淨名玄論 6.2

6.2

略明四句：一境智俱常。唯大乘有之，小乘無也。以小乘凡聖之智皆無常故。但大乘境智俱常，可有三義：一常智照實相境，如果法觀照般若照實相般若。二常智照虛空常境，如《大經》云「一切常中，虛空第一」。今常智照此常境也。若以實相即是虛空，如《釋論》中說虛空論非有非無，言語道斷、心行處滅，即是實相。今且據事辨，以虛空為常。此二句分境智二義也。三者常智還自照智，即反照智義也。次常照無常，凡有二義：一照眾生無常、二照應迹無常也。次無常照常，凡有三句：一照虛空之常、二照實相境常、三照法身佛性常義。但是照境，非照智常，以因中未有常智故也。次無常照無常，有二句：一照無常境、二者無常智自照無常智。問：無常智還照智，與常智知常智何異？答：常智知常，唯有一義。無常智知無常，有二義：一者後念智知前念智、二者一念智即自然知。能得竝觀者，具有二義；未能竝者，但有前後相知也。常知於常，但有一念自知，無前後知也。問：北地論師云：初地以上即有常住法身，亦即有常智。是事云何？答：須詳此說意，為以證真如之智為法身耶、為取所證真如佛性為法身耶？若以能證之智為法身常者，是事不然。《釋論》云「在菩薩心名為般若，在佛心變名薩般若」。是常者則無明昧，不應有改變也。又《涅槃經》云「此常法稱要是如來」。〈長壽品〉凡簡三法常義，一者外道、二者小乘、三者菩薩，並無常住，故知常義唯在佛果，因中未有現顯之常。若以所證真如佛性為常者，則一切眾生皆有此事，何止初地以上耶？若言初地以上即見佛性，故以佛性常為法身者，此猶是江南舊宗，非北異說此。問，有講攝大乘論師云：初地見真如，與佛地不異。是事云何？答：若示論，何得云「在菩薩心名般若，在佛心變名薩婆若」？既其改變，則知有明昧不同。又論云「般若清淨，變名才便」，則知六地般若未淨。又本以見真故斷惑，初地見真與佛不異，則一切惑斷。若不以見真斷惑，即便應是有智斷惑。故此說不然。如此皆是無分別中善巧分別。不示者淺識者。學失於眉眼。名無巧方便。今既欲釋二智，即廣解方便。方便者無差別。差別智故，前須善巧分別諸門，然後無方無礙之用。後當廣解得失，未可驚同舊宗。今寄此門，可有四句：一者語同意異。語同者，如上來所釋，乃至常無常也。問：何故語同耶？答：語出經論，經論共用，何得不同？而意異者，《中論》云「言語雖同，其心則異」。今明此是無分別中善巧分別不二二義，故開常無常境智二義耳。既云不二二，即知雖二不二。如《大經》云「我無我無有二相，常無常亦示」。經云「愚者謂二，智者了達，知其無二」。復有愚者但謂不二，智人了知不二而二。何者？愚人不識常無常、不知境智，故是無明，無明故名為愚。智人了知常無常，名為智者。是故名為語同意異也。二者語異意異。有所得人不善分別，無所得人善能分別，故名語異。一是無所得心善分別、二者有所得心不善分別，故名意異也。三者語同意同者，語與諸佛菩薩方等經論則同，意與諸佛菩薩無依正觀亦同，故名語同意同。又語與有所得人同，有所得人復有小分得處，今意亦與彼同，故云語同意同。四者語異意同。語異經論而意扶合者，亦得用之。又語異舊宗而意同會佛旨，亦得用之。宜以斯四句總貫諸門，不應一向徧有去取。問：何故明此四句？答：有二種人，一始學大乘，謂必須一向與舊宗為異，則成謗法。所以然者，語出經論，宜共用之。但得與無得，其心各別，不應以意異故今語亦異。二者學小乘人，云小與大異，強謂義同是亦謗法。所以然者，小乘語意與大乘語意其實不同，而強謂同，如學《成實論》者，無相滅諦與方等理均，亦名謗法也。為此大小學人，宜開同異四句。

Briefly explaining the catuṣkoṭi: First, object and cognition are both permanent. This exists only in the Mahāyāna, not in the Hīnayāna, because in the Hīnayāna the cognitions of both ordinary beings and nobles are impermanent. However, regarding the Mahāyāna's claim that both object and cognition are permanent, there are three senses: 1. Permanent cognition illuminates the object of dharmatā, as when the contemplative prajñā of the fruit-stage illuminates dharmatā-prajñā. 2. Permanent cognition illuminates the permanent object of space, as the Great Sūtra says: 'Among all permanent things, space is foremost.' Now permanent cognition illuminates this permanent object. If dharmatā is taken to be space itself—as the Dazhidulun says that space is neither existent nor non-existent, the path of words is cut off, and the activity of the mind is extinguished, which is dharmatā itself—now, proceeding provisionally on the basis of conventional facts, space is taken as permanent. These two propositions distinguish the two meanings of object and cognition. 3. Permanent cognition turns back to illuminate cognition itself; that is, the meaning of self-reflexive cognition. Next, permanent [cognition] illuminating the impermanent has two senses: 1. It illuminates the impermanence of sentient beings; 2. It illuminates the impermanence of manifested traces. Next, impermanent [cognition] illuminating the permanent has three propositions: 1. It illuminates the permanence of space; 2. It illuminates the permanence of the object of dharmatā; 3. It illuminates the permanent meaning of the dharmakāya and Buddha-nature. But this is only illuminating an object, not illuminating permanent cognition, because on the causal stage permanent cognition does not yet exist. Next, impermanent [cognition] illuminating the impermanent has two propositions: 1. It illuminates impermanent objects; 2. Impermanent cognition itself illuminates impermanent cognition. Question: How does impermanent cognition reflecting back on cognition differ from permanent cognition knowing permanent cognition? Answer: Permanent cognition knowing the permanent has only one meaning. Impermanent cognition knowing the impermanent has two meanings: first, a subsequent moment of cognition knows a prior moment of cognition; second, a single moment of cognition naturally knows [itself]. One capable of simultaneous contemplation possesses both meanings; one not yet capable of simultaneity only has cognition of prior and subsequent knowing each other. Permanent [cognition] knowing the permanent has only a single moment of self-knowing, with no prior or subsequent knowing. Question: The treatise masters of the north say that from the first bhūmi upwards there is already the permanently abiding dharmakāya, and thus there is also permanent cognition. How is this matter? Answer: One must scrutinise the intention of this assertion: do they take the cognition that realizes tathatā as the dharmakāya, or do they take the realized tathatā and Buddha-nature as the dharmakāya? If they take the cognition capable of realization as the permanence of the dharmakāya, this is not so. The Dazhidulun states: 'In the mind of a bodhisattva it is called prajñā; transformed in the mind of a Buddha it is called sarvajñā.' If it were permanent, it would have no clarity and obscurity, and should not undergo transformation. Furthermore, the Nirvāṇa Sūtra says: 'This designation of permanent Dharma applies only to the Tathāgata.' The chapter 'On Longevity' screens out three types of dharmas from the meaning of permanence: first, non-Buddhists; second, Hīnayāna; third, bodhisattvas—none of them are permanently abiding. Therefore, we know the meaning of permanence lies only in the Buddha-fruit; in the causal stage there is no permanence that is presently manifest. If they take the realized tathatā and Buddha-nature as permanent, then all sentient beings possess this; why limit it to the first bhūmi upwards? If they say that from the first bhūmi upwards one perceives Buddha-nature, and therefore takes the permanence of Buddha-nature as the dharmakāya, this is still an old doctrine of Jiangnan, not a different theory of the north. Question: A treatise master who lectures on the Mahāyānasaṃgraha says: 'The first bhūmi's perception of tathatā is not different from the Buddha-stage.' How is this matter? Answer: If shown according to the treatises, how could it say: 'In the mind of a bodhisattva it is called prajñā; transformed in the mind of a Buddha it is called sarvajñā'? Since there is transformation, we know there is a difference of clarity and obscurity. Moreover, the treatise says: 'When prajñā is purified, it changes its name to [sarvajñā]', so we know that in the sixth bhūmi prajñā is not yet pure. Furthermore, originally it is because of seeing reality that delusion is severed; if the first bhūmi's seeing of reality were no different from the Buddha's, then all delusions would be severed. If delusions are not severed by seeing reality, then it would have to be an existent cognition that severs delusions. Therefore, this assertion is incorrect. All such things are skillful distinctions within the non-distinguished. If one does not explain this, those of shallow understanding will lose the eyebrows and eyes of learning; this is called lacking skillful means. Now, since we wish to explain the two cognitions, we will explain upāya extensively. Upāya is the cognition of differentiation within the non-differentiated. Therefore, one must first skillfully distinguish the various gates, and only then will there be unrestricted and unhindered functioning. Later, we shall explain success and failure in detail; do not be startled by similarities to the old doctrines. Now, relying on this gate, there are four propositions: 1. Words are the same, but the intention is different. 'Words are the same' is as explained above, up to permanent and impermanent. Question: Why are the words the same? Answer: The words come from the sūtras and treatises; since the sūtras and treatises share their usage, how could they not be the same? But 'the intention is different': the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā says, 'Though the words are the same, the mind is different.' We now clarify that this is the skillful distinction within the non-distinguished of the two meanings of non-duality and duality; hence the two meanings of the objects and cognitions of permanence and impermanence are opened. Since it says 'duality in non-duality', one knows that although they are two, they are non-dual. As the Great Sūtra says: 'Self and non-self have no dual characteristics; permanence and impermanence are also shown thus.' The sūtra says: 'The foolish regard them as two; the wise comprehend and know they are non-dual.' Furthermore, there are foolish ones who only consider them non-dual, while the wise understand that non-duality is precisely duality. Why is this? The foolish do not recognize permanent and impermanent, nor do they know object and cognition; therefore it is ignorance, and because of ignorance they are called foolish. The wise comprehend permanence and impermanence; they are called the wise. Therefore it is said that the words are the same, but the intention is different. 2. Words are different and intention is different. Those who have grasping do not distinguish skillfully; those without grasping are able to distinguish skillfully; hence it is called 'words are different'. The first is that the mind without grasping distinguishes skillfully; the second is that the mind with grasping does not distinguish skillfully; hence it is called 'intention is different'. 3. 'Words are the same and intention is the same': the words are the same as those in the vaipulya sūtras and treatises of the Buddhas and bodhisattvas, and the intention is also the same as the correct contemplation without reliance of the Buddhas and bodhisattvas; hence it is called words are the same and intention is the same. Furthermore, the words are the same as those of people who grasp, and those who grasp also have a small fraction of what they attain; now the intention is also identical to theirs, hence it is called words are the same and intention is the same. 4. Words are different, but the intention is the same. If the words differ from the sūtras and treatises but the intention accords with them, they may also be used. Moreover, if the words differ from the old doctrines but the intention unifies with the Buddha's purport, they may also be used. One should use these four propositions to run through all the gates comprehensively, and not take or reject things in a one-sided manner. Question: Why clarify these four propositions? Answer: There are two kinds of people. First, those who begin studying the Mahāyāna think they must exclusively differ from the old doctrines, which then becomes slandering the Dharma. Why is this? The words come from the sūtras and treatises and should be used in common. It is only that grasping and non-grasping have different minds; one should not make the words different just because the intention is different. Second, those who study the Hīnayāna say the small differs from the great, and forcibly assert that the meaning is identical; this is also slandering the Dharma. Why is this? The words and intention of the Hīnayāna and the words and intention of the Mahāyāna are actually not identical, yet they forcibly assert they are identical. For example, students of the Tattvasiddhi-śāstra equate the markless cessation truth with the principle of the vaipulya; this too is called slandering the Dharma. For the sake of these students of the great and small, the four propositions of sameness and difference should be laid open.