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維摩經義疏 3.7

English (machine translation) 3.7

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3.7

"The Buddha told Mahākātyāyana: 'Go to Vimalakīrti to inquire about his illness.'" This is the sixth, commanding Kātyāyana. In the text there are two parts: first the command, second the declining. "Mahā" means great. Kātyāyana is a southern Indian brāhmaṇa clan name, and he is referred to by his original clan name; an alternative name of his is "Fan-sheng" (Fan-cord). His father died early, and his mother, longing [for him], did not remarry, like a cord tethering a fan so that the wind cannot blow it away; hence he was called "Fan-cord". Among the ten disciples, he was foremost in debate and skilled in explaining the sūtras. While the Buddha was in the world, he composed the *Petako[padesa]* in one hundred thousand verses and 3,200,000 words. "Kātyāyana said to the Buddha: 'World-Honoured One! I am not competent to go there to inquire about his illness.'" This is the second, declining as incompetent. In the text there are three parts, namely the statement, the explanation, and the conclusion. This is the first part. "Why is this? I recall in the past, when the Buddha briefly explained the essentials of the Dharma for the monks, I subsequently elaborated upon their meaning, namely the meaning of impermanence, the meaning of suffering, the meaning of emptiness, the meaning of non-self, and the meaning of cessation." This is the second, explaining the incompetence. In the text there are three parts: first, explaining the reason for being rebuked; second, setting forth the import of what can rebuke; third, the assembly at that time receiving benefit. This is the first part. "Briefly explained" has two aspects: namely the conditioned and the unconditioned. These two subsume all phenomena, so it is called "brief". Again, "brief" means that the Buddha constantly explained in brief that conditioned phenomena are impermanent, suffering, empty, and non-self, and that unconditioned phenomena are quiescent and unmoving. These two completely encompass all phenomena, hence it is said to be "brief". The Buddha only briefly explained this beforehand, and Kātyāyana broadly elaborated upon it afterward. The five approaches and the three seals differ in their separation and combination: opening the seal of impermanence yields suffering; opening non-self yields emptiness; the unconditioned is precisely cessation; thus there are five approaches. They are not different from the three seals, but pertain only to the Hinayana. Because Mahāyāna non-self exists only within saṃsāra, one cannot say that all phenomena are non-self; the five approaches, however, fully apply to both the Small and the Great [Vehicles]. "At that time, Vimalakīrti came and said to me: 'O Kātyāyana! Do not expound the reality of phenomena with a mind and mental factors [tied to] arising and ceasing.'" This is the second, explaining the import of what can rebuke. In the text there are two parts: first, a general rebuke; second, a specific rebuke. This is the first part. The Buddha fully realized that impermanence is neither arising nor ceasing, which is precisely the reality of phenomena. But Kātyāyana considered impermanence to be phenomena of arising and ceasing. The Buddha, with a mind free of arising and ceasing, expounded impermanence; that is, with a mind free of arising and ceasing, he expounded the reality of phenomena. Kātyāyana, hearing of phenomena of arising and ceasing, generated a mind of arising and ceasing and expounded impermanence; this is expounding the reality of phenomena with mental activities of arising and ceasing. Although in words they are the same, their minds differ; hence Kātyāyana was rebuked, while the Buddha was without fault. "'Kātyāyana! That all phenomena are ultimately non-arising and non-ceasing is the meaning of impermanence.'" This is the second, specifically explaining the five approaches and rebuking Kātyāyana's error, which is using the Mahāyāna mind to refute the Hinayana. "Impermanence" is the name; both schools agree in articulating the name of impermanence, but the meaning of impermanence differs between the Great and Small Vehicles. Kātyāyana explained the meaning of impermanence through arising and ceasing; Jingming explained the meaning of impermanence through neither arising nor ceasing. Why is this? When the Buddha expounded the name of impermanence, there were two meanings: first, to demolish permanence; second, to prevent clinging to impermanence. Now, leaving behind the two extremes, one awakens and enters the Middle Way. As Master Sengzhao said: "To say it is impermanent clarifies that there is no permanence; it does not mean there is an [entity of] impermanence." Because there is no permanence, one is free from the extreme of the non-Buddhists; because it does not mean there is an impermanence, one is free from the extreme of the Hinayana. This then completely eliminates afflictions and makes the teaching complete and the principle consummate; it is called the full-letter [teaching]. But Kātyāyana's explanation of impermanence only succeeded in demolishing permanence; still having arising and ceasing, he dwelled in impermanence. Therefore, his elimination of afflictions was not complete, and his teaching was not full and consummate; it is termed the half-letter [teaching]. Now Jingming re-expresses the Buddha's intent, addressing specifically Kātyāyana's one-sided view; therefore he says that neither arising nor ceasing is the meaning of impermanence. Question: Does "neither arising nor ceasing" demolish impermanence or not? Answer: The Buddha expounded the name of impermanence to make one leave the extreme of permanence, and further to make one leave the extreme of arising and ceasing; only then does it reveal the meaning of impermanence. Although Kātyāyana understood that there is no permanence, he still held that there is arising and ceasing; that is, knowing the one and not knowing the other. Now, wishing to make him advance further toward awakening, he specifically says that neither arising nor ceasing is the meaning of impermanence; it is not demolishing impermanence. Question: In texts such as the *Abhidharma* and *Tattvasiddhi*, it is said that "arising and ceasing is impermanence"; why say that neither arising nor ceasing is impermanence? Answer: These are all instances of Kātyāyana being rebuked. When Nāgārjuna, in the "Examination of the Three Characteristics", demolishes arising and demolishes ceasing, he belongs to the same stream as Jingming. If one says that arising and ceasing is impermanence, then arising would be at its beginning and ceasing would be at its end; since at the beginning there is no ceasing, then for a time it would be permanent. If for a time it is permanent, then for a time it is not conditioned. Furthermore, if for a time it does not cease, then ultimately it also would not cease, which would mean it is permanently abiding. If at the beginning there is arising and immediately there is ceasing, then ceasing would destroy arising, and arising could not occur. Deducing it logically, arising is not truly existent; since arising is not truly existent, this means there is no arising. Since there is no arising, how could there be ceasing? Therefore we know that neither arising nor ceasing is its actual principle. One should not say that arising and ceasing is definitively the meaning of impermanence. Question: Why did Kātyāyana say that arising and ceasing is the meaning of impermanence? Answer: The Hinayana has not yet clarified the emptiness of phenomena; therefore they cannot say that impermanence is neither arising nor ceasing. Although the *Tattvasiddhi* acknowledges the emptiness of phenomena, it considers impermanence to be the preliminary gateway to emptiness, and cannot have this [identity] within emptiness; therefore it cannot say that neither arising nor ceasing is the meaning of impermanence. "'That the five appropriated aggregates are thoroughly penetrated as empty and without any arising is the meaning of suffering.'" The tainted five aggregates appropriate and defile saṃsāra, hence they are called "appropriated aggregates". The Hinayana takes the arising of the appropriated aggregates, from which all sufferings arise, to be the meaning of suffering. The Mahāyāna thoroughly penetrates that the appropriated aggregates are constantly empty internally and externally and fundamentally without arising; who then generates suffering? This is the true meaning of suffering. Question: If the five aggregates are empty, then there is no suffering; how can this be the meaning of suffering? Answer: It is analogous to what was said above. The Buddha clarified impermanence to remove permanence, not meaning that there is an [entity of] impermanence; the Buddha spoke of suffering to eliminate pleasure, not meaning that there is suffering. This indeed is the Tathāgata's intended meaning in speaking of suffering. Kātyāyana merely grasped the absence of pleasure and claimed the presence of suffering, and thus did not understand the meaning of the Buddha's speaking of suffering. Now, specifically addressing this, he says that the fundamental absence of the five aggregates is the meaning of suffering; he does not say that emptiness is itself suffering, or that within emptiness there is still suffering. Impermanence is also like this. "'That all phenomena are ultimately non-existent is the meaning of emptiness.'" This phrase addresses the two Piṭakas of the Hinayana: first, the Abhidharma masters consider the absence of a person internally to be emptiness, while phenomena still exist; this is not ultimate emptiness. In the Mahāyāna, both persons and phenomena are empty, which is the ultimate meaning of emptiness. Second, the *Tattvasiddhi* clarifies that persons and phenomena are both empty, but existence is removed while emptiness remains; this also is not the ultimate meaning of emptiness. In the Mahāyāna, emptiness and existence are both obliterated; only this is ultimate emptiness. "'Regarding self and non-self, that there is no duality is the meaning of non-self.'" Those who cling to attainments demolish self and dwell in non-self, thus seeing self and non-self as two. Now, to counter and refute this fault, it clarifies that self and non-self are non-dual. "'That phenomena are fundamentally unignited and now unextinguished is the meaning of cessation.'" The preceding four phrases analyzed saṃsāra; next, nirvāṇa is expounded. The Hinayana considers saṃsāra to be burned away, and therefore there is quiescent nirvāṇa; the Mahāyāna clarifies that saṃsāra is fundamentally unignited and now unextinguished, which is the true meaning of cessation. "'When he expounded this Dharma, those monks attained liberation of mind.'" This is the third, clarifying that the assembly at that time attained awakening. If one removes permanence and dwells in impermanence, although one is liberated from permanence, one is bound by impermanence. If it is as Jingming distinguished, removing permanence without dwelling in impermanence, utterly detached and without reliance, this is called attaining liberation. "'Therefore I am not competent to go there to inquire about his illness.'" This is the third, concluding the incompetence.

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