維摩經義疏 4.10.2

4.10.2

“If sentient beings were free from sickness, then the bodhisattva would have sickness no more.” Now, the dharmakāya is unarisen, much less having a physical form. Since it has no physical form, how could sickness arise? Yet, taking birth on their behalf, it cannot be without form. Since it has form, it cannot be without sickness. If they are freed from sickness, the bodhisattva will have sickness no more. “Just as an elder who has an only son: when that son falls ill, the father and mother also fall ill; when the son recovers from the illness, the father and mother also recover. The bodhisattva likewise loves all sentient beings as an only son: when sentient beings are sick, the bodhisattva is sick; when sentient beings recover from sickness, the bodhisattva also recovers.” This adduces the simile and the matching explanation, resolving the previous question regarding the cessation of the illness. Furthermore, it says, “What is the cause from which this illness arises?” This answers the first question. The question was originally first, but here the answer is placed after; hence it says “furthermore.” The reason it was not answered first is simply that, once the duration and the arising and cessation of the illness are made clear, great compassion becomes self-evident; therefore, he first answered concerning arising and ceasing, and later answered concerning great compassion. “A bodhisattva's illness arises from great compassion.” The bodhisattva's earlier compassion is infinite, arising together with [sentient beings'] ignorance and craving; the later compassion is inexhaustible, ceasing together with all sentient beings. While the root of sentient beings' illness arises from ignorance and craving, the bodhisattva's illness fundamentally originates in great compassion. Question: If the bodhisattva's illness arises on account of sentient beings, why is it said to arise on account of great compassion? Answer: Because of sentient beings there is great compassion; because of the bodhisattva's compassionate mind, there is the illness of the bodhisattva's body. “Mañjuśrī said: ‘Householder, why is this room empty, without attendants?’” This secondly discusses the empty room. Jingming previously manifested an empty room and afterward displayed illness; this clarifies that love arises from emptiness, which is to say that real wisdom gives rise to upāya. Mañjuśrī, having previously asked about the illness of great compassion, asks again about the empty room to reveal that great compassion is itself empty, and also that from upāya, real wisdom is thereby illuminated. At first, there are two questions: the first asks about the empty room. What a person dwells in should have provisions for life, but now it is thoroughly open and completely empty—why is this so? Furthermore, anyone who is ill, by principle, definitely requires attendants—why are there none? The reason both matters are asked together is that because both are absent, they are questioned together. Asking about the empty room clarifies the absence of dharmas; asking about the absence of attendants reveals the absence of persons. “Vimalakīrti said: ‘The buddha-lands of all buddhas are likewise all empty.’” Answering the two questions, there are two distinct parts. Answering the first question, there are two turns: The Path of equality is non-dual in principle, and of the lands of the ten directions there are none that are not empty; why ask about the emptiness of a single room? As for citing buddha-lands: the confused think that sentient beings are illusory, so their dependent fruition can be empty, whereas a buddha-land is real and therefore cannot be empty. Moreover, [they think that] because sentient beings lack sustaining power, [their realm] can be empty, whereas a buddha has sustaining power and therefore it should not be empty. Therefore, he now clarifies that even though a buddha has attained sovereign mastery, he still cannot make his own land existent, so how much less the lands of sentient beings! “He further asked: ‘With what is it empty?’” Your room is empty because it is devoid of objects, while the buddha-lands of the ten directions exist because they clearly appear—how can they be empty? “He replied: ‘It is empty with emptiness.’” The former “empty” is the emptiness of empty wisdom; the latter “empty” is the emptiness of the objective realm before it. One must necessarily contemplate it with empty wisdom, and only then is everything empty; it is not that things are empty only after being devoid of objects. “He further asked: ‘Why use emptiness to empty?’” Dharmas are fundamentally empty of themselves; why use empty wisdom to empty dharmas? “He replied: ‘It is empty because one empties dharmas through non-discrimination.’” Although dharmas are of themselves empty, empty wisdom is essential; if there were no empty wisdom, they would exist for me. By using this non-discriminating empty wisdom, one attains its emptiness. Attaining its emptiness, it does not exist for me. Why is it called non-discriminating empty wisdom? The arising of non-wisdom originates in discrimination, whereas all dharmas are markless; hence wisdom is without discrimination. Thus, with non-discriminative wisdom one contemplates all dharmas as empty. The Mahāyānasaṃgraha precisely takes empty wisdom to be non-discriminating wisdom. “He further asked: ‘Can emptiness be discriminated?’” From above, the emptiness of the objective realm has been clarified; from here down, he wishes to examine the emptiness of wisdom. The wisdom that embodies emptiness does not discriminate, and thus it knows that all dharmas are empty. Does this very contemplative wisdom, being existent in its substance, admit of discrimination? “He replied: ‘Discrimination is also empty.’” This clarifies that empty wisdom is also empty. If wisdom were different from emptiness, it would be discrimination; because wisdom is also empty, it is without discrimination; hence he says, “Discrimination is also empty.” “He further asked: ‘Where should emptiness be sought?’” Above, emptiness was clarified based on correct contemplation; the confused think that the meaning of emptiness lies in the correct and not in the perverse, so he asks where the meaning of emptiness resides, to show that the perverse and the correct are non-dual. “He replied: ‘It should be sought within the sixty-two views.’” The sixty-two views are themselves ultimate emptiness; therefore, he clarifies where emptiness resides with reference to these views. “He further asked: ‘Where should the sixty-two views be sought?’” Above, perverse and correct were eliminated; now bondage and liberation are equalized, so he asks where the views should be sought. “He replied: ‘They should be sought within the liberation of all buddhas.’” The liberation of all buddhas is itself ultimate emptiness; therefore, it is non-dual with the views; hence he seeks the views in liberation. “He further asked: ‘Where should the liberation of all buddhas be sought?’” Wishing to clarify that sentient beings and buddhas are non-dual, he raises this question. “He replied: ‘It should be sought within the mental activities of all sentient beings.’” The confused think that the liberation of all buddhas lies in correct contemplation, whereas the mental activities of sentient beings abide in the defilements of craving and views; hence he clarifies that sentient beings and buddhas fundamentally have no dual characteristics, and the defilements of craving and views are themselves Great Nirvāṇa; therefore, he seeks the liberation of buddhas in the mental activities of sentient beings. “He also said: ‘As for your question, Benevolent One, “Why are there no attendants?”—all the māras and all the non-Buddhists are my attendants.’” This answers the second question. Previously he clarified the empty room to reveal emptiness; now he answers regarding the lack of attendants to reveal existence. Why is this so? Because with an empty room, above, he encompasses the buddha-lands as all empty; because of having no attendants, below, he encompasses all sentient beings as attendants. Moreover, above, in clarifying the empty room, he examined the emptiness of dharmas; now, in discussing having no attendants, he clarifies the existence of persons. The emptiness of dharmas refers to real wisdom; the existence of persons is upāya wisdom; therefore, this sūtra has both wisdoms from beginning to end. “‘Why is that? The māras delight in saṃsāra, and the bodhisattva does not abandon saṃsāra; the non-Buddhists delight in views, and the bodhisattva remains unmoved among views.’” Māras delight in and cling to the five desires and do not seek transcendence of the world; hence they are said to delight in saṃsāra. Non-Buddhists, although seeking transcendence of the world, cling to their own dharmas; hence they are said to delight in views. Through great compassion, one contemplates saṃsāra as identical to nirvāṇa, and thus is able not to abandon it;