維摩經略疏垂裕記 4.123

4.123

二番，荊溪云：問學等者，此問從前答文而生。若真若中俱得名理。附中之惑既名自體，依真亦名自體惑耶？前答既用攝論師名，今還承茲以為進難。答中意者，二真既別，真義乃殊。故障界內全非自體，不可同於障中立名，況二惑體殊麁細永別，二真元隔何須疆同？故知自體以對於中則顯偏真，非自非體，但對無為不合別立，故依前破有理存焉。

The second round, Jingxi says: "Regarding the question on trainees and so on: this question arises from the preceding answer text. Whether the true or the middle, both can be named principle. If the delusion attached to the middle is already named 'own substance,' when relying on the true is it also named the delusion of 'own substance'? Since the preceding answer made use of the terminology of the *Saṃgraha* masters, now, relying on this, an objection is advanced. The intention in the answer is: since the two truths are different, the meaning of 'true' is distinct. Therefore, what obstructs the internal realm is entirely not one's own substance, and cannot be named identically with what obstructs the middle; how much more so, as the substances of the two delusions are distinct and eternally separated as coarse and subtle, the two truths are fundamentally divided, so why must they be forced to be identical? Therefore, we know that when 'own substance' is contrasted with the middle, it reveals biased truth; it is neither self nor substance, but when contrasted with the unconditioned, it should not be separately established; thus, relying on the previous refutation, the principle remains present."