維摩經略疏 2.57
English (machine translation) 2.57
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2.57
Question: Non-Buddhists also say that the soul and the world are neither permanent nor impermanent, which is just 'neither existent nor non-existent'; and the Lesser Vehicle also, for Channa, spoke of freedom from existence and non-existence. How, then, can you say that this is solely the Mahāyāna? Answer: Ordinary persons and non-Buddhists do not even see the non-existence of the ultimate truth, let alone what is 'not non-existent'. Although 'neither existent nor non-existent' is spoken of in the śrāvaka sūtras, they only see the non-existence of the ultimate truth; when have they ever seen the principle of what is 'not non-existent' within the middle? To explain the differences among the 'double negations' in terms of the teachings: if non-Buddhists postulate single, complex, complete, double-negation propositions, as well as the ineffable, these are all deluded passions; they do not see the principle of emptiness and do not transcend birth and death—they do not even have 'not existent', let alone 'not non-existent'—and all of them are refuted by the existence-door of the Tripiṭaka. The Tripiṭaka's refutation of views has four doors in all: the sūtra spoken for Channa on freedom from existence and non-existence is merely the door of neither existence nor non-existence. If one attains the expedient means and enters the principle through this door, it is termed only 'not existent' and not 'not non-existent'; if one does not attain the expedient means, one falls into existence and non-existence, being equivalent to the non-Buddhists. Even if they enter the principle, it is still not the Mahāyāna's 'neither existent nor non-existent'. The shared teaching contemplates form and the like as being all like illusions and transformations, and does not speak of existence or non-existence. If one enters the principle through this door, this is the door of neither existence nor non-existence. If one turns to a person of the shared [teaching], hears the explanation, and sees the principle, yet grasps it as conceptual proliferation, burned by the fire of wrong views, then even if they enter the principle, it is still not the Middle Way's 'neither existent nor non-existent'. The separate [teaching]'s contemplation of the Middle Way, which explains 'neither existent nor non-existent' by refuting the two extremes, explains 'neither existent nor non-existent' with respect to the four doors of the matrix-nature (garbha-dhātu), differing from the preceding two teachings. If one succeeds in entering the principle, then refutation is not required; if one has not yet awakened, it is foolish discourse, not the true Middle Way's 'neither existent nor non-existent'. Although the perfect [teaching] has four doors, one door is itself the four doors, and the four doors are itself the one door; it does not fixate on existence or non-existence and has nothing on which to rely, using this empty, open mind to suddenly see the Middle Way. If attachment arises even toward this, it must still be refuted, let alone toward the rest. Now, distinguishing the spurious to reveal the true attains the meaning of the perfect [teaching]; 'neither existent nor non-existent' is used to praise the superior response [body]'s being 'neither existent nor non-existent'. Furthermore, the double negations of the preceding three [teachings] are provisional, while the perfect teaching is real; both the provisional and the real are spoken of, which is why it says that his expounding of the Dharma is 'neither existent nor non-existent'.
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- 維摩經略疏 — Classical Chinese