楞伽阿跋多羅寶經註解 2.79

2.79

The three kinds of pramāṇa are direct perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), and authoritative testimony (śabdapramāṇa / āptāgama). 'Pramāṇa' means standard and definitive determination, just as pecks and bushels measure things. Direct perception: 'direct' means manifest; it directly obtains the substance of dharmas, free from false conceptualization, and is not erroneous. Inference: 'infer' means comparison and categorization; by comparing and measuring categories one knows how things are, just as seeing smoke across a mountain one definitely knows there is fire, or seeing horns across a wall one definitely knows there is an ox; although not directly seen, it is also not false. Authoritative testimony means taking the Tathāgata's correct teaching as the measuring line. The five-part syllogism comprises: first, proposition (pratijñā); second, reason (hetu); third, example (dṛṣṭānta); fourth, application (upanaya); fifth, conclusion (nigamana). The three of proposition, reason, and example are also called the three-membered inference. Application and conclusion merely complete these three meanings. For example, when tīrthikas falsely calculate and cling to sound as permanent, establishing a syllogism in the science of sound (śabdavidyā), they say: 'Sound is the subject (dharmin); it is definitely permanent as the proposition (pratijñā).' The reason states: 'Because it is produced.' The similar example is: 'Like space.' However, space is not something produced, so the reason does not apply, and the cited example does not match; establishing sound as permanent is not accomplished. If in the Buddhadharma sound is impermanent, one thus establishes the syllogism, saying: 'Sound is the subject; it is definitely impermanent as the proposition.' The reason states: 'Because it is produced.' The similar example is: 'Like a jar or basin.' As the Śūraṅgama says: 'Voice is mingled with spoken words, merely relying on names, phrases, and syllables.' How could it be permanent? The tīrthikas have various clingings and consider themselves superior to others; if one does not follow their method of establishing syllogisms to refute them, by what means could their attachments be refuted? Therefore the Tathāgata explains that although the three kinds of pramāṇa and five-part syllogisms are each established, if one cultivates them one attains pratyātmāryajñāna and can transcend the two kinds of svabhāva: paratantra and vikalpa. Yet foolish people are confused about the teaching, still calculating intrinsic entities and engaging in discrimination through vikalpa.