淨名玄論 3

English (machine translation) 3

Language: English

3.1

3. Explaining the Dharma Gate Separately

3.2

There are three sections: first, explaining the section on the inconceivable; next, explaining the section on liberation; finally, explaining the section on the Dharma gate.

First, explaining "inconceivable" has four parts: 1. the motivation [for the name]; 2. explaining the name "inconceivable"; 3. discerning the essence of the inconceivable; 4. explaining the number of occurrences of the name "inconceivable".

3.4

First, regarding the motivation: Question: The teachings of all the Vaipulya sūtras are inconceivable; why is it that this sūtra alone receives this name? Answer: Although all sūtras are inconceivable, this sūtra specifically takes "inconceivable" as its name. For example, all Buddhas possess the treasure of the Dharma, yet Ratnarāśi Buddha specifically takes it as his name. Furthermore, the inconceivable is of two kinds: first, the general inconceivable, meaning the realm of all Buddhas and bodhisattvas, which is not something that the two vehicles or ordinary beings can fathom; second, the particular inconceivable, referring to extraordinary spiritual powers, such as the vast and the minute accommodating each other. Most sūtras predominantly elucidate the general inconceivable, whereas this sūtra predominantly discerns the particular inconceivable; hence it uniquely receives this designation. Question: This sūtra has two titles: first, Vimalakīrti; second, Inconceivable. Why is there a separate "Inconceivable Chapter" but no separate "Vimalakīrti Chapter"? Moreover, this sūtra is named the Inconceivable Sūtra and has a separate "Inconceivable Chapter"; why is this not so for other sūtras? For instance, why do the Prajñā sūtras and others not have a "Prajñā Chapter"? Answer: Although this sūtra has two titles based on the person and the Dharma, Vimalakīrti's deeds are evident, as he is comprehensively the principal figure of the whole sūtra, so there is no need to establish a separate chapter. Although the inconceivable runs through the entire sūtra, the particulars of the inconceivable are not yet manifest, so a separate chapter must be established. In the Prajñā sūtras and others, the subject of prajñā is made manifest, so there is no need to establish a separate Prajñā Chapter. Question: Why does this sūtra discern the inconceivable? Answer: Briefly, there are five meanings. First, it wishes to praise the inconceivable nature of the liberation Dharma gate of all Buddhas and bodhisattvas, causing those who receive the teaching to accept it with an open mind, revere it, have faith in it, and practice it. Second, Vimalakīrti's virtue has reached profound heights; having attained the effortless mind, when manifesting spiritual penetrations and preaching the Dharma, whatever he undertakes happens spontaneously without reliance on thinking or deliberation. Having attained this awakening, he wishes in turn to demonstrate it to others; therefore, he speaks of the inconceivable. Third, wishing to reveal that all dharmas lack a determinate nature or characteristic, he speaks of the inconceivable. For example, if long were determinately long, one could not contract the long and make it short; if short were determinately short, one could not extend the short and make it long. Because they can be extended and contracted, they lack determinate characteristics and nature. Because they lack a determinate nature, all dharmas are empty; through this, one awakens and enters into dharmatā; therefore, he speaks of the inconceivable. Fourth, this sūtra directly elucidates the inconceivable Dharma; hence it establishes the name "inconceivable." Like the Dharma gate of nonduality, where the paths of mental activity are extinguished and the ways of speech are cut off, Vimalakīrti's silence is precisely this matter. Because it directly teaches this Dharma, it discerns the inconceivable. Fifth, this sūtra wishes to demonstrate two kinds of persons and dharmas; hence it elucidates the inconceivable. First, those outside the principle, meaning the persons and dharmas of ordinary beings, the two vehicles, and those of the Mahāyāna who grasp at attainment: their objective spheres of practice, their subjective cognitions of practice, and the teachings they expound are all inverted views of grasping at attainment, and are therefore not inconceivable. Second, elucidating those inside the principle—the Buddhas and bodhisattvas: their objective spheres of practice, their subjective cognitions of practice, and the teachings they expound completely transcend the grasped realms of ordinary beings and the two vehicles; thus only this is inconceivable. Question: How do we know this is so? Answer: That this sūtra rebukes ordinary beings and denounces the noble, refutes the great and reprimands the small, is precisely because ordinary and noble, great and small, are all inverted with attachment to attainment, with minds of practice outside the principle; therefore they are not inconceivable. It extensively explains the boundless wondrous functions and unobstructed Dharma gates of bodhisattvas, which those who grasp at attainment cannot fathom; therefore it is named "inconceivable." For this reason, one should know that it is to open up these two meanings that the inconceivable is elucidated. This praises the inconceivable in contrast to the conceivable, causing one to abandon the conceivable and awaken to the inconceivable. Since there is neither conceivable nor inconceivable, the path traversed by the Buddhas and bodhisattvas is neither conceivable nor inconceivable. Question: The doctrines outside the principle also explain the cutting off of the catuṣkoṭi and the transcendence of the hundred negations, where the ways of speech are cut off and the paths of mental activity are extinguished; why are they not inconceivable and without attainment? Whether it be the catuṣkoṭi or the cutting off of the catuṣkoṭi, are not all dharmas inconceivable? Answer: For those with grasping, cutting off is determinately cut off and cannot be made not cut off; not cutting off is determinately not cut off and cannot be made cut off. Such cutting off and not cutting off both leave traces and places that can be conceived. For those without grasping, both cutting off and not cutting off are dependently arisen, unobstructed, and inconceivable. Furthermore, for those with grasping, neither cutting off nor not cutting off can be established, and in the end such a dharma does not exist; what thing could be discussed as inconceivable? For those without grasping, the meaning of cutting off and not cutting off is established for the first time; only then can there be the inconceivable. This will be explained in full when dealing with the two cognitions.

3.5

Second, explaining the name "inconceivable".

3.6

Briefly, there are three meanings:

3.7

First, explaining the name "inconceivable" with reference to the root. It is precisely because the root is inconceivable that there is the function of the inconceivable. The root of the inconceivable is the Dharma gate of nonduality. The Dharma gate of nonduality refers to the dharmatā of all dharmas. Because the activity of the mind is cut off in the dharmatā of all dharmas, the mind cannot think [it]; because speech is extinguished, the mouth cannot discuss [it]. The fourteen chapters of the sūtra are specifically meant to disclose nonduality; hence the preceding preface states: "The original intention of Vimalakīrti manifesting illness, and the reason for Mañjuśrī inquiring about the illness, should be known as being to elucidate the root inconceivable; therefore it is named inconceivable."

3.8

Second, with reference to Vimalakīrti's two cognitions. Because he embodies the path of nonduality, he has the cognition of nonduality. The cognition of nonduality can adapt transformations without fixed direction, display skillful and wondrous functions, and spontaneously accomplish effortless activity without needing to think or deliberate; hence it is called inconceivable.

3.9

Third, externally manifesting the traces of the inconceivable. Whether physical form or voice, as well as the expounding of the root of the inconceivable, whether object or cognition—all are beyond what lower-stage bodhisattvas, the two vehicles, and ordinary beings can fathom; therefore it is called inconceivable. The essence of the inconceivable has only three, and the name "inconceivable" also has only these three meanings. Question: How does this differ from the old explanations of the Guanzhong school? Answer: Master Sengzhao said, "Profound, remote, subtle, and obscure, it cannot be fathomed by the two vehicles," which refers only to the latter meaning among the three meanings of inconceivable. Master Daosheng said, "The inconceivable has two kinds: first, the principle of emptiness, which cannot be fathomed by deluded sentiments; second, the marvelous and extraordinary, which cannot be known by shallow understanding," which articulates the first two meanings among the three meanings. Master Kumārajīva said, "When a dharmakāya bodhisattva performs an action, if they wish to be capable of it, they are capable of it, without needing to generate intention," which grasps one among the three kinds. Now, presenting the three approaches, and further discerning the order of root and trace and the differences between internal and external, embraces all the preceding meanings.

3.10

Third, distinguishing the essence of the inconceivable. Question: In terms of what dharmas is the inconceivable now explained? Answer: Although dharmas are immeasurable, there are briefly three kinds: first, objects; second, cognitions; third, gates of teaching. Objects are the inconceivable two objects of paramārtha-satya and saṃvṛti-satya; cognitions are the inconceivable two cognitions, provisional and real; teachings refer to the teaching gates of the two truths. These three gates have two kinds of sequence. In terms of that which transforms [i.e., the teacher]: from the two objects of paramārtha-satya and saṃvṛti-satya, the two cognitions of provisional and real are generated; due to the two cognitions of provisional and real, the teaching gates of the two truths are expounded outwardly. Combining these two senses yields two pairs. Cognition being generated from object, and object being illuminated by cognition, is called the pair of generating and illuminating. Internally illuminating the two objects is practice; outwardly revealing the holy speech is teaching: this is the pair of teaching and practice. Next, in terms of the sequence of the three gates for those who are transformed [i.e., the disciples]: receiving the teaching of the two truths generates the two cognitions; the two cognitions then illuminate the two truths. Combining these three senses also forms two pairs. The first is teaching and practice; the second is generation and illumination. The sage expounds in accordance with practice; sentient beings receive the teaching of the two truths and then practice in accordance with the expounding; hence it is called the pair of teaching and practice. By practicing in accordance with the expounding, understanding the teaching and awakening to the principle, the two cognitions are generated; thus the two objects are that which generates and the two cognitions are that which is generated, while the two cognitions are that which illuminates and the two objects are that which is illuminated: this is called the pair of generating and illuminating. Question: Are the two truths of paramārtha-satya and saṃvṛti-satya designations for teachings or appellations for objects? Answer: In terms of that which transforms and that which is transformed, viewed mutually they are different. Speaking in terms of that which transforms: internally illuminating paramārtha-satya and saṃvṛti-satya, they are named objects; outwardly expounding the Dharma for sentient beings based on the two truths, they are named teachings. Speaking in terms of that which is transformed: receiving paramārtha-satya and saṃvṛti-satya, distinguishing paramārtha-satya and saṃvṛti-satya is called teaching; generating the two cognitions due to paramārtha-satya and saṃvṛti-satya, paramārtha-satya and saṃvṛti-satya are called objects. Yet these two truths of paramārtha-satya and saṃvṛti-satya have never been [rigidly] object or teaching. Question: If so, why has it been constantly said that the two truths are teachings, not objects or principles? Answer: This is in terms of expounding the Dharma based on the two truths, hence the two truths are named teachings; if based on generating the two cognitions, then paramārtha-satya and saṃvṛti-satya are named objects. Furthermore, when paramārtha-satya and saṃvṛti-satya express the principle of nonduality, then paramārtha-satya and saṃvṛti-satya are named teachings; when contrasted with the two cognitions, they are called objects. One must not adhere universally [to one view]. Question: One should simply say that the sage internally illuminates the two objects, and outwardly expounds the Dharma for sentient beings based on the two truths; sentient beings receive the teaching of the two truths, generate the two cognitions, and the two cognitions in turn illuminate the two truths. How can it also be said that the teaching of the two truths expresses the principle of nonduality? Answer: This meaning has unfolding and collapsing. If one unfolds principle and teaching as different: speaking in terms of that which transforms, the principle that is awakened to is neither paramārtha-satya nor saṃvṛti-satya, and the cognition that is capable of awakening is also neither real nor provisional. Although the principle is neither paramārtha-satya nor saṃvṛti-satya, for the sake of drawing forth sentient beings, nominal designations are expounded where there are no names and marks; thus the gate of paramārtha-satya and saṃvṛti-satya is unfolded and the Dharma of the two truths is expounded; hence neither paramārtha-satya nor saṃvṛti-satya is the principle, while paramārtha-satya and saṃvṛti-satya are the teachings. As with the gate of the two truths, cognition is also like this. The cognition that awakens to the principle is neither provisional nor real; for the sake of transforming beings, the two cognitions are unfolded. Illuminating the two objects of paramārtha-satya and saṃvṛti-satya with the two cognitions of provisional and real, one outwardly expounds the two truths of paramārtha-satya and saṃvṛti-satya for sentient beings. This is unfolding the meanings of principle, teaching, object, and cognition in terms of that which transforms. Next, explaining principle, teaching, object, and cognition in terms of that which is transformed: the transformed sentient beings receive the two teachings of paramārtha-satya and saṃvṛti-satya, and thereupon awaken to the nondual principle that is neither paramārtha-satya nor saṃvṛti-satya. Having awakened to the nondual principle, they thereupon generate the nondual contemplation; the object that is awakened to being neither paramārtha-satya nor saṃvṛti-satya, the cognition capable of awakening is also neither provisional nor real. Having awakened that the principle is neither being nor non-being, they thereupon recognize that the teaching has paramārtha-satya and saṃvṛti-satya. Awakening to the principle generates the cognition that is neither provisional nor real; recognizing that the teaching has paramārtha-satya and saṃvṛti-satya, they therefore generate the two cognitions of provisional and real. This is unfolding principle, teaching, object, and cognition respectively in terms of that which transforms and that which is transformed.

3.11

Next, discussing principle, teaching, object, and cognition collectively: the principle that is neither paramārtha-satya nor saṃvṛti-satya is called paramārtha-satya; the teachings of both paramārtha-satya and saṃvṛti-satya are all called saṃvṛti-satya; therefore there are only the two truths. That which is neither provisional nor real is called real cognition; both the provisional and the real are called provisional cognition; therefore there are only two cognitions. Since there are only two objects, the sage internally illuminates the two objects and outwardly expounds the two truths in turn for sentient beings. Sentient beings, due to the teaching of the two truths, also generate the two cognitions in turn. Question: Why is there first unfolding and then collapsing? Answer: To reveal that the ultimate principle is extremely profound and has never been paramārtha-satya or saṃvṛti-satya, and the holy mind is subtle and wondrous, also neither real nor provisional. Yet now speaking of saṃvṛti-satya and paramārtha-satya, and expounding the provisional and the real, is only to draw forth sentient beings, hence forcedly expounded in names and marks. For this reason, they must be unfolded. Furthermore, wishing to subsume all dharmas under the two truths so that no meaning is omitted, and encompassing all with the provisional and the real so that no cognition is unincluded, therefore merely explaining the two truths as having only the provisional and the real: this is why they are collapsed. Moreover, the sūtras contain both unfolding and collapsing; since we are explaining the sūtras, they are fully clarified. Furthermore, in order to refute the old lineages' grasping at the two truths while being ignorant of nonduality, they must be unfolded; and when those pursuing the teachings also say that beyond the two truths there is separately a nondual principle, they must be collapsed. Therefore, the differences of unfolding and collapsing each have their meaning. The above generally explains the three gates.

3.12

Now next, individually explaining the three gates comprises three points. First, explaining the two cognitions also comprises three gates: first, clarifying the inconceivable provisional cognition; second, clarifying the inconceivable real cognition; third, collectively explaining the inconceivable two cognitions. Question: What is called the inconceivable provisional cognition? Answer: Both internal illumination and external functioning completely surpass the two vehicles; therefore they are both inconceivable. The two vehicles cannot completely know all illnesses and cannot completely recognize all medicines; hence they cannot fathom the bodhisattva's cognition: this is called the inconceivable internal illumination. Furthermore, the bodhisattva's internal illumination is illumination without illumination. Illumination being unstirred by non-illumination is also not known by the two vehicles. Furthermore, although the bodhisattva illuminates, it does not depend on effort; the two vehicles come to know only after making mental effort, and thus also cannot conceive of the bodhisattva's effortless cognition. Next, clarifying the inconceivable external activity and functioning: these matters are myriad, impossible to enumerate fully; now we demonstrate their characteristics in terms of the large and the small accommodating and entering each other. Regarding the explanation of the large and small accommodating and entering, there are three masters: The first says that the large truly does not enter the small, nor does the small accommodate the large; it is merely that through spiritual power, persons who should be saved are made to see their accommodating and entering. The second explanation says that the large truly enters the small, and the small truly accommodates the large. If they did not accommodate and enter, then the bodhisattvas would lack this capability; if accommodating and entering is explained, yet they do not accommodate and enter, then all spiritual powers of transformation would be useless.

3.13

The third explanation says that it possesses two meanings: first, in reality it does not accommodate and enter, but [the bodhisattva] can make them see its accommodating and entering; second, in reality it can accommodate and enter, and furthermore makes them see the accommodating and entering. Now we clarify that the third explanation is fitting to be adopted. However, this sūtra properly clarifies accommodating and entering, not non-accommodating and non-entering; thus the high and broad thrones come to enter the small room of ten cubits, and the small room of ten cubits accommodates the high and broad thrones, with no increase or decrease in large or small while accommodating and entering are clearly evident; hence it is inconceivable. Question: If the absence of increase and decrease is called inconceivable, how can the text say 'its room was vast and broad'? Answer: Lecturers and reciters mostly do not examine it closely, hence they fail to see the meaning of this text. If examined below, a good explanation has not yet been seen. If one is ignorant of this single point, then the inconceivable events all fail to hold. Now we clarify that the 'Chapter on the Inconceivable' has two passages: one says 'its room was vast and broad', and the other says 'the original appearance remained as before.' These two passages directly contradict each other. Since it says its room was vast and broad, how could the original appearance remain as before? If it says the original appearance remained as before, why call it vast and broad? Now we clarify that the room has an inside and an outside: viewed from the inside, its room is vast and broad; viewed from the outside, the original appearance remains as before; therefore the two passages do not contradict each other. Question: If so, why is it called inconceivable? Answer: It is only a single room; viewed from inside it is broad, viewed from outside it is as before: this is precisely the inconceivable. Question: Viewed from outside as before may have no increase or decrease and be called inconceivable; but viewed from inside being broad is an increase and decrease, so how is it called inconceivable? Answer: If being broad inside caused the outside to increase, it could be non-inconceivable. But being broad inside does not cause the outside to increase, so being broad inside is inconceivable. Question: Not causing the outside to be broad may have no increase outside, being called outside-inconceivable. Causing the inside to be broad is increasing the inside, so the inside is not inconceivable. Answer: Since Vimalakīrti can cause the outside not to increase, he can also cause the inside not to be broad. How is this known? Small worldly arts can cause a one-foot mirror to enter a one-inch bottle, where the bottle does not increase and the mirror does not decrease, yet accommodating and entering are fully realized; how much more so with the buddhas and bodhisattvas! That it now causes the interior of the room to be broad has two meanings: First, this sūtra from beginning to end recounts Vimalakīrti receiving guests, having fully four things: first, having a vast and broad room; second, setting up dignified and magnificent thrones; third, having food of the taste of amṛta; fourth, having the subtle and wondrous Dharma. If the room were not broad, one of the four would be lacking. Now, wishing the reception of guests to be complete, he causes the room to be vast and broad. Although the room is broad, if it caused the outside to increase, it would not be extraordinary. But outside, the original appearance remains as before; this again is inconceivable. Therefore, the inner large and the outer small each have a profound import. Second, if both inside and outside were not broad, and the large thrones entered the small room, one could only contrast the room with the thrones to distinguish the inconceivable of large and small. Now he wishes to demonstrate two kinds of inconceivable: first, the inconceivable of the large entering the small; second, the inconceivable of inside and outside. The inconceivable of large and small is that the large thrones enter inside the small room, and although the room is broad inside, outside it is not large; hence it is the inconceivable of large and small. Second, the inconceivable of inside and outside is that it is only a single room: viewed from inside it is broad, viewed from outside it is not large. If one wishes to say the room is large, the outer appearance is clearly evident; if one wishes to say the room is small, it can accommodate the large thrones. Therefore, this room is inconceivable. Question: Someone says: Looking at it accommodating the thrones, the room is said to be broad. If one sets aside the thrones and looks at the room, the original appearance remains as before. This explanation works on its own, so why bother distinguishing inside and outside? Now we ask: The room is only ten cubits, and the thrones are eighty thousand [yojanas] high; does one see the room as larger than the thrones, or see the room as smaller than the thrones? If one sees the room as larger than the thrones, how can it also be said that the original appearance remains as before? If the original appearance remains as before, then one sees the room as still ten cubits; how then could one see it accommodate the large thrones? Then the phenomena would not hold, and it would be inadequate in skillful meaning. Now examining the meaning of the sūtra text: the thirty-two thousand thrones all came and entered the room, and the entire assembly saw that its room was vast and broad, no longer seeing it as merely ten cubits; yet looking at the outer shape, the original appearance remained as before. The former resolution should be adopted, and the latter explanation discarded.

3.14

Next, clarifying the inconceivable real cognition: if illuminating emptiness is real and illuminating existence is provisional, this real cognition is prajñā. The dharmatā surveyed by prajñā is devoid of the hundred negations and oblivious to all of the catuṣkoṭi. Prajñā, which is capable of surveying, also illuminates in accordance with reality. Thus the Dazhidulun says: 'Prajñāpāramitā / is real dharma, not inverted. / Thoughts, conceptions, and contemplations are already eliminated, / and the dharmas of speech are also extinguished.' Hence it is the inconceivable real cognition. Furthermore, prajñā illuminates dharmatā without seeing cognition as that which illuminates and object as that which is illuminated. Therefore the sūtra says: 'When a bodhisattva accords with prajñā, he sees neither according nor non-according.' The Dazhidulun says: 'The object is one extreme, the contemplation is one extreme; departing from these two extremes is called prajñā.' Object and cognition are nondual; how could this not be inconceivable! Furthermore, it sees neither the duality of object and cognition, nor does it see nonduality; in this way, the five propositions are completely exhausted, yet that which illuminates and that which is illuminated are clearly evident and not lost; hence it is called the inconceivable dharmatā.

3.15

Next, to explain the inconceivability of the two cognitions combined is precisely to see the central tenet of this sūtra. How is this known? The text states: "The buddhas and bodhisattvas possess a liberation called inconceivable." The "Inquiring about Illness" chapter specifically analyzes liberation in terms of the two cognitions, hence stating: "Wisdom without upāya binds; upāya without wisdom binds." This explains bondage in terms of the two wisdoms, wherein there is no liberation, and thus they are not inconceivable. "Wisdom with upāya liberates; upāya with wisdom liberates"—thus the liberation of the two wisdoms is called inconceivable. Question: What is meant by bondage and liberation of the two cognitions? Answer: The text has already detailed this; for now, let us set forth their defects and merits according to our school. First, to show that both wisdoms being bound is not inconceivable; next, to distinguish that both wisdoms being liberated is called inconceivable.

3.16

Regarding both wisdoms being bound as not inconceivable: If there is a provisional that can be provisional, then there is a real that can be real. If there is a provisional that can be provisional, it is not provisional by reason of the real; if there is a real that can be real, it is not real by reason of the provisional. Not being real by reason of the provisional, this real is not the real of the provisional; not being provisional by reason of the real, this provisional is not the provisional of the real. The provisional not being the provisional of the real, the provisional is an intrinsic provisional; the real not being the real of the provisional, the real is an intrinsic real. The provisional being an intrinsic provisional, the provisional cannot become the real; the real being an intrinsic real, the real cannot become the provisional. Provisional and real such as these each abide in their own intrinsic nature, unable to act freely at ease, unhindered and boundless, and are therefore called bound. Because they are bound, they are not inconceivable; rather, they are the two views of annihilation and permanence with apprehension belonging to ordinary persons and the two vehicles—how could they be called the wondrous contemplation of the buddhas and bodhisattvas?

3.17

Next, in contrast to the defect, to clarify the merit and explain that it is the inconceivable of liberation: We now explain that when there is no provisional that can be provisional, there is no real that can be real. When there is no provisional that can be provisional, it is provisional by reason of the real; when there is no real that can be real, it is real by reason of the provisional. Being provisional by reason of the real, the provisional is called the provisional of the real; being real by reason of the provisional, the real is called the real of the provisional. The provisional being called the provisional of the real, the provisional is not intrinsically provisional; the real being called the real of the provisional, the real is not intrinsically real. The provisional not being intrinsically provisional, it is not provisional; the real not being intrinsically real, it is not real. Being neither provisional nor real, only then are provisional and real established. The real of the provisional allows the real to become provisional; the provisional of the real allows the provisional to become real. Acting freely at ease, unhindered and boundless, this is therefore called liberation. Liberation is precisely the inconceivable. Question: The sūtra contains no such words; how can you frame it conceptually like this? Answer: The text truly has it, but you simply have not seen it. Now I shall briefly show one instance, and all myriad doctrines will follow by analogy. As the "Inquiring about Illness" chapter says: "Taking the two practices of adorning the land and transforming people as upāya, and self-regulation through the three emptinesses, is called wisdom." Being unable to initiate the two practices through the three emptinesses is called wisdom without upāya, which binds; if one can initiate the two practices through the three emptinesses, it is called wisdom with upāya, which liberates. Being unable to enter the three emptinesses through the two practices is called upāya without wisdom, which binds; if one can enter the three emptinesses through the two practices, it is called upāya with wisdom, which liberates. Therefore, emptiness and existence being unhindered, and the provisional and real being sovereign at ease, is called liberation; because it is liberation, it is inconceivable.

3.18

Next, to explain the inconceivability of objects, there are also three aspects: first, the conventional object; second, the real object; third, explaining the two objects together. The reason for explaining the inconceivability of objects is that cognition is not intrinsically cognition; cognition is elicited by objects. It is truly because objects are inconceivable that cognition is inconceivable. If cognition were intrinsically inconceivable while objects were not inconceivable, how could an object that can be conceived elicit an inconceivable cognition, or an inconceivable cognition illuminate an object that can be conceived?

3.19

First, regarding the explanation of the conventional object as inconceivable: The Tattvasiddhi-śāstra states: "Even a small blade of grass cannot be comprehended through thinking and observation, not to mention all dharmas. Śāriputra does not know the beginning and end of a single bird, not to mention all sentient beings." Hence we know that the conventional object is inconceivable. For now, let us treat it based on the single meaning of the mutual containment of large and small. Question: Vast and minute have different forms, and moreover have neither increase nor decrease; how can they contain one another? Answer: The old masters of the South said: Since it is called inconceivable, it is exclusively the realm of the noble ones, beyond the reckoning of the two vehicles—how could ordinary persons understand it? Thus they set it aside without explaining it. We now question them: The mutual containment of vast and minute is merely the trace of the inconceivable. The six pāramitās and the four immeasurables, the two cognitions of provisional and real, and the Dharma gate of nonduality are called the root of the inconceivable. Although root and trace are different, their inconceivability is one. If one can already understand the root of the inconceivable, why does one not penetrate its traces? Furthermore, traces are immediate phenomena, while the root is the remote principle; if one still penetrates the root of principle, why not understand the traces of phenomena? The Dilun masters of the North said: The large has no mark of largeness, so the large can enter the small; the small has no mark of smallness, so the small can contain the large. We now question them: Since the large has no mark of largeness, then there is no large—what enters the small? The small has no mark of smallness, then there is no small—what contains the large? If they say that there are a markless large and a markless small and therefore they can contain each other, we now examine this again: Does the markless large still possess largeness, or is there no largeness? If there is largeness, then there is still a mark; if it is markless, then there is no largeness. If they say the large is markless yet largeness exists, should there also be marklessness without largeness? Although such words exist, we do not see their rationale, and so we reject both of them. We now first open up the defects and merits to show their characteristics. As for the defects: If there is a large that can be large, then there is a small that can be small. If there is a large that can be large, it is not large by reason of the small; if there is a small that can be small, it is not small by reason of the large. Not being large by reason of the small, the large is an intrinsic large; not being small by reason of the large, the small is an intrinsic small. The large being an intrinsic large, the large is not the large of the small; the small being an intrinsic small, the small is not the small of the large. The large not being the large of the small, the large determinately abides as large; the small not being the small of the large, the small determinately abides as small. Large and small being like this, containing and not containing are also like this. Since the small originally does not contain the large, not containing determinately does not contain and cannot be made to contain; the large originally does not enter the small, not entering determinately does not enter and cannot be made to enter. Therefore, for large and small such as these, there is no meaning of mutual containment. Furthermore, without such intrinsic large and small, of what thing could containment be discussed? And without intrinsic containment, of what thing could large and small be discussed? Question: Where is it stated that determinate large and small have no meaning of mutual containment? And where is it stated that there are no intrinsic large and small? Answer: Nāgārjuna states: "If one did not see before, how can one see now?" Because their nature is determinate, if the origin [of suffering] was originally unsevered, being unsevered it is determinately unsevered; being unsevered, how could it be severed? The four noble truths being like this, the myriad doctrines follow by analogy. Hence we know that not containing is determinately not containing and cannot contain. It is also stated: "If one grasps that there is an intrinsic nature, then there are no worldly or transworldly dharmas." Hence we know that there are no intrinsic large and small; what could contain or enter? Next, in contrast to the defect, to distinguish the merit: We now explain that when there is no small that can be small, then there is no large that can be large; it is large by reason of the small, and small by reason of the large. The small is not intrinsically small; the large is not intrinsically large. The large is called the large of the small; the small is called the small of the large. The large of the small is not small; the small of the large is not large. Being neither large nor small, they are provisionally called large and small, and thus the meaning of large and small is only then established. Because large and small are established, only then is there mutual containment. Because the small is the small of the large, the small can contain the large; because the large is the large of the small, the large can enter the small. Large and small being like this, containment is also like this. Containing is not containing, therefore it contains; not containing is the not containing of containing. Because not containing is the not containing of containing, the small's not containing is the not containing of containing and thus it can contain; the large's not entering is the not entering of entering and thus it can enter. Question: Why do you explain determinate and indeterminate in terms of large and small, and then again explain determinate and indeterminate in terms of containing and entering? Answer: In doctrines with apprehension, there are two kinds of determinateness: first, the essence of large and small is determinate; second, the function of containing and entering is determinate; hence there is neither essence of large and small nor function of containing and entering. In contrast to these two determinacies, we conversely explain dependent origination in essence and function. First, because the essence of large and small is dependently originated, large and small are only then established. Second, because the function of containing and entering is dependently originated containment, the function of large and small is immediately established. Therefore, both must be explained. Question: But large and small are conventional objects, whereas the function of containing and entering should be the function of provisional cognition; why do you say that both the essence of large and small and the function of containing and entering are conventional objects? Answer: Within conventional truth, essence and function are both fully present, but it definitely requires provisional cognition to operate them so that they can contain and enter; thus both object and cognition are fully present. Question: Now you are analyzing the inconceivability of the object of conventional truth; why do you then explain the function of provisional cognition? Answer: Both senses of object and cognition are present here. If one explains the essence of large and small and the function of containing and entering, these are conventional objects. If one operates them with provisional cognition to make them contain and enter, this is the function of provisional cognition.

3.20

Next, explaining the inconceivability of the real object. While the conventional object is the inconceivability of the one and the immeasurable, the real object is the inconceivability of the immeasurable and the one. Thus the Madhyamaka-śāstra states: "The dharmatā of all phenomena is where the activities of the mind and the paths of speech are severed; it is without arising and without cessation, quiescent like nirvāṇa." Question: The two vehicles also realize dharmatā; why do you say that dharmatā is inconceivable? Answer: Since this objection was raised in the past, ancient traditions have also found it difficult to resolve. If the three vehicles equally realize the real object and all transcend the catuṣkoṭi, and what the two vehicles and the bodhisattvas practice is the same, why is only the bodhisattva considered inconceivable? We now explain that the two vehicles and the bodhisattvas differ in six summary respects; hence there is the conceivable and the inconceivable. First, the two vehicles only attain the emptiness of persons and do not attain the emptiness of dharmas; hence it is conceivable. The bodhisattva fully attains both emptinesses; hence it is inconceivable. Second, the two vehicles also do not fully attain the emptiness of persons. Why is this so? Nonduality regarding self and nonself is the true meaning of nonself. The two vehicles view self and nonself as dual; how could they attain nonself? Third, even if sharp-rooted practitioners of the two vehicles attain the emptiness of dharmas, it is merely by analyzing dharmas to explain emptiness. The bodhisattva's emptiness of dharmas is inherent emptiness and specific-characteristic emptiness: emptiness is immediately existence, and existence is immediately emptiness. Hence the emptiness of dharmas of the two vehicles is conceivable, while that of the bodhisattva is inconceivable. Fourth, the Dazhidulun states: "The two vehicles attain mere emptiness, hence it is conceivable. The bodhisattva attains unobtainable emptiness, hence it is inconceivable." Fifth, the two vehicles attain a minor emptiness, like the emptiness inside a pore. The bodhisattva attains an emptiness that is vast and all-pervading, like the emptiness of the ten directions. Question: How can emptiness have size? Answer: The two vehicles cannot know the emptiness of all dharmas in their specific characteristics one by one, but only know the emptiness of the twelve sense bases in general characteristics; hence it is called minor. The bodhisattva can know all dharmas in their specific characteristics—namely coarse and fine, large and small, shallow and deep—and only then knows them to be empty; hence their emptiness is vast and great. Furthermore, the two vehicles only attain the emptiness of persons and dharmas within the three realms; hence, explaining emptiness in terms of existence, the scope of emptiness is brief. The bodhisattva knows that the persons and dharmas within the three realms as well as those outside the three realms are all empty; hence, explaining emptiness in terms of existence, the scope of emptiness is extensive. Therefore, the two vehicles attain a small portion of emptiness, like a hare or a horse [crossing a river]. The bodhisattva fully attains extensive emptiness, like a fragrant elephant. Thus emptiness has great and small [scopes]. Sixth, the two vehicles only attain the emptiness of saṃsāra and do not see that the wondrous existence of great nirvāṇa has an essence transcending all characteristics and is therefore empty—how much less do they know that the wondrous existence of nirvāṇa is itself empty! Hence the emptiness of the two vehicles is conceivable, while the emptiness of the bodhisattva is inconceivable. Question: If so, and the two vehicles and the bodhisattvas do not contemplate dharmatā in the same way, how can the Lotus Sūtra say that they equally enter the dharmatā, and the Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra say that they equally contemplate the madhyamā pratipad? Answer: When the ancients distinguished the three vehicles' contemplation, some said they contemplate identically, while others said they contemplate differently; the two views were tangled in controversy. We now state briefly: the three vehicles have both identical contemplation and different contemplation. Because they equally see emptiness, it is said that they contemplate identically; because some attain both emptinesses while others do not—as in the six points above—they do not contemplate identically. Identity and difference each have their own meaning; one should not cling one-sidedly. Question: Is the real object only a single inconceivability, or can it also have multiple inconceivabilities? Answer: Dharmatā is without duality, but in terms of the teachings there are shallow and deep levels, as in the aforementioned explanation of the three stages of entering the Dharma gate of nonduality.

3.21

Next, explaining jointly the inconceivability of the real and the conventional. This also first demonstrates the fault to clarify what is not inconceivable, and afterwards explains the correct understanding to show what truly is inconceivable. If one has apprehension, the real and the conventional each abide in their own inherent nature; thus the real cannot be the conventional, and the conventional cannot be the real. Such "real" and "conventional" are the root of the two views of annihilationism and eternalism. As the Lotus Sūtra says: "Relying upon these views—whether of existence or nonexistence—the sixty-two [views] are completely fulfilled." This merely exposes the existence and nonexistence from which the two views arise within what is conceivable; how could it be called inconceivable? We now explain that emptiness and existence are dependent origination: if existence were not empty, it would not exist; if emptiness were not existent, it would not be empty. Emptiness unmistakably is existence, and existence unmistakably is emptiness. Thus Master Zhao said: "It is like an illusory person: it is not that there is no illusory person, but the illusory person is not a real person." The person is unmistakably not a person, and not a person is unmistakably a person. Ratnakūṭa praised: "Able to skillfully distinguish the characteristics of all dharmas, yet remaining unmoved in the ultimate truth." This is to distinguish all dharmas without moving from the ultimate truth, and not to move from the ultimate truth while distinguishing all dharmas. Such unimpeded dependent origination of emptiness and existence is practiced only by Buddhas and bodhisattvas; hence it is called inconceivable. The explanation above of the inconceivability of the three objects and three cognitions is concluded.

3.22

Next, resolving the inconceivability of object and cognition. The previous division into the two of object and cognition is merely the dual meaning of nonduality. For object and cognition are a matter of dependent origination: without the object there is no way to clarify cognition, and without cognition there is no way to discern the object. Hence the object is called the object of cognition, and cognition is called the cognition of the object. The cognition of an object is then not cognition; the object of cognition is then not an object. Being neither object nor cognition, their traces are sought in vain. Thus the Dazhidulun states: "The conditions are one extreme, and contemplation is one extreme. Though they are two extremes, this is called the madhyamā pratipad." Master Ying said: "All transformations are not without a source, yet what sources them is formless. The empty source is not without realization, yet what realizes it is without mind. Therefore, the sage uses the wondrous wisdom of no-mind to realize that empty source of formlessness; then inner and outer both merge into obscurity, and conditions and cognition are both quiescent. Though conditions and cognition are both quiescent, object and cognition remain unmistakable. Hence it is called inconceivable."

3.23

Fourth, explaining the number of inconceivabilities. Question: In general, how many approaches to the inconceivable are there? Answer: The number is exceedingly great and cannot be fully enumerated. We now briefly present five types to show their essentials: first, the inconceivability of hearing and not hearing; second, the inconceivability of the great and the small; third, the inconceivability of the general and the specific; fourth, the inconceivability of the root and the trace; fifth, the inconceivability of the internal and the external. These five approaches summarily subsume the many numbers; no meaning is left ungathered.

3.24

First, as for the inconceivability of hearing and not hearing, the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā states: "All śrāvakas and others, whether they have heard or not heard, all wish to hear; they should study prajñā." The Dazhidulun states: "When the Buddha preached the Inconceivable Liberation Sūtra, the śrāvakas in the assembly all failed to hear it—that is, when the Buddha first attained enlightenment and preached the Avataṃsaka Sūtra." Someone claimed: The Inconceivable Liberation Sūtra cited by the Dazhidulun is the Vimalakīrti Sūtra. That person had neither read the Avataṃsaka nor consulted the Dazhidulun; hence they made this error. This inconceivability was heard only by bodhisattvas, while the two vehicles did not hear it. When the Vimalakīrti Sūtra expounds the inconceivable, both the great and the small hear it together; hence it is called the inconceivability of hearing and not hearing.

3.25

Second, as for the inconceivability of the great and the small, the Dazhidulun states: "In the teachings of the Hīnayāna there are five inconceivabilities: first, the inconceivability of sentient beings' karmic actions; second, the inconceivability of the world; third, the power of dragons; fourth, the power of a person sitting in dhyāna; fifth, the power of the Buddha." In the Mahāyāna teachings, it explains that preaching the Lotus Sūtra took sixty kalpas, yet the assembly perceived it as lasting only the space of a meal. In the Hīnayāna teachings, there is no such thing. This is called the inconceivability of the great and the small.

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淨名玄論 — Classical Chinese