楞伽阿跋多羅寶經註解 3.153

3.153

上言妄想與聖智皆空，乃真妄俱遣，是不生義。恐菩薩立此為宗，混於外計，故說此以破之。言一切法不生，則言想俱絕，言之已非，況妄立宗乎？如彼外道立不生宗，反生枝葉，故云「不應立是宗」。所以者何下，徵釋其義，謂宗一切性非性者，意謂宗必有主，若宗一切性，性自非性，宗義何在？凡言不生，必因生立，既有待對，則不生成生，自壞不生義，其不應立宗一也。又彼宗不生，必入一切法中，言不生義遍一切世間諸法之中，言不壞相不生故者，《入楞伽》云：「不生相亦不生，故言諸法本皆不生，豈待立耶！」故云彼說則壞，其不應立宗二也。言有無不生者，前以無為不生，此乃轉計有無皆不生。言入一切性者，性即法也，謂有無不生亦遍一切法中，皆離有無之相，縱有轉計有無性相，皆不可得，是亦不生義，其不應立宗三也。五分論多過者，五分論義見前註。多過，指宗、因、喻三過也。初宗有九過，曰現量相違、聖教相違、世間相違、比量相違、自語相違、相符極成、能別不極成、所別不極成、俱別不極成。次因有十四過，謂遍是宗法性，初相中有四不成，曰隨一不成、所依不成、兩俱不成、猶預不成。後二相共十過，有六不定，曰同分異全不定、異分同全不定、俱品一分轉不定、共不定、不共不定、決定相違不定；有四相違，曰法自相相違、法差別相違、有法自相相違、有法差別相違。三同喻有五過，別喻中有五過。同喻中曰所立不成、能立不成、俱不成、無合、倒合。別喻中曰能立不遣、所立不遣、俱不遣、不離、倒離。共三十三過也。展轉因異相者，言彼轉計因相不同，及墮有為有作，其不應立宗四也。又曰謂一切法不生、又曰空、又曰無自性，此三者若各立宗則有多宗，其不應立宗五也。

Above it was said that vikalpa and noble knowledge are both empty, which dismisses both the true and the false, this being the meaning of non-arising. Fearing that bodhisattvas would set this up as a proposition and conflate it with the doctrines of the tīrthikas, he speaks this to refute it. To say that all dharmas do not arise is such that both words and thoughts are extinguished; to speak of it is already erroneous, let alone falsely setting it up as a proposition! Just as those tīrthikas set up a proposition of non-arising and thereby conversely give rise to branches and leaves, it is therefore said, 'one should not set up this proposition.' Below, 'Why is that?' examines and explains the meaning: taking all svabhāvas as non-entities means that a proposition must have a subject; if one takes all svabhāvas as the proposition, svabhāva itself is a non-entity, so where is the meaning of the proposition? Whenever one speaks of non-arising, it must be established dependent on arising; since it is relative, non-arising becomes an arising and destroys the meaning of non-arising by itself—this is the first reason why one should not set up a proposition. Furthermore, that non-arising of the proposition must enter into all dharmas; this means the meaning of non-arising pervades all worldly dharmas. Regarding the phrase 'because the non-destruction of characteristics does not arise', the Ru Lengqie says: 'The characteristic of non-arising also does not arise; hence it is said that all dharmas fundamentally do not arise, so why wait to establish it!' Therefore it says that statement is destroyed—this is the second reason why one should not set up a proposition. Regarding 'the non-arising of existence and nonexistence': earlier, nonexistence was taken as non-arising; here it further presumes that both existence and nonexistence do not arise. 'Enters into all svabhāvas'—svabhāva means dharmas—means that the non-arising of existence and nonexistence also pervades all dharmas and is entirely free from the characteristics of existence and nonexistence; even if one further presumes the characteristics of existent and nonexistent svabhāvas, none can be found, which is also the meaning of non-arising—this is the third reason why one should not set up a proposition. 'Because the five-part treatise has many fallacies': the meaning of the five-part treatise was seen in the earlier commentary. 'Many fallacies' refers to the fallacies of the three [parts]: proposition (pakṣa), reason (hetu), and example (dṛṣṭānta). First, the proposition has nine fallacies: contradiction with perception, contradiction with scripture, contradiction with worldly consensus, contradiction with inference, self-contradiction, proving what is already accepted, unestablished predicate, unestablished subject, and unestablished both predicate and subject. Second, the reason has fourteen fallacies: regarding the condition of being present in the subject (pakṣadharmatā), in the first characteristic there are four kinds of unestablished reasons (asiddha): unestablished for one party, unestablished locus, unestablished for both parties, and doubtful unestablished. The latter two characteristics have ten fallacies in all: there are six indeterminate reasons (anaikāntika): inconclusive because present in part of the homologous and all of the heterologous, inconclusive because present in part of the heterologous and all of the homologous, inconclusive because present in part of both classes, common indeterminate, uncommon indeterminate, and indeterminate due to balancing of opposite arguments; there are four contradictory reasons (viruddha): contradictory to the particular nature of the property, contradictory to the general nature of the property, contradictory to the particular nature of the subject, and contradictory to the general nature of the subject. Third, the similar example has five fallacies, and the dissimilar example has five fallacies. In the similar example: unestablished probandum, unestablished probans, unestablished both, absence of connection, and inverse connection. In the dissimilar example: non-exclusion of probans, non-exclusion of probandum, non-exclusion of both, absence of separation, and inverse separation. In total there are thirty-three fallacies. 'Because the conditions in succession have different characteristics' means that the characteristics of their further-presumed reasons are not identical, and fall into being conditioned and created—this is the fourth reason why one should not set up a proposition. Furthermore, it says that stating that all dharmas do not arise, or stating that they are empty, or stating that they are devoid of svabhāva—if one sets up a proposition for each of these three, then there would be multiple propositions—this is the fifth reason why one should not set up a proposition.