淨名玄論 3.19

3.19

First, regarding the explanation of the conventional object as inconceivable: The Tattvasiddhi-śāstra states: "Even a small blade of grass cannot be comprehended through thinking and observation, not to mention all dharmas. Śāriputra does not know the beginning and end of a single bird, not to mention all sentient beings." Hence we know that the conventional object is inconceivable. For now, let us treat it based on the single meaning of the mutual containment of large and small. Question: Vast and minute have different forms, and moreover have neither increase nor decrease; how can they contain one another? Answer: The old masters of the South said: Since it is called inconceivable, it is exclusively the realm of the noble ones, beyond the reckoning of the two vehicles—how could ordinary persons understand it? Thus they set it aside without explaining it. We now question them: The mutual containment of vast and minute is merely the trace of the inconceivable. The six pāramitās and the four immeasurables, the two cognitions of provisional and real, and the Dharma gate of nonduality are called the root of the inconceivable. Although root and trace are different, their inconceivability is one. If one can already understand the root of the inconceivable, why does one not penetrate its traces? Furthermore, traces are immediate phenomena, while the root is the remote principle; if one still penetrates the root of principle, why not understand the traces of phenomena? The Dilun masters of the North said: The large has no mark of largeness, so the large can enter the small; the small has no mark of smallness, so the small can contain the large. We now question them: Since the large has no mark of largeness, then there is no large—what enters the small? The small has no mark of smallness, then there is no small—what contains the large? If they say that there are a markless large and a markless small and therefore they can contain each other, we now examine this again: Does the markless large still possess largeness, or is there no largeness? If there is largeness, then there is still a mark; if it is markless, then there is no largeness. If they say the large is markless yet largeness exists, should there also be marklessness without largeness? Although such words exist, we do not see their rationale, and so we reject both of them. We now first open up the defects and merits to show their characteristics. As for the defects: If there is a large that can be large, then there is a small that can be small. If there is a large that can be large, it is not large by reason of the small; if there is a small that can be small, it is not small by reason of the large. Not being large by reason of the small, the large is an intrinsic large; not being small by reason of the large, the small is an intrinsic small. The large being an intrinsic large, the large is not the large of the small; the small being an intrinsic small, the small is not the small of the large. The large not being the large of the small, the large determinately abides as large; the small not being the small of the large, the small determinately abides as small. Large and small being like this, containing and not containing are also like this. Since the small originally does not contain the large, not containing determinately does not contain and cannot be made to contain; the large originally does not enter the small, not entering determinately does not enter and cannot be made to enter. Therefore, for large and small such as these, there is no meaning of mutual containment. Furthermore, without such intrinsic large and small, of what thing could containment be discussed? And without intrinsic containment, of what thing could large and small be discussed? Question: Where is it stated that determinate large and small have no meaning of mutual containment? And where is it stated that there are no intrinsic large and small? Answer: Nāgārjuna states: "If one did not see before, how can one see now?" Because their nature is determinate, if the origin [of suffering] was originally unsevered, being unsevered it is determinately unsevered; being unsevered, how could it be severed? The four noble truths being like this, the myriad doctrines follow by analogy. Hence we know that not containing is determinately not containing and cannot contain. It is also stated: "If one grasps that there is an intrinsic nature, then there are no worldly or transworldly dharmas." Hence we know that there are no intrinsic large and small; what could contain or enter? Next, in contrast to the defect, to distinguish the merit: We now explain that when there is no small that can be small, then there is no large that can be large; it is large by reason of the small, and small by reason of the large. The small is not intrinsically small; the large is not intrinsically large. The large is called the large of the small; the small is called the small of the large. The large of the small is not small; the small of the large is not large. Being neither large nor small, they are provisionally called large and small, and thus the meaning of large and small is only then established. Because large and small are established, only then is there mutual containment. Because the small is the small of the large, the small can contain the large; because the large is the large of the small, the large can enter the small. Large and small being like this, containment is also like this. Containing is not containing, therefore it contains; not containing is the not containing of containing. Because not containing is the not containing of containing, the small's not containing is the not containing of containing and thus it can contain; the large's not entering is the not entering of entering and thus it can enter. Question: Why do you explain determinate and indeterminate in terms of large and small, and then again explain determinate and indeterminate in terms of containing and entering? Answer: In doctrines with apprehension, there are two kinds of determinateness: first, the essence of large and small is determinate; second, the function of containing and entering is determinate; hence there is neither essence of large and small nor function of containing and entering. In contrast to these two determinacies, we conversely explain dependent origination in essence and function. First, because the essence of large and small is dependently originated, large and small are only then established. Second, because the function of containing and entering is dependently originated containment, the function of large and small is immediately established. Therefore, both must be explained. Question: But large and small are conventional objects, whereas the function of containing and entering should be the function of provisional cognition; why do you say that both the essence of large and small and the function of containing and entering are conventional objects? Answer: Within conventional truth, essence and function are both fully present, but it definitely requires provisional cognition to operate them so that they can contain and enter; thus both object and cognition are fully present. Question: Now you are analyzing the inconceivability of the object of conventional truth; why do you then explain the function of provisional cognition? Answer: Both senses of object and cognition are present here. If one explains the essence of large and small and the function of containing and entering, these are conventional objects. If one operates them with provisional cognition to make them contain and enter, this is the function of provisional cognition.