維摩經義疏 3.7

3.7

「佛告摩訶迦旃延：汝行詣維摩詰問疾」。此第六命旃延。就文有二：初命、二辭。摩訶為大，迦旃延是南天竺婆羅門姓，而以本姓為稱，別名扇繩。其父早亡，母戀不嫁，如繩繫扇，風吹不動，故名扇繩。十弟子內，論議第一，善解修多羅。佛在世時，造《昆勒論》十萬偈三百二十萬言。「迦旃延白佛言：世尊！我不堪任詣彼問疾」。此第二辭不堪。就文為三，謂標、釋、結。此初文也。「所以者何？我念昔者佛為諸比丘略說法要，我即於後敷演其義，謂無常義、苦義、空義、無我義、寂滅義」。此第二釋不堪。就文為三：初明被呵之由、二述能呵之旨、三時眾得益。此初文也。略說有二：謂有為、無為。此二攝一切法，故名為略。又言略者，佛常略說有為法無常、苦、空、無我，無為法寂滅不動。此二總一切法盡，故言略也。佛但此略說於前，旃延廣敷後。五門與三印，有離合不同。開無常印為苦、開無我為空、無為即是寂滅，故五門也。不異三印，但是小乘。以大乘無我唯在生死，不得云一切法無我；五門則具通小大。「時維摩詰來語我言：唯迦旃延！無以生滅心行說實相法」。此第二明能呵之旨。就文為兩：初總呵、二別呵。此初文也。佛了無常是無生無滅，即是實相。而迦旃延謂無常是生滅法故。佛以無生滅心說無常，即無生滅心說實相也。迦旃延聞生滅法，起生滅心而說無常，是以生滅心行說實相法。在言雖同，其心則異，故迦旃延被呵，佛無咎也。「迦旃延！諸法畢竟不生不滅是無常義」。此第二別釋五門，呵旃延之失，即是用大乘心斥小也。無常是名也，二家同辨無常之名，但無常之義大小乘則異。旃延以生滅釋無常義，淨名以無生滅釋無常義。所以然者，佛說無常之名，凡有二義：一者破常、二不著無常故。今離二邊，悟入中道。如肇公云「言其無常者，明其無有常，非謂有無常。」以無有常，故離外道邊；非謂有無常，則離小乘邊。斯則破病既周、教圓理足，名為滿字。而迦旃延說無常但得破常，猶有生滅則住無常，故破病未周、教非圓足，稱為半字。今淨名還申佛意，偏對旃延一邊，故說不生不滅是無常義。問：不生不滅是破無常以不？答：佛說無常名，令離常邊，復令離生滅邊，始是顯無常義。旃延雖領無有常，猶謂有生滅，即知一不知二。今欲令其更得進悟，故偏說不生不滅是無常義，非破無常也。問：如《毘曇》、《成實》等云「生滅是無常」，云何言不生不滅是無常？答：此皆旃延被呵之例。龍樹〈觀三相品〉破生破滅者，斯淨名之流。若言生滅是無常者，則生在其初、滅在其後，初既無滅則一無為常。若一無為常，則一無非有為。又若一無不滅，則終亦不滅，便是常住。若初有生即有滅者，則滅害於生，生不得起。以義推之則生非實有，生非實有是則無生。既其無生，何有滅？故知不生不滅是其理實。不應言生滅定是無常義也。問：旃延何故言生滅是無常義？答：小乘未明法空，故不得言無常是不生滅也。如《成論》有法空，而彼謂無常是空之初門，不得有是於空，故不得說不生不滅是無常義也。「五受陰洞達空無所起是苦義」。有漏五陰受染生死，名為受陰。小乘以受陰起則眾苦生為苦義；大乘通達受陰內外常空、本自無起，誰生苦者？此真苦義也。問：若五陰空，此則無苦，云何是苦義？答：類如上說。佛明無常去常，非謂是無常；佛說苦以除樂，非謂有苦，蓋是如來說苦之義意也。旃延但領無樂，稱在有苦，故不識佛說苦義。今偏對之，故言本無五陰是苦之義，不言空即是苦而空猶有苦。無常亦然。「諸法究竟無所有是空義」。此句對小乘二藏：一者毘曇人以內無人為空，而猶在有法，此非究竟空；大乘則人法並空，始為究竟空義。二者《成論》明人法並空，有去而空在，此亦非究竟空義；大乘則空有俱泯，始是究竟空也。「於我無我而不二是無我義」。有所得人破我而住無我，則見我與無我為二。今對斥此病，明我無我不二。「法本不然今則不滅是寂滅義」。前四句辨生死，今次說涅槃。小乘謂生死然盡，故有寂滅涅槃；大乘明生死本不燃、今則不滅，始是寂滅義也。「說是法時，彼諸比丘心得解脫」。此第三明時眾得悟。若除常而住無常，雖於常得脫，而為無常所縛。若如淨名所辨，除常不住無常，蕭然無寄，名得解脫。「故我不任詣彼問疾」。第三結不堪。

"The Buddha told Mahākātyāyana: 'Go to Vimalakīrti to inquire about his illness.'" This is the sixth, commanding Kātyāyana. In the text there are two parts: first the command, second the declining. "Mahā" means great. Kātyāyana is a southern Indian brāhmaṇa clan name, and he is referred to by his original clan name; an alternative name of his is "Fan-sheng" (Fan-cord). His father died early, and his mother, longing [for him], did not remarry, like a cord tethering a fan so that the wind cannot blow it away; hence he was called "Fan-cord". Among the ten disciples, he was foremost in debate and skilled in explaining the sūtras. While the Buddha was in the world, he composed the *Petako[padesa]* in one hundred thousand verses and 3,200,000 words. "Kātyāyana said to the Buddha: 'World-Honoured One! I am not competent to go there to inquire about his illness.'" This is the second, declining as incompetent. In the text there are three parts, namely the statement, the explanation, and the conclusion. This is the first part. "Why is this? I recall in the past, when the Buddha briefly explained the essentials of the Dharma for the monks, I subsequently elaborated upon their meaning, namely the meaning of impermanence, the meaning of suffering, the meaning of emptiness, the meaning of non-self, and the meaning of cessation." This is the second, explaining the incompetence. In the text there are three parts: first, explaining the reason for being rebuked; second, setting forth the import of what can rebuke; third, the assembly at that time receiving benefit. This is the first part. "Briefly explained" has two aspects: namely the conditioned and the unconditioned. These two subsume all phenomena, so it is called "brief". Again, "brief" means that the Buddha constantly explained in brief that conditioned phenomena are impermanent, suffering, empty, and non-self, and that unconditioned phenomena are quiescent and unmoving. These two completely encompass all phenomena, hence it is said to be "brief". The Buddha only briefly explained this beforehand, and Kātyāyana broadly elaborated upon it afterward. The five approaches and the three seals differ in their separation and combination: opening the seal of impermanence yields suffering; opening non-self yields emptiness; the unconditioned is precisely cessation; thus there are five approaches. They are not different from the three seals, but pertain only to the Hinayana. Because Mahāyāna non-self exists only within saṃsāra, one cannot say that all phenomena are non-self; the five approaches, however, fully apply to both the Small and the Great [Vehicles]. "At that time, Vimalakīrti came and said to me: 'O Kātyāyana! Do not expound the reality of phenomena with a mind and mental factors [tied to] arising and ceasing.'" This is the second, explaining the import of what can rebuke. In the text there are two parts: first, a general rebuke; second, a specific rebuke. This is the first part. The Buddha fully realized that impermanence is neither arising nor ceasing, which is precisely the reality of phenomena. But Kātyāyana considered impermanence to be phenomena of arising and ceasing. The Buddha, with a mind free of arising and ceasing, expounded impermanence; that is, with a mind free of arising and ceasing, he expounded the reality of phenomena. Kātyāyana, hearing of phenomena of arising and ceasing, generated a mind of arising and ceasing and expounded impermanence; this is expounding the reality of phenomena with mental activities of arising and ceasing. Although in words they are the same, their minds differ; hence Kātyāyana was rebuked, while the Buddha was without fault. "'Kātyāyana! That all phenomena are ultimately non-arising and non-ceasing is the meaning of impermanence.'" This is the second, specifically explaining the five approaches and rebuking Kātyāyana's error, which is using the Mahāyāna mind to refute the Hinayana. "Impermanence" is the name; both schools agree in articulating the name of impermanence, but the meaning of impermanence differs between the Great and Small Vehicles. Kātyāyana explained the meaning of impermanence through arising and ceasing; Jingming explained the meaning of impermanence through neither arising nor ceasing. Why is this? When the Buddha expounded the name of impermanence, there were two meanings: first, to demolish permanence; second, to prevent clinging to impermanence. Now, leaving behind the two extremes, one awakens and enters the Middle Way. As Master Sengzhao said: "To say it is impermanent clarifies that there is no permanence; it does not mean there is an [entity of] impermanence." Because there is no permanence, one is free from the extreme of the non-Buddhists; because it does not mean there is an impermanence, one is free from the extreme of the Hinayana. This then completely eliminates afflictions and makes the teaching complete and the principle consummate; it is called the full-letter [teaching]. But Kātyāyana's explanation of impermanence only succeeded in demolishing permanence; still having arising and ceasing, he dwelled in impermanence. Therefore, his elimination of afflictions was not complete, and his teaching was not full and consummate; it is termed the half-letter [teaching]. Now Jingming re-expresses the Buddha's intent, addressing specifically Kātyāyana's one-sided view; therefore he says that neither arising nor ceasing is the meaning of impermanence. Question: Does "neither arising nor ceasing" demolish impermanence or not? Answer: The Buddha expounded the name of impermanence to make one leave the extreme of permanence, and further to make one leave the extreme of arising and ceasing; only then does it reveal the meaning of impermanence. Although Kātyāyana understood that there is no permanence, he still held that there is arising and ceasing; that is, knowing the one and not knowing the other. Now, wishing to make him advance further toward awakening, he specifically says that neither arising nor ceasing is the meaning of impermanence; it is not demolishing impermanence. Question: In texts such as the *Abhidharma* and *Tattvasiddhi*, it is said that "arising and ceasing is impermanence"; why say that neither arising nor ceasing is impermanence? Answer: These are all instances of Kātyāyana being rebuked. When Nāgārjuna, in the "Examination of the Three Characteristics", demolishes arising and demolishes ceasing, he belongs to the same stream as Jingming. If one says that arising and ceasing is impermanence, then arising would be at its beginning and ceasing would be at its end; since at the beginning there is no ceasing, then for a time it would be permanent. If for a time it is permanent, then for a time it is not conditioned. Furthermore, if for a time it does not cease, then ultimately it also would not cease, which would mean it is permanently abiding. If at the beginning there is arising and immediately there is ceasing, then ceasing would destroy arising, and arising could not occur. Deducing it logically, arising is not truly existent; since arising is not truly existent, this means there is no arising. Since there is no arising, how could there be ceasing? Therefore we know that neither arising nor ceasing is its actual principle. One should not say that arising and ceasing is definitively the meaning of impermanence. Question: Why did Kātyāyana say that arising and ceasing is the meaning of impermanence? Answer: The Hinayana has not yet clarified the emptiness of phenomena; therefore they cannot say that impermanence is neither arising nor ceasing. Although the *Tattvasiddhi* acknowledges the emptiness of phenomena, it considers impermanence to be the preliminary gateway to emptiness, and cannot have this [identity] within emptiness; therefore it cannot say that neither arising nor ceasing is the meaning of impermanence. "'That the five appropriated aggregates are thoroughly penetrated as empty and without any arising is the meaning of suffering.'" The tainted five aggregates appropriate and defile saṃsāra, hence they are called "appropriated aggregates". The Hinayana takes the arising of the appropriated aggregates, from which all sufferings arise, to be the meaning of suffering. The Mahāyāna thoroughly penetrates that the appropriated aggregates are constantly empty internally and externally and fundamentally without arising; who then generates suffering? This is the true meaning of suffering. Question: If the five aggregates are empty, then there is no suffering; how can this be the meaning of suffering? Answer: It is analogous to what was said above. The Buddha clarified impermanence to remove permanence, not meaning that there is an [entity of] impermanence; the Buddha spoke of suffering to eliminate pleasure, not meaning that there is suffering. This indeed is the Tathāgata's intended meaning in speaking of suffering. Kātyāyana merely grasped the absence of pleasure and claimed the presence of suffering, and thus did not understand the meaning of the Buddha's speaking of suffering. Now, specifically addressing this, he says that the fundamental absence of the five aggregates is the meaning of suffering; he does not say that emptiness is itself suffering, or that within emptiness there is still suffering. Impermanence is also like this. "'That all phenomena are ultimately non-existent is the meaning of emptiness.'" This phrase addresses the two Piṭakas of the Hinayana: first, the Abhidharma masters consider the absence of a person internally to be emptiness, while phenomena still exist; this is not ultimate emptiness. In the Mahāyāna, both persons and phenomena are empty, which is the ultimate meaning of emptiness. Second, the *Tattvasiddhi* clarifies that persons and phenomena are both empty, but existence is removed while emptiness remains; this also is not the ultimate meaning of emptiness. In the Mahāyāna, emptiness and existence are both obliterated; only this is ultimate emptiness. "'Regarding self and non-self, that there is no duality is the meaning of non-self.'" Those who cling to attainments demolish self and dwell in non-self, thus seeing self and non-self as two. Now, to counter and refute this fault, it clarifies that self and non-self are non-dual. "'That phenomena are fundamentally unignited and now unextinguished is the meaning of cessation.'" The preceding four phrases analyzed saṃsāra; next, nirvāṇa is expounded. The Hinayana considers saṃsāra to be burned away, and therefore there is quiescent nirvāṇa; the Mahāyāna clarifies that saṃsāra is fundamentally unignited and now unextinguished, which is the true meaning of cessation. "'When he expounded this Dharma, those monks attained liberation of mind.'" This is the third, clarifying that the assembly at that time attained awakening. If one removes permanence and dwells in impermanence, although one is liberated from permanence, one is bound by impermanence. If it is as Jingming distinguished, removing permanence without dwelling in impermanence, utterly detached and without reliance, this is called attaining liberation. "'Therefore I am not competent to go there to inquire about his illness.'" This is the third, concluding the incompetence.