維摩經玄疏 2.33

2.33

Answer: If the object is called "self," how could wisdom not be "other"? If wisdom is not other, how could the object be self? If the object is inherent nature, then wisdom is other-nature. If the object is inherent nature, it cannot be established as provisional; if wisdom is other-nature, how could it be spoken of as provisional? If wisdom is other-nature and can thereupon be spoken of as provisional, then the object being inherent nature should also be spoken of as provisional! If the object is inherent nature and cannot be spoken of as provisional, how could wisdom being other-nature be spoken of as provisional! Examining in this manner, speaking of wisdom on the basis of the object is the error of inherent nature; speaking of wisdom as the object falls into the fault of other-nature. Arguing in this way, speaking of the object on the basis of wisdom fails to establish the provisional. If it does not establish a provisional object, it is not an inconceivable object. If, when examining the object through the four propositions, it is ultimately unobtainable and yet spoken of as an object, then it is a provisional object and is also an inconceivable object. Wisdom is also like this. This inconceivable object and wisdom is precisely the correct meaning of the inconceivable object and wisdom clarified in this sūtra. Hence the Chapter on the Yakṣa Saṃjñeya in the Suvarṇaprabhāsa Sūtra states: "I now see the light of inconceivable wisdom... the object of inconceivable wisdom."