維摩經玄疏 2.31

2.31

Answer: If one says that "the object of itself is an object," that is an object of inherent nature. If one says that "the object is spoken of because of wisdom," that is an object of other-nature. If one says that "the object is spoken of because of object and wisdom [together]," that is an object of both self- and other-nature. If "the object is spoken of apart from wisdom," that is speaking of an object without causes and conditions. Speaking of an object on the basis of causes and conditions is already unacceptable, how much more so speaking of an object without causes and conditions! Speaking of wisdom through the four propositions has the same fault. Now, as the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā clarifies, "Dharmas do not arise from themselves"—how could one say "the object is spoken of because of the object"? "Nor do they arise from other"—how could one say "the object is spoken of because of wisdom"? "Nor do they arise from both"—how could one say "the object is spoken of because object and wisdom combine"? "Nor do they arise without cause"—how could one [say] "the object is spoken of apart from object and wisdom"? Examining wisdom through the four propositions is also like this. Now, when examining the object through the four propositions, it cannot be found, yet it is spoken of as "object"—this is a provisional object, and is also an inconceivable object. Wisdom is also like this. All existence and nonexistence, causes and conditions, good and evil, right and wrong, defilement and purity, worldly and world-transcending, are examined in this manner. If one uses this intent to scrutinize the various commentators' explanations of sūtras and treatises, they will hardly escape essentialist views.