維摩經玄疏 2
English (machine translation) 2
- Language
- English
2.1
Composed by the Śramaṇa Zhiyi of Xiuchan Monastery on Mount Tiantai
2.2
First, explaining the title: generally indicating the five meanings has already been fully laid out in the previous section.
2.3
In this explanation of the title, there are two divisions: first, explaining the specific title; second, explaining the general title.
2.4
First, explaining the specific title: this sūtra is titled with 'Spoken by Vimalakīrti'; its name differs from the other sūtras, so it is called 'specific.'
2.5
Second, explaining the general title: the single word 'Sūtra' is precisely the general title. Now, the two—general and specific—are briefly treated under three meanings: first, in terms of teaching; second, in terms of practice; third, in terms of principle.
2.6
First, in terms of teaching: as in the Avataṃsaka, the Large [Prajñāpāramitā], and so forth, because the teachings differ, the names established also differ; this is 'specific.' Because they are all spoken by the Buddha and are identically named 'sūtra,' this is called 'general.'
2.7
Second, concerning practice: just as with the true dharma-jewel of nirvāṇa, sentient beings enter through various gates, and their entering through various gates is called distinctiveness of practice, and hence it requires a "distinctive" title. Their heading together toward nirvāṇa is just one principle, and hence the title is established as "shared."
2.8
Third, concerning principle: the principle is a single dharma, yet its names and meanings are manifold. Hence the Mahānirvāṇa Sūtra states: "Just as the heavenly king Śakra has various names." Liberation is also like this, having many names. Because the names differ, it is called "distinctive." Because it is identically one principle, it is called "shared." From teaching one generates practice, and from practice one enters principle; all possess both the shared and the distinctive.
2.9
Now, in explaining the distinctive title, it is divided into two points: first, previously explaining "Vimalakīrti"; second, clarifying the dharma that is preached. "Vimalakīrti" indicates the person; "that which is preached" is the inconceivable liberation. From this one knows that without the person there is no way to propagate the Dharma, and without the Dharma there is no way to manifest the person. "Pure Name" ascends to the stage of succession, his wisdom borders on the ultimate realm, and the teaching he preaches is none other than the inconceivable liberation. This sūtra thus designates both person and Dharma at the head of the teaching, which honors the person and esteems the Dharma.
2.10
First, in previously explaining Vimalakīrti, there are four tiers:
2.11
First, translating and explaining the name and meaning; second, interpretation through the three contemplations; third, differentiation through the four teachings; fourth, the fundamental and the trace of Pure Name.
2.12
First, as for translating the name and explaining the meaning, there are two points: 1. translating the name "Vimalakīrti"; 2. interpretation.
2.13
1. Concerning translating the name: the speech of foreigners naturally differs, just as in this land there is the difference between Chu and Xia. Moreover, earlier and later translations are not without additions and omissions. Regarding their additions, omissions, and established meanings, there are roughly three traditions:
2.14
One says "Weimolajiedili" (Vimalakīrtinirdeśa), which in this land is translated as Pure Name (Jingming), or Undefiled Fame (Wugoucheng); "fame" (cheng) is also called "praise" (tan) (this is the translation by Master Jīva).
2.15
The next tradition says "Weimolajie" (Vimalakīrti), which in this land is translated as Pure Name (this is the translation by Master Sengzhao).
2.16
The later tradition says "Weimolajiezhi" (Vimalakīrti), which in this land is translated as Pure, Undefiled, Fame (this is the translation of the Tripiṭaka master transmitted by Master Huiguang).
2.17
2. Concerning the interpretation:
2.18
The initial translation seems rather cumbersome and difficult to expound.
2.19
The next translation renders it as "Pure Name." We now use this explanation to correspond to the two bodies, the true and the responsive. "Pure" is the true body: true wisdom is free of delusion, and hence is called pure. "Name" is the responsive body: manifesting forms to save beings, its name and renown are universally heard.
2.20
The later tradition translates it as "Pure," "Undefiled," and "Fame." We now use this translation and explanation to correspond to the three bodies, which has two aspects: first, explaining in terms of phenomena; second, in terms of contemplating the mind.
2.21
First, explaining the three bodies in terms of phenomena: first, the dharma-body; second, the reward-body; third, the responsive body. First, the meaning of "pure" is the dharma-body: its own-nature is pure, luminous, and without blemish; this is the intrinsically pure dharma-body. Second, "undefiled" is the reward-body: reward-wisdom is fully luminous, free from defiling taints; this is the completely pure reward-body. Third, "fame" is the responsive body: with great compassion converting the world, its name and renown universally spread; this is the responsive body. Hence the Dazhidulun states: "When quicksilver blends with genuine gold, it can reflect all visible forms; when meritorious qualities blend with the dharma-body, it responds and manifests everywhere, going to all places." Yet the meaning of the three bodies is completely present throughout various sūtras. Although the principle is fully evident, the names are not clearly manifested. As in the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, the names and meanings of the three buddhas are completely present; furthermore, the Samantabhadra Contemplation Sūtra says, "The three kinds of bodies of the Buddha are born from the Vaipulya." The meaning clarified by the three bodies does not contradict the two bodies: if one recognizes their opening and merging, how could one fixate on using one exclusively! This is of the same category as the opening and merging of the three truths and the two truths. Using these two translations to explain the names in correspondence with their meanings, the intent can be seen.
2.22
Second, clarifying the three bodies in terms of contemplating the mind:
2.23
Wherever there is mind, the mind is just dharma-nature. Dharma-nature is fundamentally pure. Fundamental purity is the dharma-body.
2.24
When contemplation and mind correspond, in times of illumination there is no darkness. Freedom from darkness is the meaning of "undefiled." Undefiled is the fruition reward-body of wisdom and severance.
2.25
According with whatever benefits beings, initiating all affairs, they are all like illusions and transformations, the moon in water, or images in a mirror: blending with the light without defilement, this is the meaning of the responsive body matching conditions.
2.26
These three meanings, neither vertical nor horizontal, are the seeds of bodhi. The Nirvāṇa Sūtra states: "The initial aspiration and the ultimate are not different; between these two minds, the prior mind is the difficult one. One who has not yet crossed over crosses others over first; therefore I pay homage to the initial aspiration." If one skillfully recognizes the six identities, there will be no confusion.
2.27
Second, explaining the name Vimalakīrti by means of the three contemplations: the three contemplations sever the delusions that confuse the two truths and the three truths, and manifest the wondrous principle of the two truths and three truths. The true principle being luminous is called "pure"; the defiling obstructions being completely exhausted is called "undefiled"; contemplation uniting with principle, its great function being measureless, is called "fame." When the meaning of the three contemplations is accomplished, the intent of "pure," "undefiled," and "fame" is present therein. This sūtra clarifies admonishing outside the room and embracing inside the room. If one does not understand the dharma-door of the three contemplations, entering into the profound intent of the text will indeed be difficult to discern. Now, in clarifying the meaning of the three contemplations, there are roughly seven tiers:
2.28
First, distinguishing object and wisdom; second, explaining the names of the three contemplations; third, discerning the characteristics of the three contemplations; fourth, matching them with wisdom and the eyes; fifth, establishing the meanings of the various vehicles; sixth, explaining the meaning of Pure Name in terms of severing fetters; seventh, penetrating the text of this sūtra.
2.29
First, in previously distinguishing object and wisdom: the object is that which is contemplated, and wisdom is that which contemplates. The object that is contemplated is the principle of the twelvefold causal conditioning and the three truths; the wisdom that contemplates is the three contemplations. As for why the object that is contemplated is clarified in terms of the twelvefold causal conditioning: the Great Sage taught this dharma of correct causal conditioning in order to demolish the erroneous views of outsiders who postulate perverse causes or generate the perverse error of causelessness. If one is deluded about this correct causal conditioning, then there is the birth-and-death of the six destinies; if one understands this correct causal conditioning, then there are the four kinds of noble persons. Thus, based on the twelvefold causal conditioning, one discerns these ten dharma-realms. The principle of the two truths and the three truths is the object illuminated by the three contemplations. Now, as our school explains that just as the four truths are of four kinds, the twelvefold causal conditioning is also of four kinds: first, the twelvefold causal conditioning of arising and ceasing; second, the twelvefold causal conditioning of non-arising; third, the twelvefold causal conditioning of the immeasurable; fourth, the twelvefold causal conditioning of non-contrivance. The causal conditioning of arising-and-ceasing and of non-arising are the object of the first contemplation; the immeasurable causal conditioning is the object of the second contemplation; the unconditioned causal conditioning is the object of the third contemplation. Now, based on the verse of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, we correctly clarify the objects of these three contemplations. The verse states: "Dharmas that arise from causes and conditions, I say are empty; they are also provisionally named, and are also the meaning of the Middle Way."
2.30
Question: Is the object of itself an object? Or is the object spoken of by relying on wisdom?
2.31
Answer: If one says that "the object of itself is an object," that is an object of inherent nature. If one says that "the object is spoken of because of wisdom," that is an object of other-nature. If one says that "the object is spoken of because of object and wisdom [together]," that is an object of both self- and other-nature. If "the object is spoken of apart from wisdom," that is speaking of an object without causes and conditions. Speaking of an object on the basis of causes and conditions is already unacceptable, how much more so speaking of an object without causes and conditions! Speaking of wisdom through the four propositions has the same fault. Now, as the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā clarifies, "Dharmas do not arise from themselves"—how could one say "the object is spoken of because of the object"? "Nor do they arise from other"—how could one say "the object is spoken of because of wisdom"? "Nor do they arise from both"—how could one say "the object is spoken of because object and wisdom combine"? "Nor do they arise without cause"—how could one [say] "the object is spoken of apart from object and wisdom"? Examining wisdom through the four propositions is also like this. Now, when examining the object through the four propositions, it cannot be found, yet it is spoken of as "object"—this is a provisional object, and is also an inconceivable object. Wisdom is also like this. All existence and nonexistence, causes and conditions, good and evil, right and wrong, defilement and purity, worldly and world-transcending, are examined in this manner. If one uses this intent to scrutinize the various commentators' explanations of sūtras and treatises, they will hardly escape essentialist views.
2.32
Question: If the object is the object, the object may be an object of inherent nature. Now, speaking of the object in dependence on wisdom, how could it be an object of other-nature?
2.33
Answer: If the object is called "self," how could wisdom not be "other"? If wisdom is not other, how could the object be self? If the object is inherent nature, then wisdom is other-nature. If the object is inherent nature, it cannot be established as provisional; if wisdom is other-nature, how could it be spoken of as provisional? If wisdom is other-nature and can thereupon be spoken of as provisional, then the object being inherent nature should also be spoken of as provisional! If the object is inherent nature and cannot be spoken of as provisional, how could wisdom being other-nature be spoken of as provisional! Examining in this manner, speaking of wisdom on the basis of the object is the error of inherent nature; speaking of wisdom as the object falls into the fault of other-nature. Arguing in this way, speaking of the object on the basis of wisdom fails to establish the provisional. If it does not establish a provisional object, it is not an inconceivable object. If, when examining the object through the four propositions, it is ultimately unobtainable and yet spoken of as an object, then it is a provisional object and is also an inconceivable object. Wisdom is also like this. This inconceivable object and wisdom is precisely the correct meaning of the inconceivable object and wisdom clarified in this sūtra. Hence the Chapter on the Yakṣa Saṃjñeya in the Suvarṇaprabhāsa Sūtra states: "I now see the light of inconceivable wisdom... the object of inconceivable wisdom."
2.34
Second, explaining the names of the three contemplations: the names of the three contemplations come from the Yingluo jing, which states: "Entering emptiness from the provisional is called the contemplation of the two truths; entering the provisional from emptiness is called the contemplation of equality. These two contemplations are the path of expedient means. By relying on these two contemplations of emptiness, one can enter the contemplation of the Middle Way paramārtha-satya, dual-illuminating the two truths, mind after mind quiescing, naturally flowing into the ocean of sarvajñā."
2.35
As for what is called the "contemplation of entering emptiness from the provisional": nonexistent yet posited unreal, this is termed "provisional." Contemplating the provisional and knowing nonexistence, like an illusion or transformation, existing merely as a name, one immediately enters emptiness. As for why it is spoken of as the "contemplation of the two truths," it is either the two truths of sentiment and wisdom, or in terms of the two truths according with wisdom.
2.36
Next, explaining the "contemplation of entering the provisional from emptiness": if one does not abide in emptiness, but returns and enters illusions and transformations, differentiating the conventional truth of provisional designations without obstruction, this is the contemplation of entering the provisional from emptiness. As for saying "equality": if previously one destroyed the conventional and applied the true, that is not called equality; because this contemplation destroys and applies equally, it is called equality.
2.37
Next, explaining the "contemplation of the Middle Way": "middle" takes non-duality as its meaning; "way" takes being able to penetrate as its name. Illuminating the one real truth, opening unhindered and without obstruction, is called the contemplation of the Middle Way. Hence the sūtra states: "The prior two contemplations are the path of expedient means; by relying on these two contemplations of emptiness, one can enter the Middle Way, dual-illuminating the two truths, mind after mind quiescing, naturally flowing into the ocean of sarvajñā."
2.38
The reason these three are collectively called 'contemplations' is that 'contemplation' (guan) has the meaning of 'piercing through' (guanchuan) and also has the function of 'thoroughly penetrating' (guanda). 'Piercing through' means piercing through the delusions of views and thoughts, of [delusions as numerous as] the Ganges sands, and of fundamental ignorance; hence it is called 'piercing through'. 'Thoroughly penetrating' means thoroughly penetrating the principle of the three truths. Therefore the Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra says: 'Just like a person who well knows where a hidden treasure lies: he immediately takes a sharp hoe and digs straight down into the earth; boulders, sand, and gravel are passed straight through without difficulty; only when he reaches vajra can he pierce no further.' 'Boulders' are the delusions of views and thoughts. 'Sand' is the delusion of nescience [as numerous as] fine particles of dust and sand. 'Gravel' is the delusion of the entrenched ground of fundamental ignorance. 'Passing through' is precisely the meaning of piercing through. 'Reaching vajra' is thoroughly penetrating the principle of the one real truth, the buddha-nature.
2.39
Question: If all three contemplations illuminate the two truths, what difference is there between them?
2.40
Answer: Although the previous contemplation illuminates the two truths, its refutation and application are unequal. The next contemplation also illuminates the two truths, and its refutation and application are equal; yet since it does not perceive the middle way, it is merely equality at different times. As for the third contemplation, it attains the vision of the middle way and simultaneously illuminates the two truths; this is equality at one and the same time.
2.41
Third, in discerning the characteristics of the three contemplations, there are two points: first, explaining the three contemplations of distinctive characteristics; second, explaining the three contemplations in a single mind.
2.42
First, in explaining the three contemplations of distinctive characteristics: Contemplating the principle of the three truths produced from causes and conditions has distinct and different characteristics. The coarseness and subtlety of the three kinds of delusive hindrances—grasping at characteristics, [delusions as numerous as] the Ganges sands, and fundamental ignorance—have different stages. In contemplating the principle and refuting delusion, the application of wisdom differs; hence they are called the three contemplations of distinctive characteristics. These are precisely the characteristics of the three wisdoms explained in the 'Chapter on the Threefold Prajñā' of the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra. Now, in explaining these three contemplations of distinctive characteristics, there are three distinct parts: first, the contemplation of entering emptiness from the provisional; second, the contemplation of entering the provisional from emptiness; third, the contemplation of the middle way as paramārtha-satya.
2.43
First, directly explaining the characteristics of the contemplation of entering emptiness from the provisional briefly comprises three points: first, explaining the provisional that is contemplated; second, explaining the differences in the contemplation-doors; third, discerning the wisdom of the contemplation that enters emptiness.
2.44
First, in explaining the provisional that is contemplated: There are two kinds of provisionality that subsume all phenomena: first, the provisionality of craving; second, the provisionality of views. 'Craving' refers to craving-discourse; 'views' refers to view-discourse. Both of these are conceptual proliferation: they destroy the wisdom-eye and obstruct the vision of the real. Craving-discourse gives rise to craving and attachment according to whatever object is seen, which is the work of Māra. View-discourse gives rise to conceptual discrimination according to whatever object is seen, which is the work of non-Buddhists. Therefore this sūtra says: 'Heavenly Māras delight in birth and death; non-Buddhists delight in various views.' Because of this craving and these views, the ninety-eight proclivities are aroused, causing the three modes of karma to perform wholesome and unwholesome deeds, whereby one transmigrates through the six destinies and undergoes the suffering of birth and death. Therefore this sūtra says: 'From delusion there is craving, and thus my illness arises.' It also says: 'The arising of this illness is entirely due to attachment to a self; therefore, one should not give rise to attachment to a self.' Now it is explained: If one knows that craving and views arise from fundamental ignorance, then all the three realms arise from the mind alone. Therefore the Avataṃsaka Sūtra says: 'In the three realms there is no separate phenomenon; they are made by the one mind alone.' And that these various phenomena all derive from provisionality means that the phenomena aroused by fundamental ignorance, craving, and views all possess the characteristics of the three provisionalities. The three provisionalities are: first, provisionality through causal composition; second, provisionality through continuity; third, provisionality through mutual dependence. Because these three are empty designations, they are called provisional.
2.45
Question: Both the Tripiṭaka and the Mahāyāna explain the three provisionalities; how are the differences between the two teachings to be distinguished?
2.46
Answer: If one explains the provisional according to ordinary sentiments, that is what is taught in the sūtras of the śrāvakas; if one explains the provisional in terms of principle, showing that all things are like dreams and illusions, that is what is taught in the Mahāyāna. In this sūtra, the chapter 'Rebuking Upāli' fully clarifies the characteristics of these three provisionalities.
2.47
Question: How do the three vehicles enter emptiness from the three provisionalities, and how are they distinguished?
2.48
Answer: Some say: 'Śrāvakas mostly use provisionality through causal composition; pratyekabuddhas mostly use provisionality through continuity; bodhisattvas mostly use provisionality through mutual dependence.' Now I maintain that the characteristics of the 'three provisionalities' explained in the Tripiṭaka are distinct, and one enters principle according to whatever is convenient. In the Mahāyāna, the three provisionalities are all explained as being like illusions and transformations; when the three vehicles contemplate these, they enter emptiness together.
2.49
Second, in explaining the differences in contemplation-doors, these are the two contemplation-doors of analytical reduction and direct embodiment. As for the 'entering the twofold emptiness of persons and phenomena by analytically reducing the provisional' explained in the śrāvaka sūtras, this is like taking a hand that is truly empty to be a fist with fingers. As for the Mahāyāna 'entering the twofold emptiness of persons and phenomena by directly embodying the provisional', this is like taking a fist with fingers in a mirror image to be empty. Analytically reducing the provisional to enter emptiness is called the clumsy crossing; directly embodying the provisional to enter emptiness is called the skillful crossing. Therefore the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa provides the metaphor of the skillful and clumsy physicians. Now, to explain this metaphor: it is like an eye disease being one, while the treatments are skillful or clumsy. In the clumsy case, with needles and medicines, it is cured only after severe pain. In the skillful case, through incantations, it subsides naturally without pain. The subsiding and curing are identical, and their seeing of colors does not differ. Therefore the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā says: 'He who can teach this dependent origination / Excellently extinguishes all conceptual proliferations.' The clumsy crossing is an inexcellent extinction; the skillful crossing is spoken of as an excellent extinction.
2.50
Question: What is the difference between these?
2.51
Answer: Excellent extinction is severance without severing; inexcellent extinction is absolute severance.
2.52
Third, in explaining the wisdom of the contemplation that enters emptiness, there are also two points: first, explaining the entry into emptiness through analytically reducing the provisional; second, explaining the Mahāyāna path of entering emptiness through directly embodying the provisional.
2.53
First, entering emptiness through analytically reducing the provisional has two points: first, analytically reducing the provisionality of views to enter emptiness; second, analytically reducing the provisionality of craving to enter emptiness. Both are the teaching-door of the clumsy crossing of the Tripiṭaka.
2.54
Question: Above, in explaining the two provisionalities of craving and views, craving came first and views came second. Now, in explaining the cultivation of contemplation, why do views come first and craving second?
2.55
Answer: Sentient beings have two kinds of proclivities: dull proclivities are coarse and belong to craving, which is the work of Māra; sharp proclivities are subtle and belong to views, which is the work of non-Buddhists; hence craving came first and views second. Now, in the true path of the Buddhadharma, one severs defilements by taking the principle as object. On the path of vision, there are two kinds of persons: dull persons enter the path of vision through the practices of impermanence and suffering, severing craving first; sharp persons enter the principle of vision through the practices of emptiness and non-self, severing views. With views entirely exhausted beforehand, the path of cultivation comes afterward, and the fetters of craving are eliminated next.
2.56
First, explaining the analytical reduction of the provisionality of views to enter emptiness: this is precisely analytically reducing what is not the provisionality of views to enter emptiness. The contemplation of analytically reducing the provisional is like the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa's breaking down a piece of fine cloth down to atoms adjacent to space, analytically reducing this provisionality of fine material dust subject to arising and ceasing in order to enter emptiness; contemplating the internal body and mind is also like this. However, the three great Dharma masters of the Chengshilun each used their own emotional views to break down these fine particles: if the fine particles are completely extinguished, one cannot avoid the view of annihilation; if the particles are not completely extinguished, it remains the view of permanence. If one does not escape these two views, how could one enter emptiness? Examining now the intent of the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa, it is not as those masters inferred. The author of the treatise quotes the Buddha's words: 'Matter, whether coarse or subtle, when contemplated as a whole, is impermanent and without self; he did not speak of the existence of an infinitesimal particle of matter.' Now I maintain that if one knows that coarse and subtle matter alike are impermanent and without self, then they are causally composed, continuous, and mutually dependent—illusory, provisional, and unreal. Once one cannot grasp matter as existent, how could one stagnate in matter's being empty, both existent and empty, or neither existent nor empty? Thus, both the view of a self-body and extreme views are formed through the four conditions and the three provisionalities, and being unreal, they are all empty. When conceptualizations and contemplative thoughts are eliminated, the dharmas of verbal expression cease, and with single-minded dhyāna and stillness, because the mind is in concentration, one can know the characteristics of arising and ceasing dharmas in the world. If one knows that the four views and sixty-two views are impermanent, empty, and still, one suddenly awakens to the real and becomes a srotāpanna. This is the contemplation of entering emptiness by analytically reducing the provisionality of views.
2.57
Question: In analytically reducing the provisional to enter emptiness, one should only reduce matter; how can the mind's existence, emptiness, both existence and emptiness, and neither existence nor emptiness be analytically reduced?
2.58
Answer: Whatever is grasped according to views is entirely of the four conditions and three provisionalities, all having the characteristics of arising and ceasing. One breaks down coarse arising and ceasing down to subtle arising and ceasing. When subtle arising and ceasing are exhausted, one enters emptiness.
2.59
Question: How are the characteristics of the twofold emptiness of persons and phenomena distinguished in the four views?
2.60
Answer: Both the view of a self-body and extreme views are defiled and indeterminate five aggregates. Contemplating these five aggregates, whether as identical to the aggregates or apart from the aggregates, one perceives no characteristic of a self at all; there are only the phenomena of the aggregates. This is like looking at five fingers and seeing no characteristic of a fist. This is entering the 'emptiness of persons' from the provisionality of the sixteen kinds of views and notions. The Abhidharma's door of existence uses this emptiness of persons to awaken to the real and uncontaminated, perceive paramārtha, completely sever the three fetters, and realize the srotāpanna fruit. The Chengshilun's door of emptiness contemplates these extreme views as being merely the aggregate of formations; the aggregate of formations is entirely the three provisionalities, and since the provisional is unreal, one enters emptiness through this, breaks the fetters of various views, and becomes a srotāpanna. This is precisely the primary intent of entering emptiness by analytically reducing the provisionality of real dharmas; such is the characteristic of the 'emptiness of phenomena' taught in the śrāvaka sūtras.
2.61
Second, explaining the analytical reduction of the provisionality of craving to enter emptiness: 'Craving' refers to craving for the desire realm, craving for the form realm, and craving for the formless realm; all are formed from the four conditions and the three provisionalities. If one contemplates the four conditions and three provisionalities, enters emptiness, awakens to the real, severs defilements via the path of non-obstruction, and realizes [cessation] via the path of liberation, up to the ninth liberation of neither-perception-nor-non-perception, this is the fruit of an arhat abiding in nirvāṇa with remainder. Only then does the function of the contemplation of entering emptiness by analytically reducing the provisional come to rest. It is also called the all-knowledge, and also called the wisdom-eye.
2.62
Second, as for the Mahāyāna contemplation of entering emptiness through directly embodying the provisional: Although there are many avenues for the contemplation-door of entering emptiness, now we explain entering emptiness through directly embodying the provisional in terms of the contemplation-door of non-arising. With regard to this contemplation-door, there are also two divisions: first, explaining the entry into emptiness through directly embodying the provisionality of views; second, explaining the entry into emptiness through directly embodying the provisionality of craving.
2.63
First, explaining the entry into emptiness through directly embodying the provisionality of views: One directly embodies dharmas such as the view of a self-body produced from causes and conditions as being all like dreams and illusions; their causal composition, continuity, and mutual dependence are mere names. Names are themselves empty, not made empty by cessation; emptiness is precisely the real, and the real is precisely nirvāṇa. This is the 'contemplation of entering emptiness through directly embodying the provisional'. This is examined in terms of the three provisionalities:
2.64
First, examining in terms of causal composition: Internally there is the mental faculty, and externally there are mental objects; when faculty and object confront each other, then through the condition of mental contact, craving arises. When craving arises, this is precisely the arising of the view of a self-body and mental consciousness. Now let us contemplate: from where do this view and consciousness definitively arise? Do they arise from the mental faculty? Do they arise from the mental objects? Do they arise from the conjunction of faculty and object? Or do they arise apart from faculty and object? If they arise from the mental faculty, that is arising from self-nature. If they arise from mental objects, that is arising from other-nature. If they arise from the conjunction of faculty and object, that is arising from both. If they arise apart from faculty and object, that is arising without causes or conditions. Arising from causes and conditions cannot even be asserted, how much less arising without causes and conditions! Therefore a verse in the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā states: 'Dharmas do not arise from themselves, / Nor do they arise from another, / Nor from both, nor without cause; / Therefore they are explained as unarisen.' One should know that the mind of the view of a self-body is fundamentally unarisen. When it is spoken of as arising despite being unarisen, this is merely following worldly names and designations; hence it is said to arise. The dharmas of names and designations are not internal, not external, nor in between the two, nor do they eternally exist of themselves. These words do not abide, nor do they not abide; these words are non-existent, and the path of speech is cut off. This is called 'entering emptiness from provisionality through causal composition'.
2.65
Question: There are two kinds of 'emptiness': first, emptiness of intrinsic nature; second, emptiness of characteristics. How are these distinguished?
2.66
Answer: In the examination by the previous four propositions, the intrinsic nature of arising cannot be found; this is the emptiness of intrinsic nature. When one speaks of arising where there is no arising, this is provisional arising; provisional arising is non-arising, and non-arising is the emptiness of characteristics. Therefore, worldly truth refutes intrinsic nature and establishes the provisional; ultimate truth refutes the provisional, which is the emptiness of characteristics.
2.67
Second, examining the provisionality of continuity: does this one thought-moment of the mind arise from arising? Does it arise from cessation? Does it arise from both arising and cessation? Or does arising exist apart from arising and apart from cessation? If it arises from arising, that is arising from self-nature. If it arises because of cessation, that is arising from other-nature. If it arises from both arising and cessation, that is arising from a shared nature. If it arises apart from arising and apart from cessation, that is arising without causes and conditions. Even arising from causes and conditions is ungraspable, how much more so arising without cause! Now, contemplating this mind: it does not arise from self-nature, hence it does not arise from arising; it does not arise from other-nature, hence it does not arise from cessation; it does not arise from both self- and other-nature, hence it does not arise from the conjunction of arising and cessation; and it does not arise without cause, hence it does not arise apart from arising and apart from cessation. In this way, examining with the four propositions, arising cannot be grasped; yet one speaks of arising only in accordance with worldly verbal designation, which is why one speaks of arising. Verbal designation of arising is provisional arising; the arising of provisional designation is non-arising; when there is no verbal designation of arising, the path of words is cut off. This is termed "entering emptiness from the provisionality of continuity."
2.68
Question: If one says arising arises, that might be arising from self-nature, since it depends on cessation to arise; cessation-arising is not arising, which is the meaning of provisionality—how can you say it is other-nature?
2.69
Answer: If arising is called "self," how could cessation not be "other"! If cessation is not other, how could arising be self! Arising is self-nature, and cessation is other-nature. Since arising is self-nature, it cannot establish provisionality; since cessation is other-nature, how could one speak of provisionality? If cessation being other-nature allows one to speak of provisionality, then arising being self-nature should also allow one to speak of provisionality. Examining it critically in this way: arising due to arising is the error of self-nature; speaking of cessation as arising falls into the fault of other-nature. In this kind of argument, speaking of arising due to cessation fails to establish provisionality.
2.70
Third, examining the provisionality of relativity: does the mind of this view of self arise from arising? Does it arise from non-arising? Does it arise from both arising and non-arising? Or does it arise apart from arising and apart from non-arising? If it arises from arising, that is arising from self-nature; if it arises from non-arising, that is arising from other-nature; if it arises from both arising and non-arising, that is shared arising; if it arises apart from arising and apart from non-arising, that is uncaused arising. Arising from causes and conditions cannot even be asserted, how much less could one speak of arising without causes and conditions! Now, contemplating this mind of views: it does not arise from self-nature, hence it does not arise from arising; it does not arise from other-nature, hence it does not arise from non-arising; it does not arise from both self- and other-nature, hence it is not a shared arising of arising and non-arising; and it does not arise without cause, hence one does not speak of it arising apart from arising and non-arising. In this way, when examining arising through the four propositions fails to grasp it, that is non-arising. Speaking of arising when there is no arising is done merely in accordance with worldly verbal designations, and therefore one speaks of arising. The arising of verbal designation is provisional arising; the arising of provisional designation is non-arising; if there is no verbal designation of arising, then the path of words is cut off. This is termed "entering emptiness from the provisionality of relativity."
2.71
Question: Arising from arising may well be arising from self-nature; but speaking of arising in relativity to non-arising, how could that be arising from other-nature?
2.72
Answer: If arising is called "self," how could non-arising not be "other"! In the section on continuity, this was already fully analyzed; the finer categories can be known accordingly.
2.73
The Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra explains that Śāriputra asked Subhūti: "Does arising arise, or does non-arising arise?" Subhūti replied: "It is not that arising arises, nor is it that non-arising arises." This refutes the three provisionalities of the view of arising, comprising twelve contemplation gates in total. If, contemplating the arising and non-arising of the three provisionalities, one clings to non-arising, one again uses twelve contemplations to refute it. Refuting the view of both arising and non-arising also has twelve contemplations; refuting the view of neither arising nor non-arising likewise has twelve refutations. Combining the refutations of the four views, there are forty-eight contemplations in all. Since the refuting mind corresponds to what is refuted, refuting the contemplating mind also has forty-eight rounds. Combining the refuting and the refuted, there are ninety-six contemplation gates in total. By skillfully cultivating this contemplation, one contemplates that the characteristics of arising are ultimately ungraspable, and further, compound four views, complete four views, and ineffable views are all ungraspable. One suddenly opens into awakening: the sixty-two views and the eighty-eight entangling afflictions are all extinguished, and one attains [the stage of] srotāpanna. Therefore, the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra says: "Whether it be the knowledge or the abandonment of the srotāpanna, this is the bodhisattva's anutpattika-dharma-kṣānti." This is skillful crossing over, abandoning without abandoning, unlike the definitive abandoning of clumsy crossing over.
2.74
Second, concerning embodying the provisionality of craving to enter emptiness: the differentiation of the provisionality of craving is as explained before. Now, to explain cultivating the path: embodying the craving of the three realms, all is like dreams and illusions, and the three provisionalities are immediately empty; examining arising with the four propositions, none can be grasped. This is called embodying the provisionality of craving in the three realms to enter emptiness. Emptiness is the increase of true wisdom: when phenomena do not arise and prajñā arises, one severs the fetters of the three realms. If the six grades of desire-craving are exhausted, one is called a sakṛdāgāmin. Whether it be the knowledge or abandonment of a sakṛdāgāmin, this is the bodhisattva's anutpattika-dharma-kṣānti. Next, severing the remaining three grades of the lower fetters, one is called an anāgāmin. Whether it be the knowledge or abandonment of an anāgāmin, this is the bodhisattva's anutpattika-dharma-kṣānti. Severing the craving of the upper two realms and exhausting the five higher fetters, one is an arhat. Whether it be the knowledge or abandonment of an arhat, this is the bodhisattva's anutpattika-dharma-kṣānti. Even up to the pratyekabuddha, eliminating the residual habit-energies: whether it be knowledge or abandonment, this is also the bodhisattva's anutpattika-dharma-kṣānti. These are all skillful crossing over, abandoning without abandoning. This is the contemplation of causes and conditions being identical to emptiness, entering the contemplation of emptiness through the four noble truths of non-arising arising and non-arising; its efficacy reaches this point. It is also called all-knowledge (sarvajñatā) and also called the wisdom eye.
2.75
Second, explaining the contemplation of entering the provisional from emptiness, there are also three points: first, explaining the intention of entering the provisional; second, explaining the cultivation of the contemplation of entering the provisional; third, explaining the contemplation's completion in transforming beings.
2.76
First, explaining the intention of entering the provisional: this contemplation specifically contemplates the conventional truth to destroy ignorance [vast as] sands of dust. If the two vehicles do not transform beings, they do not need this contemplation; but for the bodhisattva's vast salvation, this contemplation is indispensable. As for what is called "entering the provisional from emptiness": if one stagnates in emptiness, one falls into the ground of the two vehicles. As the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra says: "With the divine eye, I see bodhisattvas [countless as] the sands of the Ganges in the worlds of the ten directions who study the bodhisattva path; few manage to enter the bodhisattva stage, while many fall into the ground of the two vehicles." Therefore, bodhisattvas of the shared teaching must enter the provisional from emptiness, and using the knowledge of the aspects of the path, enter the bodhisattva stage. If one does not stagnate in emptiness, it is like planting trees in space, diagnosing medicines and sicknesses, and transforming sentient beings.
2.77
Second, explaining the cultivation of the contemplation of entering the provisional: entering the provisional is of two kinds: first, entering all phenomena of the provisionality of views; second, entering all phenomena of the provisionality of craving.
2.78
First, explaining entering all phenomena of the provisionality of views: the bodhisattva abides in deep meditative absorption, knowing that emptiness is not [mere] emptiness; endowed with great compassion, they contemplate the provisional and discern the provisional. The provisional is of four kinds, and from these four views arise immeasurable views: first, the view of self-arising; second, the view of other-arising; third, the view of shared arising; fourth, the view of uncaused arising. Each of these four views possesses the sickness of grasping and dispute. Furthermore, clinging has two tiers:
2.79
First, clinging to the outsiders' views of the four arisings through perverse causes and conditions or no cause and conditions—namely, arising from primordial darkness producing mahat, arising from subtle atoms, arising from the sovereign deity (Īśvara), arising from time, and arising from nature (svabhāva).
2.80
Second, clinging to the Buddhist teaching's correct causes and conditions, generating the views of the four arisings: self, other, shared, and uncaused.
2.81
Clinging to the view of self-arising: if one reckons that the mind-faculty gives rise to the mental consciousness, then mind can produce mind. Thus the Saddharmasmṛtyupasthāna Sūtra says: "The mind is like a master painter, creating the various five aggregates; among all mundane phenomena, none is not created from the mind." It is also as explained in the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi.
2.82
Other-arising: the sūtra states, "Mind does not arise alone; it necessarily relies on conditions to arise." Therefore the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra says, "When there is a condition, thought arises; without a condition, thought does not arise." One should know that all phenomena arise from external conditions.
2.83
Shared arising: someone says, "As the sūtra states: 'The six contacts as condition give rise to the six feelings, obtaining all phenomena.'"
2.84
Spontaneous arising (nature): as the Nāgarāja Sūtra says, "All things arise naturally of themselves."
2.85
The Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra says: "The twelve links of dependent origination were not made by buddhas, devas, humans, or asuras; their nature is just so." The Buddha's four modes of teaching are all skillful means of the siddhāntas, entering the provisional to benefit beings. Yet sentient beings, confused and uncomprehending, either cling to the four extremes of the outsiders' perverse doctrines, or cling to the four extremes in the Buddhist sūtras and treatises, giving rise to dogmatic attachments. Therefore the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa says: "Prajñā is like a great mass of fire; the four sides cannot be grasped, or one is burned by the fire of wrong views." Now we explain that according to whatever view is grasped, that is suffering and the origin; if one can understand suffering and eradicate the origin, one must cultivate the path and realize cessation. All these are known as provisional names, like illusions and transformations.
2.86
Next, explaining entering all phenomena of the provisionality of craving can be known [by analogy].
2.87
Third, explaining the contemplation's completion in transforming beings: when the bodhisattva cultivates and realizes by entering the provisional from emptiness, this is contemplating the provisionality of causes and conditions, termed the immeasurable four noble truths of arising and non-arising, also called the knowledge of the aspects of the path (mārgākārajñatā), and also called the Dharma eye. Surpassing the ground of the two vehicles, they use the knowledge of the aspects of the path to enter the bodhisattva stage and cultivate realization by entering the provisional. The knowledge of the aspects of the path has three kinds: first, the aspects of the path of arising and cessation; second, the aspects of the path of non-arising; third, the aspects of the path relying on the storehouse consciousness. When the bodhisattva abides in this stage, in order to subdue the heavenly Māra and his retinue, they enter the provisionality of craving, manifesting various supernormal powers and even performing shared actions to benefit beings, expounding various treatises on affection—such as the Three Tomes and Five Canons of this land, texts that pacify the state and nurture the populace. In order to subdue non-Buddhists and their retinue, they enter the provisionality of views, displaying wisdom and even performing shared actions to benefit beings, expounding various treatises on views—just as the eighteen kinds of the six teachers all claim all-knowledge. They deeply know that the sicknesses of suffering and origin born of craving and views are immeasurable, and the medicines of the path and cessation are likewise immeasurable, all like immeasurable dreams and illusions; using the four siddhāntas, they respond to their capacities and conditions, prescribing medicines according to the sickness. Furthermore, in order to deliver such immeasurable sentient beings, the bodhisattva sports with supernormal powers, purifies the buddha-lands, brings sentient beings to maturity, and enters the provisional to cultivate immeasurable vows and practices. This is "the contemplation's completion in transforming beings."
2.88
Third, explaining the middle way paramārtha contemplation comprises three points: first, explaining the object of contemplation; second, explaining cultivating the contemplating mind; third, explaining realization and completion.
2.89
First, explaining the object of contemplation: the preceding two contemplations are skillful means; although they have the wisdom that illumines the two truths, they have not yet broken through fundamental ignorance and do not perceive the middle way. Illuminating the ultimate and the conventional separately is itself the cognitive obscuration (jñeyāvaraṇa). Therefore the Mahāyānasaṃgraha says: "The cognitive obscuration is extremely dark and blind, meaning the differentiation between the ultimate and conventional." The cognitive obscuration relies on the ālayavijñāna. Consciousness is the stage of the entrenchment of ignorance; the stage of the entrenchment of ignorance is the root of birth and death. Hence this sūtra says: "From the root of non-abiding, all phenomena are established." The root of non-abiding is beginningless ignorance, upon which no other affliction abides or relies.
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Linked texts (1)
- 維摩經玄疏 — Classical Chinese