維摩經略疏垂裕記 8.145

8.145

四、問空可分別，二：初、問。荊溪云：先正難，次「若以」下引同小乘。「若是空」者下，夫云空者應空分別，今那更云空不空耶？二、答，二：初、依實正釋，二：初、明能所俱空。荊溪云：答意者，分別尚空，況不分別，豈不空耶。「若所觀分別」等者，雖約境智相對以辨無分別相，而須互作自他等性，及以破性而辨二空。二、「若能」下，約能所互顯。初以能顯所，「以所觀」下，以所顯能。

Fourth, regarding the question of whether emptiness can be differentiated, there are two parts. First is the question. Jingxi says: "First he directly challenges; next, from 'if by' onward, he cites agreement with the Hīnayāna. From 'if this emptiness' onward: now, that which is called emptiness should empty differentiation; why then say further 'empty and not empty'?" Second is the answer, which has two parts: first, directly explaining according to the real, which has two parts: first, clarifying that both subject and object are empty. Jingxi says: "The meaning of the answer is that differentiation itself is still empty, so how much more so non-differentiation—how could it not be empty? Regarding 'if the observed differentiation', etc.: although distinguishing the marks of non-differentiation by pairing object and wisdom, one must still mutually posit their self-nature and other-nature, etc., and distinguish the two kinds of emptiness by refuting intrinsic nature." Second, from 'if the subjective' onward, mutually revealing [them] in terms of subject and object: first revealing the object through the subject; from 'since the observed' onward, revealing the subject through the object.