維摩經義疏 4.10
English (machine translation) 4.10
- Language
- English
4.10.1
"At that time the elder Vimalakīrti thought: 'Now Mañjuśrī is coming together with the great assembly.' He immediately used his supernormal power to empty his room, removing everything he owned and all his attendants, leaving only a single couch on which he lay sick." This is the second [section], explaining [his] arriving without coming. Within the text there are also four parts: first, emptying the room to await the guests; second, Mañjuśrī silently grasping [the intent]; third, the householder's greeting; and fourth, Mañjuśrī's reply. As for emptying the room to await the guests, there are six meanings in all: first, using the room to represent the Tathāgata's realm; second, desiring to embrace all sentient beings to make them his attendants; third, borrowing thrones from the King of Lamps; fourth, answering the question of the universal manifestation of physical form; fifth, requesting food from the Fragrant Realm; and sixth, all the profound discourses on emptiness stem from it. Furthermore, it also gives rise to the subsequent five chapters: empty of couches and thrones, it gives rise to the "Inconceivable Chapter"; empty of attendants, it gives rise to the "Contemplating Sentient Beings Chapter"; the heavenly maiden manifesting her body is also this matter; empty of retinue, it gives rise to the "Buddha Path Chapter"; the principle of emptiness being non-dual, it gives rise to the "Dharma Door of Non-Duality Chapter"; empty of food and drink, it gives rise to the "Fragrance Accumulated Chapter." Question: Why did he only place a single couch and lie sick [upon it]? Answer: The empty room reveals real wisdom; lying sick discerns expedient wisdom. Furthermore, the empty room reveals prajñā; lying sick reveals great compassion. In addition, the empty room possesses the six meanings above; lying sick is meant to reveal the bodhisattva's illness of great compassion and sentient beings' illness of ignorance and craving. "When Mañjuśrī entered his house, he saw his room empty of all possessions, with only a single couch." This is the second [part], Mañjuśrī silently grasping [the intent]. Saying that he "saw it" means he grasped its purport: the preceding empty room and manifestation of illness expressed the two paths of emptiness and compassion, the two wisdoms of the expedient and the real, and now he similarly grasped this intent. "Then Vimalakīrti said: 'Welcome, Mañjuśrī! You have come without the characteristics of coming; you are seen without the characteristics of being seen.'" This is the third [part], Jingming's greeting. As for saying "come without the characteristics of coming," someone said: "The dharmakāya does not come, while the response-body does come; therefore it says 'come without the characteristics of coming.'" Someone said: "In ultimate truth there is no coming, while in worldly truth there is coming; therefore it says 'come without the characteristics of coming.'" Someone said: "In real entities there is no coming, while in continuity there is coming." Someone said: "In the essence of the dharmadhātu there is no coming, while in the functioning of the dharmadhātu there is coming." Someone said: "In the Middle Way there is no coming, while in conventional designations there is coming." Now I clarify this text: not only is this an immediate exchange of words between guest and host to greet one another, it extends distantly through the entire sūtra and encompasses all teachings. Therefore he used these words beforehand to mark the head of this section, like the words on "dwelling without dwelling" in the Large Sūtra, and the principle of "hearing without hearing" in the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra]. The reason for presenting these words is that the assembly at that time thought that Mañjuśrī had come from the Āmrapālī Grove to meet with Jingming. Now it is explained that Mañjuśrī's coming is a coming without coming, and his seeing is a seeing without seeing, unlike ordinary beings and people of the two vehicles. Because he can come without coming and be seen without being seen, it is the ultimate excellence. "Mañjuśrī said: 'It is so, householder! If one has already come, one does not come again; if one has already gone, one does not go again. Why is that? One who comes has nowhere from which to come, and one who goes has nowhere to go; that which can be seen can no longer be seen.'" This is the fourth [part], Mañjuśrī's reply, fulfilling Jingming's meaning. As for "if one has already come, one does not come again," this clarifies the meaning of no coming in the three times. Once coming is already done, the event of coming has already ceased, and therefore there is no coming. Furthermore, as for saying "if one has already gone, one does not go again": looking from the Āmrapālī Grove toward the ten-foot room, one sees that Mañjuśrī has gone; looking from the ten-foot room toward the Āmrapālī Grove, one sees that Mañjuśrī has come; hence he explains the meaning of going and coming. As for "one who comes has nowhere from which to come," this clarifies that the Āmrapālī Grove is empty. "One who goes has nowhere to go" clarifies that the ten-foot room is empty. Going and coming being thus, the meaning of seeing is also like this. "Let us set this matter aside." Second is directly explaining the inquiry about illness. Within the text there are two parts: first, requesting to stop peripheral discussion; second, directly inquiring about the illness. Coming without coming and seeing without seeing are indeed the great overarching theme of the one transformation, but the words differ from analyzing the illness, and the sage's intent has not yet been proclaimed, so it is appropriate to cease peripheral discussion. "Mañjuśrī said: 'Is the householder's illness bearable?'" From here down is the second [part], directly explaining the inquiry about illness. Within the text there are two parts: first, explaining the householder's illness; next, discerning sentient beings' illness. These two are also the two kinds of illness of deep-practicing bodhisattvas and those who have generated the mind [for awakening]. The first section has three parts: first, discussing the substance of the illness; second, discussing the empty room; third, discussing the characteristics of the illness. In the first passage, first there is the question, followed by the answer. The question has two intents: first, respectfully conveying the Buddha's inquiry; second, posing a question himself. The first [intent] has three questions: first, asking about the severity of the illness—being bearable means mild, while being unbearable means severe—hence he says, "Is it bearable?" "Has treatment brought relief?" This is the second question, [asking about] reduction through counteractive remedies. "Has it not reached the point of worsening?" This is the third question, [asking about] worsening through lack of treatment. "The World-Honoured One inquires solicitously and boundlessly." This summarizes the sage's intent, concluding what came before and introducing what follows. "From what cause did this illness of the householder arise?" This is the second [intent], Mañjuśrī posing questions himself. There are also three questions: first, asking about the cause of the illness—due to what did he contract the illness? "How long has it been since it arose?" This asks how long ago he contracted the illness. "How should it be eliminated?" This asks about counteractive treatment—when the illness can be eliminated. "Vimalakīrti said: 'From ignorance there is craving, and thus my illness arose.'" This is the second [part], answering the questions. Above there were six questions; he only answers the latter three, which encompass the former three. Answering the questions on the cause of the illness and its duration simultaneously answers the initial question on severity and the subsequent question on the worsening of the illness. Answering the question on the elimination of the illness simultaneously answers the second question on the illness's reduction. Regarding the answers to the latter three questions, there are three distinct parts, but the order is different: first he answers the second question on duration, next he answers the third question on the elimination of the illness, and finally he answers the first question on the cause of the illness. As for "from ignorance there is craving, and thus my illness arose": sentient beings give rise to craving due to ignorance; because of craving they take on a body, and because of a body they have illness. Out of pity for their illness, there is the bodhisattva's illness. Sentient beings' illness has existed from beginningless [time]; because the bodhisattva has compassion for sentient beings, he gives rise to illness, and thus the illness has also lasted long. "Because all sentient beings are ill, therefore I am ill; when all sentient beings' illness is eliminated, then my illness will be eliminated." This answers the third question on the elimination of the illness; it has the doctrine, a simile, and the application. The bodhisattva's illness arises for the sake of [all] beings; once their illness is eliminated, my illness will also be eliminated. "Why is that? For the sake of sentient beings, he enters saṃsāra; where there is saṃsāra, there is illness;"
4.10.2
“If sentient beings were free from sickness, then the bodhisattva would have sickness no more.” Now, the dharmakāya is unarisen, much less having a physical form. Since it has no physical form, how could sickness arise? Yet, taking birth on their behalf, it cannot be without form. Since it has form, it cannot be without sickness. If they are freed from sickness, the bodhisattva will have sickness no more. “Just as an elder who has an only son: when that son falls ill, the father and mother also fall ill; when the son recovers from the illness, the father and mother also recover. The bodhisattva likewise loves all sentient beings as an only son: when sentient beings are sick, the bodhisattva is sick; when sentient beings recover from sickness, the bodhisattva also recovers.” This adduces the simile and the matching explanation, resolving the previous question regarding the cessation of the illness. Furthermore, it says, “What is the cause from which this illness arises?” This answers the first question. The question was originally first, but here the answer is placed after; hence it says “furthermore.” The reason it was not answered first is simply that, once the duration and the arising and cessation of the illness are made clear, great compassion becomes self-evident; therefore, he first answered concerning arising and ceasing, and later answered concerning great compassion. “A bodhisattva's illness arises from great compassion.” The bodhisattva's earlier compassion is infinite, arising together with [sentient beings'] ignorance and craving; the later compassion is inexhaustible, ceasing together with all sentient beings. While the root of sentient beings' illness arises from ignorance and craving, the bodhisattva's illness fundamentally originates in great compassion. Question: If the bodhisattva's illness arises on account of sentient beings, why is it said to arise on account of great compassion? Answer: Because of sentient beings there is great compassion; because of the bodhisattva's compassionate mind, there is the illness of the bodhisattva's body. “Mañjuśrī said: ‘Householder, why is this room empty, without attendants?’” This secondly discusses the empty room. Jingming previously manifested an empty room and afterward displayed illness; this clarifies that love arises from emptiness, which is to say that real wisdom gives rise to upāya. Mañjuśrī, having previously asked about the illness of great compassion, asks again about the empty room to reveal that great compassion is itself empty, and also that from upāya, real wisdom is thereby illuminated. At first, there are two questions: the first asks about the empty room. What a person dwells in should have provisions for life, but now it is thoroughly open and completely empty—why is this so? Furthermore, anyone who is ill, by principle, definitely requires attendants—why are there none? The reason both matters are asked together is that because both are absent, they are questioned together. Asking about the empty room clarifies the absence of dharmas; asking about the absence of attendants reveals the absence of persons. “Vimalakīrti said: ‘The buddha-lands of all buddhas are likewise all empty.’” Answering the two questions, there are two distinct parts. Answering the first question, there are two turns: The Path of equality is non-dual in principle, and of the lands of the ten directions there are none that are not empty; why ask about the emptiness of a single room? As for citing buddha-lands: the confused think that sentient beings are illusory, so their dependent fruition can be empty, whereas a buddha-land is real and therefore cannot be empty. Moreover, [they think that] because sentient beings lack sustaining power, [their realm] can be empty, whereas a buddha has sustaining power and therefore it should not be empty. Therefore, he now clarifies that even though a buddha has attained sovereign mastery, he still cannot make his own land existent, so how much less the lands of sentient beings! “He further asked: ‘With what is it empty?’” Your room is empty because it is devoid of objects, while the buddha-lands of the ten directions exist because they clearly appear—how can they be empty? “He replied: ‘It is empty with emptiness.’” The former “empty” is the emptiness of empty wisdom; the latter “empty” is the emptiness of the objective realm before it. One must necessarily contemplate it with empty wisdom, and only then is everything empty; it is not that things are empty only after being devoid of objects. “He further asked: ‘Why use emptiness to empty?’” Dharmas are fundamentally empty of themselves; why use empty wisdom to empty dharmas? “He replied: ‘It is empty because one empties dharmas through non-discrimination.’” Although dharmas are of themselves empty, empty wisdom is essential; if there were no empty wisdom, they would exist for me. By using this non-discriminating empty wisdom, one attains its emptiness. Attaining its emptiness, it does not exist for me. Why is it called non-discriminating empty wisdom? The arising of non-wisdom originates in discrimination, whereas all dharmas are markless; hence wisdom is without discrimination. Thus, with non-discriminative wisdom one contemplates all dharmas as empty. The Mahāyānasaṃgraha precisely takes empty wisdom to be non-discriminating wisdom. “He further asked: ‘Can emptiness be discriminated?’” From above, the emptiness of the objective realm has been clarified; from here down, he wishes to examine the emptiness of wisdom. The wisdom that embodies emptiness does not discriminate, and thus it knows that all dharmas are empty. Does this very contemplative wisdom, being existent in its substance, admit of discrimination? “He replied: ‘Discrimination is also empty.’” This clarifies that empty wisdom is also empty. If wisdom were different from emptiness, it would be discrimination; because wisdom is also empty, it is without discrimination; hence he says, “Discrimination is also empty.” “He further asked: ‘Where should emptiness be sought?’” Above, emptiness was clarified based on correct contemplation; the confused think that the meaning of emptiness lies in the correct and not in the perverse, so he asks where the meaning of emptiness resides, to show that the perverse and the correct are non-dual. “He replied: ‘It should be sought within the sixty-two views.’” The sixty-two views are themselves ultimate emptiness; therefore, he clarifies where emptiness resides with reference to these views. “He further asked: ‘Where should the sixty-two views be sought?’” Above, perverse and correct were eliminated; now bondage and liberation are equalized, so he asks where the views should be sought. “He replied: ‘They should be sought within the liberation of all buddhas.’” The liberation of all buddhas is itself ultimate emptiness; therefore, it is non-dual with the views; hence he seeks the views in liberation. “He further asked: ‘Where should the liberation of all buddhas be sought?’” Wishing to clarify that sentient beings and buddhas are non-dual, he raises this question. “He replied: ‘It should be sought within the mental activities of all sentient beings.’” The confused think that the liberation of all buddhas lies in correct contemplation, whereas the mental activities of sentient beings abide in the defilements of craving and views; hence he clarifies that sentient beings and buddhas fundamentally have no dual characteristics, and the defilements of craving and views are themselves Great Nirvāṇa; therefore, he seeks the liberation of buddhas in the mental activities of sentient beings. “He also said: ‘As for your question, Benevolent One, “Why are there no attendants?”—all the māras and all the non-Buddhists are my attendants.’” This answers the second question. Previously he clarified the empty room to reveal emptiness; now he answers regarding the lack of attendants to reveal existence. Why is this so? Because with an empty room, above, he encompasses the buddha-lands as all empty; because of having no attendants, below, he encompasses all sentient beings as attendants. Moreover, above, in clarifying the empty room, he examined the emptiness of dharmas; now, in discussing having no attendants, he clarifies the existence of persons. The emptiness of dharmas refers to real wisdom; the existence of persons is upāya wisdom; therefore, this sūtra has both wisdoms from beginning to end. “‘Why is that? The māras delight in saṃsāra, and the bodhisattva does not abandon saṃsāra; the non-Buddhists delight in views, and the bodhisattva remains unmoved among views.’” Māras delight in and cling to the five desires and do not seek transcendence of the world; hence they are said to delight in saṃsāra. Non-Buddhists, although seeking transcendence of the world, cling to their own dharmas; hence they are said to delight in views. Through great compassion, one contemplates saṃsāra as identical to nirvāṇa, and thus is able not to abandon it;
4.10.3
Regarding all views as identical with right view, one is therefore able to be unmoving. Being unmoving and not abandoning, one is therefore able to have them as attendants. Question: If one is unmoving and does not abandon, how does that constitute being an attendant? Answer: Being unmoving and not abandoning is the attainment of correct contemplation; when one attains correct contemplation, it nourishes the dharmakāya, serving as its attendant. 'Mañjuśrī said: What are the characteristics of the householder’s illness?' This third section discusses the characteristics of the illness. Discussing the characteristics of the illness should properly have preceded inquiring about the empty room, but here the intention is for emptiness and existence to mutually complete and illuminate each other. Previously the existence of the illness was clarified, and next the empty room was examined; now, wishing to use the empty room to show that the illness is likewise empty, the inquiry into the characteristics of the illness is placed after [that of] the empty room. Looking at it according to the circumstances, it seems as if there were no illness, yet it was said that there is illness; since its characteristics have not yet been seen, he therefore inquires about it. Moreover, the four hundred and four illnesses each have their own characteristics; by what characteristic is the illness of great compassion characterized? Therefore he asks. 'Vimalakīrti said: My illness has no form and cannot be seen.' Great compassion has no conditions [as its object], yet there is nothing it does not take as a condition; because there is nothing it does not take as a condition, in response to beings there is illness. In response to beings there are also characteristics; yet because it has no conditions, this clarifies that I have no illness—having no illness, how could it have characteristics? Another explanation: Responding to beings there is illness, hence he feigns illness in his square-furlong chamber. But there is no real entity, so it is said to have no form. 'He asked further: Is this illness associated with the body, or is it associated with the mind?' Confused people, hearing that the illness cannot be seen, might think that a mental illness has no form, and because it is associated with the mind it cannot be seen. Or they might think that a bodily illness is subtle, and because it is still associated with the body it cannot be seen; therefore he asks whether it is associated with the body or the mind. 'He replied: It is not associated with the body, because the body’s characteristics are detached; nor is it associated with the mind, because the mind is like a phantom.' That the body’s characteristics are detached clarifies that the body is empty; 'detached' is an alternative name for emptiness. That the mind is like an illusion clarifies that the mind is empty. The body is an external form, which is why it is called detached. The movements of the mind have no fixed direction, which is why it is called a phantom. When body and mind do not even exist, with what could the illness be associated? Because there is no association, it cannot be seen. 'He asked further: Of the four great elements—earth element, water element, fire element, and wind element—the illness of which great element is this?' The body and mind were originally compounded of the four great elements; while body and mind may be absent, the four great elements might exist. The four hundred and four illnesses arise due to the four great elements; now, which great element's illness is this? Kumārajīva said: 'Non-Buddhists only speak of illnesses from three great elements, not mentioning the earth element. The Buddhadharma fully clarifies that illnesses arise from all four great elements: if one great element is disordered, there are one hundred and one illnesses; taking the four great elements together, there are four hundred and four illnesses.' 'He replied: This illness is neither the earth element nor detached from the earth element; the water element, fire element, and wind element are likewise.' If the illness were identical with the four great elements, then whenever the four great elements exist separately there should be illness. Yet when the four great elements are in their respective places there is no illness, so we know it is not identical. If the illness were detached from the four great elements, then when the four great elements combine there should be no illness. Yet when the four great elements meet, illness consequently occurs, so we know it is not detached. Being neither identical nor detached, but a provisional combination of causes and conditions, one knows that illness is empty. 'Yet the illnesses of sentient beings arise from the four great elements; because they have illness, I therefore have illness.' The illnesses of both the bodhisattva and sentient beings are neither identical nor detached; but the illnesses of sentient beings arise from the four great elements, whereas the bodhisattva's illness arises from sentient beings, not arising from an actual disharmony of the four great elements. 'At that time Mañjuśrī asked Vimalakīrti: How should a bodhisattva console a sick bodhisattva?' This second part clarifies the illness of sentient beings, that is, bodhisattvas of initial practice. Within the text there are two parts: first, clarifying consolation; second, distinguishing subduing. Consolation refers to the un sick person in front soothing and instructing the sick person; subduing is based on the person enduring illness subduing their own mind. Because those of initial practice, having received this body, are furthermore entangled in the suffering of illness, they then cling to life and fear death, thereby increasing saṃsāra and failing to practice correct contemplation; therefore they are instructed and consoled, so that while their bodies abide in illness they personally practice and convert others. Furthermore, subduing clarifies that the person enduring illness has their own mental illness, so they must subdue it themselves. Moreover, consolation causes them to gather goodness, while subduing causes them to depart from evil. Furthermore, consolation causes them to practice phenomenal deeds, while subduing enables them to awaken to the understanding of emptiness. In terms of stages: consolation applies to outer worldlings before the thirty minds, while subduing applies to inner worldlings from the thirty minds onward. The above examination of Jingming’s illness applied to the first bhūmi and above up to the Buddha; hence this chapter fully clarifies all the worthy and noble ones. First the previous question is presented, followed by the reply. Now, consoling the sick should properly have come from Mañjuśrī, but his asking Jingming has three meanings: first, to signal to the assembly where their focus should be directed; second, to seek verification from the sick person, so as to carefully examine the reality of consolation from that perspective; third, only one who was originally without illness can offer consolation. Although Jingming manifested illness, in reality he was himself without illness, and was therefore able to console. 'Vimalakīrti said: One should speak of the body’s impermanence, but not speak of weariness and detachment from the body.' Within the reply there are two parts: first, the direct reply; second, the general conclusion. The direct reply has two parts: first, clarifying consolation in terms of the approach of practice; next, clarifying consolation in terms of the approach of vows. The approach of practice clarifies consoling practices: first, regarding the practices to be abandoned; next, clarifying the practices to be attained. But consolation has many gates: if it is for ordinary worldlings fully bound who cling to life and fear death, one cannot speak to them of impermanence; one can only accommodate their intentions and say that before long their illness will heal. If consoling śrāvakas, one speaks to them of impermanence to cause them to swiftly sever afflictions and enter nirvāṇa early. Here, this text consoles bodhisattvas, causing them to leave far behind both ordinary worldlings and [two-vehicle] sages, personally practicing and converting others. Speaking of the body’s impermanence shatters the delusion of permanence, distinguishing them from ordinary worldlings. Ordinary worldlings cling greedily to this body, yearning for life and fearing death, without contemplating impermanence; hence one does not speak to them of impermanence. Now, persons of initial practice know that the body will surely perish—how could they crave it? Not speaking of weariness and detachment from the body shatters the delusion of impermanence, distinguishing them from persons of the two vehicles. Those of the two vehicles contemplate the body's impermanence and immediately feel weariness and detachment, wishing to enter nirvāṇa; therefore now, abiding peacefully in the body while enduring illness, personally practicing and transforming people, one should not seek to realize [the goal of] the two vehicles. 'One should speak of the body having suffering, but not speak of delighting in nirvāṇa. One should speak of the body having no self, yet speak of teaching and guiding sentient beings. One should speak of the body being empty and quiescent, but not speak of ultimate extinction.' Some, although hearing of impermanence, still deem it not suffering, so suffering is spoken of for them. Some, although hearing of suffering, still deem that suffering and pleasure have a master, so emptiness and non-self are spoken of for them. Just as a great tree is not felled by a single axe, and accumulated roots being deep cannot be eradicated by a single dharma, the four non-permanences are fully spoken of. Although seeing the suffering of the body, one does not delight in the bliss of nirvāṇa.
4.10.4
Although they know selflessness, they do not discard teaching and guiding because sentient beings are empty. Although they understand the body to be empty, they do not seize upon the ultimate emptiness of nirvāṇa. Thus they can abide peacefully in saṃsāra and share the same illness as all living beings. Therefore, consoling them causes them to recognize what should be practiced and what should not be practiced. [The sūtra says:] "Speak of repenting past transgressions, but do not speak of entering the past." Above, bodhisattva practice was explained for those of sharp faculties; now Dharma is expounded further for those of dull faculties who have not yet awakened. Furthermore, above the eight inversions were refuted, explaining consolation with respect to the gate of abandoning afflictions; now consolation is explained with respect to the gate of abandoning karma. Present illness necessarily stems from past transgressions, and thus one causes them to repent; hence it says "speak of repenting past transgressions." Since it says there are past transgressions, it seems as though karma possesses an inherent fault that comes from the future into the present and from the present enters the past; therefore, it is now explained that it does not enter the past. 'Not entering the past' means that transgressions are inherently empty in their fundamental nature, so there is no transgression that can pass away and enter [the past]. [The sūtra says:] "Use one's own illness to empathize with their illness." Above, consolation was explained with respect to the gate of afflictions and karma; now consolation is explained with respect to the gate of suffering retribution, causing them to extend from themselves to feel compassion for other beings: If my present slight illness brings such pain and suffering, how much more so for the living beings in the evil destinies who undergo immeasurable suffering? Furthermore, even though I possess wisdom, I am still beset by the suffering of illness, so how much more so for those who have not attained it? Extending from oneself to empathize with others is the great being's mind of universal rescue; therefore, hearing this teaching, one does not cling to life nor fear death, but should cultivate oneself and transform others. [The sūtra says:] "One should recognize the suffering of countless kalpas in past lives, and should resolve to benefit all sentient beings." For countless kalpas one has undergone immeasurable suffering; now suffering for but a moment, how is it worthy of causing sorrow? One should only strive against illness to save them from their suffering. [The sūtra says:] "Recall the merits cultivated." According to the custom in foreign countries, the meritorious karmas performed from birth to death are recorded one by one, and when one is about to die, another person is made to recount them so that, relying on merit, one's mind feels neither worry nor fear. [The sūtra says:] "Mindful of pure livelihood." One reflects for oneself that from birth to death one has constantly practiced right livelihood and will surely reach a good destiny, so what is there to worry about? Furthermore, one must not engage in various wrongful deeds to preserve life merely to cure the body's illness. [The sūtra says:] "Do not give rise to worry or distress." The ill often worry, and worrying often produces distress; hence it explains that useless sorrow is of no benefit and merely brings about distress unnecessarily. [The sūtra says:] "Constantly arouse vigor." Illness tends toward indolence, so one is encouraged to be vigorous; even if the body perishes and life ends, the intention will not abandon it. [The sūtra says:] "One should act as a physician king to treat all diseases." Above, consolation was explained with respect to the gate of practice; now consolation is explained with respect to the gate of vows, causing them, on account of illness, to make vast vows to act as a physician king to treat all physical and mental diseases. [The sūtra says:] "A bodhisattva should console an ill bodhisattva in this way, causing them to rejoice." This concludes the summary. [The sūtra says:] "Mañjuśrī said: 'Householder, how should an ill bodhisattva subdue their mind?'" This is the second [section], explaining subduing [the mind]. Having skillful consolation on the outside and good subduing on the inside, one can traverse saṃsāra and share the same illness as all living beings, experiencing all bitter hardships without considering them suffering. This is precisely Jingming's intention in manifesting illness. First comes the question, next the reply. Regarding 'subduing': the mind is like a galloping horse that is difficult to restrain, so one uses skillful means to first tame and then subdue it. Now, about to explain the method of subduing, he therefore asks about it first. [The sūtra says:] "Vimalakīrti said: 'An ill bodhisattva should think: Now this illness of mine is entirely produced from the false conceptualizations, inversions, and afflictions of previous lives; there is no real dharma, so who is it that experiences the illness?'" This is the second, the reply. In the text there are three parts: first, explaining subduing through one's own practice and transforming others; second, explaining the gains and losses in subduing through one's own practice and transforming others; third, explaining that neither subduing nor non-subduing is truly called subduing. The first text again has three parts: first, subduing in one's own practice, which is real wisdom; second, subduing in transforming others, which is called skillful wisdom; third, jointly explaining subduing through one's own practice and transforming others, which is jointly explaining the two wisdoms. The first text has three parts: first, emptiness of sentient beings; second, emptiness of all dharmas; third, that the illness of emptiness is also empty. One uses these three gates to tame the mind and subdue it. In the first text there are four phrases: first, using the future to illustrate the origin. Since there is suffering now, one traces the suffering: suffering is due to illness, illness is due to the body, and the body is due to false conceptualization. Since false conceptualization is unreal, the body is also unreal. Since the body is unreal, how could the suffering be real? [The sūtra says:] "Why is this? Because the four great elements combine, it is provisionally called a 'body'; the four great elements have no master, and the body also has no self." This is the second phrase, using the root to illustrate the branch. Previously, selflessness was deduced with respect to separate lifetimes; now, selflessness is deduced with respect to the present lifetime. Furthermore, previously it was with respect to the cause of the body; now the four great elements are the conditions of the body, so both are without self. One only sees the four great elements and does not see a single master; if there were a master, there ought to be a self, but in reality it is not so, and thus we know there is no master. The four great elements are the root of the body; since the root has no master, how could the body, being its branch, have a self? [The sūtra says:] "Furthermore, the arising of this illness is entirely due to grasping at a self; therefore, one should not give rise to grasping at a self." This is the third phrase, revealing its fault. In general terms, the arising of illness has two [causes]: first, due to grasping at a self in past lives, one fully produced fettering karma, and the karmic retribution of that fettering karma is presently experienced as suffering; second, due to grasping at a self in the present, the mind is distressed, and when the mind is distressed, the illness increases. [The sūtra says:] "Having known the root of illness, one immediately removes the notion of a self and the notion of sentient beings." The fourth phrase concludes by eliminating the self. Master Kumārajīva says: "That root of illness is what is called the self." Master Sengzhao says: "The root of the self is the aforementioned false conceptualization. Because of false conceptualization, one sees a self and sentient beings; if one awakens to false conceptualization being an inversion, then there is neither self nor sentient beings." [The sūtra says:] "One should give rise to the notion of dharmas." From above onward, selflessness was deduced repeatedly; from this passage onward, provisional dharmas are used to refute the self. Although it is an illness with respect to emptiness, it is medicine with respect to the self, so dharmas are borrowed to remove the self. [The sūtra says:] "One should think: 'It is merely that various dharmas combine to form this body; when arising, it is only dharmas arising; when perishing, it is only dharmas perishing.'" This explains the notion of dharmas. The various dharmas of the five aggregates provisionally assemble to form the body; when arising, it is only the various dharmas arising together; when perishing, it is only the various dharmas perishing together; there is no separate true ruler that governs their arising and perishing. Having eliminated the notion of a self, one only sees the various dharmas of dependent origination; hence it is called the 'notion of dharmas.' [The sūtra says:] "Furthermore, these dharmas do not know one another; when arising, they do not say 'I arise,' and when perishing, they do not say 'I perish.'" The previous phrase explained that there are only dharmas; this phrase clarifies that they are not produced by a person. Because various dharmas exist when conditions combine and separate when conditions disperse, and their gathering and dispersion have no prior agreement, dharmas do not know one another. [The sūtra says:] "In order to eliminate the notion of dharmas, that ill bodhisattva should think: 'This notion of dharmas is also an inversion. An inversion is a great calamity; I should abandon it.'"
4.10.5
From here below is the second [section], discerning the emptiness of dharmas. Previously, dharmas were borrowed to eliminate the self; these dharmas serve as medicine for the self, but serve as sickness for emptiness, and are therefore eliminated—it is not that there are truly existing dharmas which are eliminated. Dharmas exist because of inversion; therefore they must be abandoned. "'What is abandonment? It is abandoning self and what belongs to self.'" The self constitutes what is internal; all dharmas other than it are what belongs to the self. 'What belongs to self' is dharmas that correspond to the self; since the self already does not exist, how could what belongs to it stand independently? "'What is abandoning self and what belongs to self? It means abandoning the two dharmas—that is, not conceiving internal or external dharmas, and practicing impartiality.'" What is internal is the self; what is external is all dharmas—these correspond to each other as two. Not conceiving them and practicing impartiality is therefore called abandonment. "'What is impartiality? It means the impartiality of self and the impartiality of nirvāṇa.'" The self is the person at the utmost bottom; nirvāṇa is the dharma at the supreme top. Bringing the supreme top and the utmost bottom together into a single contemplation is therefore called impartiality. "'Why is this? Both the self and nirvāṇa are empty. In what way are they empty? They are empty merely by virtue of nominal designation. Such two dharmas have no determinate nature.'" It is because of turning away from nirvāṇa that it is called the self, and because of relinquishing the self that it is called nirvāṇa; when the two dharmas are mutually contingent, names arise, and since they are mutually contingent and merely nominal, they have no determinate [nature], and are therefore empty. "'Having attained this impartiality, one has no remaining sickness except the sickness of emptiness; the sickness of emptiness is also empty.'" This third [point] clarifies that the sickness of emptiness is also empty. From above up to this point, existence has been refuted to clarify emptiness; since existence is not established, emptiness also has no basis—meaning that neither emptiness nor existence only then is called right contemplation. "'This sick bodhisattva, by virtue of having nothing that is experienced, experiences all experiences, yet without having completed the Buddha-dharmas, does not extinguish experience to attain realization.'" From here below is the second [major part], clarifying taming [the mind] to transform others. In the text there are also three parts: first, clarifying taking birth for the sake of beings; second, clarifying enduring suffering for the sake of beings; third, eliminating beings' sicknesses. 'Having nothing that is experienced' means that the sickness of emptiness is also empty, so the mind does not accept or cling to emptiness or existence. 'Experiences all experiences' means that although the mind has nothing that is experienced, for the sake of beings it takes birth and experiences the suffering and pleasure therein. Because it takes birth for the sake of beings, it fully practices all practices, which are called Buddha-dharmas. If it has not yet completed all practices, it also does not extinguish the three kinds of experience to attain the nirvāṇa of the two vehicles. "'If the body experiences suffering, one should be mindful of sentient beings in the evil destinies and give rise to great compassion: "Since I have already tamed [myself], I should also tame all sentient beings."'" This is the second [part], clarifying enduring suffering for the sake of beings. Even for my body of merit and wisdom, suffering and pain are like this; how much more so for sentient beings in the evil destinies who undergo immeasurable suffering? Therefore, compassion arises. Since I have already tamed myself through the three kinds of emptiness, I should also tame everyone. "'One only eliminates their sickness, but does not eliminate dharmas.'" This is because one is about to trace the source of beings' sickness. Earlier, the meaning of eradication was explained: the bodhisattva personally eradicates the three sicknesses of self, emptiness, and so on. Now, as for having to eradicate the three sicknesses of sentient beings, there are truly no three dharmas to be eliminated; one only eliminates the sickness of falsely conceiving emptiness. Just as due to eye disease one sees flowers in the sky, one only cures the eye disease and there is no real dharma of sky-flowers to be eliminated; hence it says 'does not eliminate dharmas.' According to another explanation: not eliminating means only shattering the sickness of sentient beings' clinging to inherent existence and the like, not eliminating the dharmas of conditioned arising and conventional designations. Thus the Nirvāṇa [Sūtra] says: 'One only severs grasping and clinging, but does not sever the view of self. The view of self is the Buddha-nature.' Each of these two has its rationale, and it is not that there cannot be both explanations. "'One instructs them in order to sever the root of sickness.'" This is the third [part], directly clarifying severing sickness for the sake of beings. Above, the two headings of the root of sickness and instruction were set forth, and next the two headings are explained. This is the initial setting forth. "'What is the root of sickness? It is having conceptual grasping. Arising from conceptual grasping, it becomes the root of sickness. What is conceptually grasped? It refers to the three realms.'" This explains the heading of the root of sickness. Above, it spoke of the bodhisattva personally investigating the root of sickness and pacifying the mind through principle, thus being able to abide in sickness without sorrow. Now it clarifies that in order to sever sentient beings' sickness, one investigates the source of their sickness and then responds according to what is appropriate. When the subtle awareness stirs, the mind attaches to something; the mind attaching to something is called conceptual grasping, and conceptual grasping by seizing characteristics is the beginning of deluded thoughts and the root of sickness. Once deluded thoughts conceptually grasp, beauty and ugliness are distinguished; once beauty and ugliness are distinguished, hatred and love both flare up, and consequently the manifold fetters trouble within, and the myriad sicknesses arise without. The grasping mind is deluded thoughts, and the grasped objective realm does not go beyond the three realms. The reason is that outside the three realms is untainted and unconditioned, whereas the mind of deluded thoughts is possessed of attainment, and is therefore conditioned and tainted, and thus belongs to the three realms. "'How does one sever conceptual grasping? By having no attainment. If there is no attainment, then there is no conceptual grasping. What is called having no attainment? It means abandoning the two views. What are the two views? They refer to internal views and external views; this is having no attainment.'" This explains the heading of instructing the severance of the root of sickness. Since the root of sickness is having attainment, severing sickness is having no attainment. 'Having no attainment' means the mind does not grasp any dharmas. If the mind grasps any dharmas, the mind generates attachments; when the mind generates attachments, the mind is bound and cannot be freed from birth, old age, sickness, death, sorrow, lamentation, suffering, and distress. If the mind has no attainment, the mind is not bound, and thus attains freedom from birth, old age, and sickness. What is called 'having no attainment' is precisely not grasping internal or external views, which is called 'having no attainment'; it is not that there is a separate entity called 'no attainment'. Therefore it says, 'internal views and external views; this is having no attainment.' 'Internal and external' means having deluded thoughts internally and having various dharmas externally; this is called internal and external. "'Mañjuśrī! This is the sick bodhisattva taming his mind in order to sever the suffering of old age, sickness, and death. This is the bodhisattva's bodhi. If it is not like this, that which he cultivates and cures is without benefit.'" The third combines and clarifies taming oneself and transforming others, containing the doctrine, the metaphor, and the application. By being able to sever the root of sickness in oneself and others as described above, this is precisely taming the mind of oneself and others. Once the root of sickness is severed, old age, sickness, and death are eliminated. Because it simultaneously severs them for both oneself and others, it is the bodhisattva's bodhi, which differs from that of the two vehicles. The reason it refers generally to bodhi is that bodhi takes real benefit as the Way; if one simultaneously severs them for both oneself and others, one attains quiescent contemplation, and is therefore able to provide real benefit. If it is not so, there is no advantage to oneself and no benefit to beings. "'Just as overcoming an enemy is considered valorous.'" This is the metaphorical explanation. Old age, sickness, death, and the like are the enemies of the bodhisattva and also the enemies of sentient beings. Furthermore, the enemies of sentient beings are the enemies of the bodhisattva, because the bodhisattva views beings like children, and the enemy of a child is the enemy of the father;
4.10.6
If one does not eliminate the son-enemy, the father-enemy is also not eliminated. "Thus, one who simultaneously eliminates old age, sickness, and death is called a bodhisattva." This joins the metaphor to its meaning. The two vehicles only eliminate their own enemy, whereas the bodhisattva possesses the path of universal salvation. "That sick bodhisattva reflects: 'Just as my sickness is neither real nor existent, the sickness of sentient beings is also neither real nor existent.'" This is the second section, which explains the success and failure in the taming [of mind] through one's own practice and transforming others. The text also has three parts: first, it explains the success and failure in one's own taming, completing [the discussion of] one's own practice above; second, it explains the success and failure in taming through transforming others, completing [the discussion of] transforming others above; third, it combines the explanation of success and failure in both one's own practice and transforming others, completing the combined explanation of one's own practice and transforming others above. The reason success and failure must be addressed is that people in the world together wish to be bodhisattvas practicing for themselves and transforming others—disdaining the two vehicles and aspiring to the Great Way—yet in studying the bodhisattva practices there are skillful and unskillful [approaches], which thus result in success and failure; hence, this must be clarified. The initial passage only identifies success and briefly omits failure. "Just as my sickness is neither real nor existent" recounts the bodhisattva's own awakening. "The sickness of sentient beings is also neither real nor existent" explains that sentient beings have not yet comprehended this. As discussed above, birth, old age, and death are physical sicknesses, while conceiving of a self and grasping at conditions are mental sicknesses; these two sicknesses are neither real nor existent. Some say: "neither real" means it is not the ultimate truth, and "neither existent" means it is not the conventional truth, which is the correct contemplation of the Middle Way. Others say: "neither real" means it is not genuine reality, which is to say it has no intrinsic reality; "neither existent" means it is also not a provisional existence through causes and conditions; thus, by doubly negating intrinsic nature and provisionality, one awakens to the emptiness of sickness. The reason one must comprehend the emptiness of sickness is that if sickness were truly existent, then the sicknesses of oneself and others could not be eliminated. Because it is neither real nor existent, it can indeed be eliminated. Because it can be eliminated, compassionate thoughts immediately arise and vast vows are at once engendered; hence, there is the path of universal salvation. "When making this contemplation, if one engenders great compassion with views of attachment toward sentient beings, one should immediately abandon it." This is the second part, which explains the success and failure in transforming others. If one can, as stated above, comprehend that one's own sickness and the sickness of sentient beings are neither real nor existent and thereby engender compassion, then there is only success and no failure. But if this contemplation is not yet mastered, seeing sentient beings, loving them, and thereby engendering compassion is called "great compassion with views of attachment." "Views" refers to the underlying afflictions of views; "attachment" refers to the underlying afflictions of craving. Although this is a compassionate mind, because it is mixed with views and attachment, it should properly be abandoned. "Why is this? A bodhisattva engenders great compassion by completely cutting off adventitious afflictions." This explains the meaning of abandoning views and attachment mentioned above. The mind is fundamentally pure and free of defiling dust; because of the causes and conditions of delusive conceptualization, views and attachment are wrongly generated, and are therefore called adventitious afflictions. It is by eliminating these adventitious afflictions that compassion is engendered. "One who has compassion with views of attachment develops weariness toward saṃsāra; if one can be free of this, there is no weariness, and wherever one is born, one will not be obscured by views of attachment." For whatever is viewed will inevitably involve fixation, and whatever is loved will inevitably involve hatred. How could this finite path bring about infinite functioning? If one can be free of this, the dharmakāya manifests transformations and there is nowhere it is not present; though saṃsāra is endless, one does not perceive it as prolonged, so how could there be the obscuration of views and attachment or the toil of weariness? "Being free of bondage in what is born, one is able to explain the Dharma to sentient beings to untie their bonds." When views and attachment have been eliminated and the dharmakāya has been established, then wherever one is born one is free of bondage, and one is also able to untie their bonds. "As the Buddha stated: 'It is impossible for one who is himself in bondage to be able to untie the bonds of others; it is possible for one who is himself free of bondage to be able to untie the bonds of others. Therefore, a bodhisattva should not engender bondage.'" This cites the Buddha's truthful words to corroborate the meaning of great compassion, admonishing one to abandon bondage. "What is called bondage? What is called liberation?" Having previously cited the Buddha's words, he now explains bondage and liberation; this sets forth the two thematic headings. "Craving and clinging to the taste of dhyāna is the bodhisattva's bondage; taking birth through upāya is the bodhisattva's liberation." This explains the headings of bondage and liberation in terms of the two approaches of samādhi and wisdom. First, regarding the approach of samādhi: craving and clinging to the taste of dhyāna has two faults—first, it impedes one's own practice; second, it impedes transforming others; hence it is bondage. If one takes birth for the sake of beings, both other and self receive benefit, which is called skillful upāya; hence it is called liberation. "Furthermore, wisdom without upāya is bondage, while wisdom with upāya is liberation; upāya without wisdom is bondage, while upāya with wisdom is liberation." This explains the meaning of bondage in terms of the approach of wisdom. It first sets forth two headings: first, clarifying the bondage and liberation of wisdom; second, presenting the bondage and liberation of upāya. As for the bondage and liberation of wisdom: lacking upāya, wisdom is bondage; if upāya is present, in wisdom there is liberation. Upāya is also like this: lacking wisdom, upāya is bondage; with wisdom, upāya is liberation. "What is called wisdom without upāya being bondage? It means that a bodhisattva adorns the buddha-lands and brings sentient beings to maturity with a mind of views of attachment, while taming himself within the dharmas of emptiness, signlessness, and wishlessness—this is called wisdom without upāya being bondage." This explains the thematic heading of wisdom's bondage and liberation; it first explains bondage, and next explains liberation. Regarding what is called wisdom and upāya, their meanings vary. Now, following Kumārajīva's intent: contemplating emptiness without actualizing [cessation], and engaging in existence without clinging—these two skills are called upāya. Those at the sixth stage and below are not yet capable of non-obstruction; when they contemplate emptiness, they have no grasping or clinging, but when they emerge from contemplation to adorn the lands and transform people, views of attachment arise. Thus they are clumsy in engaging in activity, but wondrous in quiet contemplation. Although not grasping signs while contemplating emptiness is indeed upāya, it only receives the name of wisdom. Therefore, this passage solely takes engaging in existence without clinging to be upāya. Question: Examining Master [Kumāra]jīva's intended explanation, he merely explains the difference between the two meanings of wisdom and upāya, but we have not yet seen the reason for wisdom and upāya being bondage or liberation. Please resolve this. Answer: In the first case, engendering defilement in accordance with existence is called lacking upāya; entering emptiness to tame oneself is called wisdom. A practitioner such as this cannot guide engagement in existence with the wisdom of emptiness to make it free of clinging; hence this wisdom of emptiness is called bondage. Furthermore, he cannot, based on the three emptinesses, cultivate the two practices of adorning the lands and transforming people; hence this wisdom of emptiness is called bondage. "What is called wisdom with upāya being liberation? It means not adorning the buddha-lands and bringing sentient beings to maturity with a mind of views of attachment, while taming oneself within the dharmas of emptiness, signlessness, and wishlessness without wearying—this is called wisdom with upāya being liberation." This explains the thematic heading of wisdom with upāya being liberation. Master [Kumāra]jīva says: "From the seventh stage onward, one attains simultaneous contemplation; thus one can make movement and stillness non-dual, which is called wisdom with upāya being liberation." Question: Why is this called the liberation of wisdom? Answer: Adorning the lands and transforming people without clinging in accordance with existence is called upāya; entering emptiness to tame oneself is called wisdom.
First 6 of 9 passages. Read on
Linked texts (1)
- 維摩經義疏 — Classical Chinese