維摩經略疏 4.48

4.48

From "Dharma is without..." downward, second, [the text] specifically explains the three emptinesses by embodying dharmas, refuting his error of employing the three emptinesses through deconstructive analysis. This has three parts: first, four iterations explain the emptiness of sentient beings in the Mahāyāna teaching, refuting the emptiness of sentient beings through deconstructive analysis; next, eight iterations explain the emptiness of dharmas by embodying dharmas, refuting the emptiness of dharmas through deconstructive analysis; third, seven iterations together with six phrases explain equal emptiness, refuting the equal emptiness of the Tripiṭaka [teaching]. One must briefly differentiate the divergence among the three emptinesses. As for the three emptinesses of the Tripiṭaka, that teaching explains that the five aggregates constitute a person; seeking a person either within the aggregates or apart from the aggregates, none can be found—this is called the emptiness of sentient beings. Deconstructing the five aggregates into emptiness is called the emptiness of dharmas. Therefore the Āgamas state: "'Who is it that grows old and dies?' and 'It is this that grows old and dies'—both are wrong views." The absence of "who grows old and dies" is called the emptiness of sentient beings; the absence of "this grows old and dies" is called the emptiness of dharmas. Relying on the Abhidharma approach, only the emptiness of sentient beings is explained; the emptiness approach of the Tattvasiddhi explains all three emptinesses completely. There is a master who explains equal emptiness, saying: "If there are persons and dharmas, it is not called equal; the absence of distinction between person and dharma is precisely equality; equality being empty is called equal emptiness." Now, examining this statement: if equality is itself equal emptiness, then sentient beings and dharmas should likewise themselves be the emptiness of sentient beings and dharmas. If simply sentient beings and dharmas are not the emptiness of sentient beings and dharmas, and one must deconstruct sentient beings and dharmas before calling it the emptiness of sentient beings and dharmas, then one must likewise deconstruct equality before it can be called equal emptiness. If one merely posits two emptinesses, equality pertains to dharmas, for the term "dharma" is all-encompassing, leaving nothing unincluded. Therefore the Dàzhìdù lùn states: "Among dharmas, nirvāṇa is unexcelled"; hence the emptiness of nirvāṇa is still the emptiness of dharmas. Although both two and three [emptinesses are posited], all deconstruct nominal designations, which is called clumsy crossing; refuting the clumsy and employing the skilful, one explains embodying emptiness. Now, illustrating the difference between deconstruction and embodiment through an analogy: like an actual fist and fingers versus a fist and fingers in a mirror reflection, it is fully set out in the Profound Meaning. A wise person embodies the knowledge that the mirror reflection is without fist, without fingers, and without emptiness; one does not need to deconstruct it before knowing there is no emptiness. These three dharmas are merely nominal designations; dharmas of nominal designation are neither inside, outside, nor in between, nor do they exist of themselves; these names neither abide nor do not abide; the path of language is cut off, beyond explanation and beyond demonstration. Such being the nature of dharmas, how could it be spoken of? In the case of the three emptinesses of the Tripiṭaka, the former two are expedient means, and only equal emptiness begins to be real. In the case of the three emptinesses of the Mahāyāna teaching, one embodies the real and enters the Middle; in the case of the three emptinesses of the Shared Teaching, all equally attain the vision of the real. Those of superior faculties and sharp wisdom, though receiving the Shared Teaching, see that emptiness is not empty and immediately see the buddha-nature. Here Vimalakīrti uses embodiment to refute deconstruction; hence he says, "You should not speak as the benevolent one has spoken."