淨名玄論 5.20

5.20

問：《大品》二智與《淨名》二智何異？答。凡有三說，辨五時義，如上所明。《大品》鑒空有為二慧，《淨名》知病識藥、應病授藥。無為權實用四時義，云《大品》、《淨名》同為第二教。但《大品》通說淺深，《淨名》徧明八地以上，然同辨照空為實、鑒有為權也。此二，南土人釋也。有人言：維摩是圓教，非染非淨、染淨雙遊。此北土論師釋也。今謂不然，「智度菩薩母，方便以為父，一切眾導師，無不由是生。」豈得局在《波若》、不通《淨名》？又鑒空照有，故名般若、漚和，此多明菩薩自行。知病識藥、應病授藥，蓋明大士化他之法。夫為菩薩，皆具斯二，何得以化他而呈《淨名》、自行以局《大品》？故前釋為非也。《釋論》列《法華》等十種大經，而《般若》最大，豈言《大品》通說淺深、《淨名》獨明妙道？若言《淨名》是八地以上之人故法深者，如來為究竟果地，於般若應為宗妙，又身子善吉小人說之便非大法。若云《淨名》辨不思議、巨細容入復為深者，《般若》明指障風力、毛舉大千，豈不明耶？又般若、謳和，不思議之本也；借座、請飯，不思議之迹也。《大品》盛明二慧，則辨不思議本。《淨名》現通，乃顯不思議迹，何得本通淺深而跡謂為妙？若三乘通學般若，故復般若通淺深；淨名釋於智度菩薩母，則是般若。豈不通？又云是圓頓教者，是亦不然。般若等亦廣歎菩薩權道方便，何故獨以淨名為圓頓教耶？今明《大品》、《淨名》明二惠有同異。所言同者，智度菩薩母、方便以為父，則知二經皆照空為實、涉有為權也。所言異者，《大品》先明實慧、後明方便，九十章經開為二道，六十六品明般若道，餘二十四品辨方便道。所以先明實慧、後辨方便者，實相為本、諸法為末。般若照實相，故波若為本；方便照諸法，故方便為末。此示二本二末，從本至末、從體起用，故先明實慧、後辨方便也。又一切諸見凡有二種：一者有見、二者無見。般若破其有見、方便破其無見，則顯中道、遠離二邊，故先明實慧、後明方便，則破見次第也。又菩薩退有二事：一貪三界、二取小乘。方便實慧故不著三界、實慧方便故不墮二乘，故入菩薩位，得至佛道。要須先離三界、後離二乘，故先明實慧、後辨方便。此如《法華》五百由旬嶮難惡道，三界為三百、二乘為二百，先離三百、後離二百，故先明實慧、後辨權慧。故《大品》中以二乘合為一百，但明四百，開合為異，與《法華》大同，如彼廣說。又叡公《釋論．序》云「正覺知邪思之自起，故阿含為之作；鑒滯有之由惑，故般若為之內照。」若然者，波若則明破小乘之有，故先明實慧。雖破著有，復恐證空，故方便破空。此約教之先後為次第也。次就位明者，前明般若道，謂六地以還法門；次明方便，則七地以上無生忍。此皆大判為言。龍樹云「般若中非無方便，方便中非無般若」，但前多明般若，後多明方便。次《淨名經》辨二慧者，先明方便、後辨於實。所以然者，此教所興正起於疾，故云「其以方便現身有疾」。以有疾故，便有方丈二集菴薗兩會，故前明方便、後辨實也。又成就眾生、淨佛國土，此是菩薩方便之用。故〈佛國〉一品明淨佛國土，〈方便〉以去辨成就眾生，是以此經多明方便也。又《大品》多明自行二慧，《淨名》多辨外化權實。何以知然，《大品》明般若不著有、漚和不證空，此多是菩薩自行二慧。《淨名經》內靜鑒根藥、外則廣現神通，故多明化他二慧。又《大品》多明實慧方便慧，《淨名經》多明權實二慧。

Question: What is the difference between the two cognitions of the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā Sūtra and the two cognitions of the Vimalakīrti Sūtra?

Answer: In all, there are three explanations. Distinguishing the meaning of the five periods is as explained above. The Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā Sūtra perceives emptiness and existence as the two wisdoms; the Vimalakīrti Sūtra knows the disease and recognises the medicine, applying medicine in response to the disease. Those who take the asaṃskṛta provisional and real according to the meaning of the four periods say that the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā and the Vimalakīrti Sūtra are together the second teaching; however, the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā broadly explains both the shallow and the profound, while the Vimalakīrti Sūtra comprehensively illuminates from the eighth bhūmi and above, yet both alike distinguish illuminating emptiness as the real and observing existence as the provisional. These two are the explanations of masters from the southern lands.

Some say: "Vimalakīrti is the perfect teaching, neither defiled nor pure, yet disporting in both defilement and purity." This is the explanation of the treatise masters of the northern lands.

I say now that this is not so. "The perfection of wisdom is the mother of bodhisattvas, and upāya is their father; all guides of beings are born from these without exception." How could this be restricted to the Prajñā[pāramitā] and not apply to the Vimalakīrti Sūtra? Furthermore, perceiving emptiness and illuminating existence are named prajñā and upāya; this mostly clarifies the bodhisattva's own practice. Knowing the disease and recognising the medicine, and applying medicine in response to the disease, clarifies the Great Being's method of transforming others. As bodhisattvas, all are endowed with these two; how could one present the Vimalakīrti Sūtra solely through transforming others and confine the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā to one's own practice? Therefore, the previous explanations are incorrect.

The Dazhidulun lists ten kinds of great sūtras, such as the Lotus Sūtra, yet the Prajñā[pāramitā] is the greatest; how could one say that the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā broadly explains both the shallow and the profound, while the Vimalakīrti Sūtra alone illuminates the wondrous path? If it is said that the teaching of the Vimalakīrti Sūtra is profound because [its interlocutors] are people of the eighth bhūmi and above, the Tathāgata is the ultimate fruit-stage and should be the central marvel of the Prajñā[pāramitā]; moreover, if Śāriputra and Subhūti, being lesser men, spoke it, then it would not be a great teaching. If it is said that the Vimalakīrti Sūtra distinguishes the inconceivable, where the immense and the minute accommodate each other, and is therefore profound, does not the Prajñā[pāramitā] clarify the power of a finger obstructing the wind, or a single hair lifting up the great chiliocosm—does it not make this clear? Furthermore, prajñā and upāya are the root of the inconceivable; borrowing the seats and requesting the meal are the traces of the inconceivable. The Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā abundantly clarifies the two wisdoms, thus distinguishing the root of the inconceivable; the Vimalakīrti Sūtra manifests supernormal powers, thereby showing the traces of the inconceivable. How could the root be common to both shallow and profound while the traces are considered wondrous? If the three vehicles study prajñā in common, and so prajñā is common to the shallow and the profound, the Vimalakīrti Sūtra explains that the perfection of wisdom is the mother of bodhisattvas, which is prajñā itself; how could it not be common [to both]?

Furthermore, to say that it is the perfect and sudden teaching is also not so. The Prajñā[pāramitā] and other texts also broadly praise the provisional path and upāya of bodhisattvas; why should the Vimalakīrti Sūtra alone be taken as the perfect and sudden teaching?

I now clarify that the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā and the Vimalakīrti Sūtra have both similarities and differences in clarifying the two wisdoms. As for the similarity: since the perfection of wisdom is the mother of bodhisattvas and upāya is their father, we know that both sūtras illuminate emptiness as the real and engage existence as the provisional. As for the difference: the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā first clarifies real wisdom and afterwards clarifies upāya. Its ninety chapters are opened into two paths: sixty-six chapters clarify the path of prajñā, and the remaining twenty-four chapters distinguish the path of upāya. The reason it first clarifies real wisdom and afterwards distinguishes upāya is that dharmatā is the root and all phenomena are the branches. Prajñā illuminates dharmatā, so prajñā is the root; upāya illuminates all phenomena, so upāya is the branches. This shows two roots and two branches, proceeding from root to branches and giving rise to function from essence; hence it first clarifies real wisdom and afterwards distinguishes upāya.

Furthermore, all views are of two kinds: first, the view of existence; second, the view of non-existence. Prajñā refutes the view of existence, and upāya refutes the view of non-existence, thereby revealing the madhyamā pratipad and leaving behind the two extremes. Therefore, first clarifying real wisdom and afterwards clarifying upāya constitutes the sequence of refuting views.

Furthermore, the regress of a bodhisattva involves two matters: first, craving the three realms; second, taking up the Hinayana. Through upāya and real wisdom, one does not cling to the three realms; through real wisdom and upāya, one does not fall into the two vehicles. Therefore one enters the bodhisattva stage and is able to attain the Buddha path. One must necessarily leave the three realms first and leave the two vehicles afterwards; therefore it first clarifies real wisdom and afterwards distinguishes upāya. This is like the five-hundred-yojana perilous and evil path in the Lotus Sūtra: the three realms are three hundred [yojanas] and the two vehicles are two hundred [yojanas]; one leaves the three hundred first and leaves the two hundred afterwards. Hence it first clarifies real wisdom and afterwards distinguishes provisional wisdom. Thus in the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā the two vehicles are combined as one hundred, clarifying only four hundred; opening and combining differ, but it is broadly identical with the Lotus Sūtra, as is explained at length there.

Furthermore, Master Sengrui's preface to the Dazhidulun states: "The Fully Awakened One, knowing that mistaken thoughts arise from oneself, therefore produced the Āgamas; perceiving that attachment to existence is caused by delusion, therefore made the Prajñā[pāramitā] to provide internal illumination." If that is so, then the Prajñā[pāramitā] clarifies the refutation of the existence posited by the Hinayana; hence it first clarifies real wisdom. Although it refutes clinging to existence, it also fears the realization of emptiness; hence upāya refutes emptiness. This is the sequence determined according to the order of the teachings.

Next, clarifying in terms of stages: what is first clarified as the path of prajñā refers to the Dharma gates of the sixth bhūmi and below; what is next clarified as upāya is the non-arising tolerance of the seventh bhūmi and above. These are all broad distinctions. Nāgārjuna says, "Within prajñā there is no absence of upāya; within upāya there is no absence of prajñā," but the former mostly clarifies prajñā, while the latter mostly clarifies upāya.

Next, when the Vimalakīrti Sūtra distinguishes the two wisdoms, it first clarifies upāya and afterwards distinguishes the real. Why is this? The arising of this teaching directly originates from the illness; hence it says: "Through upāya he manifested illness in his body." Because there was illness, there were the two gatherings in the ten-foot room and the two assemblies in the Āmrapālī Grove; therefore it first clarifies upāya and afterwards distinguishes the real. Furthermore, maturing sentient beings and purifying Buddha lands are the applications of the bodhisattva's upāya. Thus the chapter on "Buddha Land" clarifies purifying Buddha lands, and from "Upāya" onward it distinguishes maturing sentient beings; for this reason, this sūtra mostly clarifies upāya.

Furthermore, the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā mostly clarifies the two wisdoms of one's own practice, whereas the Vimalakīrti Sūtra mostly distinguishes the provisional and real of transforming others. How is this known? The Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā clarifies that prajñā does not cling to existence and upāya does not realize emptiness; this mostly pertains to the two wisdoms of the bodhisattva's own practice. The Vimalakīrti Sūtra internally and serenely observes the faculties and medicines, and externally manifests supernormal powers extensively; therefore it mostly clarifies the two wisdoms of transforming others. Furthermore, the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā mostly clarifies real wisdom and expedient wisdom, whereas the Vimalakīrti Sūtra mostly clarifies the two wisdoms of the provisional and the real.