淨名玄論 1.42

1.42

Second, after the Buddha's parinirvāṇa, the five hundred treatise masters and the various sectarian traditions likewise did not go beyond the meaning of the catuṣkoṭi. As Nāgārjuna cited: the Vātsīputrīyas assert that there is a self and there are dharmas, which is called the view of existence. The Vaitulyakas (Fangguang) hold that there is no self and no dharmas, which is called the view of emptiness. The Sarvāstivādins say there is no self but there are dharmas, which is both existence and nonexistence. Harivarman says that in saṃvṛti-satya there is a self and there are dharmas, hence it is not nonexistence; and in paramārtha-satya there is no self and no dharmas, hence it is not existence; this is the middle way of neither existence nor nonexistence by explaining the two truths together. Question: How does the self asserted by the Vātsīputrīyas differ from that of the heterodox? Answer: The Vātsīputrīyas explain a nominal self, whereas the heterodox cling to a real self; therefore, they differ. This is extensively distinguished in the Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya regarding the Vātsīputrīya tenet of the three designations. Furthermore, as cited in the Dazhidulun: the Vātsīputrīyas assert that because the five skandhas aggregate, there is the dharma of a person; because the four great elements aggregate, there is the dharma of the eye. Since it is called an aggregation, it is a designation (prajñapti); therefore, we know it is a nominal self. Question: Since it is a nominal self, how does it differ from what Harivarman distinguished? Answer: The Vātsīputrīyas assert that there is a distinct nominal person in essence, neither one with nor different from the essence of the skandhas, residing in the fifth, ineffable treasury. Therefore, the Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya presents their doctrine, saying: just as fire exists dependent on fuel, yet there is a distinct essence of fire; although a person exists dependent on the skandhas, there is a distinct essence of a person. Question: Not so. What is explained here as a nominal existent in essence exists due to saṃvṛti-satya, and is nonexistent because it is identical to the real. But the self asserted by the Vātsīputrīyas cannot be made empty; therefore, they are not of the same kind. Answer: Perhaps it is because you have not fully understood the Vātsīputrīya tenet that you make this statement. As the Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya states: when the Vātsīputrīyas have not entered the contemplation of emptiness and selflessness, there is a self; on the day they enter the contemplation, they know the self is empty. Therefore, you should know it is completely identical to their doctrine. The tenets established by these various schools all fall into the catuṣkoṭi and lack the words that transcend the catuṣkoṭi. Because they lack the words that transcend the catuṣkoṭi, they lack the Way of nonduality. Originally, because there was nonduality, there was duality; since there is no nonduality, there is also no duality. Therefore, their principle and teaching fail to stand; they are all conceptual proliferation, obstructing the Dharma gate of nonduality.