維摩經略疏垂裕記 9.109

9.109

二、更對法性簡無始，二：初、問。二、答，二：初、從容兩釋。謂約即離二義釋之也。文為二：初、約真妄兩殊性非惑本。「不可指法性為煩惱本」者，法性靜、煩惱動，法性真、煩惱妄，氣類既異其猶水火，豈得指水為火本耶？此乃約離義說。既真妄事乖，故法性非無明之本也。二、「若依」下，約即妄是真性為惑本。「無明不出法性」等者，以妄體全真、動法元靜，真為真本、靜為靜本，氣類且同，而言法性為無明本者，何足怪耶？此約即義說。既事理體一，得言法性為無明本也。世有火井，既井中生火，則是水為火本，仍符前喻。

Second, further distinguishing beginninglessness in relation to dharmatā, in two parts: first, a question; second, an answer, in two parts: first, two accommodating explanations. This means explaining it in terms of the two meanings of identity and separation. The text has two parts: first, in terms of truth and delusion being two different natures, [dharmatā] is not the basis of afflictions. Regarding "dharmatā cannot be pointed to as the basis of afflictions": dharmatā is quiet, afflictions are active; dharmatā is true, afflictions are delusional. Since their natures and kinds are already different, like water and fire, how could water be pointed to as the basis of fire? This is spoken in terms of the meaning of separation. Since truth and delusion diverge in phenomena, dharmatā is not the basis of ignorance. Second, from "If according to..." onward, in terms of identity, delusion is the true nature and serves as the basis of afflictions. Regarding "Ignorance does not go beyond dharmatā," etc.: because the substance of delusion is entirely true, and active dharmas are originally quiet, truth is the basis of truth, and quietude is the basis of quietude. Since their natures and kinds are moreover identical, when it is said that dharmatā is the basis of ignorance, what cause for wonder is there? This is spoken in terms of the meaning of identity. Since phenomena and principle are one in substance, one may say that dharmatā is the basis of ignorance. In the world there are fire-wells; since fire is produced from within a well, water is the basis of fire, which still accords with the previous metaphor.