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淨名玄論 3.4

English (machine translation) 3.4

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English

3.4

First, regarding the motivation: Question: The teachings of all the Vaipulya sūtras are inconceivable; why is it that this sūtra alone receives this name? Answer: Although all sūtras are inconceivable, this sūtra specifically takes "inconceivable" as its name. For example, all Buddhas possess the treasure of the Dharma, yet Ratnarāśi Buddha specifically takes it as his name. Furthermore, the inconceivable is of two kinds: first, the general inconceivable, meaning the realm of all Buddhas and bodhisattvas, which is not something that the two vehicles or ordinary beings can fathom; second, the particular inconceivable, referring to extraordinary spiritual powers, such as the vast and the minute accommodating each other. Most sūtras predominantly elucidate the general inconceivable, whereas this sūtra predominantly discerns the particular inconceivable; hence it uniquely receives this designation. Question: This sūtra has two titles: first, Vimalakīrti; second, Inconceivable. Why is there a separate "Inconceivable Chapter" but no separate "Vimalakīrti Chapter"? Moreover, this sūtra is named the Inconceivable Sūtra and has a separate "Inconceivable Chapter"; why is this not so for other sūtras? For instance, why do the Prajñā sūtras and others not have a "Prajñā Chapter"? Answer: Although this sūtra has two titles based on the person and the Dharma, Vimalakīrti's deeds are evident, as he is comprehensively the principal figure of the whole sūtra, so there is no need to establish a separate chapter. Although the inconceivable runs through the entire sūtra, the particulars of the inconceivable are not yet manifest, so a separate chapter must be established. In the Prajñā sūtras and others, the subject of prajñā is made manifest, so there is no need to establish a separate Prajñā Chapter. Question: Why does this sūtra discern the inconceivable? Answer: Briefly, there are five meanings. First, it wishes to praise the inconceivable nature of the liberation Dharma gate of all Buddhas and bodhisattvas, causing those who receive the teaching to accept it with an open mind, revere it, have faith in it, and practice it. Second, Vimalakīrti's virtue has reached profound heights; having attained the effortless mind, when manifesting spiritual penetrations and preaching the Dharma, whatever he undertakes happens spontaneously without reliance on thinking or deliberation. Having attained this awakening, he wishes in turn to demonstrate it to others; therefore, he speaks of the inconceivable. Third, wishing to reveal that all dharmas lack a determinate nature or characteristic, he speaks of the inconceivable. For example, if long were determinately long, one could not contract the long and make it short; if short were determinately short, one could not extend the short and make it long. Because they can be extended and contracted, they lack determinate characteristics and nature. Because they lack a determinate nature, all dharmas are empty; through this, one awakens and enters into dharmatā; therefore, he speaks of the inconceivable. Fourth, this sūtra directly elucidates the inconceivable Dharma; hence it establishes the name "inconceivable." Like the Dharma gate of nonduality, where the paths of mental activity are extinguished and the ways of speech are cut off, Vimalakīrti's silence is precisely this matter. Because it directly teaches this Dharma, it discerns the inconceivable. Fifth, this sūtra wishes to demonstrate two kinds of persons and dharmas; hence it elucidates the inconceivable. First, those outside the principle, meaning the persons and dharmas of ordinary beings, the two vehicles, and those of the Mahāyāna who grasp at attainment: their objective spheres of practice, their subjective cognitions of practice, and the teachings they expound are all inverted views of grasping at attainment, and are therefore not inconceivable. Second, elucidating those inside the principle—the Buddhas and bodhisattvas: their objective spheres of practice, their subjective cognitions of practice, and the teachings they expound completely transcend the grasped realms of ordinary beings and the two vehicles; thus only this is inconceivable. Question: How do we know this is so? Answer: That this sūtra rebukes ordinary beings and denounces the noble, refutes the great and reprimands the small, is precisely because ordinary and noble, great and small, are all inverted with attachment to attainment, with minds of practice outside the principle; therefore they are not inconceivable. It extensively explains the boundless wondrous functions and unobstructed Dharma gates of bodhisattvas, which those who grasp at attainment cannot fathom; therefore it is named "inconceivable." For this reason, one should know that it is to open up these two meanings that the inconceivable is elucidated. This praises the inconceivable in contrast to the conceivable, causing one to abandon the conceivable and awaken to the inconceivable. Since there is neither conceivable nor inconceivable, the path traversed by the Buddhas and bodhisattvas is neither conceivable nor inconceivable. Question: The doctrines outside the principle also explain the cutting off of the catuṣkoṭi and the transcendence of the hundred negations, where the ways of speech are cut off and the paths of mental activity are extinguished; why are they not inconceivable and without attainment? Whether it be the catuṣkoṭi or the cutting off of the catuṣkoṭi, are not all dharmas inconceivable? Answer: For those with grasping, cutting off is determinately cut off and cannot be made not cut off; not cutting off is determinately not cut off and cannot be made cut off. Such cutting off and not cutting off both leave traces and places that can be conceived. For those without grasping, both cutting off and not cutting off are dependently arisen, unobstructed, and inconceivable. Furthermore, for those with grasping, neither cutting off nor not cutting off can be established, and in the end such a dharma does not exist; what thing could be discussed as inconceivable? For those without grasping, the meaning of cutting off and not cutting off is established for the first time; only then can there be the inconceivable. This will be explained in full when dealing with the two cognitions.

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