; its reality transcends the hundred negations. Emptiness upon emptiness cannot plumb its true limit; mystery upon mystery cannot exhaust its subtle gateway. Unless one's virtue is equal to impartiality and one's mind accords with non-arising, how could the golden furnace and jade chamber be easily entered?"

1.4

The commentaries and notes I recorded in former times have been scattered and lost; among what I remember today, not one in ten remains. Taking occasion from these lectures, I shall briefly set down a commentary once again.

1.5

Regarding the Great Master of Sheshan, he lectured only on the Sanlun and the Mahāprajñā, never opening the Nirvāṇa Sūtra or the Lotus Sūtra. When various scholars requested a lecture on the Nirvāṇa Sūtra, the Great Master said: "You all understand prajñā now; why make me lecture again?" When they repeatedly requested it, he merely spoke for them the verse on "originally having, now lacking," and in the end did not lecture on the text. Only from the time of Xinghuang onward did this scripture begin to be widely propagated.

1.6

Yet at the beginning of opening this scripture, the circumstances were not single. Some clarified the meaning of "opening a path": just as when a state has obstacles within its territory or remote corners that have not submitted, in opening up frontiers and sending forth aid one must first fell [trees] and clear [the way], and only then can the army advance. Now it is also like this: because longstanding attachments from the past have blocked the correct path, one must demolish and wash them away, and only then can one lecture on the scripture. The meaning of opening a path has a separate outline, which will await another occasion. Furthermore, some clarify that the teachings of the two Buddhas, Rocana and Śākyamuni, are distinct and not the same; or they distinguish the ten pairs of opposites between cause and effect, person and dharma. All of these are set aside without discussion.

1.7

Now, at the beginning of this scripture, it is provisionally divided into six sections: first, the general meaning; second, the central tenet; third, explaining the title; fourth, distinguishing the essence; fifth, clarifying the function; sixth, critical analysis.

1.8

First, on explaining the general meaning of the scripture:

1.9

How could the meaning of this scripture ever be exhausted? For example, the five gateways of Hexi, the seven divisions of Posou, the eight sections of Xinghuang, the thirty questions of understanding by Kāśyapa, and the Tathāgata's sequential explanations amounting to thirty intentions of understanding. Now, if we directly present its crucial essentials and set forth its main guidelines, that will suffice.

1.10

The correct path is impartial and fundamentally pure; how could saṃsāra be different from nirvāṇa? It is solely due to the false delusions of sentient beings who cling to the letter and seek substantial reality: hearing the name, they still fail to see its truth. Some say nirvāṇa is existence, or they intend it to be nonexistence; some say it is subsumed by the two truths, or they intend it to transcend the two truths; some intend it to transcend the impermanence of saṃsāra, or they intend nirvāṇa to be permanent. Because of this, they mistakenly construct all kinds of divergent views, which then become fetters and bring about saṃsāra.

1.11

The past Buddhas and bodhisattvas, in order to guide these deluded sentiments, provisionally spoke of nirvāṇa, emptily and provisionally establishing names as skillful means for emerging [from defilement]. Names do not capture things, and things do not correspond to names. Since names and things are like this, the myriad dharmas are established. Therefore, saṃsāra and nirvāṇa fundamentally lack two characteristics; it is only to transform these false delusions—just like ferrying across empty space—that in reality no sentient beings attain extinction. Comprehending thus is called attaining nirvāṇa, yet in reality there is no nirvāṇa to be attained.

1.12

It is merely in terms of this delusion and awakening that one speaks of ordinary persons and noble ones, provisionally naming saṃsāra and forcibly calling it nirvāṇa, causing them to transform from ordinary persons into noble ones, and to abandon saṃsāra to attain nirvāṇa. Having awakened to this fact that fundamentally they are neither two nor one, if one forms a view of oneness or difference regarding ordinary persons and noble ones, saṃsāra and nirvāṇa, that obstructs the correct path and is called "clinging to words." Now, demolishing these views of oneness and difference is called "opening the path."

1.13

In terms of revealing and concealing through wisdom, what path is there to be opened? Formerly it was said that the Tathāgata's body is not an ordinary person but a noble one, and that the dharma of a noble one's nirvāṇa is permanent and not impermanent. Now, to counter this, it is clarified that the Tathāgata's body is neither ordinary nor noble—both ordinary and noble are the Tathāgata's skillful means—and nirvāṇa is neither permanent nor impermanent—both permanence and impermanence are skillful means of nirvāṇa.

1.14

What is the disease? Because the disease of permanence was severe, the medicine of impermanence was provided. Because sentient beings clung to existence as nirvāṇa, nonexistence was provided, holding that the complete exhaustion of body and mind is the ultimate subtlety; yet because beings' minds did not comprehend, they then said that the Buddha's body does not exist and nirvāṇa is total annihilation. Therefore the sūtra says: not long after, the king fell ill again and had to take the medicine of milk. Therefore the present teaching provides permanence to counter impermanence; thus on both sides diseases are removed, sequentially demolishing attachments. If the diseases of attachment are exhausted, whatever medicines remain are completely eliminated.

1.15

What, in the end, does the dharma of nirvāṇa have? Although it has nothing, there is nothing it does not have; although there is nothing it does not have, it has nothing. Since existence and nonexistence are like this, permanence and impermanence are also like this: it is neither permanent nor impermanent, yet permanence and impermanence are fully complete.

1.16

Here the Great Master clarified the doctrine of the four pairs and eight single items: first, ordinary person and noble one; second, permanence and impermanence; third, concealed and manifest; fourth, half and full.

1.17

Regarding "ordinary person and noble one": nirvāṇa in reality does not reveal ordinary person and noble one, but dwelling in the great nirvāṇa, one is able to establish great significance: at times acting as an ordinary person, and at times manifesting as a noble one.

1.18

Therefore, when the Buddha first appeared in the world, he conformed to the affairs of ordinary beings; yet although conforming to ordinary beings, he had a different understanding. Right after being born, he walked seven steps in each direction, saying: "In the heavens above and beneath the heavens, I alone am supreme." He also said: "My birth from the womb is exhausted; this is my final body. Having myself attained liberation, I shall again liberate sentient beings." These words already revealed that he was a noble one; yet after speaking these words, he became an infant again, and even engaged in riding horses, wrestling, and so forth, fully conforming to ordinary affairs. This, then, was concealing the noble one by means of the ordinary person. Today, as the teaching arises, it clarifies that he had long been a noble one and manifested these affairs through skillful means; this, then, is revealing the ordinary person by means of the noble one.

1.19

The meaning of revealing and concealing fully applies to both the past and the present. In the past, the ordinary was revealed and the noble was concealed; now, the noble is revealed and the ordinary is concealed. But in the past it was concealing in name, and now it is revealing in designation. Why is this? Initially, because the capacities of the conditioned beings were not yet adequate, one could not say he was a noble one, but could only say he was an ordinary person; thus the ordinary concealed the noble. Only now can it be stated: "I was originally a noble one," revealing the ordinary by means of the noble. Therefore, previously it was concealing, and now it is said to be revealing.

1.20

When people hear of this revealing and concealing, they form two distinct interpretations. Hearing of past concealment, they claim that there is separately a noble one who was concealed by the ordinary person; hearing of present revealing, they claim that an ordinary person is removed and a noble one separately emerges. Now it is clarified that this is not so: in the past, he was fundamentally a noble one; because the capacities of beings were not yet adequate, he could not be spoken of as a noble one, but could only be spoken of as an ordinary person. Hiding the noble path and being unable to speak of it is called "concealing"; how could there separately be a noble one to be concealed? Now it is merely said that the former ordinary person was in fact the noble one, which is designated "revealing"; how could there separately be an ordinary person to be removed and a noble one to be revealed?

1.21

Therefore the sūtra says: "Because of manifesting the Tathāgata's esoteric teaching of skillful means, formerly hiding and not speaking was esoteric; today manifestly speaking is revealing the esoteric."

1.22

Ordinary person and noble one being like this, permanence and impermanence are also like this. In the past, speaking of "impermanence" and hiding "permanence" was "concealing"; today, manifestly speaking of "permanence" is "revealing." Yet in the past, when speaking of "impermanence," one merely spoke of "permanence" as "impermanence," designating "impermanence" as concealing "permanence"; today, one merely says that what was formerly designated "impermanence" is "permanence," which is called "revealing." Furthermore, in the past it was called "concealing," and now it is again called "revealing." Why? In the past, speaking of "impermanence" was not done for the sake of "impermanence"; in the past, speaking of "impermanence" was for the sake of revealing. Today's "permanence," if lacking the past "impermanence," how could it reveal today's "permanence"? Thus the past "impermanence" serves as today's "permanence." Because it transforms through skillful means, the past "impermanence" can now be "revealing." This is an explanation from one perspective, not yet the finest revealing.

1.23

When it comes to the lower text clarifying permanence and impermanence in order to manifest neither permanence nor impermanence, and that permanence, impermanence, impermanence, and permanence are fully complete, this is "revealing the esoteric." Being thus fully complete in ordinary person, noble one, permanence, impermanence, revealing impermanence and permanence, permanence and impermanence, impermanence and permanence, is "revealing the esoteric." Such revealing and concealing of ordinary and noble, permanence and impermanence, are all the skillful means of great nirvāṇa. If their function were real, clarifying that the ordinary conceals the noble, the noble reveals the ordinary, and the revealing and concealing of permanence and impermanence would not be considered extraordinary, nor would it be a subtle function; it is simply because in ultimate reality they do not exist. In this way, having ordinary person, noble one, permanence, and impermanence, and yet being able within them to act as ordinary person and as noble one, being able to be permanent and impermanent, and engaging in revealing and concealing and such matters—this is precisely the inconceivable, subtle function of skillful means.

1.24

However, here there can be three ways of revealing and concealing: First, concealing the noble by means of the ordinary, and revealing the ordinary by means of the noble. Second, ordinary and noble being considered real conceals the skillful means of ordinary and noble in nirvāṇa; now, clarifying that the existence and nonexistence of ordinary and noble are both the subtle function of nirvāṇa is called revealing. Third, ordinary and noble concealing the skillful means of neither ordinary nor noble; only now can it be revealed that nirvāṇa is neither noble nor ordinary, and that ordinary and noble are fully complete, which is called revealing.

1.25

Ordinary and noble being like this, permanence and impermanence are also like this. But within ordinary and noble, there are further: ordinary beginning and ordinary end; noble beginning and noble end; ordinary end and noble beginning; noble beginning and ordinary end.

1.26

What are they? In the past, relying on the royal palace to be born was the ordinary beginning; attaining the path beneath the Bodhi tree was the ordinary end. Becoming a Buddha was the noble beginning; entering extinction in the twin śāla grove was the noble end. The noble beginning is simply the ordinary end, and the ordinary end is simply the noble beginning.

1.27

If revealing the ordinary end as the noble beginning, and the noble beginning being the ordinary end, is the case, can the noble end be the ordinary beginning, and the ordinary beginning be the noble end? The explanation says: If generally considered in terms of real ordinary beings and real noble ones, then it can be analogized. Why? If one merely gives rise to a single mind of apprehension regarding annihilation and permanence, and the correct contemplation of non-apprehension is thereby severed, then the ordinary beginning becomes the noble end. If the correct contemplation of non-apprehension does not contemplate, and the delusion of apprehension arises, then the noble end becomes the ordinary beginning. But here, regarding the Tathāgata's skillful means of ordinary and noble in a single period, it can only be that the ordinary end is the noble beginning, and the noble beginning is the ordinary end; it cannot be that the noble end is the ordinary beginning, and the ordinary beginning is the noble end.

1.28

If we discuss further: when the conditions here cease, he manifests birth in another region; then it is the noble end in this land and the ordinary beginning in another country.

1.29

Question: If the ordinary has a beginning and an end, and the noble also has a beginning and an end, does impermanence have a beginning and an end, and does permanence also have a beginning and an end or not? In the opposition between permanence and impermanence, impermanence has a beginning and an end, while permanence has no beginning and no end; likewise, in the opposition between ordinary and noble, the ordinary should have a beginning and an end, while the noble has no beginning and no end.

1.30

The explanation says: The Hīnayāna clarifies that both ordinary and noble are impermanent, and therefore both have a beginning and an end. In the Mahāyāna, ordinary and noble are of two kinds: first, as skillful means, then both ordinary and noble are impermanent. Second, in terms of the real meaning, then these do not exist; as for this ordinary and noble, they have no beginning and no end. The questioner asks: when impermanence conceals permanence, does it conceal false permanence, or does it not conceal correct permanence? If the past impermanence only concealed false permanence and did not conceal correct permanence, then the past teaching that he was ordinary only concealed false noble ones, and did not conceal the present correct noble one. In the past, it directly concealed today's noble one; likewise, the past impermanence directly concealed today's permanence.

1.31

Another objection: If the past impermanence concealed today's permanence, and did not conceal the past permanence, then the past impermanence removed today's permanence and did not remove the past permanence; yet in the past it was appropriate to prohibit milk, so the past comprehensively removed permanence. Furthermore, if impermanence concealed today's permanence, before today's permanence was spoken of, how could it conceal today's permanence? When impermanence was previously spoken of, today's permanence could conceal the past impermanence; but when the past impermanence was taught, today's permanence did not yet exist—how could one say the past impermanence concealed today's [permanence]?

1.32

The explanation for this has already been stated above: all Buddhas are fundamentally permanent; in the past, this was hidden and one could not speak of permanence, but only spoke of impermanence; therefore it is said that impermanence conceals permanence.

1.33

Now, this revealing and concealing is precisely the meaning of the tathāgatagarbha.

1.34

Why is it named "tathāgatagarbha"? Is it named "tathāgatagarbha" because sentient beings conceal the Tathāgata, or is it named "tathāgatagarbha" because the Tathāgata conceals himself? In fact, precisely herein the explanation is complete, for it possesses both meanings: first, the perversions in the nature of sentient beings obscure and conceal the nature of the Tathāgata, and therefore it is named "tathāgatagarbha"; second, sentient beings are incapable of hearing the nature of the Tathāgata, so it is concealed and not spoken, and thus it is also named "tathāgatagarbha".

1.35

Now the teaching reveals that all sentient beings possess Buddha-nature, and Buddha-nature has the sense of "self". When sentient beings rely on the great teaching of the Vaipulya scriptures and approach liberation, severing and eliminating perversions, then the tathāgatagarbha is revealed. When the treasury is revealed, it is named the dharmakāya. Revealing that sentient beings have Buddha-nature reveals that sentient beings are the root of Buddha-nature. Because sentient beings are Buddhas, they have Buddha-nature; if they were not Buddhas, they could not have Buddha-nature. Just as when a person's family name is Zhang, that young man possesses the surname Zhang, but if he were not a Zhang he could not possess the surname Zhang—Buddha-nature is also like this.

1.36

Therefore a treatise states: "That there is a Buddha inside the body of sentient beings is not esoteric; that there is one outside the body is also not esoteric; all four are not esoteric. That sentient beings are precisely the Buddha is the esoteric [teaching]."

1.37

At times this meaning is challenged: Why is having Buddha-nature not esoteric, while being precisely the Buddha is esoteric?

1.38

An explanation says: Having the sense of "possessing" is distant, while having the sense of "being" is intimate and esoteric. In resolving the difficulty of why sentient beings being precisely the Buddha is esoteric while having the nature is not esoteric: the meaning of sentient beings being Buddha-nature is profound, whereas sentient beings having Buddha-nature is not profound. The sūtra says: "Sentient beings have a Buddha-nature that is extremely profound." Since having the nature is profound, why would having Buddha-nature not be esoteric? One does not see a good explanation. (A supplementary explanation notes: The words "distant and intimate" do not speak of profound or not profound, just like two people. When two people are close to each other, one says they are intimate; one cannot say they are profound. If someone approaches, how could one speak of profundity and shallowness? This is just like that. Sentient beings being precisely the Buddha-nature is mutually intimate. If one discusses Buddha-nature alone, it is profound. When the sūtra says that sentient beings have a Buddha-nature that is extremely profound, this is stated with reference to the Buddha-nature. That sentient beings are precisely the Buddha is discussed with reference to sentient beings. Therefore, outside of sentient beings, there is no separate Buddha-nature. Thus, being precisely the Buddha-nature and not being distant from sentient beings is intimacy. Because this esoteric meaning is extremely profound, it is said that having Buddha-nature is extremely profound.)

1.39

Question: The Dilun tradition also has the meaning of concealing and revealing; how does it differ from the present [view]?

1.40

An explanation says: Although the words are the same, their intent is vastly different. In that tradition, there is an essence of the tathāgatagarbha which, being concealed by delusion, is called "concealed"; and when it appears again, this essence is called "revealed". Like the poor woman's treasure-store or the jar in a dark room, they take these parables for their meaning.

1.41

Now it is not so. These parables were used to refute the notion of [Buddha-nature] having a beginning, and therefore said it was originally possessed; how could one hold fast to this as definitive? Now it is clarified that it is merely because of delusion that it is called concealed and called a treasury; how could there still be a separate essence that could be concealed? It is merely because of awakening that it is called revealed, called the dharmakāya; there is no essence to be revealed. Being deluded, it is called concealed, yet when concealed there is nothing concealed; being awakened, it is called revealed, yet when revealed there is nothing revealed. It is merely through delusion regarding conditions that it is concealed, and through awakening to conditions that it is called revealed. Just as in the parable of the harp, without the conditions of the body, the bridge, and so forth, there is no sound, which is concealment, yet there is no separate sound that could be concealed within; if conditions are fully present, the sound then comes forth, yet there is no separate sound that could be revealed. The concealing and revealing of the tathāgatagarbha are also like this: not understanding conditions, it is concealed; revealing is also like this. Both concealment and revelation arise from conditions. Because conditions were not yet ready to hear it spoken in this way, it was concealed; now all have heard it, so it is not concealed. They merely arise from conditions—what further concealment or revelation could there be for the dharmakāya!

1.42

Fourth, next is the meaning of half and full [letters].

1.43

Others say: In the past, impermanence was the "half", and now permanence is the "full".

1.44

Here there are various differing assertions: some say that from the Prajñāpāramitā upwards through the Lotus Sūtra is the "half teaching" of impermanence, and only the eternal abiding of the Nirvāṇa Sūtra constitutes the "full" letter. This is questioned (and so forth).

1.45

Furthermore, when they clarify permanence and impermanence, they say: In terms of cutting-off clarification, the "impermanence" of saṃsāra does not connect to "permanence"; the "permanence" of nirvāṇa does not connect to "impermanence". Up to the vajra-like mind, impermanence does not connect to "permanence", and the fruit of buddhahood as permanence does not connect to "impermanence".

1.46

Thus, one handful is "impermanence" and one handful is "permanence". Since the handful of impermanence is "half", the handful of permanence is also "half". Now our tradition at times confronts this by drawing the impermanence of saṃsāra to the "permanence" of the fruit of buddhahood, and drawing the permanence of the fruit of buddhahood to the "impermanence" of saṃsāra, causing those two positions to connect with each other. The side of impermanence is also "full", and the side of permanence is also "full".

1.47

Our tradition says: The side of the half is full, and the side of the full is half. This is not the reciprocal phrasing of "half of three dǒu" and "three dǒu and a half"; nor is it like "the mountain is to the south" and "to the south of the mountain"—how could they be the same?

1.48

Now "full-half" and "half-full" also have different meanings. But there are intentions in this:

1.49

First, "full-half" is spoken in terms of complete and partial, while "half-full" is spoken in terms of accumulating to sufficiency.

1.50

"Full-half" being spoken in terms of complete and partial means: it clarifies that nirvāṇa is originally complete, but because conditions were not yet skillfully ready to hear the complete tenet, one side, "impermanence", was spoken and named the "half" letter. Therefore the sūtra asks: "How is understanding the meaning of the 'full' letter together with the 'half' letter also attaining the Way? How is understanding the meaning of the 'half' letter together with the 'full' letter? But now, grasping the intent, it clarifies that nirvāṇa is fully complete." Because for the sake of conditions it speaks of the "half", it is therefore called "full-half". That "half-full" is accumulating to sufficiency means: "impermanence" is "half", and "permanence" being added makes it "full". Permanence is also like this; therefore we definitively know that "half-full" was merely a playful remark of the Great Master.

1.51

Furthermore, "full-half" is spoken in terms of complete and partial, whereas, as before, "half-full" is spoken in terms of therapeutic remedy. How so? When you say "permanence" is "full", this is merely "full on the side of the half". Sometimes clarifying "permanence and impermanence" is called "full on the side of the half", while employing both "permanence and impermanence" is called "half on the side of the full".

1.52

Yet our tradition's explanation of "half-full" further clarifies the meaning progressively: First, impermanence is "half" and permanence is "half", while impermanence being "half" and permanence being "full"; second, permanence and impermanence are both "half", and that which pertains to permanence and impermanence, when its illness is completely washed away, is entirely called "full"; third, employing permanence and impermanence is "half", while the essence of neither permanence nor impermanence is "full". Because essence and function differ, only when this essence-function and function-essence are complete does it become "full".

1.53

Impermanence being "half" and permanence being "full" distinguishes the hierarchy of the two extremes. If neither permanence nor impermanence and permanence and impermanence are both complete, it distinguishes traversing both extremes simultaneously.

1.54

The Great Master clarified that impermanence further has four kinds: first, illness and medicine; second, revealing and concealing; third, half and full; fourth, the two extremes. How are these four propositions on impermanence not distinguished?

1.55

An explanation says: As for the impermanence of illness and medicine, one treats permanence with impermanence; once the illness of permanence is gone, the medicine of impermanence is also eliminated. Like the three cultivations, though permanence is gone, impermanence still remains, which therefore becomes a severe illness. This is why the text says the king is now severely ill. This must be purgated entirely.

1.56

The impermanence of revealing and concealing is as before: using impermanence to conceal permanence, and furthermore it is saying impermanence, where permanence does not eliminate impermanence.

1.57

The impermanence of half and full: previously impermanence was taught as half, but now impermanence is again clarified as full. Furthermore, previously impermanence was taught in an inexplicit manner, so it was half; now it clarifies impermanence explicitly: the impermanence of saṃsāra and the eternal abiding of the fruit of buddhahood, with both letters and meanings complete, constitutes full.

1.58

As for the impermanence of the two extremes: these two are always concomitant; how could one eliminate impermanence to clarify permanence? However, between the two extremes there are before and after, there are hierarchies, and there are meanings of being co-extensive and equal.

1.59

Second, clarifying the central tenet of the sūtra.

1.60

Since ancient times, clarifying the central tenet and the essence differentiated them: taking eternal abiding as the central tenet, and the text and words as the essence.

1.61

Now our tradition clarifies that the central tenet is precisely the essence; how could there be a separate central tenet distinct from the essence? The Great Master said: "Now in explaining this, it does not exist in this country. Where did you obtain this meaning?" He replied: "It was received from Guanhe, transmitted to Sheling; Sheling attained the correct intent of the Mahāyāna." Other masters all make partial deductions; not reading the sūtras and treatises thoroughly, they falsely cite superficial passages and lose the complete tenet.

1.62

For instance, hearing that Buddha-nature is named the emptiness of the ultimate truth, they offer various explanations: some say it is named after the cognitive object, while others say it is precisely the ultimate truth. They say: Buddha-nature is wisdom, and the emptiness of the ultimate truth is the cognitive object, but since wisdom is precisely the cognitive object, it is said that Buddha-nature is named the emptiness of the ultimate truth. Furthermore, they say: Buddha-nature is conventional truth, but since conventional is precisely ultimate, it is said that Buddha-nature is named the emptiness of the ultimate truth. Now we clarify that these statements are insufficient. Buddha-nature is named the emptiness of the ultimate truth; the wise see emptiness as well as non-emptiness—only this forms a complete proposition. Therefore, from the very outset, our position differs from that of others.

1.63

Others clarify that this sūtra takes permanence as its central tenet. Now, distinguishing permanence at the beginning is merely the function of inverting and purging; it is not yet the correct intent. Permanence is a medicinal function; how could it reveal the correct central tenet? Former medicine treats former illness, and later medicine treats later illness. If permanence is a medicinal function and permanence is taken as the central tenet, then since impermanence is also a medicine, impermanence should also be taken as the central tenet.

1.64

They say: Later medicine treats later illness, so later medicine is the central tenet of the later sūtra; former medicine treats former illness, so former medicine is the central tenet of the former sūtra. Now we clarify: If former medicine is the central tenet of the former sūtra, there are immeasurable kinds of former sūtras—how could they all uniformly take impermanence as the central tenet of the former sūtras? Since impermanence cannot be taken as the central tenet, how could the later sūtra take permanence as its central tenet? Now, in opposition to them, we take non-acquisition as the central tenet. When you take permanence as the central tenet, from what text does that derive?

1.65

I now rely on the sūtra text which itself says: "Non-acquisition is named great nirvāṇa." Therefore, having nothing that is acquired is the central tenet of this sūtra. Furthermore, when you say that nirvāṇa is definitely permanent and cannot be impermanent, then because of this permanence, permanence is called having something that is acquired; and having something that is acquired is called saṃsāra—how can it be called nirvāṇa?

1.66

They say: "We also have the meanings of acquisition and non-acquisition. Reaching oblivion is non-acquisition, and ever-persisting is having acquisition." Now we reprove you: Delusion cannot be taken as persistence, and persistence cannot be taken as delusion. The ultimate transcending cannot depend on relativity, and conventional relativity cannot be transcended. It turns out to be having something that is acquired again. How could it be called non-acquisition?

1.67

Furthermore, in their doctrine, within the ultimate truth there cannot be bliss, nor can there be the One Vehicle; self, bliss, and the One Vehicle are all conventional truth. Moreover, in your verification, you say saṃsāra is impermanent and nirvāṇa is permanent; hearing this, what do the assemblies awaken to? Therefore it is said: nirvāṇa cannot be definitely permanent, nor can it be definitely impermanent; it is neither relative nor non-relative; it is inconceivable—and those who hear this awaken!

1.68

Precisely because of having nothing that is acquired, it is inconceivable; having nothing that is acquired is the central tenet of the sūtra.

1.69

Others challenge: "If you are correct in explaining the sūtra's central tenet by non-acquisition, I am also correct in explaining the sūtra's central tenet by permanence."

1.70

An explanation says: Although permanence and impermanence are taught in the sūtras, because there is illness, the meaning of having nothing that is acquired arises. The sūtra says: "Although it does not abide permanently, it does not perish moment to moment." This has already eliminated both permanence and impermanence.

1.71

Next, it further clarifies that nirvāṇa is neither permanent nor impermanent, washing away both permanence and impermanence. As taught in the chapter on "Virtuous King": why should one one-sidedly take permanence as the central tenet? The meaning of non-acquisition is without practice from beginning to end, and therefore it is taken as the central tenet.

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Question: If having acquisition is named saṃsāra and non-acquisition is named nirvāṇa, then having acquisition is named impermanence and non-acquisition is named permanence; acquisition and non-acquisition are still just permanence and impermanence. Why discard permanence and impermanence to employ acquisition and non-acquisition?

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The explanation says: If one definitely considers having non-attainment as correct, that still turns into having attainment and is not called having nothing attained. Only when one has nothing at all to rely upon is it called non-attainment; non-attainment pervades both permanence and impermanence. Why is this? The other [position] says that saṃsāra is impermanent and nirvāṇa is permanent; such permanence and impermanence both involve having attainment. Now we elucidate permanence and impermanence as spoken of in terms of conditioned, provisional names: there is no impermanence that can exist, nor is there permanence that can be attained. Having nowhere whatsoever to abide is therefore called having nothing attained.

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Furthermore, the other [position] elucidates its meaning in terms of the permanence and impermanence of wisdom and abandonment: saṃsāra is impermanent and nirvāṇa is permanent; the former mind is impermanent and the subsequent mind is permanent, and therefore it involves having attainment. Now we elucidate that all dharmas have never been permanent or impermanent; whether one speaks of permanence or speaks of impermanence, the true nature of all dharmas operates through permanence and impermanence.

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Yet having nothing attained is not only the central tenet of this sūtra, but is the correct meaning common to all of the Mahāyāna.

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Third, explaining the title. Within this there are again three parts: first, explaining the different names; second, translating the names; third, transcending names.

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First, explaining the different names: some say nihuan, and some say niri. Master Zhao said: “In that country, regional dialects simply differed.” Daliang said: “Nirvāṇa is the sound of a different vernacular; sounds have regional dialects, and nirvāṇa is precisely the sound of Central India.” Some say: “These three names designate three recensions: Niri is the medium recension, Nihuan is the six-fascicle sūtra, and Nirvāṇa is this large recension.” Now I say this is not necessarily so; the large recension can also be called the Da nihuan jing.

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Next, translating the names. First let us explain the meaning of mahā: this is a foreign sound. Although this has three meanings, it is properly translated as “great.” The Suvarṇaprabhāsa says: “Mahādeva is here called Great Deva.” Moreover, now that the meaning of “great” has already been indicated, why is it necessary to indicate it again? But “great” has many meanings; according to this sūtra, there are altogether six meanings:

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First, it is great because it is permanent. That which is called great is termed permanent. Now, impermanence can also obtain the name “great,” yet in the end it does not equal permanence. [Just as with] great firewood and a great fire: great firewood does not equal the fire; permanence and impermanence are likewise.

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Second, it is great because it is vast. Why is this? The sūtra says: “That which is called great—its nature is broad and vast; because it is broad and vast, it is great.”

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Third, it is named great because it is high. The sūtra says: “Like a great mountain that none of the worldly people can ascend, it is therefore called a great mountain; nirvāṇa is likewise, for śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas, and all bodhisattvas cannot ascend it, and therefore it is named great.”

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Fourth, it is great because it is deep. The sūtra says: “ ‘Great’ is named inconceivable, for none of the worldly people can fathom it; therefore it is named great.”

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Fifth, it is named great because it is manifold. The sūtra says: “Like a great city that has many rare treasures and is therefore called a great city; nirvāṇa is likewise, having many treasures of the Dharma, and is therefore called great.”

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Sixth, it is named great because it is supreme. For example, there is a person who is supreme among people and is therefore called great; nirvāṇa is likewise, being supreme over all, and is therefore called great.

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Although there are six types of greatness, the names do not go beyond two kinds: first, greatness of essence; second, greatness of function. Greatness of essence is precisely the dharmatā; nirvāṇa is the dharmatā of all Buddhas. Greatness of function is the eight masteries of the self, and is therefore called greatness of function.

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There are also two types of greatness: first, relative greatness; second, absolute greatness. Yet these two are not separate; it is merely that being relative is itself absolute, because conditioned arising is empty.

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Next, explaining the meaning of nirvāṇa. Formerly, since the title mahā already indicated “great,” there were no different interpretations; but in translating nirvāṇa, the various explanations differ: some say it is untranslatable, and some say it is translatable.

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Now I briefly present four masters of untranslatability, and six masters of translatability.

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As for the four masters of untranslatability:

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First, Master Daliang explained that nirvāṇa cannot be translated. He said: “Nirvāṇa is the ultimate designation of the Tathāgata’s spiritual powers, the collective name for permanence, bliss, and the eight flavors. Nirvāṇa is the name of a different vernacular; names have regional dialects, and appearing mutually earlier and later there are three names. Nirvāṇa is precisely the sound of Central India; its name contains manifold meanings, and this country has no single name with which to translate it, so its foreign original is preserved.” This extends from Hexi as far as Daji, all sharing this explanation.

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Second, Master Yao also said it cannot be translated. That master’s preface says: “The appellation encompasses manifold principles, and the name heads manifold meanings; within one name there are immeasurable names. The sounds of Chu cannot translate its appellation, and the words of Jin cannot replace its title; therefore it cannot be translated.”

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Third, Master Baoliang also said it cannot be translated. His preface says: “Nirvāṇa is the general name for transcendent dharmas, the common designation running through manifold dharmas. Yet this term is the sound of that land; since the Sage appeared in that country, here too there is no name to properly translate it, but only literal responses, analogical pointers, and semantic explanations.”

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Fourth, Master Zhixiu also said it cannot be translated. That master’s preface says: “Nirvāṇa is the general name for the consummate, ultimate, supreme state. Yet following the traces one sees the name, and seeing the name one knows the fundamental. The rising of name and trace originated in India, and our Great Liang should also have an appellation. But the recent spread of the Way, having departed from the Western Regions in unfathomability, is translated in this country with the letter ‘I’; therefore former worthies and later sages all followed the old text, transmitting without inventing, and thus titled the path of the sūtra.”

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These four masters all say that nirvāṇa cannot be translated. Their explanation that it cannot be translated has both textual and doctrinal bases: doctrinally, nirvāṇa is consummate virtue, and consummate virtue establishes a consummate name, so it cannot be translated by a single name; second, textually, three dots constitute nirvāṇa, so it cannot be translated by a single name.

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Now I formulate five objections to challenge them:

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First, formulating the objection that great compassion would not be equal: That country has the general name, but this country lacks the consummate appellation. If the Tathāgata was mindful only of the sentient beings of that land and did not accept those of this country, now leaving them with a consummate name to understand the meaning, whereas here without a consummate name one would not understand the consummate meaning, then his compassion would not be like this, and nirvāṇa’s coming to this land would then become useless.

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Second, the objection of resolving the present against the past: Both present and past are nirvāṇa, so both should be translatable. Yet if the present is untranslatable, it can be nirvāṇa; the past was translatable, so the past should not be nirvāṇa. If in the past it was incomplete nirvāṇa, while now it is complete and untranslatable; and if because in the past it was incomplete it could be translated, then challenging this: the present being complete can be nirvāṇa, but the past being incomplete should not be nirvāṇa.

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Third, challenging nirvāṇa by reference to mahā: Nirvāṇa is mahānirvāṇa. Since nirvāṇa cannot be translated, and mahā is nirvāṇa, mahānirvāṇa also cannot be translated. Furthermore, mahā contains three meanings; if one translates mahā, and nirvāṇa contains three virtues, then one should also explain and translate nirvāṇa. If one says that mahā is not a consummate name whereas nirvāṇa is a consummate name, then this mahā is not the mahā of nirvāṇa, and nirvāṇa is not the nirvāṇa of mahā. Nirvāṇa contains three virtues and its name is already consummate; mahā contains three meanings, so mahā is also a consummate name. Both cannot be translated, or both can be translated.

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Fourth, challenging that if nirvāṇa cannot be translated, then the entire Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] is ruined. At the outset of the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra], in the early morning it is proclaimed that he is entering parinirvāṇa, and the entire great assembly is sorrowful and distressed. Cunda says: “Although we know that the Tathāgata’s nirvāṇa is skillful means, yet we cannot help harboring sorrow and distress.” If it is manifold virtues, why should the great assembly and Cunda grieve and suffer? Furthermore, the Manifesting Illness Chapter says: “Lying between the crane trees, even lowest foolish ordinary people who see it say he will definitely enter nirvāṇa.” If it were manifold virtues, how could lowest fools see it? If they saw manifold virtues, they would be of superior wisdom; why would they be called lowest fools? Therefore it is unacceptable.

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Fifth, the objection regarding general and particular: That [land] has consummate and partial names; that [land] has general and particular. Here there are only partial names and no consummate name; here there is only the particular and no general. Both this and that [land] have general and particular names; both this and that [land] have consummate and partial names.

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Next, presenting the six masters of translatability. Those who translate it are immeasurable; I briefly explain six masters.

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First, Dharma Master Daosheng translated it as “cessation” (mie). Its semantic glosses are indeed diverse, but its proper name is cessation; sūtras and treatises are all like this.

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Second, Master Zhao translated it as “extinction and crossing over” (miedu); in the language of Qin it is “unconditioned” (wuwei), and also called “extinction and crossing over.” Because it is empty, nothingness, tranquil, and silent, subtly transcending the conditioned, it is named unconditioned; because its great afflictions are eternally extinguished and it transcends the four currents, it is called extinction and crossing over.

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Other traditions differ: extinction pertains to dharmas, and crossing over designates persons. Dharmas originally existed and now do not; persons go from here to there. Moreover, it is said: real persons and real dharmas are both extinguished, and provisional persons and dharmas are all crossed over. Furthermore, as for extinction, both ordinary persons and noble ones are extinguished; crossing over distinguishes [them] from ordinary persons: when ordinary persons are extinguished, they are subsequently reborn and cannot be termed crossed over; when the great Sage is once extinguished, he is never reborn again, and therefore it is termed crossing over.

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Third, Master Zong of Taiyuan translated it as “liberation” (jietuo). He said: “Nirvāṇa is the general name for the exhaustion of defilements, the designation of myriad goods. Nirvāṇa is the sound of India; here it properly means liberation, as spoken in the sūtras.” Down to Kaishan and others, they translated it as “absence of defilement” (wulei).

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Fourth, Master Chong of Xuanwu translated it as “great tranquil concentration” (dajiding). The sūtra says: “Nirvāṇa is named great tranquil concentration.”

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Fifth, Master Xian translated it as “non-arising” (busheng). Emperor Wu of Liang used it in opposition to afflictions not being called nirvāṇa; only when afflictions do not arise is it called nirvāṇa.

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Sixth, Master Ying translated it as “peace and bliss” (anle). What is not peaceful is called saṃsāra, and peace and bliss is precisely nirvāṇa. Northerners say: parinirvāṇa translates as “entering cessation.” There are three kinds of entering: first, speaking in terms of reality, it means resting delusions and returning to the real, proceeding from cause toward fruit, and is therefore called entering; second, contrasting the real and the responsive, resting transformation and returning to the real is called entering; third, speaking only in terms of the responsive, it means abandoning the conditioned and entering the unconditioned, which is called entering.

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Nirvāṇa is properly translated as “cessation”; according to the meaning, it translates as non-arising, liberation, and so forth.

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Question: If it is properly translated as cessation, why does the text below say that the extinction of the fire of defilements is called extinction and crossing over, while freedom from initial and sustained thought is called nirvāṇa?

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The foreign words for extinction differ: the extinction of the fire of defilements is called mi-liu-tuo (nirodha); freedom from initial and sustained thought is called nie-pan-na (nirvāṇa), meaning resting, ultimate liberation, and eternal repose.

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There are three kinds of resting: first, resting the afflictions of cause and fruit. Second, resting all activities. As for all activities, the text says: “Although one attains dhyāna, wisdom, and liberation, it is not called ultimate; if one can sever and eliminate the activities practiced in the thirty-seven factors, it is then called ultimate nirvāṇa.” The former masters definitively said it cannot be translated, fully as challenged before. Now, to definitively say again that it can be translated is also investigated by them: Master Rui’s Preface to the Pañcaviṃśati says: “What is erroneous in the Qin language is determined by characters and meanings; what is defective in foreign sounds is corrected by Indian [standards]; that which cannot be altered is transcribed and produced.” Now, since it was produced as nirvāṇa, it is untranslatable; how can you say it is translatable?

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Now I further make distinct objections with two points: translating as cessation by Daosheng, Sengzhao, and others is one objection; translating as liberation and freedom from defilement by Master Zong and others is another objection. If you say that nirvāṇa translates as liberation, then when the spirit reposes free from defilement, why should there be sorrow and grief? Furthermore, it says that the extinction of the fire of defilements is called extinction and crossing over, and freedom from initial and sustained thought is called nirvāṇa. Since nirvāṇa and extinction and crossing over both appear distinctly, one knows that extinction and crossing over is not used to translate nirvāṇa. Yet masters such as Daosheng and Sengzhao personally received instruction from Master Kumārajīva and translated together; how could there be errors for later scholars to criticize?

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Now we clarify that this does not refute Daosheng and Sengzhao; modern and ancient figures merely criticize those who definitively translate it; if one definitively says it translates as extinction and crossing over, the fault is extreme.

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Question: Why do you now pose this question? Let us turn it back upon you: when you ask whether it is translatable or untranslatable, are you asking whether nirvāṇa has a name or has no name? Yet without knowing whether it has a name or has no name, you further ask about translatable or untranslatable; is this not like asking whether a rabbit’s horns are long or short without knowing whether a rabbit’s head has horns or has no horns?

First 115 of 259 passages. Read on

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