維摩經略疏垂裕記 1.212

1.212

二、釋，二：初、明法無定性。荊溪云：若定有者不應有四，若定無者亦不應四。二、「若其」下，示執無之過。荊溪云：則有二失。一者壞佛方便教失，方便對實則有四種；二者增於不信之人破正教失，以不信者不信佛有逗機眾教。今還不許佛法諸教正義，當於不信之人所不信境。三藏教中尚有三文以明於我假實不同、更互破立，顯我不無。及後三教並明有我，是故當知不可無也。雖然許有，不可定一意，欲並存權實諸說，以醻難者佛法無我。故知。任彼各立其宗。方便教中三藏已多，況復三權一實相對其名不一，何得一向云無我耶？故知有無無非佛法。

Second, the explanation, in two parts: first, clarifying that phenomena have no fixed nature. Jingxi states: if it were definitively existent, there should not be four; if it were definitively non-existent, there also should not be four. Second, from "If they" below, showing the error of grasping at non-existence. Jingxi states: there are then two faults. First, the fault of destroying the Buddha's expedient teachings: the expedients in contrast to the real are of four types; second, the fault of increasing those without faith in destroying the correct teaching, because those without faith do not believe that the Buddha has various teachings that respond to capacities. Now, if one also does not accept the correct meanings of the various teachings of the Buddha's Dharma, that matches the realm disbelieved by those without faith. In the storehouse teaching there are still three passages clarifying the differences between the conventional and real of the self, mutually refuting and establishing to show that the self is not non-existent. And the subsequent three teachings all clarify that there is a self; therefore one should know that it cannot be non-existent. Although existence is accepted, it cannot be fixed as a single meaning; the intent is to preserve both provisional and real expositions to respond to the objector's claim that the Buddha's Dharma lacks a self. Thus one knows. Let each establish their own tenets. In the expedient teachings, the storehouse [teaching] already has many, let alone the three provisional and one real contrasted with one another whose designations are not uniform—how could one exclusively say that there is no self? Thus we know that whether existence or non-existence, neither is not the Buddha's Dharma.