維摩義記 4.69

4.69

自下第二觀佛同己廣明所見。於中先別、後總結之。別中義多，要而論之，妙絕諸相圓具諸義，妙絕諸相乃至無有一相可存，圓具眾義乃至無有一相可捨。經中說真極唯在斯，離此別立悉是虛妄。故下文言「作如是觀名為正觀，若他觀者名為邪觀」。以此真極，經中所說悉與此同。故《涅槃經．金剛身品》明佛法身十功德中明涅槃相，〈聖行品〉中明性，〈梵行品〉中念法念僧，悉皆同此；《無量經》歎佛法身亦與此同。是故應以此之所說，類顯一切真實法矣。有人宣說如來法身唯空非有，此乃外道所立定空。宣說如來法身唯有非空，此亦外道所立性有，非佛法身。有人復言如來法身定非有無，此亦外道所立定義，非佛法身。有人復言如來法身亦有亦無，有真色心、無於眾相，有不為無、無不為有，此亦外道所立有無，非佛法身。有人復言如來法身出於四句定不可說，此亦外道所立第五不可說藏，如《成實》說非佛法身。離此偏過，諸義通取無非法身。即無說有，有非定有；即有說無，無非定無。即此有無說非有無，非有非無亦非定性；即非有無而說有無，當知有無亦非定性。即此四句不可定說名不可說，彼不可說亦非定性。佛身既爾，菩提、涅槃、佛性等法類皆同爾。文中合有一百二句，相從為三：初至「不可以識識」來，明離妄想，智知識識是妄想故。二「無晦」下乃至「一切言語道斷」，明離假名，名字是其言語道故。三「非福田」下乃至「不可言說顯示」，明離言說，不可言說分別顯故。

From here below is the second [section]: contemplating the Buddha as identical to oneself, extensively clarifying what is seen. Herein, it first explains [the points] individually, and later summarizes them. Within the individual explanations, the meanings are manifold; to discuss them essentially, it wondrously transcends all characteristics and perfectly possesses all meanings. It wondrously transcends all characteristics to the extent that not a single characteristic can remain; it perfectly possesses all meanings to the extent that not a single characteristic can be abandoned. The sūtras state that the ultimate truth consists solely in this; to establish anything separately apart from this is entirely false. Hence the text below states: "To cultivate this contemplation is called right contemplation; if one contemplates otherwise, it is called wrong contemplation." Because of this ultimate truth, everything spoken in the sūtras is identical to this. Thus, the Nirvāṇa Sūtra's "Adamantine Body Chapter", in explaining the ten merits of the Buddha's dharmakāya, clarifies the characteristics of nirvāṇa; the "Noble Practice Chapter" clarifies nature; and the "Brahma Practice Chapter" clarifies mindfulness of the Dharma and mindfulness of the Saṅgha—all are identical to this. The Wuliang jing's praise of the Buddha's dharmakāya is also identical to this. Therefore, by means of what is spoken here, one should analogously reveal all real dharmas. Some people preach that the Tathāgata's dharmakāya is solely empty and not existent; this is merely the fixed emptiness established by non-Buddhists. Preaching that the Tathāgata's dharmakāya is solely existent and not empty is also the intrinsic existence established by non-Buddhists, and not the Buddha's dharmakāya. Furthermore, some say that the Tathāgata's dharmakāya is definitely neither existent nor non-existent; this also is a fixed proposition established by non-Buddhists, and not the Buddha's dharmakāya. Furthermore, some say that the Tathāgata's dharmakāya is both existent and non-existent—possessing real form and mind, while lacking various characteristics; having existence that does not constitute non-existence, and non-existence that does not constitute existence—this also is the existence and non-existence established by non-Buddhists, and not the Buddha's dharmakāya. Furthermore, some say that the Tathāgata's dharmakāya transcends the four propositions and is definitely ineffable; this also is the fifth ineffable piṭaka established by non-Buddhists, which, as the Chengshi [lun] states, is not the Buddha's dharmakāya. Leaving aside these one-sided errors, if all meanings are universally integrated, nothing is not the dharmakāya. Approaching non-existence, one speaks of existence, yet existence is not determinately existent; approaching existence, one speaks of non-existence, yet non-existence is not determinately non-existent. Approaching this existence and non-existence, one speaks of neither existence nor non-existence, yet neither existence nor non-existence is also not a determinate nature; approaching neither existence nor non-existence, one speaks of existence and non-existence, yet one should know that existence and non-existence are also not determinate natures. Approaching these four propositions, that they cannot be determinately spoken of is termed ineffable, yet that ineffability is also not a determinate nature. The Buddha-body being so, dharmas such as bodhi, nirvāṇa, and Buddha-nature are all likewise by analogy. In the text there are altogether one hundred and two phrases, which are grouped into three [sections]: First, up to "cannot be known by consciousness", it clarifies separation from deluded conception, because knowing by wisdom and cognizing by consciousness are deluded conceptions. Second, from "without darkness" down to "the path of all speech is cut off", it clarifies separation from provisional designations, because names are the path of speech. Third, from "not a field of merit" down to "cannot be explained or demonstrated", it clarifies separation from verbal explanation, because it cannot be conceptually demonstrated through verbal explanation.