維摩經略疏 4.95

4.95

「謂我」下，二、正述被彈。大意為二問：一問若是敬田乃可取食，二問若是悲田乃可取食。初問多依通圓，後問多約別圓。所以然者，非為惜食，但善吉自謂應供生福田想，故須問其真偽。若是聖人可作敬田，若非敬田即須愜同魔外悲田取食。善吉不測問旨深玄，欲從敬田而取，所問聖法皆悉不知，始從悲田而取。何容無學頓同魔外？逡巡兩楹進退不可，便棄鉢欲去。淨名彈呵，正意在此。初問敬田，文為二：一問知聖法不？二問是聖人不？「若能至取食」，初、問知聖法不？若知，乃可取食，以法能成人，故先約法問。義推有二：一約事問、二約理問。事者，若知聖法，事中於食等者，事法亦等，化他自行慈悲平等，不應捨貧從富，如前所明。以食不等，故慈悲觀行皆悉不等，是為於食不等、於法不等。既慈悲觀行不等，故乞食不等，是則於法不等、於食不等。若俱不等，云何取食？復次若謂有可破、空不可破，心無畏難而來乞者，則有空不等於法不等。法不等故，詣問求食，食亦不等。菩薩不爾，空有不偏是則法等，法等故食等，食等故即不如善吉恃空無畏因食生諍，何名無諍？若能有空平等於食無諍，即是能知聖法，可謂敬田。修觀行者若能如是，即真乞士。二約理者，如《大品》云「一切法趣味，是趣不過。」味尚不可得，云何當有趣非趣？今言一切法趣味，味即法界含一切法。食有故法有，食無故法無，今食不可得故，尚不可見有，云何有趣？尚不見無，云何有非趣？即是中道三昧真禪悅食，而能通達趣非趣法雙照二諦，得三諦三昧，名真法喜，是名法食平等。又諸法等者，一切諸法趣陰入界乃至一切種智，陰入界一切種智不可得故，云何當有趣非趣？宛然具足趣及非趣，則一切諸法皆具三諦，如《大論》喻剎那三相，是為諸法亦等。若見食法性不異諸法法性，即二法一等。又於食等者，若通達諸法三諦之理，即是食中三諦之理，所以於食亦等。能如是知，是知聖法，方是敬田，乃可取食。既不能如是，即非敬田，何得取食？此去多是觀心明義，故不須別立。

From "Said to me" below, second, directly recounting the rebuke. The broad meaning consists of two inquiries: first, asking whether he is a field of respect, so that he may take the food; second, asking whether he is a field of compassion, so that he may take the food. The first inquiry is mostly based on the shared and perfect [teachings]; the second inquiry is mostly based on the distinct and perfect [teachings]. The reason for this is: it is not out of begrudging food, but because Subhūti considered himself worthy of offerings and gave rise to the notion of being a field of merit; therefore, he had to examine whether he was genuine or false. If he is a noble one, he can serve as a field of respect; if he is not a field of respect, he must appropriately take the food as equal to the field of compassion of māras and non-Buddhists. Subhūti did not fathom the profound subtlety of the inquiry's intent; wishing to receive it as a field of respect, he was entirely ignorant of the noble teachings being questioned, yet to begin with he had taken it as a field of compassion. How could an arhat (aśaikṣa) suddenly be equated with māras and non-Buddhists? Hesitating between the two pillars, unable to advance or retreat, he abandoned his bowl and wished to leave. Vimalakīrti's rebuke was specifically aimed at this. The first inquiry, regarding the field of respect, has two parts: first, asking whether he knows the noble Dharma; second, asking whether he is a noble person. "If you can [...] take the food": first, asking whether he knows the noble Dharma. If he knows it, he may take the food; because the Dharma can fulfill the person, he first inquires in terms of the Dharma. Deductively there are two meanings: first, inquiring in terms of phenomena; second, inquiring in terms of principle. Regarding phenomena: if he knows the noble Dharma, then if in phenomena he is equal toward food, the phenomena and Dharma are also equal; transforming others and his own practice, compassion would be impartial, and he should not abandon the poor to follow the rich, as clarified earlier. Because he was unequal toward food, his compassion and contemplation practice were both unequal; this is being unequal toward food and unequal toward the Dharma. Since his compassion and contemplation practice were unequal, his begging for food was unequal; this is being unequal toward the Dharma and unequal toward food. If both are unequal, how can he take the food? Furthermore, if he thought that existence could be refuted while emptiness could not be refuted, and came to beg with a mind devoid of fear or hesitation, then existence and emptiness were unequal, and he was unequal toward the Dharma. Because the Dharma was unequal, when he approached and asked for food, the food was also unequal. Bodhisattvas are not like this: without bias toward emptiness or existence, this is equality of Dharma; because the Dharma is equal, the food is equal; because the food is equal, they are not like Subhūti, who relied on emptiness without fear and gave rise to dispute because of food—how could that be called non-dispute? If he could be equal toward existence and emptiness and without dispute toward food, that would be being able to know the noble Dharma, and he could be called a field of respect. If a practitioner of contemplation can be like this, he is a true mendicant. Second, regarding principle: as the Dàpǐn says, "All phenomena tend toward taste, and this tendency does not exceed it." Taste itself is unattainable, so how could there be tending or non-tending? Here it is said that all phenomena tend toward taste: taste is the dharmadhātu, which contains all phenomena. When food exists, phenomena exist; when food does not exist, phenomena do not exist. Now, because food is unattainable, existence cannot even be seen, so how could there be tending? Non-existence is not even seen, so how could there be non-tending? This is the samādhi of the Middle Way, the food of true meditative joy, being able to penetrate the phenomena of tending and non-tending, illuminating both of the two truths, attaining the samādhi of the three truths, called true Dharma joy; this is called equality of Dharma and food. Furthermore, that all phenomena are equal means: all phenomena tend toward aggregates, sense bases, and elements, up to the knowledge of all aspects. Because aggregates, sense bases, elements, and the knowledge of all aspects are unattainable, how could there be tending or non-tending? Fully possessing tending and non-tending in their entirety, all phenomena are endowed with the three truths, like the Dàzhìdù lùn's analogy of the three characteristics of a single moment (kṣaṇa); this is all phenomena also being equal. If one sees that the nature of the phenomenon of food is not different from the nature of all phenomena, then the two phenomena are unified and equal. Furthermore, being equal toward food means: if one penetrates the principle of the three truths in all phenomena, that is the principle of the three truths within food; therefore one is also equal toward food. Being able to know like this is knowing the noble Dharma; only then is one a field of respect and may take the food. Since he cannot do so, he is not a field of respect; how could he take the food? From here on, the meanings are mostly clarified through the contemplation of mind, so there is no need to establish them separately.