淨名玄論 6.2

6.2

Briefly explaining the catuṣkoṭi: First, object and cognition are both permanent. This exists only in the Mahāyāna, not in the Hīnayāna, because in the Hīnayāna the cognitions of both ordinary beings and nobles are impermanent. However, regarding the Mahāyāna's claim that both object and cognition are permanent, there are three senses: 1. Permanent cognition illuminates the object of dharmatā, as when the contemplative prajñā of the fruit-stage illuminates dharmatā-prajñā. 2. Permanent cognition illuminates the permanent object of space, as the Great Sūtra says: 'Among all permanent things, space is foremost.' Now permanent cognition illuminates this permanent object. If dharmatā is taken to be space itself—as the Dazhidulun says that space is neither existent nor non-existent, the path of words is cut off, and the activity of the mind is extinguished, which is dharmatā itself—now, proceeding provisionally on the basis of conventional facts, space is taken as permanent. These two propositions distinguish the two meanings of object and cognition. 3. Permanent cognition turns back to illuminate cognition itself; that is, the meaning of self-reflexive cognition. Next, permanent [cognition] illuminating the impermanent has two senses: 1. It illuminates the impermanence of sentient beings; 2. It illuminates the impermanence of manifested traces. Next, impermanent [cognition] illuminating the permanent has three propositions: 1. It illuminates the permanence of space; 2. It illuminates the permanence of the object of dharmatā; 3. It illuminates the permanent meaning of the dharmakāya and Buddha-nature. But this is only illuminating an object, not illuminating permanent cognition, because on the causal stage permanent cognition does not yet exist. Next, impermanent [cognition] illuminating the impermanent has two propositions: 1. It illuminates impermanent objects; 2. Impermanent cognition itself illuminates impermanent cognition. Question: How does impermanent cognition reflecting back on cognition differ from permanent cognition knowing permanent cognition? Answer: Permanent cognition knowing the permanent has only one meaning. Impermanent cognition knowing the impermanent has two meanings: first, a subsequent moment of cognition knows a prior moment of cognition; second, a single moment of cognition naturally knows [itself]. One capable of simultaneous contemplation possesses both meanings; one not yet capable of simultaneity only has cognition of prior and subsequent knowing each other. Permanent [cognition] knowing the permanent has only a single moment of self-knowing, with no prior or subsequent knowing. Question: The treatise masters of the north say that from the first bhūmi upwards there is already the permanently abiding dharmakāya, and thus there is also permanent cognition. How is this matter? Answer: One must scrutinise the intention of this assertion: do they take the cognition that realizes tathatā as the dharmakāya, or do they take the realized tathatā and Buddha-nature as the dharmakāya? If they take the cognition capable of realization as the permanence of the dharmakāya, this is not so. The Dazhidulun states: 'In the mind of a bodhisattva it is called prajñā; transformed in the mind of a Buddha it is called sarvajñā.' If it were permanent, it would have no clarity and obscurity, and should not undergo transformation. Furthermore, the Nirvāṇa Sūtra says: 'This designation of permanent Dharma applies only to the Tathāgata.' The chapter 'On Longevity' screens out three types of dharmas from the meaning of permanence: first, non-Buddhists; second, Hīnayāna; third, bodhisattvas—none of them are permanently abiding. Therefore, we know the meaning of permanence lies only in the Buddha-fruit; in the causal stage there is no permanence that is presently manifest. If they take the realized tathatā and Buddha-nature as permanent, then all sentient beings possess this; why limit it to the first bhūmi upwards? If they say that from the first bhūmi upwards one perceives Buddha-nature, and therefore takes the permanence of Buddha-nature as the dharmakāya, this is still an old doctrine of Jiangnan, not a different theory of the north. Question: A treatise master who lectures on the Mahāyānasaṃgraha says: 'The first bhūmi's perception of tathatā is not different from the Buddha-stage.' How is this matter? Answer: If shown according to the treatises, how could it say: 'In the mind of a bodhisattva it is called prajñā; transformed in the mind of a Buddha it is called sarvajñā'? Since there is transformation, we know there is a difference of clarity and obscurity. Moreover, the treatise says: 'When prajñā is purified, it changes its name to [sarvajñā]', so we know that in the sixth bhūmi prajñā is not yet pure. Furthermore, originally it is because of seeing reality that delusion is severed; if the first bhūmi's seeing of reality were no different from the Buddha's, then all delusions would be severed. If delusions are not severed by seeing reality, then it would have to be an existent cognition that severs delusions. Therefore, this assertion is incorrect. All such things are skillful distinctions within the non-distinguished. If one does not explain this, those of shallow understanding will lose the eyebrows and eyes of learning; this is called lacking skillful means. Now, since we wish to explain the two cognitions, we will explain upāya extensively. Upāya is the cognition of differentiation within the non-differentiated. Therefore, one must first skillfully distinguish the various gates, and only then will there be unrestricted and unhindered functioning. Later, we shall explain success and failure in detail; do not be startled by similarities to the old doctrines. Now, relying on this gate, there are four propositions: 1. Words are the same, but the intention is different. 'Words are the same' is as explained above, up to permanent and impermanent. Question: Why are the words the same? Answer: The words come from the sūtras and treatises; since the sūtras and treatises share their usage, how could they not be the same? But 'the intention is different': the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā says, 'Though the words are the same, the mind is different.' We now clarify that this is the skillful distinction within the non-distinguished of the two meanings of non-duality and duality; hence the two meanings of the objects and cognitions of permanence and impermanence are opened. Since it says 'duality in non-duality', one knows that although they are two, they are non-dual. As the Great Sūtra says: 'Self and non-self have no dual characteristics; permanence and impermanence are also shown thus.' The sūtra says: 'The foolish regard them as two; the wise comprehend and know they are non-dual.' Furthermore, there are foolish ones who only consider them non-dual, while the wise understand that non-duality is precisely duality. Why is this? The foolish do not recognize permanent and impermanent, nor do they know object and cognition; therefore it is ignorance, and because of ignorance they are called foolish. The wise comprehend permanence and impermanence; they are called the wise. Therefore it is said that the words are the same, but the intention is different. 2. Words are different and intention is different. Those who have grasping do not distinguish skillfully; those without grasping are able to distinguish skillfully; hence it is called 'words are different'. The first is that the mind without grasping distinguishes skillfully; the second is that the mind with grasping does not distinguish skillfully; hence it is called 'intention is different'. 3. 'Words are the same and intention is the same': the words are the same as those in the vaipulya sūtras and treatises of the Buddhas and bodhisattvas, and the intention is also the same as the correct contemplation without reliance of the Buddhas and bodhisattvas; hence it is called words are the same and intention is the same. Furthermore, the words are the same as those of people who grasp, and those who grasp also have a small fraction of what they attain; now the intention is also identical to theirs, hence it is called words are the same and intention is the same. 4. Words are different, but the intention is the same. If the words differ from the sūtras and treatises but the intention accords with them, they may also be used. Moreover, if the words differ from the old doctrines but the intention unifies with the Buddha's purport, they may also be used. One should use these four propositions to run through all the gates comprehensively, and not take or reject things in a one-sided manner. Question: Why clarify these four propositions? Answer: There are two kinds of people. First, those who begin studying the Mahāyāna think they must exclusively differ from the old doctrines, which then becomes slandering the Dharma. Why is this? The words come from the sūtras and treatises and should be used in common. It is only that grasping and non-grasping have different minds; one should not make the words different just because the intention is different. Second, those who study the Hīnayāna say the small differs from the great, and forcibly assert that the meaning is identical; this is also slandering the Dharma. Why is this? The words and intention of the Hīnayāna and the words and intention of the Mahāyāna are actually not identical, yet they forcibly assert they are identical. For example, students of the Tattvasiddhi-śāstra equate the markless cessation truth with the principle of the vaipulya; this too is called slandering the Dharma. For the sake of these students of the great and small, the four propositions of sameness and difference should be laid open.