維摩經略疏垂裕記 3.74

3.74

二、「初文」下，隨釋五：初、正答，二：初答果，二：初、正答，三。初、標章總答，二：初、事釋，二：初、總示。「然土不在至已如前說」者，荊溪云：問既非四句，土定在誰？答：秖緣定屬，以成性過，故四句中皆云不在。言四句者，破凡非聖。凡理本來亦無性過，眾生業力不可思議，佛菩薩應亦復如是。豈兩難思合成性過？離二無別，不可思議。應知思議即不思議，況不思議理可思議耶？若離若合皆不逾理。作此觀之，諸土永寂無可說示，四悉示之隨聞獲益。餘何可論。

Second, from "the initial text" onward, commenting according to the text, in five [parts]: First, the proper reply, in two [parts]: First, replying regarding the fruition, in two [parts]: First, the proper reply, in three [parts]. First, stating the topic and giving a general reply, in two [parts]: First, phenomenal explanation, in two [parts]: First, general indication. Regarding "however, the land is not in […] as explained previously," Jingxi says: One asks: since it is not within the four propositions, to whom does the land definitely belong? The answer is: precisely because a definitive attribution constitutes the fault of intrinsic nature, it is said in all four propositions to be "not in." The mention of "four propositions" refutes the ordinary, not the noble. In the principle of the ordinary, originally there is also no fault of intrinsic nature; the karmic power of sentient beings is inconceivable, and the responses of the Buddhas and bodhisattvas are likewise so. How could two inconceivable things combine to produce the fault of intrinsic nature? Apart from the two, there is nothing else; it is inconceivable. One should know that the conceivable is itself the inconceivable, so how could the principle of the inconceivable be conceivable? Whether separate or united, neither exceeds the principle. Viewing it with this contemplation, the various lands are eternally quiescent, with nothing that can be preached or shown; yet showing them through the four siddhāntas, beings obtain benefit according to what they hear. What else is there to discuss?