注維摩詰經 3.125

3.125

什曰：凡說空則先說無常，無常則空之初門。初門則謂之無常，畢竟則謂之空。旨趣雖同而以精麁為淺深者也。何以言之？說無常則云念念不住，不住則以有繫住。雖去其久住而未明無住，是麁無常耳，未造其極也。今此一念若令繫住，則後亦應住。若今住後住則始終無變，始終無變據事則不然。以住時不住，所以之滅。住即不住，乃真無常也。本以住為有，今無住則無有，無有則畢竟空，畢竟空即無常之妙旨也，故曰畢竟空是無常義。迦旃延未盡而謂之極者，故自招妄計之譏也。肇曰：此辯如來略說之本意也。小乘觀法生滅為無常義，大乘以不生不滅為無常義，無常名同而幽致超絕。其道虛微，固非常情之所測，妙得其旨者，淨名其人也。生曰：夫言無常者，據事滅驗之也。終苟有滅，始無然乎？始若果然，則生非定矣。生不定生，滅孰定哉？生滅既已不定，真體復何所在？推無在之為理，是諸法之實也。實以不生不滅為義，豈非無常之所存耶？然則無常雖明常之為無，亦所以表無無常也。畢竟者，不得不然也。

[Kumāra]jīva says: Whenever emptiness is spoken of, impermanence is spoken of first; impermanence is the initial gateway to emptiness. The initial gateway is called impermanence, and the ultimate is called emptiness. Although their purport is the same, they differ in depth according to their subtlety and coarseness. Why do we say this? When speaking of impermanence, one says that thought-moment after thought-moment does not abide; if it does not abide, one then binds it to abiding through existence. Although this eliminates prolonged abiding, it does not yet clarify non-abiding; this is merely coarse impermanence, not yet having reached the ultimate. Now, if this single thought-moment is made to be bound to abiding, then subsequent ones should also abide. If it abides now and abides later, then from beginning to end there would be no change; that there is no change from beginning to end is, in terms of facts, not the case. It is precisely because when it abides it does not abide that it goes toward cessation. That abiding is non-abiding is true impermanence. Originally, abiding was taken to be existence; now that there is non-abiding, there is no existence, and having no existence is ultimate emptiness. Ultimate emptiness is the wondrous purport of impermanence; hence it is said that ultimate emptiness is the meaning of impermanence. Because Kātyāyana had not exhausted it yet took it to be the ultimate, he brought upon himself the reproof of false conceptualisation.

[Seng]zhao says: This discerns the Tathāgata's original intention in his brief preaching. The Hīnayāna contemplates the production and cessation of dharmas as the meaning of impermanence; the Mahāyāna takes non-production and non-cessation as the meaning of impermanence. The name 'impermanence' is the same, yet the profound purport is transcendentally distinct. Its path is empty and subtle, certainly not what ordinary sentiments can measure; the one who wondrously grasped its purport was the Pure Name himself.

[Dao]sheng says: Speaking of impermanence is based on verifying it through the cessation of affairs. If the end indeed has cessation, could the beginning be otherwise? If the beginning is indeed so, then production is not fixed. If production is not fixedly produced, what cessation could be fixed? Since production and cessation are already not fixed, where can the true substance lie? Deducing that having nowhere to lie is the principle—this is the reality of all dharmas. If reality takes non-production and non-cessation as its meaning, how could this not be where impermanence resides? That being so, although impermanence clarifies that permanence is non-existent, it also expresses that there is no impermanence. 'Ultimate' means it cannot be otherwise.