淨名玄論 5.20

5.20

Question: What is the difference between the two cognitions of the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā Sūtra and the two cognitions of the Vimalakīrti Sūtra?

Answer: In all, there are three explanations. Distinguishing the meaning of the five periods is as explained above. The Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā Sūtra perceives emptiness and existence as the two wisdoms; the Vimalakīrti Sūtra knows the disease and recognises the medicine, applying medicine in response to the disease. Those who take the asaṃskṛta provisional and real according to the meaning of the four periods say that the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā and the Vimalakīrti Sūtra are together the second teaching; however, the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā broadly explains both the shallow and the profound, while the Vimalakīrti Sūtra comprehensively illuminates from the eighth bhūmi and above, yet both alike distinguish illuminating emptiness as the real and observing existence as the provisional. These two are the explanations of masters from the southern lands.

Some say: "Vimalakīrti is the perfect teaching, neither defiled nor pure, yet disporting in both defilement and purity." This is the explanation of the treatise masters of the northern lands.

I say now that this is not so. "The perfection of wisdom is the mother of bodhisattvas, and upāya is their father; all guides of beings are born from these without exception." How could this be restricted to the Prajñā[pāramitā] and not apply to the Vimalakīrti Sūtra? Furthermore, perceiving emptiness and illuminating existence are named prajñā and upāya; this mostly clarifies the bodhisattva's own practice. Knowing the disease and recognising the medicine, and applying medicine in response to the disease, clarifies the Great Being's method of transforming others. As bodhisattvas, all are endowed with these two; how could one present the Vimalakīrti Sūtra solely through transforming others and confine the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā to one's own practice? Therefore, the previous explanations are incorrect.

The Dazhidulun lists ten kinds of great sūtras, such as the Lotus Sūtra, yet the Prajñā[pāramitā] is the greatest; how could one say that the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā broadly explains both the shallow and the profound, while the Vimalakīrti Sūtra alone illuminates the wondrous path? If it is said that the teaching of the Vimalakīrti Sūtra is profound because [its interlocutors] are people of the eighth bhūmi and above, the Tathāgata is the ultimate fruit-stage and should be the central marvel of the Prajñā[pāramitā]; moreover, if Śāriputra and Subhūti, being lesser men, spoke it, then it would not be a great teaching. If it is said that the Vimalakīrti Sūtra distinguishes the inconceivable, where the immense and the minute accommodate each other, and is therefore profound, does not the Prajñā[pāramitā] clarify the power of a finger obstructing the wind, or a single hair lifting up the great chiliocosm—does it not make this clear? Furthermore, prajñā and upāya are the root of the inconceivable; borrowing the seats and requesting the meal are the traces of the inconceivable. The Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā abundantly clarifies the two wisdoms, thus distinguishing the root of the inconceivable; the Vimalakīrti Sūtra manifests supernormal powers, thereby showing the traces of the inconceivable. How could the root be common to both shallow and profound while the traces are considered wondrous? If the three vehicles study prajñā in common, and so prajñā is common to the shallow and the profound, the Vimalakīrti Sūtra explains that the perfection of wisdom is the mother of bodhisattvas, which is prajñā itself; how could it not be common [to both]?

Furthermore, to say that it is the perfect and sudden teaching is also not so. The Prajñā[pāramitā] and other texts also broadly praise the provisional path and upāya of bodhisattvas; why should the Vimalakīrti Sūtra alone be taken as the perfect and sudden teaching?

I now clarify that the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā and the Vimalakīrti Sūtra have both similarities and differences in clarifying the two wisdoms. As for the similarity: since the perfection of wisdom is the mother of bodhisattvas and upāya is their father, we know that both sūtras illuminate emptiness as the real and engage existence as the provisional. As for the difference: the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā first clarifies real wisdom and afterwards clarifies upāya. Its ninety chapters are opened into two paths: sixty-six chapters clarify the path of prajñā, and the remaining twenty-four chapters distinguish the path of upāya. The reason it first clarifies real wisdom and afterwards distinguishes upāya is that dharmatā is the root and all phenomena are the branches. Prajñā illuminates dharmatā, so prajñā is the root; upāya illuminates all phenomena, so upāya is the branches. This shows two roots and two branches, proceeding from root to branches and giving rise to function from essence; hence it first clarifies real wisdom and afterwards distinguishes upāya.

Furthermore, all views are of two kinds: first, the view of existence; second, the view of non-existence. Prajñā refutes the view of existence, and upāya refutes the view of non-existence, thereby revealing the madhyamā pratipad and leaving behind the two extremes. Therefore, first clarifying real wisdom and afterwards clarifying upāya constitutes the sequence of refuting views.

Furthermore, the regress of a bodhisattva involves two matters: first, craving the three realms; second, taking up the Hinayana. Through upāya and real wisdom, one does not cling to the three realms; through real wisdom and upāya, one does not fall into the two vehicles. Therefore one enters the bodhisattva stage and is able to attain the Buddha path. One must necessarily leave the three realms first and leave the two vehicles afterwards; therefore it first clarifies real wisdom and afterwards distinguishes upāya. This is like the five-hundred-yojana perilous and evil path in the Lotus Sūtra: the three realms are three hundred [yojanas] and the two vehicles are two hundred [yojanas]; one leaves the three hundred first and leaves the two hundred afterwards. Hence it first clarifies real wisdom and afterwards distinguishes provisional wisdom. Thus in the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā the two vehicles are combined as one hundred, clarifying only four hundred; opening and combining differ, but it is broadly identical with the Lotus Sūtra, as is explained at length there.

Furthermore, Master Sengrui's preface to the Dazhidulun states: "The Fully Awakened One, knowing that mistaken thoughts arise from oneself, therefore produced the Āgamas; perceiving that attachment to existence is caused by delusion, therefore made the Prajñā[pāramitā] to provide internal illumination." If that is so, then the Prajñā[pāramitā] clarifies the refutation of the existence posited by the Hinayana; hence it first clarifies real wisdom. Although it refutes clinging to existence, it also fears the realization of emptiness; hence upāya refutes emptiness. This is the sequence determined according to the order of the teachings.

Next, clarifying in terms of stages: what is first clarified as the path of prajñā refers to the Dharma gates of the sixth bhūmi and below; what is next clarified as upāya is the non-arising tolerance of the seventh bhūmi and above. These are all broad distinctions. Nāgārjuna says, "Within prajñā there is no absence of upāya; within upāya there is no absence of prajñā," but the former mostly clarifies prajñā, while the latter mostly clarifies upāya.

Next, when the Vimalakīrti Sūtra distinguishes the two wisdoms, it first clarifies upāya and afterwards distinguishes the real. Why is this? The arising of this teaching directly originates from the illness; hence it says: "Through upāya he manifested illness in his body." Because there was illness, there were the two gatherings in the ten-foot room and the two assemblies in the Āmrapālī Grove; therefore it first clarifies upāya and afterwards distinguishes the real. Furthermore, maturing sentient beings and purifying Buddha lands are the applications of the bodhisattva's upāya. Thus the chapter on "Buddha Land" clarifies purifying Buddha lands, and from "Upāya" onward it distinguishes maturing sentient beings; for this reason, this sūtra mostly clarifies upāya.

Furthermore, the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā mostly clarifies the two wisdoms of one's own practice, whereas the Vimalakīrti Sūtra mostly distinguishes the provisional and real of transforming others. How is this known? The Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā clarifies that prajñā does not cling to existence and upāya does not realize emptiness; this mostly pertains to the two wisdoms of the bodhisattva's own practice. The Vimalakīrti Sūtra internally and serenely observes the faculties and medicines, and externally manifests supernormal powers extensively; therefore it mostly clarifies the two wisdoms of transforming others. Furthermore, the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā mostly clarifies real wisdom and expedient wisdom, whereas the Vimalakīrti Sūtra mostly clarifies the two wisdoms of the provisional and the real.